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This study addresses Government media policy throughout the Falklands War of 1982. It 
considers the effectiveness, and charts the development of, Falklands-related public 
UHODWLRQV¶SROLF\E\GHSDUWPHQWVLQFOXGLQJEXWQRWOLPLWHGWRWKH0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFH
(MoD). The literature of the 1980s concerning the media during the conflict still dominates 
the historiography of the subject. This thesis is the first significant reappraisal of the work 
offered during the decade in which the war occurred. It is informed by recently released 
archive material and newly conducted interviews, and boasts an extensive analysis of the 
content of the printed press during the conflict.  
 
There are a number of central hypotheses contained in this research (as well as many lesser 
theories). This thesis argues that media policy observed by the MoD in relation to the Task 
Force journalists was ill-prepared, reactionary, driven by internal MoD motivation and that 
ultimately, control of policy was devolved to the men on the ground. This thesis advances 
that MoD media policy in Britain, while as reactive as that rolled out to the Task Force, 
became more effective as the war progressed. The MoD failed to adequately cater for the 
British media until the middle of May 1982, at which time a number of sensible and 
potentially successful initiatives were introduced ± specifically the News Release Group 
and the Military Briefing Group. It is also the contention of this work that the machinery 
developed centrally, by the Cabinet Office and No.10 Press Office in the form of the South 
Atlantic Presentation Unit and Information Group, had the potential to be successful 
additions to the regular organisation of Government. However, neither had enough 
authority and were plagued by departmental rivalries. While the media-related initiatives of 
the MoD ultimately became more successful, those of wider Government became less 
effective. Finally, this thesis provides a serious analysis of the printed press in order to 
substantiate the hypothesis that much of what had been argued about the printed press was 
generalised and oversimplified ± its reliance on Argentine source material, its jingoistic 
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During the Falklands conflict (2 April ± 14 June 1982), the British Government was 
fighting a war on two fronts: a very real war in the South Atlantic and an information war 
at home. For Britain, in military terms, the Falklands War was an anomaly: a unique, 
limited campaign, fought 8,000 miles from its shores which posed distinct challenges to 
the armed forces. In terms of the media, the war was equally irregular: the first instance in 
which the British media was embedded with the Services for the entirety of a campaign, 
the first war fought in the era of modern, mass communications and the first conflict in 
which the British Government and media appearHGVRRSSRVHGWRWKHRWKHU¶VKDQGOLQJRI
the conflict.  
 
This thesis seeks to clarify the Government position on the media during the Falklands by 
exploring the way in which policy towards the media was constructed, and developed, 
throughout the crisis. It constitutes an assessment of the most significant ways in which the 
Government attempted to improve and sustain media relations ± both in the South Atlantic 
and in Britain. Its original contribution to knowledge on the subject of the media during the 
Falklands War is substantial: it is the first work to fully address Government bodies 
FRQVWUXFWHGIRUWKHVROHSXUSRVHRIPDQDJLQJWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSUHVHQWDWLRQHIIRUWLWLVWKH
most comprehensive analysis of Government policy catering to the Task Force journalists 
and the British domestic media and it offers the only quantitative assessment of the content 
of the printed press during the war.1 
 
The media has µ$'87<72,1)250¶ was the message behind a Times editorial in May 
1982. It said that the developing diVSXWHRYHUWKHUHSRUWLQJRIWKH)DONODQGV:DUQHHGHGµWR
EHWUHDWHGDVPRUHWKDQDSHWW\VLGHVKRZ¶2 The Daily Telegraph, almost three weeks later, 
TXHVWLRQHGZK\µWRIIHH-QRVHG¶JUDQGHHVRIWKHMinistry of Defence (MoD) WKRXJKWµ0U
DQG0UV$YHUDJH%ULWRQ¶ZHUHµQRWHQWLWOHGWRNQRZSUHFLVHO\ZKDWLVKDSSHQLQJLQWKH
)DONODQG,VODQGV"¶3 The Daily Mirror FODLPHGWKDWµ«\RXPD\EHW\RXUVHFRQG-best boots 
that months or even years from now it will be revealed that while all this to-ing and fro-ing 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter Six for content analysis. 
2
 The Times, 13 May 1982, p.13. 
3
 µ&RPH&OHDQ¶The Daily Telegraph, 2 Jun., p.14. 
2 
 
was going on, WKHUHZDVDSLHFHRIWKHMLJVDZZHZHUHQ¶WWROGDERXW¶4 Already, during the 
war, there was a sense of the importance of the mounting quarrel between the Government 
and the media. As the regulations given to journalists with the Task Force noted, and as 
sXEVHTXHQWFRPPHQWDULHVRQWKHUROHRIWKHPHGLDLQWKH)DONODQGVKDYHKLJKOLJKWHGµ7KH
essence of successful warfare is secrecy. The essence of successful journalism is 
SXEOLFLW\¶5 The divergent aims of each side - in the Falklands, the military and the media; 
in Britain, the Government and the media ± dictated that any situation in which they would 
have to co-operate would be fraught with difficulties. 
 
1. Literature Review  
The Falklands War has been the theme of a plethora of books, articles and papers. The 
crisis presented a peculiar conflict, which many have argued was avoidable.6 Published 
work on the Falklands range from military histories to political histories, cultural works to 
social studies. The war also supplied one of the most varied selections of first-hand 
accounts any British conflict ever afforded. /XGPLOOD-RUGDQRYDZURWHWKDWDQ\µQHZ¶
LQIRUPDWLRQE\LWVHOILVµQRWQHFHVVDULO\SDUWLFXODUO\VLJQLILFDQWUDWKHULWLVWKHZD\VLQ
which they are used and connected up with previous accounts tKDWUHDOO\PDWWHU¶7 
Throughout this thesis the importance of the historiography concerning the media and the 
Falklands is emphasised. The existing literature surrounding the subject is so dense that in 
order to rationalise this study, a constant valuation of what has already been discovered is 
essential to the reading of any new research.  
  
                                                 
4
 .:DWHUKRXVHµ2XUVHFUHWVRFLHW\¶Daily Mirror, 22 Apr., p.10. 
5
 Ministry of Defence, Regulations for Correspondents Accompanying an Operational Force (MoD, 1958) 
7KHPRWLYDWLRQVRIWKHWZRDUHQRWHGLQ5+DUULVµ*RWFKD¶7KH0HGLDWKH*RYHUQPHQWDQGWKH)DONODQGV
Crisis (Faber, 1983) p.16.; 6%DGVH\µ7KH )DONODQGV&RQIOLFWDVD0HGLD:DU¶LQ(GV5+DYHUVDQG0
Grove, The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years on: Lessons for the Future (Frank Cass, 2005) p.46.; Eds. P. 
Eddy, M. Linklater and P. Gillman, 7KH)DONODQGV:DU7KH)XOO6WRU\E\µ7KH6XQGD\7LPHV¶ Insight Team 
(Andre Deutsch, 1982) p.210.; L. Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: War and 
Diplomacy, v.ii. (Taylor & Francis, 2005) p.34. 
6
 Works which speculate on whether the war was avoidable: J. $UTXLOODDQG00R\DQR5DVPXVVHQµ7KH
2ULJLQVRIWKH6RXWK$WODQWLF:DU¶Journal of Latin American Studies, 33, 4 (Nov. 2001) pp.739-775.; C. 
%OXWKµ7KH%ULWLVK5HVRUWWR)RUFHLQWKH)DONODQGV0DOYLQDV&RQIOLFW,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQG-XVW:DU
TheoU\¶, Journal of Peace Research, 24, 1 (Mar. 1987) pp.5-20.; *+RSSOHµ,QWHOOLJHQFHDQG:DUQLQJ
,PSOLFDWLRQVDQG/HVVRQVRIWKH)DONODQGV:DU¶World Politics, 36, 3 (Apr. 1984) pp.339-361.; L. Freedman, 
The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: The Origins of the Falklands War, v.i. (Taylor & Francis, 
2005). 
7
 L. Jordanova, History in Practice (Hodder Education, 2006) p.31. 
3 
 
1a. General Texts 
7KHUHDUHDQXPEHURIµJHQHUDO¶WH[WVRQWKH)DONODQGV:DUZKLFKFRYHUERWKPLOLWDU\DQG
political aspects of the campaign.8 Whilst nearly all have advantages or benefits, for the 
purpose of simplicity this thesis outlines two texts which have, arguably, had the greatest 
impact on the VWXG\RIWKHFRQIOLFW0D[+DVWLQJVDQG6LPRQ-HQNLQV¶DFFRXQWThe 
Battle for the FalklandsDQG3URIHVVRU6LU/DZUHQFH)UHHGPDQ¶VThe Official History of 
the Falklands Campaign.9 The journalists, Hastings and Jenkins ± one having accompanied 
troops to the South Atlantic, the other having witnessed the effects of the war in Britain ± 
created a wide-ranging and instant history of the campaign which benefited from 
privileged source material and an abundance of interview matter. In 1997, ahead of 
)UHHGPDQ¶VRIILFLDOSXEOLFDWLRQWKHDXWKRUVDGGHGDQHZLQWURGXFWLRQWRWKHLUERRNLQ
which they claLPHGµWKHDFFRXQWRIWKHZDUZHZURWHLPPHGLDWHO\LWZDVRYHUKDVQRWEHHQ
VXSHUVHGHGLQDQ\LPSRUWDQWUHVSHFWVLQFHLWVSXEOLFDWLRQ¶10 Indeed, the pair were correct. 
Despite efforts to supply more all-purpose interpretations of the Falklands, the unique 
positions from which the journalists approached the subject dictated that theirs was the 
most thorough account of both the military and political histories of the war.11 
 
6LQFH+DVWLQJVDQG-HQNLQV¶YROXPH 3URIHVVRU6LU/DZUHQFH)UHHGPDQ¶VRIILFLDOKLVWRU\ 
published in 2005, has been regarded as the most in-depth and well-supported work on the 
Falklands. Commissioned by New Labour in 1997, Freedman was granted unfettered 
access to a vast range of previously classified Government archive material in order to 
VFULSW%ULWDLQ¶VGHILQLWLYHDFFRXQWRIWKHZDU7KHILUVWYROXPHRI)UHHGPDQ¶VKLVWRU\ZDV
based on the origins of the war ± the dispute over the ownership of the islands and the 
diplomatic events leading up to the Argentinian invasion. In some circles, particularly 
among Falkland islanders, this volume has been criticised as being too sympathetic to 
                                                 
8
 Examples: H. Bicheno, Razor's Edge: The Unofficial History of the Falklands War (Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 2006); D. Blakeway, The Falklands War (Sidgwick & Jackson, 1992), D. G. Boyce, The Falklands 
War (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); L. Freedman and V. Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War: The Falklands 
Conflict of 1982 (Faber, 1990); M. Middlebrook, Operation Corporate: The Story of the Falklands War, 
1982 (Viking, 1985). 
9
 M. Hastings and S. Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (Joseph, 1983) and Freedman, v.i. and v.ii. 
10
 Hastings and Jenkins, p.xii. 
11
 A separate historiographical debate exists about the ethics of 'justifying war'. This thesis is not specifically 
concerned with such issues. For perspectives on 'just war' theory see: M. Walzer, Arguing about War (Yale 
University Press, 2004); O. O'Donovan, The Just War Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 2003). For a 
concise synthesis of the complex historiography see: J. Fox and D. Welch., 'Justifying War: Propaganda, 
Politics and the Modern Age', in Eds. D. Welch and J. Fox, Justifying War: Propaganda, Politics and the 
Modern Age (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) pp.1-20. 
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Argentinian claims.12 2QHRI)UHHGPDQ¶VHDUOLHUZRUNVtook account of both sides. In 1990 
Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse produced an integrated account of the war 
which included the perspectives of both Britain and Argentina.13 The text drew on material 
including Argentine documentation which had not been made public and interviews with 
key political and military figures in both countries. 
 
The second volume dealt with the conduct of the war itself, picking up with the Argentine 
invasion. In addition to the sources mentioned above, in the later volume Freedman made 
extensive use of the findings of post-war Government inquiries like the HCDC inquiry and 
the Falkland Islands Review (µ)UDQNV5HSRUW¶. The volume endeavoured to cover several 
aspects of the campaign ± diplomatic and political, as well as military. An attempt was 
made to address some elements of the campaign which concerned the media. However this 
effort was limited in length and scope.  
 
1b. The Literature of the Media and the Falklands War 
The controversy surrounding the media during the war dictated that interest in the post-
mortem of the issues would evoke interest. This was compounded by the commission of a 
House of Commons Defence Committee (HCDC) inquiry LQWRWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VKDQGOLQJ
of the press and public information during the conflict.14 The importance attached to the 
media was denoted by the fact that WKH+&'&¶VZDVWKHILUVWRIWKHSRVW-war inquiries to be 
announced ± in June, before troops had even secured victory. The inquiry, printed in 
December 1982, paved the way for a multitude of works, speculating on the importance of 
the media in times of war, and specifically throughout the Falklands.  
 
1b (i). Media-Focused Texts of the 1980s 
As a direct consequence of the prominence of the topic, promoted by the HCDC, a spate of 
media-oriented texts was produced throughout the 1980s which addressed various issues 
regarding the dissemination of news during the war. Since the 1980s, however, attempts to 
consider exclusively the media and the Falklands have decreased significantly. Save a few 
valiant efforts to readdress aspects of the subject in book chapters, there has been no work 
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 Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse. 
14
 HCDC, The Handling of Press and Public Information During the Falklands Conflict, v.i: Report and 
Minutes of Proceedings (HMSO, 1982); HCDC, The Handling of Press and Public Information During the 
Falklands Conflict, v.ii: Minutes of Evidence (HMSO, 1982). 
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ZKLFKµUHYLVHG¶WRDQ\JUHDWH[WHQWWKHZRUNRIWKHV15 For the purpose of simplicity, 
WKLVWKHVLVRXWOLQHVDQXPEHURIµNH\¶WH[WVIURPWKHVZKLFKSURYLGHWKHIRXQGDWLRQ
for current research. 
 
Following the end of the war, the MoD commissioned two academic studies relating to 
media aspects of the conflict. Eleven universities were approached with a potential subject 
DUHDµ7KHUHODWLRQVKLSLQWLPHRIDUPHGFRQIOLFWEHWZHHQQHZVSDSHUVDQGRWKHUPHGLDDQG
the Ministry of DeIHQFHLQFOXGLQJWKHDUPHGIRUFHV¶16 The first study commissioned was 
that of Valerie Adams from Kings¶ College, London$GDPV¶ZRUNGHDOWZLWKPHGLD
speculation during the conflict and aimed to address two central questions:  without 
UHOLDQFHRQµOHDNV¶from official sources, how well informed was it possible to be about 
PLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVDQGKRZDFFXUDWHZDVWKHPHGLD¶VFRPPHQWDU\"17 The overriding 
premise of the work concerned the criticism focused on the media for resorting to the use 
RIµDUPFKDLUDGPLUDOV¶WRK\SRWKHVLVHRYHURSWLRQVRSHQWRWKH%ULWLVKDUPHGIRUFHV
Adams used countless broadcasts and some newspaper material, as well as documentary 
evidence provided by the MoD, to contextualise this debate. Adams judged that the 
PHGLD¶VUHVRUWWRVSeculation was as a result of the lack of information provided by the 
MoD. But she also criticised the media for lending itself to the deception of the MoD. Her 
work offered new vivacity concerning old arguments, namely that of the importance of the 
speculation of the media. Adams, who was uniquely qualified for her new project, having 
worked at the MoD, produced the book, The Media and the Falklands Campaign, in 1986 
as a result of her research.  
 
The second MoD-commissioned work belonged to a research team from University 
College, Cardiff, led by Derrik Mercer. Mercer, Kevin Williams and Geoff Mungham 
carried out a study of the policy adopted by the MoD during the Falklands and then 
SUHVHQWHGFRPSUHKHQVLYHILQGLQJVRQKRZWKH0R'¶VH[SHULHQFHLQWKH)DONODQds affected 
policy towards the media in subsequent areas of conflict including the 1983 invasion of 
Grenada and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The research was presented to the MoD 
in July 1985, presented to Parliament in July 1986 and published as the book, The Fog of 
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 6HH.)RVWHUµ7KH)DONODQGV:DU$&ULWLFDO9LHZRI,QIRUPDWLRQ3ROLF\¶LQ(G3<RXQJDefence and 
the Media in Time of Limited War (Routledge, 1992); %DGVH\µ7KH)DONODQGV&RQIOLFWDVD0HGLD:DU¶K. 
'RGGVµ&RQWHVWLQJ:DU%ULWLVK0HGLD5HSRUWLQJDQGWKH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War, in 1987.18 The Fog of War is perhaps the most relevant of all existing literature to this 
PhD. The dominant line of study contemplates specifically MoD policy. The study is 
divided between assessmeQWRIWKH0R'¶VFHQWUDOSROLF\- that relating to the experiences 
of the Task Force journalists (the 29 journalists who were to accompany the British Forces 
to the Falklands) - the accusations that the MoD willingly deceived the British media and 
manipulated coverage and the way in which the military with the Task Force viewed the 
media. Mercer et al. judged that there was no coherent policy adopted by the Government 
during the Falklands War ± that policy was developed on an ad hoc basis ± but that this 
approach had been successful in the case of the Falklands.19 In many ways this thesis 
supplements the work of Mercer et al., which focused chiefly on the policies developed by 
the MoD, not on those developed by the wider Government. In other ways, this thesis 
contributes entirely original research based on issues which attract little more than brief 
reference in the MoD-commissioned study on policy. 
 
There were two other significant and detailed works produced in the 1980s.20 Pursuant to 
the war, journalist 5REHUW+DUULVSURGXFHGWKHILUVWQDUUDWLYHDFFRXQWRIWKHPHGLD¶V
involvement in the Falklands crisis, and the first based on the newly published HCDC 
report.21 Inspired by the infamous Sun KHDGOLQHµ*27&+$¶LQUHIHUHQFHWRWKHVLQNing of 
the Argentine ARA General Belgrano+DUULV¶ZRUNFRQWULEXWHGDQHQWHUWDLQLQJDQG
UHPDUNDEO\WKRURXJKFULWLTXHRIWKHPHGLD¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLQWKHFULVLV± specifically that of 
WKHSULQWHGSUHVV7KHUHZHUHWZRPDLQWKHPHVWR+DUULV¶VZRUN+HJDYHDQoverall 
DSSUDLVDORI)OHHW6WUHHW¶VWUHDWPHQWRIWKH)DONODQGVIRFXVLQJPDLQO\RQWKHWDEORLGV+H
delved into such issues as circulation and competition, concentrating on the battle between 
The Sun and the Daily Mirror. The second theme Harris picked up on was that of the 
political controversies surrounding the media and the rows which ensued between the 
*RYHUQPHQWDQGWKHPHGLD7KHILUVWSXEOLFDWLRQWRPDNHXVHRIWKH+&'&¶VLQTXLU\LQWR
the media, and the first exclusively media-oriented study, Gotcha constituted an initial, and 
sound, preliminary overview of the role of the media in the Falklands. 
 
                                                 
18
 D. Mercer, G. Mungham and K. Williams, The Fog of War: The Media on the Battlefield (Heinmann, 
1987) p.viii. 
19
 Mercer et al., p.19. and p.61. 
20
 Other media-FHQWUHGZRUNVRIWKHV6*UHHQEHUJDQG*6PLWKµ5HMRLFH¶0HGLD)UHHGRPDQGthe 
Falklands (Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, 1983); Glasgow University Media Group 
(GUMG): L. Broadbent, J. Eldridge, G. Kimmett, G. Philo, M. Spaven and K. Williams, War and Peace 
News (Open University Press, 1985); Eds. Eddy et al. 
21
 Harris, Gotcha. 
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Whilst the works of Harris, Mercer et al. and Adams were valuable in generating a better 
understanding of the debates surrounding the subject, what was lacking was a more 
detailed look at the individuals involved in the media controversy. This gap was filled 
before the end of the decade by sociologists, David Morrison and Howard Tumber by their 
1988 publication, Journalists at War: The Dynamics of News Reporting during the 
Falklands Conflict.22 0RUULVRQDQG7XPEHU¶VZRUNDLPHGWREHDJHQHUDOµWUHDWLVH¶RQ
journalism, with the Falklands War serving as an exceptional case study. There were three 
distinct and separate parts to the work. These three sections allow the authors to cover 
extensive ground within the book ± each chapter drew on the previous and added another 
layer to the complexity of the study. As the authors put it themselves, the book dealt with 
µWKHMRXUQDOLVWVWKHQWKHSROLWLFVWKHQWKHSXEOLF¶23 What was unique to the book, and 
amongst other media-centred texts, was its ethnographic approach to the study of 
journalism. The first section of the book (eight chapters) was devoted to telling the story of 
the Task Force journalists through direct quotes from extensive interviews. Morrison and 
Tumber interviewed every member of the media who accompanied the Task Force in April 
DVZHOODVWKHµPLQGHUV¶± their study is still the only of its kind. 
 
The second section of the book examined the handling of news in London. There, it 
focused on the political controversy surrounding the media in the war, the way news was 
reported and the manner in which the MoD treated and released information. The issues 
touched upon are really an extension of the work produced the previous year by Mercer et 
DO7KHVXEMHFWILHOGRYHUODSSHGFRQVLGHUDEO\0RUULVRQDQG7XPEHU¶VVWXG\KRZHYHUZDV
poorer for the fact that, unlike Mercer et al., it was not given privileged access to the MoD 
or its files. 
 
The final segment of analysis contributed a completely original aspect to the existing 
research on the subject ± a quantitative approach to the media.24 One chapter offered a far-
reaching content analysis of television (TV) news bulletins during the war. Another 
chapter dealt with the results of a national survey of public opinion. The poll questioned 
the public about the news it witnessed and attitudes towards the media itself. Because 
Journalists at War was a sociological study, conclusions offered tended to focus on 
differenWµVRFLDOJURXSV¶LQYROYHGLQWKHFRQIOLFW7KHVWXG\ZDVPRUHFULWLFDORIWKH
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 D. Morrison and H. Tumber, Journalists at War: The Dynamics of News Reporting during the Falklands 
Conflict (Sage, 1988). 
23
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Government and the MoD than previous works had been (particularly when contrasted 
ZLWK$GDPV¶ZRUN:KDW0RUULVRQDQG7XPEHUFRQWULEXWHGWRWKHKLVWRULRJUDSK\ZDVD
series of arguments surrounding the ethics and integrities of journalism, and an overall 
judgement on the priorities and motives of the MoD and Government.25 
 
1b (ii). Media-Focused Texts since the 1980s 
3URIHVVRU6LU/DZUHQFH)UHHGPDQZURWHWKDWµVFKRODUO\ZRUNRQthe Falklands has hardly 
been a prominent feature of British university life¶26 <HWDVLGHIURPWKHµPDLQWH[WV¶WKHUH
have been some modest studies since the 1980s which have made efforts to address the 
role of the media in the war. They can be distinguished from those analytical texts of the 
µVFUXGHO\WKH\HLWKHUnarrate the experience of the media and do not draw significant, 
new conclusions, or they are short in length and have not been fully able to tackle all the 
issues necessary. All important contributions to the literature came about as the product of 
conferences. 
 
A conference was held in Brisbane to mark the 10th anniversary of the Falklands War, the 
VXEMHFWRIZKLFKZDVµ'HIHQFHDQG0HGLDLQ7LPHRI/LPLWHG&RQIOLFW¶7KHRXWFRPHRI
the assembly was a book of relevant lecture material. Kevin Foster, a lecturer in 
Communication Studies, spoke on information policy during the war.27 )RVWHU¶VZRUN
FRQYHUJHGRQWKHZRUNRI0HUFHUHWDO)RVWHUMXGJHGWKDWWKH0R'¶VLQIRUPDWLRQSROLF\
during the war, which was sanctioned by the Government, was a policy of propaganda.28 
/LNHWKHRWKHUEULHIVXPPDULHVZKLFKIROORZHGLW)RVWHU¶VZRUNSHUKDSVDWWHPSWHGWRGR
too much ± it considered the conduct of the MoD in Britain, but also covered the same 
ground as a variety of previous studies: the experiences of the Task Force journalists, for 
example, attracted substantial focus. 
 
As a result of a 2001 conference at the University of Kent, Mark Connelly and David 
Welch edited a collection of essays on war and the media in the 20th Century. This 
collection included a submission from Klaus Dodds, an expert in Geopolitics, who has 
worked extensively on issues relating to the Falkland Islands.29 'RGGV¶ZRUNFRQWHPSODWHG
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 )UHHGPDQµ%ULGJHKHDG5HYLVLWHG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 Foster, µ7KH)DONODQGV:DU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the major issues concerning the media during the war - in as much depth as the length of a 
chapter allowed. Dodds explained the background to the war, agreeing with the accepted 
argument that the trigger for the invasion of the Falklands was the political activity of 
summer 1981. He described the scramble for journalist places with the Task Force and the 
difficulties of communication. He claimed misinformation and MoD news management 
was evident throughout the war. Dodds also included a valuable reflection on how the lack 
RIHIIHFWLYHRSSRVLWLRQWRWKHZDUDQGWKHFHQVRUVKLSRIFULWLFVµKHOSHGWRPDLQWDLQWKH
claims of the British government that the Falklands was worth dyinJIRU¶30 However, what 
this chapter constituted, essentially, was a concise digest of those works which had 
previously appeared. 
 
Stephen Badsey, Professor of Conflict Studies, spoke at a conference held at Sandhurst to 
mark the 20th anniversary of the Falklands conflict. The book which was produced as a 
result was the fifth in a series originating from the Sandhurst Conference Series and was 
comprised of various lecture papers. :KDW%DGVH\¶VSDSHURIIHUHGZDVDIDU-reaching 
summary of the most important media-related issues which arose from the conflict. 
Perhaps the most interesting part of his work was a review of the literature on the subject 
of the media in the Falklands.31 The only other detailed summary of the literature was 
contributed in a 1983 journal article by Freedman.32 Badsey assessed the available works 
on the topic, as well as the Government committees which were established as a direct 
result of the furore surrounding the media in the crisis: the HCDC as well as the committee 
formed to deal with issues of censorship in 1983.33 What the key studies which followed 
the literature of the 1980s had in common was that they were, firstly, all the result of 
academic conferences. And secondly, although thorough in their appraisals and overviews 
of the subject, none significantly revised the arguments or detail that had been entrenched 
E\WKHZRUNRIWKHµV 
 
                                                 
([DPSOHVRI'RGGV¶ZRUNµ&RQVROLGDWH%ULWDLQWKH)DONODQG,VODQGVDQG:LGHUWKH6RXWK
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Aside from the chapters in books which emerged as the product of conferences, there were 
two more specific studies which concerned the media and the Falklands. Each was a 
VSHFLDOLVWFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIDQDVSHFWRIWKHµPHGLDZDU¶=RH$QGHUVRQ¶Vµ(PSLUH¶V)HWLVK¶
- ZRUNZKLFKFRQWHPSODWHGWKHUROHRIWDEORLGQHZVSDSHUVLQµVH[XDOLVHGQDWLRQDOLVP¶
during the conflict - and AlaVGDLU3LQNHUWRQ¶Vaward-winning µ6WUDQJHUVLQWKH1LJKW¶± an 
analysis of the role of the radio in the Falklands War.34 Both works provided interesting 
and original assessments of their chosen field. Neither, however, significantly altered 
previous assumptions about the media and the war. 
 
1b (iii). First-Hand Accounts  
A useful adjunct to the general literature on the Falklands is another body of text 
invaluable to the study of the Government and the media in the Falklands: first-hand 
accounts. Published first-hand accounts of the conflict provide historians with the personal 
perceptions of many prominent figures who have submitted to the public their take on 
events. Approached sensibly and with caution, memoirs can be invaluable.35 The most 
relevant accounts to the subject matter of this thesis are those which have emerged from 
two types of author: politicians and Task Force journalists. In addition to these 
perspectives, the wealth of material which has emerged from those members of the Armed 
Forces in the South Atlantic is valuable.36 
 
Wars generate assessment and provoke reflection. The end of the Falklands War triggered 
DUXVKWRSXEOLVKZRUN7KH0R'¶VLQIRUPDWLRQSROLF\DQGWKHYDVWDPRXQWRIVSHFXODWLRQ
RYHUWKHFRQGXFWRIWKHZDUFUHDWHGDQLQFHQWLYHWRWHOOWKHµUHDO¶Vtory as soon as 
possible.37 The drive of Task Force journalists to fill in the gaps, publish censored material 
and correct conjecture, therefore, came in the form of their personal accounts. It is clear, 
however, that from the outset of the journey south, the journalists had future publications 
on their mind: John Shirley of The Sunday Times had been told before he left that he would 
                                                 
34
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John Witherow and Patrick Bishop (of The Times and The Observer respectively) had also 
agreed to collaborate on a book - the deal was done before they had even left British 
territorial waters.39 Without exception, all the journalists who published works on the war 
went on to do so within a year of the conflict ending. This dictated that from the start - and 
certainly from the end of the war ± the media would attract literary attention. The 
journalists catered to a wide audience which necessitated the content also be broad. The 
market was not interested in the ethics of journalism, or the intricacies of filing copy ± that 
information was supplied by the HCDC inquiry - instead it wanted anecdotes and an 
exclusive perspective on the campaign. As such, the Task Force journalists concentrated in 
their writings on the war ± not on themselves, the media. The Task Force journalists were 
responsible for six books on the conflict.40 Later, others would also include the Falklands 
in their autobiographies.41 
 
Political memoirs are abundant in the literature surrounding the Falklands. Political 
accounts of the crisis are advantageous to this thesis. Since the construction of policies 
concerning the media were intrinsically linked with political characters, the mass of 
political biographies and autobiographies are of importance.42 Although none of the 
memoirs cover the Falklands exclusively, the conflict was extraordinary enough that it 
warranted chapters in the work of most contemporary political players.43  
 
1c. The Wider Academia of the Media 
7KHWHUPµPHGLDZDU¶GHYHORSHGIROORZLQJWKH*XOI:DU,WZDVH[SOLFLWO\UHODWHGWR
the way in which the news media interacted with the political and military circumstances 
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of war.44  Separate from the literature directly on the Falklands conflict lies a wealth of 
ZRUNRQWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHPHGLDDQGWKHµHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶GXULQJWLPHVRIZDU
Throughout the early years of this century, a number of new studies emerged which dealt 
ZLWKWKHFRQFHSWRIDµPHGLDZDU¶7KHVHWH[WVJHQHUDOO\LQFOXGHG discussion of the 
Falklands, the conflict as a case study, or at least compared the war with others in which 
media-related issues were central. A series of comparative studies also arose in the years 
following 1982. This distinct body of text serves to better inform researchers by revealing 
not only the requirements and motivations of both sides (the media and the Government) 
during times of war, but also allows one to perceive how previous experiences affected 
censorship policies and news management throughout the Falklands campaign. In relation 
to the Falklands, these works can broadly be divided into three groups: those which pay 
attention to the way in which war has been reported and which use the Falklands conflict 
as a case study ± usually with specific reflection on the role of the war correspondent; 
those which focus on previous, limited wars, and news management in those conflicts, 
which equip the student of the media in the Falklands with the knowledge to define how 
the Falklands example broke with the accepted system of war reportage; and those which 
deal expressly with the implications of news journalism in Falklands for future wars ± 
particularly the Gulf conflict of 1991.45 The most essential volume of study to this thesis is 
the first category.46  
 
Those studies which relate to war reportage and which include assessment of the Falklands 
campaign are a vital requirement for anyone wishing to place the experience of the 
)DONODQGVµPHGLDZDU¶ into the wider context of the way in which war coverage developed 
over the 20th Century.47 7ZRRIWKHZRUNVZKLFKWKLVWKHVLVDGYRFDWHVDVWKHµPDLQ¶WH[WV




 Examples of studies which informed this thesis are: D. Hallin, 7KHµ8QFHQVRUHG:DU¶7KH0HGLDDQG
Vietnam (Oxford University Press, 1986); M. McCarthy, Vietnam (Penguin, 1969); L. Curtis, Ireland: The 
Propaganda War. The British Media DQGWKHµ%DWWOHIRU+HDUWVDQG0LQGV¶ (Pluto, 1984); E. McCann. The 
British Press and Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Socialist Research Centre, 1972); D. Miller, 'RQ¶W
Mention the War: Northern Ireland, Propaganda and the Media (Pluto Press, 1994); J. Halliday and B. 
Cummings, Korea: The Unknown War (Viking, 1988).  
Examples relating to the future implications of the Falklands: A. Finlan, The Royal Navy in the Falklands 
Conflict and the Gulf War: Culture and Strategy (Routledge, 2004); P. de la Billiére, Call for Fire: Sea 
Combat in the Falklands and the Gulf War  (John Murray Publishers, 1995); D. Willcox, Propaganda, the 
Press and Conflict: The Gulf War and Kosovo (Routledge, 2005). 
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relating to the media and the Falklands have included studies which compare the Falklands 
to previous or future conflict. Valerie Adams¶ work, for example, included an assessment 
of the way news was controlled and censored in previous conflicts such as World War 
Two, Korea, Vietnam, Suez and Borneo.48 Each of these conflicts Adams judged to have 
had an impact on the way in which the Falklands was reported and news was controlled. In 
0HUFHUHWDO¶V The Fog of War9LHWQDPZKLFKWKHDXWKRUVGXEµWKHILUVWOLYLQJURRP
ZDU¶ZDVH[SORUHGDQGLWVOHVVRQVZHUHRXWOLQHGLQUHODWLRQWRWKH)DONODQGV)XWXUH
conflicts were also analysed, as mentioned, such as the invasions of Grenada and Lebanon. 
Yet a wider range of literature was produced which integrated comparative studies of the 
Falklands - pHUKDSVWKHPRVWIDPRXVRIZKLFKZDV3KLOOLS.QLJKWOH\¶VThe First 
Casualty.49 .QLJKWOH\¶VZDVIXQGDPHQWDOO\WKHKLVWRU\RIWKH war correspondent from the 
Crimean War to the Gulf War. Knightley argued that the Crimean War could be seen as the 
birthplace of modern military censorship. As such, the book is useful to trace the genesis of 
policies which would later influence the creation of policy in the Falklands War. Miles 
Hudson and John Stanier, both former military personnel, created a study of the 
relationship between war and the media in 1997.50 From their advantaged viewpoint, the 
authors examined the Falklands War against a background of studies on the Crimean War, 
WKH*UHDW:DU:RUOG:DU7ZR.RUHDDQG9LHWQDP6XH]WKHµ7URXEOHV¶LQ1RUWKHUQ
Ireland, and in relation to the Gulf War, Somalia and the Balkans.51 
 
An additional mass of work essential to the completion of this thesis related to the 
interaction between the media and the political sphere. Some key publications dealt with 
LQWHJUDOLVVXHVFRQFHUQLQJWKLVWKHVLVWKHZD\LQZKLFKWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V3UHVV2IILFH
operated, for example. Three central texts involving this subject are Michael Cockerell, 
PeWHU+HQQHVV\DQG'DYLG:DONHU¶V Sources Close to the Prime Minister/DQFH3ULFH¶V 
Where Power Lies and Seymour-8UH¶VPrime Ministers and the Media.52 Cockerel at al. 
shed light on the formerly veiled processes by which political news was disseminated from 
the echelons of Government in 1984. The included study of the Lobby system and role of 
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WKLVWKHVLV,Q3ULFH¶VERRNHPSKasised the adversarial nature of the relationship 
between the media and specifically the Prime Minister, generally, the Government. He 
considered the tenure of Prime Ministers throughout the 20th Century ± from David Lloyd 
George to Gordon Brown. Seymour-UUH¶VFRQWULEXWLRQZDVDQHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHZD\V
in which Prime Ministers have communicated with the public, with specific focus on 
'RZQLQJ6WUHHW¶V3UHVV6HFUHWDULHVRIWKHSDVWDQGWKH3UHVV2IILFH¶VYDU\LQJIXQFWLRQV53  
 
2. Project Outline 
This thesis is, principally, a study of the way in which British Government policy towards 
the media was developed and organised throughout the Falklands conflict. It considers the 
SXEOLFUHODWLRQV¶ (PR) efforts of key departments involved in the crisis: the Prime 
0LQLVWHU¶V2IILFHWKH&DELQHW2IILFHWKHForeign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and 
the MoD. Broadly, there are two parts to this thesis: analysis of Government policy and 
structure in response to the media during the Falklands crisis; and an analysis of the 
content of the printed press during the campaign ± the first of its kind. 
 
Analysis of policy is divided into four sections (and four chapters). Firstly, the way in 
which Government policy ± specifically that of the MoD ± was arrived at in the week 
following the Argentine invasion of the islands. This includes discussion of who took 
decisions, and why, regarding the departure of journalists with the Task Force, as well as 
postulations over the motivations for specific choices - like the use of Ascension Island. It 
concludes that the Public Relations Department at the MoD (MoDPR) was ill-equipped 
and unprepared to construct a coherent information policy in April 1982.  
 
Secondly, MoD policy towards those journalists seconded to the Task Force is discussed in 
greater depth than ever before. While the strained relationship between the MoD and the 
headquarters (HQ) of the Commander in Chief of the Task Force (C-in-C), Northwood, is 
exposed, it is suggested that Northwood played a relatively minor role in the development 
of policy than has typically been assumed. It is argued that there were two central lines of 
policy extended to the Task Force journalists: incident reporting and censorship. Policy 
towards incident reporting is assessed along the basic framework provided by existing 
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literature, but developed to address when reviews of policy took place, what events 
impacted the progress of policy (like the sinking of the Belgrano, HMS Sheffield and the 
Argentine fishing vessel, the Narwhal), and what arrangements were made to allow the 
efficient reporting of incidents in the South Atlantic. Chapter Three boasts a detailed 
assessment of what policy arrangements were made to facilitate the censorship of 
journalists with the Fleet, outlines the various stages of censorship and how they were 
imposed on the correspondents and provides the most thorough appraisal of the role of the 
service Public Relations Officers (PROs). It goes on to consider how the process of 
µGRXEOHYHWWLQJ¶LQ/RQGRQZDVHQIRUFHGDQGSRQGHUVWKH principle of censorship ± indeed, 
whether such extreme levels were required at all.  
 
The third section relates to the public relations policy of the MoD in Britain. The 
relationship between MoDPR and the FCO News Department is evaluated and the 
conclusion advanced that the success of the FCO News Department in handling the media 
over the first month of the conflict was due to its established structure and expertise. The 
MoD, on the other hand, failed to properly prepare for the commencement of the military 
campaign around the Falklands. This is reflected, it is judged, in the lack of facilities 
offered by the MoD until a relatively late stage in the war. The facilities at the MoD are 
considered at length: MoD unattributable briefings and the physical facilities at the MoD 
µ&RQFRXUVH¶RUSUHVVFHQWUHIRUH[DPSOH)XUWKHUPHWKRGVRINHHSLQJWKHPHGLDLQ
Britain informed of events are examined, including the Military Briefing Group, the 
Meetings with Editors conducted by the Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS), Sir Frank 
Cooper, and the News Release Group (NRG), established to ease the process of releasing 
news from the MoD. It is judged that there was a distinct lack of provision made for the 
media by the MoD throughout April 1982. Mostly, the groups established by the MoD 
were done so far too late in the campaign to be of any real benefit to either the media or the 
MoD. 
 
The fourth section of this thesis deals directly with the way in which Government 
information policy was co-ordinated, the ways in which control over the presentation of 
Government was exerted and the machinery established in an attempt to ensure the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VVXFFHVVIXOPHGLDLPDJH7KHFKDSWHUSURYLGHVWKHILUVWGHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVRI
the role of the 1XPEHU¶V1R Press Office and its Chief, Bernard Ingham. It 
considers the position of the Press Office within the Government and analyses its sources 
of authority. Necessarily, the organisations associated with the Press Office during the 
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conflict are reflected on in depth - the Meetings of Information Officers (MIOs) and the 
Information Group (IG), for example. The South Atlantic Presentation Unit (SAPU) is also 
explored in an attempt to provide the first commentary on its role during the crisis. Cecil 
Parkinson, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Paymaster General and Chairman of the 
Conservative Party, and his role in this initiative, and subsequent others such as the 
Parkinson Presentation Group (PPG), are examined intensely. 
 
The second half of the thesis consists of one large study ± a content analysis. Much of the 
secondary work on the role of the media during the Falklands has speculated on the subject 
and content of the printed press during the Falklands. Other content analyses concerning 
the product of television news during the crisis have been offered. The analysis presented 
here originates from the study of the content of the four highest circulation, national, daily 
newspapers published in Britain during the war. The analysis is extensive and conducive to 
a more thorough reading of the way in which the media has been viewed. It also allows for 
future researchers focused on the media in the conflict to assess the role of the printed 
press more accurately than has ever before been possible.  
 
2a. Rationale for Study 
The rationale for this study was simple and can be reduced to two main factors: the 
abundance of new, archival material; and the need to update and supplement the existing 
literature on the topic. Firstly, research for this PhD was embarked upon in September 
2011. The National Archives, in accordance with the ¶30-<HDU5XOH¶UHOHDVHGGRFXPHQWV
pertaining to the Falklands War in January 2013. The hope was that this thesis would 
present the first work on the media during the Falkland conflict with the benefit of 
unrestricted access to Government documents.  
 
The second factor which affected the direction of enquiry was the literature which existed 
surrounding the subject. As previously mentioned, the majority of analyses of the role the 
media played in the war were created in the 1980s. By the 2000s, there had been relatively 
little added to the field for some time. There was a handful of papers or chapters produced 
early in the century, most of which took a general view of the conflict between the media 
and the Government, often focusing on the experiences of the journalists who accompanied 
the Task Force.54 A thorough appraisal of existing work on the media and the Falklands 
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demonstrated that what was required was not a study of media-related events in the South 
Atlantic - or in Britain itself - nor was analysis of the consequences of media policy 
necessary. What was essential to any revision of the field was an examination of the 
derivation of the problems experienced by both the Government and the media, and as 
outlined during the HCDC LQTXLU\E\WKHµLQMXUHG¶SDUWLHV7KHSROLF\ZKLFKWKH
Government developed, or to which the Government adhered (and not to which the MoD 
specifically adhered), demanded greater attention. 
 
2b. Research Questions 
Necessarily, any work which attempts to tackle such an expansive subject requires specific 
IRFXV7KXVWKLVUHVHDUFKRULJLQDWHGIURPDQXPEHURINH\UHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQVRUµUHVHDUFK
LQWHQWLRQV¶GHYHORSHGDIWHUDQLQLWLDOUHDGLQJRIWKHH[LVWLQJOLWHUDWXUH)LUVWO\LWZDVWKe 
goal to chart how Government media policy developed throughout the crisis ± not just at 
the beginning ± and how events at home and in the South Atlantic affected the way in 
which media policy was adapted by the Government (be it the MoD, the FCO or No.10). 
Secondly it was the intention to shed light on the way in which the wider Government 
approached media policy ± not just the MoD. Partly because of the HCDC inquiry, and 
partly because the MoD-commissioned studies immediately after the war, the dominant 
assessments of the Government tend to focus mostly on the MoD. It was important that this 
thesis consider more. Thirdly, what drove much of the research behind this thesis, and 
ultimately became paramount, was a desire to unearth information about those groups 
which had been mentioned, or alluded to, in studies like The Fog of War and those of 
Adams and Morrison and Tumber, but had not received any sustained attention ± the 
SAPU, the Military Briefing Group, the NRG, the PPG and the IG, for example. Lastly, the 
content analysis was driven by a need to readdress what had been argued concerning the 
printed press, and to approach the topic in a quantitative manner. It supplements previous 
studies and establishes a precedent from which others can work in future studies.   
 
2c. Main Research Focus and Hypotheses 
Fundamental to part of this study is the explanation of structures and organisations 
previously largely undocumented and the way in which the policy adopted by the British 
Government during the Falklands War developed over the course of the conflict. There are 
a number of central hypotheses contained in this research (as well as many lesser theories). 
This thesis argues that the media policy observed by the MoD in relation to the Task Force 
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journalists was ill-prepared, reactionary, driven by internal MoD motivation and that 
ultimately, control of policy was devolved to the men on the ground.  
 
This thesis advances that the MoD media policy in Britain, while as reactive as that rolled 
out to the Task Force journalists, became more effective as the war progressed. The MoD 
failed to adequately cater for the British media until the middle of May 1982, at which time 
a number of sensible and potentially successful initiatives were introduced. The NRG and 
military briefing panel, had they been created earlier, may have had a significant impact on 
- not only relations between the media and the MoD - but also, by extension, relations 
between the MoD and wider Government.  
 
This thesis also contends that the machinery developed centrally by the Cabinet Office and 
No.10 Press Office in the form of the SAPU and Information Group, had the potential to be 
successful additions to the regular organisation of Government. However, neither had 
enough authority and was plagued by departmental rivalries. While the media-related 
initiatives of the MoD ultimately became more successful, those of wider Government 
became less effective.  
 
Finally, this thesis provides a serious analysis of the printed press in order to substantiate 
the hypothesis that much of what had been argued about the printed press was generalised 
and oversimplified ± its reliance on Argentine source material, its jingoistic nature, the 
dominance of reports on armed conflict and its aversion to a diplomatic settlement. 
 
3. Sources and Methodologies 
 
3a. Archival Research 
The source material on which this thesis is based is that which one might expect following 
the opening of the archives in 2013. A vast amount of evidence included originated from 
those files held at the National Archives at Kew. However, the importance of the media in 
Government policy is not necessarily reflected by the way in which documents have been 
filed (or not filed). The files most relevant to the construction of this work were: the 
Cabinet Office files ± relating to the SAPU; WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V2IILFH± relating to the 
Press Office; the MIOs and the IG; the MoD ± relating to the MoDPR; the office of the 
Permanent Under-Secretary; the FCO ± relating to the News Department; and the 




There were, however, a number of difficulties which emerged over the course of research. 
There was a distinct lack of documentary evidence concerning certain areas. The PPG was 
somewhat of a mystery at Kew. The ,*¶V minutes were dispersed across a number of 
Cabinet Office files. Defence communications concerning the media were found in FCO, 
Cabinet Office and MoD files. The litter of documents across department and subject file 
boundaries meant that the vast majority of archive holdings on the Falklands at Kew had to 
be accessed.55 The department which presented the poorest resources was the MoD. 
Certainly, the rapid deployment of the Task Force over the first week of the crisis and the 
ad hoc manner in which the remainder of policy was constructed determined a distinct lack 
of notes originating from MoDPR. There was, for example, a complete absence of 
documents pertaining to the meetings of editors, the Military Briefing Panel, the NRG or 
any substantial details of the way in which MoDPR was administered.  
 
As a result of the poor crop at the National Archives, the MoD was approached about the 
possibility of accessing archival documents withheld by the ministry. The withholding of 
MoD files has attracted significant attention in recent years. In 2013 it was publicised that 
WKH0R'ZDVµXQODZIXOO\KROGLQJWKRXVDQGVRIILOHVWKDWVKRXOGKDYHEHHQGHFODVVLILHGDQG
transferred to the National Archive under the 30-\HDUUXOH«¶ 56 In early 2014 access to 
MoD files earmarked for the National Archives, but had not yet been fully reviewed, was 
granted to the author. Thus, many of the most intricate arguments contained in this thesis 
(for example, on MoD pROLF\WKH15*(GLWRUV¶0eetings and the Military Briefing Panel) 
are based on material which is not yet publicly accessible ± and may not be for quite some 
time.57  
 
In addition to the files at the MoD and Kew, other archived material was utilised in the 
research of this work. As well as evidence gathered from the Imperial War Museum 
(IWM) DQG.LQJ¶V&ROOHJH¶V/LGGHOO+DUW Archives, information collected from the 
Churchill Archive at Cambridge University was pivotal to the sections of this thesis which 
FRQWHPSODWHWKHZRUNLQJVRIWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V3UHVV2IILFH1RWRQO\DUHWKHSHUVRQDO
and political papers of Margaret Thatcher stored at the Churchill Archive, but also those 
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belonging to Bernard Ingham, her Chief Press Secretary (CPS).58 Much of the 
GRFXPHQWDWLRQFRQWDLQHGLQ7KDWFKHU¶VSDSHUVKDVEHHQGLJLWDOLVHGDQGLVDYDLODEOHYLDWKH
website of the Thatcher Foundation.59  
 
The advantages and disadvantages of documentary and archival research have been noted 
by many historical practitioners and theorists. The bulk of source material examined and 
presented by this thesis originates from central archives and the majority of it is from 
various Government departments.60 Assessing this kind of material necessarily has its 
pitfalls. No historical source should be approached in a way which assumes its veracity. 
The usual parameters of source material were carefully considered in the construction of 
this work.61 In this thesis there were specific matters peculiar to it and thus required 
particular consideration such as authorship, motive and bias and the type of document and 
its implications. While most internal Government documents had, at their root, a single 
author, that author was working within an institutional framework and under a number of 
more senior figures. Issues of motive and bias also posed precarious difficulties. The 
atmosphere surrounding the construction of Government policy in 1982 was one of intense 
competition and infighting between Government departments.62 Depending on the 
recipient, the confidentiality level of the document and the nature of the document, 
different levels of motivation applied. Finally, a large percentage of documentary evidence 
observed was the product of various meetings ± mostly the minutes of meetings ± such as 
the Chiefs of Staff (CoS) meetings, MIOs, EGLWRUV¶Meetings or IG meetings. The value of 
meeting minutes, in this thesis, is extensive, since much of the material (from the IG 
meetings, Editors¶ Meetings and MIOs) has not been accessed before. However, it is 
essential to recognise that meetings were (and are) not always fully recorded. Minutes at 
different meetings varied according to the scribH,QVRPHRIWKHNH\(GLWRUV¶0HHWLQJVDQ
µHGLWRU¶ZDVTXRWHGEXWWKHTXRWHZDVQRt attributed to a named individual. In addition, 
when conflict arose, this was not necessarily logged, yet we understand it to have existed 
from the statements of witnesses. 
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3b. Government Reports 
A complete analysis of the HCDC inquiry into the way the media was handled during the 
Falklands War is fundamental to any study on the topic. Many works have made use of the 
minutes of evidence submitted to the committee.63 This thesis, however, presents the most 
thorough dissection, and extensive use, of the inquiry. Evidence and memoranda from each 
of the two sizeable volumes of minutes is used throughout to support documentary sources 
and other testimonies. Other Government inquiries were also employed, specifically the 
Franks Report - which reported on the culpability of the British Government and its 
decisions in the approach to the Argentine invasion ± DQGWKH6WXG\*URXSRQ&HQVRUVKLS¶V
report of 1983.64 
 
3c. Interviews  
$ODUJHSHUFHQWDJHRIWKHV¶OLWHUDWXUHRQWKHPHGLDDQGWKH)DONODQGVHPSOR\HG
interviews as part of the reseDUFKSURFHVV0HUFHUHWDO0RUULVRQDQG7XPEHUDQG$GDPV¶
work all benefited from communication (by telephone or face-to-face) with significant 
figures.65 ,QWKHFRXUVHRIUHVHDUFKIRUWKLVWKHVLVLQWHUYLHZVZHUHFRQGXFWHGµRQ-the-
UHFRUG¶7ZHQW\WZRother interviews, or informal discussions, took place with people who 
preferred to remain anonymous.66 In addition to this, this thesis exploited a number of 
transcripts (or audio files) of interviews conducted for archive initiatives. The IWM and 
the Churchill Archives have both led pioneering attempts to memorialise the thoughts of 
prominent political figures by storing transcripts of interviews for various initiatives like 
the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (BDOHP) DQGWKH,:0¶V6RXQG
Archive.67 The British Library also boasts a sound archive which includes collections of 
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There is a distinct difference between interviews conducted for archival purposes and those 
LQWHUYLHZVSHUIRUPHGIRUDVSHFLILFSURMHFW7KHILUVWWHQGVWREHDµOLIH¶LQWHUYLHZLQZKLFK
the interviewee is asked to reflect on their entire lifespan over a series of meetings.69 The 
second is usually conducted by an individual researcher on a specialised topic.70 Oral 
history, as a subject, is vast. It has been widely emphasised that it is the oldest form of 
history.71 The method of oral history gained a renewed currency amongst British historians 
during the 1970s - with the creation of the British Oral History Society, the journal, Oral 
History, and the Department of Sound Records at the IWM.72 Historians have typically 
been wary of issues relating to oral history. Memory as a historical source has generated 
intense debate amongst academics.73 A number of disadvantages to the pursuit of the 
method have been outlined by various critics including, not only questions over the 
reliability of memory, but the implications of the bias, training and technique of the 
LQWHUYLHZHUKLVWRULDQV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIPHPRU\DQGWKHFRQWUDGLFWRU\QDWXUHRIWKH
testimony of witnesses to the same event.74  
 
There are, however, significant advantages to be gained from engaging in oral history. 
Generally, oral history has been attributed with promoting history from the perspective of 
those who might not be considered by traditional histories, those who have been referred to 
DVµVPDOOQDPHOHVVSHRSOH¶1HFHVVDULO\WKHILHOGLQZKLFKRUDO history has perhaps had the 
most impact is that of social history.75 In the case of this thesis, oral testimony was 
supplied by politicians, civil servants and former members of the Armed Forces ± all of 
which have separate implications for each of these categories of participant. 76  
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Thorough preparation for the interview process is a prerequisite of a successful dialogue. 
Many commentators have supplied accounts of how best to conduct an interview ± often 
emphasising common pitfalls.77 A particularly useful addition to those studies which 
advise on the topic is that belonging to Anthony Seldon and Joanna Pappworth. The 
authors outlined 10 possible limitations of an interviewee, three limitations of the 
interviewer and nine limitations of the nature of interviewing.78 In addition to literature 
explaining the confines of the interviewing process, a smaller number present step-by-step 
guides to approaching oral history interviews.79 Consequentially, interview material 
presented in this thesis was gathered under strict conditions and with the benefit of full 
comprehension of the technique. In all aspects this thesis conforms to the ethical 
regulations of the University of Kent. Details of the approach taken to interviews can be 
located in Appendix Three. 
 
In many ways it was essential that this research include interview material ± if only to 
reappraise, in the same way as the literature was, the opinions of some of the chief people 
involved at the time. There exists certain advantages to personal testimony in this thesis. 
Facts not recorded in documentation pertaining to the time were revealed, allowing for a 
deeper understanding of relationships between the key figures involved; in some cases 
information aided the interpretation of existing source material and a number of colourful 
and interesting anecdotes were communicated. However, it should be stressed that in no 
way are the hypotheses presented in this thesis dependant on the evidence gathered in 
interviews. Where this work benefitted most from interviews is where evidence was used 
in conjunction with archival material. Each strand of argument stands independent of oral 
testimony and advanced by documentary evidence.  
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Bodies of source material which have contributed to the construction of this thesis have 
been those relating to the product of the media ± WKH)DONODQGV¶IRRWDJH'HVSLWHWKH
majority of evidential material contained in this thesis being of an archival nature, both 
broadcast and print material is used extensively. Resources relating to broadcast material 
include the British Universities Film and Video Council (BUFVC), the Joint Information 
Systems Committee (JISC) and ITN Source (Independent Television News).80 Each  of the 
three resources provide an internet database of thousands of television and radio reports, 
public statements and images relating to the Falklands War.  
 
Print material was accessed from a range of sources. The content analysis contained in this 
thesis dictated that four newspapers would require intense analysis. Online access to The 
Times and the Daily Mirror archives was permitted via University of Kent subscription. 
Every copy of The Sun and The Daily Telegraph was analysed at Colindale Newspaper 
Library. Other publications were also accessed at Colindale. Copies of The Guardian and 
The Observer were available on microfilm at the University of Kent. In addition to this, a 
number of veterans either gave or lent contemporary newspapers to the researcher.81  
 
7KHUHKDVEHHQFRQWHQWLRQRYHUWKHFDWHJRULVDWLRQRIQHZVSDSHUVDVDµSULPDU\VRXUFH¶82 
The accepted rule has been that a newspaper may be considered as primary evidence if it is 
of the time about which the historian is researching. However, it has been argued that 
certain newspaper articles published during the period of study should be classified as 
µVHFRQGDU\¶PDWHULDO)RUH[DPSOHDUHSRUWSHQQHGE\DMRXUQDOLVWLQEXWEDVHGRQ
WKHUHSRUWVRIRWKHUMRXUQDOLVWVRURWKHUSULPDU\PDWHULDOPLJKWEHFRQVLGHUHGDµVHFRQGDU\
VRXUFH¶83 Since the area under investigation in this thesis is the media itself (rather than 
purely the subject of a newspaper story), newspapers produced in 1982 are all considered 
µSULPDU\¶VRXUFHV7KHFRPSOH[LW\RIDQHZVSDSHUDVDVRXUFHKRZHYHUVKRXOGQRWEH
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XQGHUVWDWHG8QOLNHPRVWRWKHUµFXOWXUDOSURGXFWV¶ of the time ± such as letters, diaries or 
memoirs, newspaper articles exist as a product of more than one author. In fact, behind an 
HGLWLRQRIDQHZVSDSHUµOLHVDYDVWFRPSOH[PDFKLQHU\RIOLWHUDU\SURGXFWLRQDQGOD\HUHG
social networks, for which no siQJOHLQGLYLGXDOLVZKROO\UHVSRQVLEOH«¶84 Consequentially, 
assessment of newspaper articles should take into account the author (and the usual issues 
of bias and motive), editors, how the article is written, which information is presented and 
which is absent, the political affiliations of the newspaper, the readership and circulation, 
and where any given article appHDUHGLQWKHQHZVSDSHU¶VIRUPDW 
 
3d (i). )DONODQGV¶)RRWDJH&RQWHQW$QDO\VLV 
Chapter Six of this thesis features a content analysis of the printed press during the 
Falklands War. Contained in that chapter is extensive discussion of the way in which the 
study was formulated, developed and conducted. Content analysis has evoked much 
disagreement amongst the academic community. Perhaps the most straightforward of 
requirements ± definition ± is the most difficult to agree on precisely. In 1954, Bernard 
%HUHOVRQZURWHWKDWµ&RQWHQWDQDO\VLVLVDUHVHDUFKWHFKQLTXHIRUWKHREMHFWLYHV\VWHPDWLF
and quantitative description of the manifest contenWRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶85 As it was 
increasingly assumed that content analysis could be applied to subjects other than those 
FRQFHUQLQJFRPPXQLFDWLRQWKDWGHILQLWLRQZDVVLPSOLILHGLQµ&RQWHQWDQDO\VLVLVDQ\
technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIPHVVDJHV¶86 Since the 1960s, the art of content analysis has developed 
significantly. In 1980, Klaus Krippendorff suggested an even more streamlined definition 
which would take into account that content analysis as a tool was being extended to more 
than just text ± LWZDVµDUHVHDUFKWHFKQLTXHIRUPDNLQJUHSOLFDEOHDQGYDOLGLQIHUHQFHV
IURPGDWDWRWKHLUFRQWH[W¶87 For the purpose of this thesis and the ensuing discussion, the 
following definition of the technique is offered: content analysis is a research method by 
which quantitative (though not necessarily exclusively quantitative) methods can be 
objectively applied to produce results, most commonly in numerical terms.  
 
Different forms of communication have typically been the subject of content analysis 
studies. Historically, communications have been identified specifically with the field of 
journalism. Perhaps the first significant study of this type was conducted by John Gilmer 
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Speed in 1893. Speed considered the reading matter in New York newspapers between 
1881 and 1893, using theme classifications such as: editorials, religious stories, scientific 
stories, and political, literary, gossip and scandal-related stories. He showed how gossip, 
sports and scandal columns were being allotted an increasing percentage of newspaper 
space.88 Over the course of the 20th Century, the application of studies which contained this 
form of analysis greatly increased.89 The development of computers and the improvement 
of information accessibility via the internet have added impetus to the use of content 
analysis.  
 
One important feature of the literature of the Falklands conflict has been the use of 
newspaper product to supplement various arguments. The treatment of the press in this 
literature has been overwhelmingly generalised. The dominant benefit of a study of this 
kind is that it allows one to consider large amounts of information on the whole, concisely 
and, for the most part, accurately. Jason Toynbee and Marie Gillespie wrote that µthe most 
immediate benefit of quantitative methods such as content analysis is that they offer 
greater potential to generalise than do qualitative ones¶90 The employment of such an 
analysis in this thesis gives structure to what has previously been unstructured data.  
 
4. Conclusion 
This thesis presents findings which are the first of their kind. It is based on information 
never before accessed. It contributes the most thorough account, so far, of the media policy 
which the British Government developed and adhered to during the Falklands War. The 
H[LVWLQJERG\RIZRUNRQWKHPHGLD¶VUROHGXULQJWKHFULVLVLVLQQHHGRIUHYLVLRQ7KH
µRUWKRGR[¶DSSURDFKWRWKe subject has left it looking somewhat stale and stuck in the 
decade in which the events played out. This thesis is not written as a history of the media, 
nor as a history of the media during times of war. It is a hybrid of different histories. At its 
heart is a form of political history in that it deals with the upper echelons of British 
Government and the way in which its policy was constructed. It dips its toe in the pool of 
military history in that it considers policy adapted and developed by men on the ground, 
and traces events throughout a significant war in British history. It flirts with cultural 
history in that part of it concerns itself exclusively with the cultural product of the 
contemporary society. It is quantitative and qualitative history. AnGLW¶VQRWMXVWKLVWRU\,W
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is informed by media studies, journalism studies and communications studies. Utilising 
this hybrid of histories allows this research to fully present the topic at hand ± a rounded 









Without exception, every academic of the Falklands War who has considered the role of 
WKHPHGLDKDVZULWWHQRQ*RYHUQPHQWµSROLF\¶RIVRPHNLQG$V0RUULVRQDQG7XPEHU
pointed out in 1988, µthe two themes of censorship and information policy attracted more 
debate and more complaint than any other aspect of the coverage of the Falklands 
FDPSDLJQ¶.1 Discussion of Government policy demands that one define the term. The 
dictionary VWDWHVWKDWµSROLF\¶ PHDQVµ$course or principle of action adopted or proposed 
by an organisation or individual¶.2 Here, the wRUGµSROLF\¶LVJLYHQWRPHDQ just that: the 
line of action proposed by the Government, most specifically the MoD (more narrowly 
MoDPR), to facilitate the smooth running of public relations both in Britain and in the 
South Atlantic. :KLOVWKLVWRULDQVKDYHSRLQWHGWRWKHHIIHFWRIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VVWUDWHJ\
for handling the media, they have rarely considered the formation and management of that 
policy. The most thorough work to date is one of the MoD-commissioned pieces, The Fog 
of War.3 The authors pay by far the greatest attention to the organisation of MoD and the 
running of MoDPR than any other media-centred work. Given the co-operation they were 
afforded by the MoD, it is easy to understand why theirs might be considered the definitive 
work. However, what the authors were not able to contribute was a complete break-down 
of media policy throughout the war. Policy - adapted as the conflict progressed - was 
sculpted and modified in response to the changing situation in the South Atlantic. 
Consequentially, the policy in place on 14 June, at the end of the war, was a very different 
creature to that which was born at its beginning. Foster contributed to the limited debate on 
information policy in 1992.4 :KLOH)RVWHU¶VZRUNIROORZHGWKHFKURQological events of the 
Falklands War, specifically considering the plight of the Task Force journalists, his work 
on the actual composition and maintenance of policy was somewhat superficial compared 
to that which came before.  
 
This chapter will shed light on the various stages of policy construction, following the 
0R'¶VHIIRUWVWRFUHDWHDPHGLDVWUDWHJ\ZKLFKPLJKWVDWLVI\WKH*RYHUQPHQWWKHPHGLD
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itself, and the public. What this, and subsequent chapters, offers is in-depth consideration 
of what in other histories has often been bypassed: PR policy which was put into effect in 
the first week of April 1982. It tenders a complete assessment of the formulation of policy, 
as well as considering why formulation of policy might not have been effective. In addition 
to this, where this chapter covers established arguments, it presents new thoughts, insights 
and contentions supported by new archival material. This chapter acts as a foundation for 
subsequent chapters which deal with the implementation of policy both with the Task 
Force and in Britain, as well as the co-ordination of policy and the actual reporting of the 
war.   
 
1. The Machinery of MoDPR 
The PR department at the MoD was an amalgamation of civilian and military staff. The 
history of the department was discussed by Alan Hooper of the Royal Marines in his study 
on the military and the media.5 For further information, Appendix Five provides a history 
of MoDPR and of its relations with the media before the Falklands War. 
 
This section presents the argument that the apparatus in place for dealing with the media 
and for formulating an adequate PR policy was faulty, the department was ill-prepared and 
consequentially, the subsequent PR policy was vague, weak and driven by non-essential 
factors. It identifies four major hindrances to the efficient formulation of plans. These 
hindrances determined not only who would make PR policy, but how it would be shaped. 
Firstly, MoDPR was caught by surprise and without any contingency plan. Secondly, it had 
no permanent head. Thirdly, those who were ill-qualified for the task of running media 
policy assumed control of ministry public relations ± those who were more than capable of 
driving a coherent and long-term policy were forced to take a back seat. Lastly, and most 
crucially, the ministry did not understand the needs of the media.  
 
1a. The 1977 Plan 
'XULQJWKH+&'&¶VKHDULQJLWZDVFODLPHGWKDWDSODQGLGH[LVWZLWKLQWKH0R', but that 
the press office had neglected to consult it.  This was very serious criticism. Worse than 
having no plan at all, is having one and not bothering to put it into action. In December 
DSODQHQWLWOHGµ3XEOLF5HODWLRQV3ODQQLQJIRU(PHUJHQF\2SHUDWLRQV¶ZDVGUDIWHG,WV
SXUSRVHZDVWRµJLYHJXLGDQFHRQWKHKDQGOing of Public Relations when it is anticipated 
that units of the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, the Army or the Royal Air Force may be 
                                                 
5
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brought to higher states of readiness and deployed overseas to meet situations of crisis and 
LQFUHDVHGWHQVLRQ¶6 It gave a brief outline of the steps to be taken concerning the media in 
the event that any service was involved in urgent overseas¶ activity. The paper included a 
checklist of steps WREHWDNHQDVµLQLWLDODFWLRQ¶,WSURFHHGHGWRJLYHYHU\JHQHUDOJXLGDQFH
on issues like communication, transporting the media and how to deal with press interest at 
airfields and ports. The plan was drawn up by a former Director of Public Relations 
(Army) (DPR(A)), General Martin Farndale. The Acting Chief of Public Relations 
(ACPR), Ian McDonald, has been heavily criticised for having apparently ignored plans 
which were in place should an emergency of this nature arise, and for having taken but five 
PLQXWHVWRµWKLQNLWRXW¶.HYLQ)RVWHUYLHZHGWKDWµLQWKHFRQIXVLRQWKHPRVWUHFHQWSODQ
from 1977 was entiUHO\IRUJRWWHQ¶7 $GDPVMXGJHGµWKDWVRVKRUWDWLPHZDVDOORZHGWR
GHYLVHDSROLF\LOOXVWUDWHVEHWWHUWKDQDQ\DUJXPHQWWKH0R'¶VLQLWLDOIDLOXUHWRJUDVSWKH
importance of their arrangements for disseminating LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHFRQIOLFW¶8 
 
The Chief of Public Relations (CPR), Neville Taylor, who considered the document after 
the war, assessed that µ«WKHSURFHGXUHVWKDWZHUHVSHOWRXWLQWKHGUDft document were 
more relevant, in my view, to a land situation in Europe than they were to a maritime 
situatLRQRUDPSKLELRXVVLWXDWLRQ¶.9 The HCDC ruled rather generously that µQR
contingency plans could have coped altogether smoothly with the accreditation 
DUUDQJHPHQWVIRUWKHFRQIOLFW«¶10 There were, however, two reports separate to that of 
1977, which might have been of value to MoDPR when formulating policy. In January 
1982 DPR(A), Brigadier Ramsbotham, persuaded McDonald that a study was required to 
GHDOZLWKµDQHPHUJHQF\RIWKLVNLQG¶7KH$&35UHTXHVWHGWKDW'35$VKRXOGLQVWLWXWHD
study immediately. Ramsbotham went on to produce a first draft.11 In addition, in May 
1981, the CoS had produced a paper on the µDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRISXEOLFUHODWLRQVLQWLPHVDQG
WHQVLRQDQGZDU¶7KHCPR ZDVDVNHGWRUHSRUWRQWKHPHGLD¶VUHTXLUHPHQWRIPLOLWDU\
communications in relevant situations. By the time the crisis broke, MoDPR was still to 
report to the Chiefs of Staff. The fact that there were moves made throughout the year, 
prior to the invasion of the Falklands, to mould a media policy in case of a similar conflict 
LVDGHTXDWHLQGLFDWLRQWKDWFRQWUDU\WR6LU)UDQN¶VYLHZWKDWWKHZDUZDVQRWH[SHFWHGWKH
MoD at large had requested media plans for exactly that: war. 
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1b. Ian McDonald 
Ian McDonald had become ACPR in January 1982. He had applied for the permanent 
position but was rejected shortly after his interview. The Civil Service Department gave an 
XSGDWHRQWKHTXHVWWRILQGDVXLWDEOHFDQGLGDWHµ0U0F'RQQHOO>VLF@GLGZHOOEXWWKH
difficulty about appointing him is that he is an administrator and his appointment would 
XSVHWWKH,QIRUPDWLRQ2IILFHU&ODVV¶.12 Five months before the war then, McDonald was 
identified as unsuitable because of his background in administration. McDonald was a 
careHUFLYLOVHUYDQW+HKDGEHHQ$VVLVWDQW6HFUHWDU\LQ&KDUJHRIWKH0LQLVWU\¶V3D\DQG
Recruitment Section until 1979 when he moved to MoDPR. Until then, McDonald had 
very little by way of media experience. He spoke of his past exploits with the Press: µ,Kave 
had some dealings with them in the context of previous jobs not as a press officer or 
controlling the preVVEXWUHVSRQGLQJWRLQTXLULHV¶13 His position was only tenable until the 
newly appointed CPR, Neville Taylor, could transfer from his current employment as 
Chief Information Officer at the Department of Health and Social Security. As a former 
MoD Chief Press Officer and Deputy Director of PR for the Navy, Taylor undeniably was 
WKHEHWWHUILWIRU0R'357D\ORU¶VWUDQVIHUZDVLQWHQGHGIRU-XQH.  
 
0DQ\KDYHSRLQWHGWR0F'RQDOG¶VODFNRIPHGLD-related knowledge and identified his 
inexperience as a reason poor policy choices were made in April 1982. The HCDC found 
WKDWµZhatever the basic judgement, the evidence which we have received indicates 
overwhelmingly that the lack of an experienced professional public relations officer at the 
head of the Ministry of Defence PR oUJDQLVDWLRQZDVZLGHO\IHOWLQWKH0LQLVWU\¶VUHVSRQVe 
WRWKHQHHGWRPDNHDUUDQJHPHQWVIRUSUHVVFRYHUDJHRIWKH)DONODQGVFDPSDLJQ¶.14 The 
ministry itself submitted to the Committee WKDWµWKH0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFHDJUHHVWKDWWKH
vacancy in the post of Chief of Public Relations at the time the crisis began inhibited the 
35RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VDELOLW\WRPDNHDUUDQJHPHQWVIRUWKHPHGLDFRYHUDJHRIWKHFDPSDLJQ¶15  
 
At the time it was argued that the MoD missed a trick when it failed, on the morning of 2 
April, to call the man who was scheduled to take over the Press Department two months 
later - the professional who could conduct and organise the media in a way in which 
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McDonald could only hope to aspire. Bernard Ingham, WKLV3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶VChief Press 
Secretary for H[DPSOHLPDJLQHGWKDWµ,IKH>7D\ORU@KDGEHHQLn the post when the 
Falklands invasion occurred the British Government would have had an experienced 
SURIHVVLRQDODWWKHKHOP¶16 In fact, when McDonald learnt of the invasion he closed the 
GRRURIKLVRIILFHLQDWWHPSWWRµWKLQNLWRXWIRUILYHPLQXWHV¶.17 This meant that the bulk of 
media policy would be shaped as and when issues arose and needed to be dealt with ± 
preparations would have to be devised haphazardly. 8QGRXEWHGO\WKHQ0F'RQDOG¶VODFN
of experience affected the successful implementation of PR policy.  
 
1. Control of MoDPR  
McDonald was responsible to WKH0R'¶V3HUPDQHQW8QGHU-Secretary, Sir Frank Cooper. 
Cooper had established a serious base of power within the MoD, having been a civil 
servant since 1948 and having been associated with high-SURILOHLVVXHVOLNHWKHµ7URXEOHV¶
in Northern Ireland, the Irish Republican Army, sovereignty disputes, and a plethora of 
Defence Reviews. Cooper had progressively risen through the ranks of the MoD. He was 
FRQVLGHUHGDQGVWLOOLVRQHRI%ULWDLQ¶VPRVWVXFFHVVIXODQGHIIHFWXDOFLYLOVHUYDQWV
However, Cooper was even less qualified to run media policy than his ACPR. Hudson and 
Stanier contended in 1997 that when the crisis erupted the CoS and the military took over 
the running of general policy and consequently, µVuddenly shorn of its erstwhile strength, 
the Civil Service cast about for what was left¶ ± control of information.18 Frank Cooper 
took more than an interest in information and PR policy - he took firm control from the 
start of the crisis. 
 
Cooper oversaw the development of policy as early as the first weekend of April. He acted 
as a go-between for a number of organisations regarding media accreditation to the Fleet. 
7KHSODFHRI5HXWHUV¶FRUUHVSRQGHQW/HVOLH'RZGZLWKWKH7DVN)RUFH was attributed to 
the authority of Cooper.19 'RGGVZURWHWKDWµ«LWZDVFOHDUWKDW6LU)UDQN&RRSHURIWKH
Ministry of Defence was instrumental in drawing on-the-VSRWJXLGHOLQHVIRUWKHPHGLD«¶20 
Cooper was wary of the media. As a result, one of the first directives he issued to MoDPR 
was one banning PR staff from communicating directly with the press in any way.21 All 
subsequent press UHOHDVHVZRXOGEHPDGHE\$&35&RRSHU¶VSRVLtion was highlighted 
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after the war by Secretary of  State for Defence, John Nott, who claimed that neither he, 
nor Cooper, needed to be briefed for the HCDC as they were the WZRSHRSOHµwho were 
actually handliQJWKLVPDWWHU«7KHUHLVQRERG\HOVHLQWKH0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFHZKRNQRZV




&RRSHU¶VFRQWURORISROLF\ZDVFRQVROLGDWHGZKHQhe began to host meetings with the 
editors of media organisations.24 The meetings of the Overseas Defence Committee (South 
$WODQWLF2'6$RUUDWKHUµWKH:DU&DELQHW¶FHUWDLQO\XWLOL]HG6LU)UDQN¶VQHZ
SRVLWLRQDVFKLHIµHGLWRU-OLDLVRQ¶ The OD(SA) had been established on 7 April following 
advice from both Cooper and former Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan.25 Cooper attended 
several meetings of the OD(SA).26 In addition, he received instructions directly from the 
group. For example, on 10 May issues concerning media speculation were discussed. It 
was agreed that problems should be urgently addressed by Cooper µat one of his regular 
meetings with (GLWRUV¶27 Throughout the conflict, various documents served to highlight 
&RRSHU¶VDXWKRULW\RYHUWKHUXQQLQJRISXEOLFUHODWLRQVSROLF\2Q0D\&RRSHUZURWHWR
Sir Douglas Wass at the Treasury demanding that the Secretary of State, Geoffrey Howe, 
consider organising briefings for British journalists, perhaps from the Bank of England, 
about the state of the Argentine economy.28 Cooper worked internally within the MoD to 
adapt PR policy, often ordering meetings between MoDPR staff.29 When the News Release 
Group was established it was under orders from Cooper.30 The group would also be 
directly responsible to him.31  
 
Alan Protheroe, the Assistant Director-General of the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC), wrote in 1982 that µWKHH[SHUWVPLOLWDU\DQGFLYLOLDQLQWKHJRYHUQPHQW 
information services have been discounted and virtually eliminated from full and proper 
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SDUWLFLSDWLRQE\WKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFLYLOVHUYDQWV¶.32 What is clear is that Cooper had an 
unprecedented amount of control over the formation and implementation of PR policy 
during the Falklands War. Whether, as The Sunday Times Insight Team argued, the reason 
IRU&RRSHU¶VVHL]LQJFRQWUROZDVDVDUHVXOWRIKis lack of power over any other sphere, the 
fact remains that he assumed responsibility of MoDPR to the detriment of those who 
usually worked within the department.33  
 
One of the most significant effects of Cooper¶VDVVXPSWLRQRISRZHURYHU0R'PR was that 
WKHGHSDUWPHQW¶VHPSOR\HHV± the men who were familiar with defence correspondents, the 
men who were practiced in dealing with the media - their demands and needs - were denied 
the opportunity to do their jobs. It is possible to distinguish three levels of authority within 
MoDPR: senior civil servants ± Frank Cooper, Ian McDonald and the upper echelons of 
the career civil service; the military PR machine ± WKH6HUYLFHV¶Directors of Public 
Relations (DPRs) and their subordinates; and the Press Officers which made up the 
majority of MoDPR, who manned the desks and answered the telephones. There was a 
DPR for each of the Services: DPR(A), Brigadier Ramsbotham, DPR for the Navy 
(DPR(N)), Captain Sutherland and DPR for the Royal Air Force (DPR(RAF)), Air 
Commodore Miller.  
 
Commentators have typically argued that the real casualties were the DPRs. 34 Yet the 
civilian PROs also experienced severe restrictions on their usual occupation for the 
duration of the war. The chief limit on the staff of MoDPR was the lack of information 
they would be given. Harris accused McDonald, in his 1983 work, of concentrating power 
in his own hands by not only forbidding his staff to speak to the Press, but by creating a 
system by which only he had access to information on Task Force operations: he 
SHUVRQDOO\GUDIWHGWKH0LQLVWU\¶VSXEOLFVWDWHPHQWVDQGODUJHO\LWZDVKHZKREULHIHGWKH
media.35 ,71FRQVLGHUHGWKDWµWKHLPSUHVVLRQZDVWKDWWKH'35VZHUHQRWSULY\WRWKH
fuller background enjoyed by the Deputy Chief Press Officer who had been briefed by the 
Permanent Under-6HFUHWDU\¶.36 This, however, had an adverse effect on MoDPR since the 
credibility of the office was called into question when it became apparent to journalists that 
even MoDPR were being kept in the dark. 
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Although the DPRs and PROs were in the same boat, suffering the same restrictions at the 
start of the conflict, they were, towards the end of May, permitted access to the Defence 
Situation Centre ± the hub of all operational information.37 For the PROs, the situation 
remained unproductive ± even humiliating. Regional Portsmouth and Sunderland 
newspapers said that µVRPH0R'VWDIINQRZQWRRXUPDQSHUVRQDOO\ZHUHSULYDWHO\




There was heavy tension within MoDPR. The media unquestionably picked up on it during 
the conflict. Independent Television (ITV) FODLPHGWKDWµWHQVLRQVEXLOWXSEHWZHHQWKHFivil 
servants who were controlling the information, the military PR men, who thought they 
VKRXOGEHFRQWUROOLQJLWDQGWKHSRRUµGHVNRIILFHUV¶ZKRNQHZOLWWOHVDLGOLWWOHDQG
UHFHLYHGIODNIURPWKHSUHVVFRUSV¶39 'DYLG1LFKRODV(GLWRUIRU,71VDLGµWhere were 
times when it seemed to us that one side did not know what the other side was doing. We 
ZHUHTXLWHFRQVFLRXVRIWHQVLRQVWKHUH¶40 Thus, the regular equipment of MoDPR was 
neglected: Press Officers and DPRs found their hands tied and their ability to meet the 
needs of the media was seriously diminished.  
 
1d. Understanding the Media 
This section proposes that MoDPR did not appreciate the needs of the media, and that lack 
of understanding meant that policy was ill considered. Of course, Britain had not witnessed 
foreign military action on such a scale since the Suez Crisis of 1956. Consequentially, 
MoDPR had little experience of dealing with the media during times of crisis. Various 
historians have pointed out that the MoD did not fully appreciate the role the media might 
play in a prolonged conflict. The Official History evaluated µ«WKDWWKH*RYHUQPHQWHIIRUW
was basically unprofessional, unsympathetic to the demands of deadlines and the appetite 
for hard information to fill the pages and the airtime they were ready to devote to such 
XQXVXDODQGKLVWRULFHYHQWV¶.41 Yet no work has paid any particular attention to the 
accusations of journalists, following the war, that MoDPR simply did not understand the 
needs of the media. In an interview with Ingham and McDonald in 1982, a radio presenter 
MXGJHGWKDWµRQHRIWKHPDMRUFRPSODLQWVE\SUHVVPHQGXULQJWKHFULVLVZDVWKHIHHOLQJWKDW
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they were dealing with Ministry people that didn't really understand the media¶.42 Perhaps 
WKHPRVWVWXQQLQJH[DPSOHRIWKH0R'¶VIDLOXUHWRDSSUHFLDWHWKHQHHGVRIWKHPHGLDFDQ
be seen in the process of accreditation to the Task Force. 7KH0R'¶Vfailure to organise 
accreditation of correspondents to the Task Force fairly and efficiently was the 
fundamental cause of many problems which plagued the Task Force later. 
 
The accreditation process has been covered in detail in a range of works on the period, 
therefore this thesis merely touches on the main events.43 Most of those who have written 
on the topic have been in agreement that the accreditation process was unclear and chaotic. 
The HCDC IRXQGWKDWµLQPDQ\UHVSHFWVWKHDFFUHGLWDWLRQDUUDQJHPHQWVPDGHIRUWKH
)DONODQGVFRQIOLFWZHUHKDSKD]DUGWRWKHSRLQWRIEHLQJIDUFLFDO¶.44 The clamber amongst 
the media to secure a representative onboard one of the ships bound for the South Atlantic, 
and its frustrations, has been well-documented.45 
 
Eventually, by 9 April, 29 places had been reserved for the media aboard the Fleet. In its 
provision for journalists, it was clear that not only did MoDPR not understand the needs of 
a democratic media, but they also did not appreciate media structures, or the way 
information was actually reported. During the accreditation period MoDPR exposed their 
lack of knowledge about the media when they suggested to The Standard, for example, that 
they did not need a correspondent with the Task Force because the Daily Express would 
represent The Standard and the StarµDV\RXDUHWKHVDPHJURXS¶46 This impression was 
born from the fact the newspapers were owned by the same corporation. This attitude 
betrayed a complete misunderstanding of the newspaper industry ± the publications had 
different staff, different approaches to the news and certainly different perspectives. 
Further to this, there was a complete lack of comprehension as to the role of the regional 
press in the UK. The only regional titles to send representatives to the Falklands were the 
Glasgow Herald and the Wolverhampton Express and Star (the latter was replaced for 
medical reasons at Ascension Island by a delegate from the Yorkshire Post). Originally, the 
Glasgow Herald ZDVWROGE\0R'35WKDWµWKH3$[Press Association] will cover for all 
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\RXUHJLRQDOSHRSOH¶47 7KLVGHPRQVWUDWHGWKH0R'¶VPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQg of the regional 
press. 
 
Poor facilities and a lack of understanding and co-operation were not only reserved for 
British journalists. MoDPR did not permit foreign journalists to travel with the Task Force, 
despite many desperate representations to the Press Office. The decision had considerable 
benefits, but some serious drawbacks. By limiting journalists to those of British origin, the 
MoD ensured the war would be reported with a pro-British slant. In a conversation with 
Hudson and Stanier, Margaret Thatcher told the authors: µ:HFHUWDLQO\GLGQ¶WZDQWDQ\
IRUHLJQHUVUHSRUWLQJZKDWZHZHUHGRLQJGRZQWKHUH¶48 Not only did the decision ensure 
pro-British reporting of the war, it also made censorship of the journalists an easier task to 
administer.49 In a summary of the criticisms levelled at the Ministry, it was noted that 
µ02'DSSDUHQWO\XQDZDUHRIWKHQHHGVDQGLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHPHGLDLQDIUHHGHPRFUDWLF
society; MOD lacked will to overcome the problems and difficulties experienced by 
media¶50  
 
This thesis contends that MoDPR, at the beginning of the war, lacked the suitable 
apparatus to work proficiently, which prohibited an efficient formulation of policy. It was 
the unhappy coincidence of time which dictated that when the conflict broke there was no 
permanent head at the helm of the department. The fact that there was no experienced 
professional to take charge meant that policy was thrashed out at the beginning of the 
conflict, then adapted haphazardly as the crisis progressed. The situation was made more 
severe by the fact that the PUS - without a specific role to fulfil in the ministry whilst the 
CoS handled military aspects of the campaign - assumed control of information policy. The 
senior Civil Service echelons of the PR Department and the PUS lacked experience and 
stamped their amateurish seal on the early policy of the MoD. The situation was 
aggravated by the gagging of Press Officers and the restrictions placed on both the officers 
and the DPRs. A more experienced department might have recognised the need for 
representation of the regional press, or the necessity of briefing and informing the 
international media, yet both requirements were inadequately dealt with by the MoD, 
indicating a considerable lack of understanding. A sufficient starting point for a PR policy 
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for the Falklands might have been a contingency plan for such a crisis. The lack of such a 
plan (or access to it) determined that policy had to be constructed on the spot, in reaction to 
events. PR policy, as devised by MoDPR, suffered from a serious inadequacy. The 
equipment with which policy might be satisfactorily constructed was deficient.  
 
 
2. Initial Policy 
This section contemplates the initial policy put into place by MoDPR and argues that its 
main failing was that it was one-dimensional. It aims to supplement those works which 
touch only lightly on media policy, by examining initial policy in detail ± how it was 
formulated and what it was. Having established that the tools and machinery necessary to 
produce a successful media policy were not in place at the MoD in April 1982, evaluation 
of the policy which MoDPR did develop is obligatory. There was one dimension to policy 
during the first week of the conflict; journalists should be sent with the Task Force. Whilst 
the co-ordination of the procedure to send journalists with the Task Force was critical, the 
lack of consideration for how the MoD might handle relations with the media in Britain 
whilst the Task Force sailed demonstrated the 0R'¶VLQDELOLW\WRJUDVSWKHSRWHQWLDOof 
both the crisis and the British media.  
 
The poor consideration of PR policy at the start of the Falklands campaign, it has been 
argued, cemented the difficulties which would later arise. Hastings and Jenkins wrote, in 
WKHLUµLQVWDQWKLVWRU\¶RIWKHZarWKDWµPRVWRIWKHGLVDJUHHPHQWVZKLFKIROORZHGEHWZHHQ
the Ministry of Defence and the media both at sea and at home were the product of the lack 
of a considered policy or plan for the reporting of a British war¶51 There were two aspects 
of policy concerQLQJWKH7DVN)RUFHMRXUQDOLVWVZKLFKUHTXLUHGWKH0R'¶VLPPHGLDWH
attention. Communications with the Fleet would have to be explored in order to enable the 
WUDQVPLVVLRQRIMRXUQDOLVWV¶FRS\RUEURDGFDVWVDQGDIRUPRIFHQVRUVKLSZRXOGKDYHWREH
implemented in order to ensure no operational details were conveyed.  
 
The British Government had two significant factors working in its favour when the Fleet 
set sail: the MoD had complete control of the warzone; and only British correspondents 
would be travelling with the Task Force. The Falkland Islands are over 8,000 miles from 
Britain. For access to the islands, correspondents were completely at the mercy of the 
MoD. It might have been possible for the media to try to reach the Falklands 
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independently, but when Britain announced the Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) around 
the Falklands on 7 April, it served to deter any real efforts to reach the Falklands. The only 
non-British reporters to set foot on the islands during the conflict were the Argentine media 
representatives their Forces had brought with them to report on the successful 
µHPDQFLSDWLRQ¶RIWKHLVOHV,79¶V News at Ten HYHQUHSRUWHGGXULQJWKHFRQIOLFWWKDWµ,Q
the same way that Britain has refused to allow foreign journalists to travel with the British 




Figure 2.1: Still of an Argentine reporter on the Falklands53 
 
2a. Communication  
Robert Fox, correspondent on the Falklands for BBC Radio, said that the MoD were 
lucky in that they had the three ingredients to manage the media in a campaign: 
µDFFUHGLWDWLRQDFFHVVDQGRXWOHWFRQWURO¶54 &RQWURORIWKHRXWOHWE\ZKLFKMRXUQDOLVWV¶
material would be transmitted was addressed from two angles: censorship of copy, and 
communication of that copy. The first issue addressed was how the journalists were to 
communicate with their organisations at home. The literature on the Falklands and the 
PHGLDLVVDWXUDWHGZLWKDFFRXQWVRIWKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQV¶IDFLOLWLHVRQERDUGYHVVHOVDQG
the difficulties the journalists faced in getting their material back to the UK. This thesis 
need not dwell on the issue save to outline the key issues which arose.55 Pressmen were 
DEOHWRILOHWKHLUFRS\E\VLJQDO:KLOHWKHVLJQDOVZHUHJUDGHGµSULRULW\¶ORZHUWKDQD
µIODVK¶VLJQDOEXWDERYHµURXWLQH¶VLJQDOVKDGWREHW\SHGE\WKHVKLSV¶6LJQDO2IILFHUV
-RXUQDOLVWV¶FRSy was, in addition, constantly competing with military signals which 
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needed to be sent. Communications were poor for the military also. On 20 May 
CINCFLEET sent a signal to the main Task Group informing them that: 
 
1. ...THERE ARE NOW ONE THOUSAND PRIORITY AND ROUTINE SIGNALS AWAITING 
TRANSMISSION ON THE SHIP BROADCASTS AT WHITEHALL COMMCEN 
2. IN GENERAL TERMS FLASH AND IMMEDIATE TRAFFIC IS GETTING ON TO THE 
WHITEHALL BROADCASTS BUT PRIORITY AND ROUTINE TRAFFIC AT A STANDSTILL AND 
BUILDING UP FAST 
3. IT IS CLEARLY IN THE INTERESTS OF OP CORPORATE TO KEEP ALL SIGNAL TRAFFIC TO A 
MINIMUM 
4. SHIPS PASS TO EMBARKED FORCES.56 
 
Radio reporters were reliant on a system of maritime telecommunications satellites 
(MARISAT), which was able to transmit voice reports and went directly to the 
broadcasting organisation to which the reporter belonged in parallel with the MoD. Not 
every ship had a MARISAT telephone installed. It was an insecure system ± one Navy 
signals expert saiGWKDWµDQ\ERG\ with a satellite dish can listen to what is going to and fro 
RQWKHV\VWHP<RXMXVWSRLQWWKHGLVFWRZDUGVWKHVDWHOOLWHDQG\RXFDQOLVWHQLQ¶57 Because 
MARISAT was not secure, most of the Navy vessels did not have access to it ± only auxiliary 
vessels did. Given, however, that the journalists were onboard naval vessels the majority of 
the time, they often had to hitch lifts and rely on the good will of pilots to transport them 
± or a recording of them - to an appropriate vessel. Television reporters were forced to file 
voice reports also, since the facility for transmitting images was not available. For radio 
and print journalists the MoD had a clear-cut option as to how the journalists might 
transmit their copy. Their policy, in this respect, was dictated for them. There was no way 
to improve communications for those media, since the vessels had left Britain and there 
was no opportunity to, for instance, fit the aircraft carriers with MARISAT.  
 
There were efforts, particularly in the first week of April, to provide facilities to transmit 
television images. McDonald met with the Editors of ITN and BBC TV News on 3 April. It 
was at this meeting that it was decided that each broadcasting company might send one 
reporter each, both of whom would be served by a shared cameraman and sound recordist. 
An ITN engineer would be permitted to travel with HMS Hermes in order to test the 
Shipborne Communications Terminal (SCOT) V\VWHP¶VVXLWDELOLW\$WDIXUWKHUPHHWLQJRQ
8 April McDonald agreed that two television engineers might be permitted access to the 
operational satellite earth station at RAF base, Oakhanger. On 14 May a technical conference 
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was held at which ITN and BBC were present under the chairmanship of Commander Peter 
Longhurst with the staff of Royal Signals and Radar Establishment, Defford.58 When it 
became clear that the SCOT system would only relay black and white images at the expense 
of all military traffic for a duration of 20 minutes or more, ITN ordered their engineer 
onboard Hermes home.   
 
One issue which has provoked disagreement amongst the academic community is whether 
the obstacles which prevented the successful transmission of television pictures were a 
UHVXOWRIJHQXLQHORJLVWLFDOSUREOHPVRUE\0R'35¶VUHOXFWDQFHWRGHOLYHr the facilities 
which would have enabled moving images to be transmitted back from the Fleet. Susan 
Carruthers proposed that the circumstance the journalists found themselves in was 
µsuggestive of at least as good a measure of cock-up as conspiracy on the PLOLWDU\¶VSDUW¶59 
)RVWHURQWKHRWKHUKDQGDUJXHGWKDWWKH0R'¶VLQIRUPDWLRQSROLF\GXULQJWKH)DONODQGV
ZDV µIRVWHUHG LQSDUWE\ WKHPLOLWDU\DQG VDQFWLRQHGE\ WKH JRYHUQPHQWZDVDSROLF\RI
SURSDJDQGD¶ DQG WKXVDQ LQWHQWLRQDOO\REWUXVLYHRQH60 Stephen Badsey believes that the 
XQGHUO\LQJSUREOHPZDVµDODFNRISROLWLFDOZLOO¶61  
 
Television images proved to be the most contentious aspect of communication from the 
Task Force. For the first 52 days of the 74 day conflict, no images of the war were 
transmitted. By the time victory was sealed, only three batches of film had reached 
London.62 Of all MoD input in communications policy in the first week of the war, the 
MoD put the most effort into securing facilities for TV images. The other way in which the 
MoD acted in order to secure a lasting policy was to invent a system of censorship which 
would apply to material being communicated back from the Fleet. Prior to the accreditation 
of Task Force journalists, there was no arrangement for, or agreement to, censorship. Only 
television crews had been subject to any prior agreement. They would have to pool their 
material as a condition of their authorisation to travel. 
 
2b. Censorship 
There was no coherent policy concerning censorship which endured the length of the 
FRQIOLFW0R'¶VLQLWLDOSROLF\LQFOXGHGsome guidelines on how best to manage the media 
delegation aboard the Task Force ± but well-thought-out parameters were not instituted. 
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advice from senior military staff¶63 :KHQWKH)OHHWVHWVDLOµ7KHUHZHUHQRZULWWHQ
LQVWUXFWLRQVRQKRZWKHYHWWLQJVKRXOGEHGRQH«¶64 This meant that rules had to be 
concocted domestically by MoDPR, then relayed to the Task Force. It was clear that 
information transmitted from the Task Force would have to be monitored to ensure that 
operational details were not conveyed, but a system to achieve this was non-existent. 
McDonald met with the DPRs to discuss how scrutiny of copy might best be implemented. 
He also met with the CoSµ«we ourselves, and the Chiefs of Staff, were working out what 
to do; there was no absolute plan at that stage, it was being formulated¶65 In addition to 
this, just after the Task Force departed, Sir Arthur Hockaday, Second Permanent Under-
Secretary of State, the Directors of Service Security and a member of the secretariat had a 
meeting to put together proposals on censorship ± the outcome of which was that vetting of 
the Task Force journalists should be established and that it was advised that military 
representatives with the Task Force should be the ones to vet copy.66  
 
During the weekend of 3 April, the issue of who would be sent to oversee the journalists 
had been provocative. In a similarly chaotic and hectic fashion to that in which the 
journalists were deployed, so too were the Press Officers accompanying the Task Force. 
The Daily Mail IHOWLQWKDWWKH352VµZHUHOLWHUDOO\SOXFNHGIURPWKHIRXUPRVW
senior men on duty in the Press Office and told to pack their bags ready to sail¶67 
However, the process was a little more complex. A senior ministry official involved in the 
organisation of the PR 7HDPWROG0RUULVRQDQG7XPEHUWKDWµFirst of all there was no 
question of sending any of the service PROs because their rank alone would have meant 
WKDW\RX¶GFKRVHQD1DY\PDQDFDSWDLQ$QGLIZH¶GVHQWWKH$UP\PDQ\RX¶GKDYHKDGD
brigadier landing on the Falklands with a brigadier in charge of the operation. So we 
decided to go for [civilian] PR staff¶68 In addition to this, a Senior Information Officer 
(IO) at the MoD, who had volunteered to go, told Mercer et al. WKDWµ,DQZDVFRQYLQFHGWKH
PHGLDZDUZRXOGEHIRXJKWLQ/RQGRQDQGWKDW¶VZKHUHKHZDQWHGKLVVHQLRUPHQ¶69  In 
the event, because of the preliminary worries concerning the potential clash of ranks, no 
military Information Officers were sent by MoDPR to the South Atlantic. Six civilian 
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Public Relations Officers travelled south (one was forced to leave at Ascension Island, so 
only five travelled south from there).70 As Freedman notes, the PROs, who became known 
DVWKHµPLQGHUV¶KDGµOLNHWKHMRXUQDOLVWVEHHQVHQWZLWKRXWSURSHUSUHSDUDWLRQRU
briefings, and also found themselves caught between the need to support the work of the 
journalists and preventing the wrong sort of disclosure¶71 The minders were to become one 
RIWKHPRVWFRQWURYHUVLDODVSHFWVRIWKH7DVN)RUFHMRXUQDOLVWV¶H[SHULHQFHLQWKH6RXWK
Atlantic.72 As civilians, they knew little of military matters. As MoD PROs, they were used 
to a less demanding role and lacked knowledge of the media and their requirements.73 
 
It was decided that the minders ZRXOGQRWEHWKHRQHVWRYHWFRS\DVSHU+RFNDGD\¶V
recommendations, it was the senior Servicemen onboard who were to be the censors. This 
meant that on naval vessels the Commanding Officer (CO), the Captain of the ship, would 
EHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUYHWWLQJMRXUQDOLVWV¶FRS\$VLJQDOVHQWWRthe Fleet on 27 April from 
CINCFLEET made the situation very clear: µ:+ILE EMBARKED MOD PR OFFICERS 
ARE TO GIVE REGULAR GUIDANCE TO THE PRESS IAW REF B PARAS 6 AND 7, 
THEY ARE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY. SCRUTINY OF PRESS 
MATERIAL LEAVING SHIPS IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDING 
OFFICERS¶74 The immense pressure of having to perform the role of censor, on top of 
that which the captain was actually trained for - the role of a captain sailing his ship 
towards war - meant that relations between captains and the media on the passage south 
was less than amicable. The situation altered, however, when the campaign became a land 
operation.75 
 
No historian has ever directed concentrated attention to the issue of how censorship policy 
altered throughout the campaign, though almost all who have devoted time to the subject 
judge that it was inconsistent and crippling.76 7KHXVHRIµFHQVRUVKLS¶DVDWHUPLQUHODWLRQ
to the Falklands War is somewhat problematic. The House of Commons Defence 
&RPPLWWHHFRXOGQRWGHILQLWLYHO\MXGJHWKDWµFHQVRUVKLS¶WRRNSODFHLQWKH)DONODQGV 
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It appears to us that during the Falklands Campaign there was no clear view as to whether the 
procedures which applied to clearing material for publication could properly be termed censorship 
or whether they were a hybrid form of vetting in part accepted voluntarily by the media.77 
 
In this thesis the term is used in relation to the conflict without reluctance. The definition 
of the word states that material which is to be published is subject to scrutiny ± any 
VHFWLRQVRILWZKLFKDUHFRQVLGHUHGµREVFHQHSROLWLFDOO\XQDcceptable or a threat to 
VHFXULW\¶DUHVXSSUHVVHG78 Material subjected to vetting procedures in the Falklands had 
references to units, the weather, locations and names concealed because of the threat to 
security. And issues of tone and taste were regularly the reasoning behind the suppression 
of sections of copy. The term is thus used freely in this thesis. 
 
&HQVRUVKLSZDVLQWURGXFHGZLWKLQDGD\RIWKHDLUFUDIWFDUULHUV¶GHSDUWXUHIURP
Portsmouth. The HCDC publication included a copy of a signal sent to the Task Force, 
apparently on 8 April. It was most simply a 10-point guide as to which matters were to be 
DYRLGHGZKHQµ7$/.,1*7225%(,1*29(5+($5'%<35(66«¶79 However, the 
same signal content was actually sent two days earlier. According to the information 
submitted by the MoD to the HCDC, the communication of 8 April was sent from 
MODUK NAVY to CINCFLEET and CINCNAVHOME (to the Commander-in-Chief 
Fleet, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, and to Commander-in-Chief Naval Home Command, 
Admiral Sir Arthur Desmond Cassidi). This information has formed the basis of some 
SURPLQHQWZRUNV¶DUJXPHQWV)RUH[DPSOHThe Fog of War argues that the guidelines sent 
to the Task Force regarding PR policy allowed for inconsistencies and were open to 
interpretation and, most crucially, that not everyone who was to be involved in the 
FHQVRUVKLSRIMRXUQDOLVWV¶FRS\ZHUHVHQWWKHJXLGHOLQHV80 However, the archives provide 
evidence that there were, contrary to the information supplied by the MoD to the HCDC, 
two signals sent on 6 April regarding PR policy. The first, instructed the PR staff embarked 
RQO\RQWKH&DUULHU%DWWOH*URXS&7*WKDWµ7+(DEPUTY FLEET PRO, 
CINCFLEET STAFF, IS THE PRINCIPAL ADVISOR TO CTG 317.8. HE HAS 
OVERALL PROFESSIONAL CHARGE AND DIRECTION OF ALL MOD PR STAFF 
EMBARKED AND IS THE LIAISON OFFICER FOR CIVILIAN JOURNALISTS IN 
THE GROUP¶81 The document listed only four of the six PROs (missing Graeme 
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Hammond on Hermes and Allan George, due to travel with SS Canberra). The Deputy 
Fleet PRO was Robin Barrett, who held the title in the United Kingdom (UK) of Deputy 
Head of Public Relations at HQ, Northwood. Unfortunately, Barrett was forced to leave the 
Task Force at Ascension Island due to a nervous breakdown ± thought to have been 
provoked by professional stress.82 There were two implications of this for PR in the South 
AtlanticWKDWWKHSROLF\RIRQHµPLQGHU¶DVVXPLQJFRQWUROLQWKH6RXWK$WODQWLFZDVQHYHU
actually applied; and that for more than two weeks during the campaign the Commander 
Task Group and Flag Officer, Rear $GPLUDO-RKQµ6DQG\¶:RRGZDUGKDGQRSUHVVDGYLser 
or MoD35SUHVHQFHRQERDUGWKHVHZRXOGWXUQRXWWREHWKHZHHNVLQZKLFK:RRGZDUG¶V
opinion of his media contingent would be shaped).  
 
The second signal communicated to the Fleet on 6 April was the same as detailed in the 
HCDC, but sent two days earlier. It provided 10 basic guidelines or points of information 
ZKLFKVWUHVVHGWKHQHHGIRUµWLJKWVHFXULW\¶DQGJDYHDGYLFHWRDYRLGJLYLQJLnformation to 
the media.83 Where the difference in signals became particularly problematic was with 
regard to the address to which it should be sent. As stated, a central tenet of Mercer et al.¶V
work was based on the premise that the signal detailing guidelines was not sent to 
everyone involved. The copy of the signal contained in the archives proves that not only 
was it sent on 6 April, but it was also sent from CINCFLEET, on 9 April, to 28 vessels.84 
 
Although policy might not have been effective and lasting, it is clear that a policy of sorts 
was created over the first week of the conflict. This policy would lead to inconsistencies, 
errors and inaccuracies throughout the whole campaign. Policy did alter later in the 
campaign, though largely it was in reaction to the dire situation which emerged in the 
South Atlantic. One thing historians are agreed on is that discrepancies with regard to 
censorship were promoted by the fact that guidelines were open to interpretation. Mercer et 
al. HYHQSRLQWHGRXWWKDWµWKe guidelines made it difficult to know what reporters could 
publish if the MoD signal was interpreted literally¶85 Morrison and Tumber pointed out 
WKDWFRQVLGHULQJWKH352VKDGOLWWOHRUQRRSHUDWLRQDONQRZOHGJHLWZDVµDOOWKHPRUH
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difficult for them to make consistent decisions¶86 Valerie Adams touches on this subject 
also in her 1986 work, The Media and the Falklands Campaign.87 Indeed, there were 10 
subjects which should be avoided according to the MoD including tactics, equipment and 
communications (see Appendix Six). 88 
 
It has been argued that µ«JXLGHOLQHVUHPDLQHGODUJHO\DVWKH\KDGEHHQFRQFHLYHGRQ
$SULO¶KRZHYHUSROLF\GLGDOWHUWKURXJKRXWWKHFRXUVHRIWKHFRQIOLFWEXWPRVWO\LQ
reaction WRDQHYHQWRUFRPSODLQWRULQGHHGWKH0LQLVWU\¶VRZQGLVFRPIRUWDWWKH
situation.89 The MoD demonstrated a clear disregard for long-term planning ± whether it 
expected war or not, the most prudent move would have been to plan for it.  
 
2c. The Ascension Option 
Another way in which MoDPR failed to consider a durable policy concerns the use of 
Ascension Island (a British-owned island in the mid-Atlantic, leased to the US). MoDPR 
failed to use the island as an asset to PR ± WRERDUGRUGLVHPEDUNMRXUQDOLVWV0F'RQDOG¶V
own preference was reportedly to have the correspondents flown to Ascension to meet the 
Task Force. This option would have allowed over a week for publications and broadcasters 
to select their representative, and for both their organisation and the MoD to brief them 
properly. But, as McDonald pointed out: µ2SHUDWLRQDOO\WKDWZDVQRWRQ«we could not 
take the risk of telling journalists they should wait to get to Ascension Island and then 
finding that we could not get them there¶90 McDonald said that the decision not to send 
journalists to Ascension came from Fieldhouse.91 Fieldhouse countered this: µ,KDYHD
much simpler explanation about why the press were not taken to Ascension to join the 
Task Force, which is that nobody thought of it and nobody asked until it was all over¶92 
Ascension was leased by the British to the United SWDWHV¶86 Air Force. The rationale for 
restricting media-access to the island was that they might report on the sensitive 
operations. Neville Taylor agreed that McDonald had made the right decision, since it was 
the view of the Services that Ascension ZDVWRRµRSHUDWLRQDOO\VHQVLWLYH¶WRKRVW
MRXUQDOLVWVµ7he risk was too great for it to be argued strongly that there should be any 
facilities in Ascension¶93 However, this thesis breaks with convention to add a further 
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option: the real consideration was the view of the US - specifically her view on her own 
correspondents¶SUHVHQFHRQWKHLVODQG.  
 
The decision not to allow journalists on to Ascension was taken at a CoS meeting on 11 
April, the day before the Carrier Group arrived there.94 However, there had been much 
discussion between the Foreign Office, the MoD and the British Ambassador to the US, Sir 
Nicholas Henderson. On the same day that the first wave of journalists left Britain, 
Henderson sent a telegram to MODUK. He advised:  
 
U.S. ABILITY TO HELP US AT ASCENSION ISLAND WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE 
DEGREE OF PUBLICITY GIVEN TO SUCH ASSISTANCE. THE STATE DEPARTMENT 
TOLD US THIS MORNING THAT THIRTY U.S. CORRESPONDENTS WISHED TO FLY TO 
$6&(16,21,6/$1'«95 
 
This message indicated that it was not the British journalists that worrLHG$PHULFD¶V6WDWH
Department, it was the AmerLFDQFRUUHVSRQGHQWV¶SUHVHQFHRQ$VFHQVLRn - those 
journalists who could charter their own transport and were free to write about the Island 
unreservedly and, perhaps, to speculate on American assistance to Great Britain in the face 
of their very public, neutral stance. Britain, it seems, took the potential of US assistance in 
the conflict as an incentive to keep journalists (of all nationalities) off the Island. The 
British Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, replied to Henderson the following day reassuring 
KLPWKDWµ:()8//<6+$5(<285&21&(51$%28T THE NEED TO MAINTAIN 
MAXIMUM SECURITY IN ORDER TO ENSURE CONTINUING AMERICAN 
COOPERATION¶96 Further to this, on 16 April, the OD(SA) heard that µ,QRUGHUWRDYRLG
embarrassment with the Americans, every effort was being made to minimise publicity for 
milLWDU\DFWLYLW\LQYROYLQJ$VFHQVLRQ,VODQG¶97 Just how significant the American media 
were to the decision not to allow British journalists on the Falklands can be inferred from a 
conversation held between the Prime Minister and Alexander Haig, Secretary of State for 
the US on 14 April. Despite American and British journalists being denied access to the 
YROFDQLFLVODQG+DLJFRPSODLQHGLPPHGLDWHO\RIDµGLIILFXOWFRPSOLFDWLRQ¶UHJDUGLQJ
$VFHQVLRQµ7he news reporting here in Washington alleging unusual American support for 
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*UHDW%ULWDLQLQLQWHOOLJHQFHDQGRSHUDWLRQDOPDWWHUV¶98 The second call that day between 
the FRXSOHVDZ+DLJUHIHUWRµYHU\PLVFKLHYRXVSUHVVUHSRUWV¶DQGWKHLUDOOHJDWLRQV99  
 
Other historians have highlighted the ludicracy of the Ascension option being discounted, 
but have not had access to documents in order to understand why - if, indeed, as Fieldhouse 
doubts, the option was even considered.100 Two other issues serve to demonstrate the 
argument that security concerns were driven by other factors than the MoD purely wishing 
WRPLQLPLVHµULVN¶)LUVWO\LWZDVQRWMXVWFRPPHUFLDOMRXUQDOLVWVZKRZHUHSUHYHQWHGIURP
gaining access to Ascension; the RAF faced a wall of obstacles in April 1982 when trying 
to get one of its IOs on to the island to pen an article for the RAF News. According to 
0HUFHUHWDODWKLVILUVWDWWHPSWKHZDVHYLFWHGE\WKH,VODQG¶VQDYDO&RPPDQGHU101 
Secondly, three journalists did in fact pass through Ascension to join or leave the Task 
Force. It is commonly supposed that two journalists left the Task Force between 
Portsmouth and Ascension ± the actual figure was three. Peter Archer of Press Association 
(PA) was flown home within 24 hours of leaving Britain. Martin Lowe of the 
Wolverhampton Express and StarRSWHGWROHDYHDW$VFHQVLRQ$UFKHU¶VUHSODFHPHQW
5LFKDUG6DYLOOHDOVRRIWKH3$DQG/RZH¶VVXEVWLWXWHIRUWKHSURYLQFLDOV'HUHN+XGVRQ
(Yorkshire Post), were both sent to Ascension to link up with the Fleet.102 Lowe was 
evacuated to Wideawake airfield on the island.103 Three journalists were delivered on to 
and off the island without presenting a security risk to the UK.  
 
3. Conclusion 
In April 1982 the Public Relations Department of the MoD should have faced a crisis for 
which it had a plan, the apparatus to act on it and the internal structure and knowledge to 
be able to effectively see out its design. In practice, though, MoDPR spent the week 
floundering in reaction to the news of the invasion, and trying to get journalists ± any 
journalists ± onboard the Fleet. This thesis contends that there were four significant reasons 
why the MoD was ill-prepared in April 1982; firstly, despite the existence of the 1977 
plans to which MoDPR did not have access, there were two additional plans in the draft 
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stage which would have been applicable to the circumstances. Secondly, MoDPR had no 
permanent head. The ACPR was not a seasoned professional and had little PR experience, 
thus policy was formulated and operated by an apprentice, not a master. The third way in 
which the MoD was poorly prepared for the conflict was perhaps a consequence of the 
second: people who were not proficient in PR assumed direction of policy. Cooper took 
control of PR matters from the start of the crisis principally because the war machinery of 
Government absorbed his regular responsibilities. The situation was exacerbated by the 
fact that those with tangible PR experience were excluded from policy decisions, as well as 
from speaking to the press, and were denied access to information. Finally, MoDPR proved 
to the media, during the accreditation process, that those managing policy had little 
working knowledge of the media. The rush of events during the first week of April has had 
a lasting effect for historians of the conflict, since there is an acute shortage of documents 
which emanated from MoDPR.  
 
During the formation of policy there was one major mistake for which the MoD was 
culpable - PR policy had only one dimension: it neglected the media in Britain and only 
considered the Task Force journalists. The policy which was born of the first week in April 
was one constructed to deal with the practicalities of carrying 29 journalists 8,000 miles 
towards an imminent warzone. As Carruthers, Trevor Royle and Phillip Knightley have 
pointed out in their work on the Falklands, the MoD had the advantage when it came to 
forming policy on the Task Force and the media.104 7KH0R'FRQWUROOHGWKHPHGLD¶V
access to the warzone, it had control over which journalists could accompany British 
Forces (thus correspondents were all British and the majority of the contingent represented 
national organisations) and, it had control over the means of communication: not only 
could the MoD vet copy, but it dictated how and when, indeed, if, copy would be 
transmitted back to Britain. Accordingly, there were two initial strands to media policy ± 
censorship and communication policy.  
 
Communication with the Task Force was at the forefront of MoD consciousness. Because 
the facilities to transmit written copy were available on all naval and commercial vessels 
with the Fleet, and audio communication could be transmitted via MARISAT on 
commercial vessels (mostly the auxiliary vessels), there was one avenue which the MoD 
explored further: the transmission of television images. Despite arguments from many 
journalists and subsequently, historians, that the MoD failed to facilitate the broadcast of 
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TV images from the Fleet to serve its own interest in keeping violent scenes away from the 
concerned British public, efforts were made to establish effective communication early on. 
The practicalities of transmitting television images proved to be insurmountable. There is 
no evidence that the failure to transmit TV images was part of a malicious MoD initiative. 
Quite the reverse; the evidence presented in this thesis implies that until very late in the 
conflict the options were being seriously, and continuously, considered.  
 
Censorship of the media delegation with the Task Force was established as early as 6 
April, when the MoD restricted subjects which servicemen could speak about with, or 
within earshot of, the media.105 7KH0R'¶VSROLF\ZDVWUDQVPLWWHGWRVKLSVRQDQG
April: COs would be responsible for vetting all copy, MoD PROs would guide the Task 
Force journalists and oversee their needs, and there was a list of subjects about which 
speaking was forbidden, as well as the general guidelines noted in this chapter. Despite 
some arguments to the contrary, there was a policy of censorship implemented at the 
beginning of the war. It was not all-encompassing or particularly detailed, but the basic 
premise by which censorship would be performed was established very early in the 
campaign. Thus, at the start of the war, despite being poorly prepared and focusing 
primarily on policy only concerning journalists with the Task Force, MoDPR did roll out a 
PR policy of sorts. It primarily concerned censorship with the Task Force, but efforts were 
certainly made to improve communication with the Fleet. The development of early policy, 
and policy in general, has been neglected in much of the literature. However, the following 
chapters discuss how policy towards both the Task Force and the British domestic media 
changed over the course of the conflict. 
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The MoD and PR Policy in the South Atlantic 
 
 
The only line of policy which was pursued by MoDPR in the first week of the Falklands 
crisis was that concerning the Task Force journalists. The focus of this chapter is the 
VXEVHTXHQWSXEOLFUHODWLRQV¶SROLF\LPSOHPHQWHGLQWKH6RXWK$WODQWLF,WLVWKHFRQWHQWLRQ
of this thesis that there were two distinct features to MoD35¶V6RXWK$WODQWLFSROLF\
policy regarding censorship; and policy involving the reporting of incidents from the 
warzone.  
 
The PR instructions contained in signals to the Fleet between 6 and 9 April (as outlined in 
the previous chapter) were to remain in place as the principal form of guidelines for the 
Force until halfway through the coQIOLFW,WZLOOEHDVVHUWHGWKDWWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V
censorship policy was fraught with problems which led to inconsistencies in the reporting 
of news. Those who were ill-qualified to administer public relations policy were already in 
place, not only in MoDPR, but also in the South Atlantic. It will also be disputed that, 
contrary to the dominant line of argument, MoDPR transferred a large degree of power to 
WKRVHKDQGOLQJ35LQWKH6RXWK$WODQWLFE\DOORZLQJWKHFLYLOLDQµPLQGHUV¶DVZHOODVERWK
military PROs and their commanders, a considerable amount of autonomy to sculpt PR 
policy from the frontline.  
 
For MoDPR, a higher priority than censorship policy was that in connection with incident 
reporting. In May MoDPR embarked on a re-evaluation of PR policy, specifically that 
relating to how major incidents were reported from the Task Force. Commentators have 
argued that the sinking of the Argentine fishing vessel, Narwhal, was the significant factor 
LQ0R'35¶VGHFLVLRQWRUHassess policy.1 This chapter proposes that it was not, in fact, the 
sinking of the Narwhal which prompted a change in policy. Policy concerning the 
reporting of incidents was a priority long before 9 May, when Narwhal was sunk. More 
attention was paid to policy concerning incident reporting than to censorship for two 
reasons: incident reporting affected the MoD more directly than censorship, and MoDPR, 
by May 1982, had become embroiled in an additional battle with the Argentines ± the 
battle for media credibility. 
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The most thorough account of the PR strategies of the MoD was provided by Mercer et al. 
LQ$FKDSWHURQµ7KH*RYHUQPHQW¶ discusses general PR policy throughout the 
conflict.2 While the literature is enhanced by this assessment of policy, it is without a 
detailed analysis of the instructions sent to the Fleet and the policy which MoDPR 
developed in response to the worsening situation in the South Atlantic. No other history of 
the media and the Falklands has contributed a thorough analysis of the signal traffic to and 
from the Task Force in an attempt to decipher the exact policy applied by MoDPR. In 
addition, none has offered a comprehensive assessment of policy - and the incentives 
which drove it. This history benefits from a plethora of source material. This chapter 
specifically profits from newly-released archival records and interview material. It makes 
use of original interview material with those who played integral parts in applying PR 
policy, but who were not questioned by the HCDC. The archival records of signals sent to 
the Task Force, and internal MoD documentation, provide a solid foundation from which 
to consider who ran PR policy, who created it, why they created it and how it was 
implemented.  
 
1. Control of Policy 
Before embarking on analysis of the policy disseminated to the Task Force, it is necessary 
to pay attention to the role the military ± rather than the civilians of the MoD ± played in 
policy construction. Only brief discussion is included here, but a more comprehensive 
analysis can be located in Appendix Seven.  
 
The administration departments of the MoD were, by and large, based in Whitehall. The 
Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) were based at Northwood, a former RAF coastal 
command in the suburbs of London. Since C-in-C, Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, had his 
own headquarters at PJHQ, Northwood became the commanding HQ for the operation to 
retake the Falklands.  
 
Task Force journalists, and subsequent literature, has accused those running the war from 
Northwood of also running a private campaign against the journalists. Nicholson, of ITN, 
wrote: 
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aboard Hermes and her sister carrier Invincible.3 
 
Fox also identified Northwood as dictating procedure.4 Indeed, to many of the journalists 
who gave evidence to the HCDC, Northwood appeared to be the main executor of policy 
and essentially, the one running the show. One reason Northwood was viewed as managing 
policy was because most signals originated there. The sign for C-in-C at Northwood, 
µCINCFLEET¶, was on many, if not the majority, of the signals transmitted to the Task 
Force containing instructions or guidance on PR.5 Major General Jeremy Moore, 
Commander of the Land Forces, claimed that all instructions on PR µZHUHLVVXHGIURPWKH
)OHHW+HDGTXDUWHUV«¶6 The origin of signals gave the overall impression that South 
Atlantic PR policy was developed and orchestrated by Northwood. However, in reality, 
1RUWKZRRG¶VUROHZDVOLPLWHG 
 
MoDPR and Northwood clashed over a number of issues regarding policy. The two central 
reasons for tension were: firstly, a lack of machinery to allow for smooth communication 
between the departments; secondly, information from the South Atlantic was not 
transmitted through Northwood to MoDPR in sufficient time or in enough detail.7  
Typically, the role of Northwood in PR has been emphasised because of its unique position 
LQWKHµFKDLQRIFRPPDQG¶8 The most thorough appraisal of the chain was contributed by 
Mercer et al.9 There were two significant implications of the existing chain of command on 
policy; that information contained in signals was often not disseminated to the appropriate 
personnel; and that the majority of information relayed from the Task Force was 
communicated directly with CINCFLEET ± and then had to be separately communicated 
from Northwood to the MoD.10 
 
2. PR Policy and the Task Force: Incident Reporting 
The chain of command seriously affected the transmission of information to the MoD. 
Communication of news or updates from the South Atlantic was to become an issue which 
afflicted the MoD throughout the whole campaign. It is the position of this chapter that 
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 Nicholson, p.215. 
4
 Fox, pp.9-10. 
5
 Fieldhouse, HCDC, v.ii, p.350, q.1432. 
6
 J. Moore, HCDC, v.ii, p.281, q.1109. 
7
 See Appendix Seven. 
8
 Morrison and Tumber, pp.8-10.; Freedman, v.ii, pp.409-410. 
9
 Mercer et al., pp.96-103. 
10
 See Appendix Seven for more details on these factors. 
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there were two lines of Task Force-related policy which MoDPR pursued throughout the 
course of the conflict. The first of which concerned the reporting of military incidents. 
MoD was anxious about the procedure for reporting events from the warzone. The sooner 
MoDPR received information, the sooner it could adapt, ascertain whether the news should 
be released, and prepare statements or press conferences. 
 
The two priorities relating to South Atlantic policy - incident reporting and censorship ± 
did not carry the same significance for the MoD during the war. There was one subject 
which dominated policy, and remained in the forefront of the minds of those in MoDPR. 
Incident reporting had precedence over any other issue concerning the reporting of the war. 
The accurate and timely reporting of incidents or events was crucial to the successful 
presentation of the conflict. There was one reason it attracted so much attention within the 
MoD: efficient incident reporting had an overt effect on the ministry and the maintenance 
of British public support. 
 
2a. MoD Credibility 
The credibility of the MoD, nationwide and internationally, was called into question by 
inaccurate reporting of events and by the fact that Argentina was often able to release news 
before the British. During the campaign the MoD was dogged by inaccurate, or piecemeal, 
information. This led, on occasion, to incorrect information being released.  There was one 
crucially significant instance during the war in which the MoD struggled to have 
information confirmed by Northwood or by the Fleet. When, on 9 May, the Narwhal was 
captured by British Special Forces, the news of its capture was released before all the facts 
had been obtained. Suspected of carrying out intelligence operations for the Argentine 
Forces, the Narwhal had been given a warning to leave the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) 
and return home 10 days earlier.11 The TEZ had come into force on 30 April, the 
consequence of which was that any aircraft or sea-going vessel which entered the zone was 
liable to attack from the British forces.  A memo, distributed within the MoD the day after 
the event, showed that the announcement was made with only confirmation from 
CINCFLEET that an attack had taken place.12 The attack occurred at 1230GMT. 
&RQILUPDWLRQRIµWKHDWWDFN¶ZDVJLYHQE\&,1&)/((7DW30.13 A statement was made 
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at 1800 that the ship had been captured with no casualties or loss of life.14 At 1830GMT, 
Reuters carried a report from the Argentine official press agency, Telam, claiming that 
British planes had returned to strafe lifeboats when the crew had abandoned ship. It was 
not until 1950, when the MoD spoke to the Fleet, that it knew casualties had been 
sustained. A later statement at 2100 alleged that that Narwhal had been hit, but that there 
ZHUHQRFDVXDOWLHVµDPRQJWKHSULVRQHUV¶+RZHYHU later, MoD rechecked with 
&,1&)/((7WREHWROGWKDW1DY\2SVKDGUHFHLYHGµLQGLFDWLRQVWKDWWKHVWDWHPHQWPDGHDW
PLJKWQRWEHFRUUHFW¶15 Copy from journalists with the Task Force confirmed that 
one man had died and that there were 12 casualties, one of whom had serious injuries. At 
2350GMT, a statement was put out which was checked by the Secretary of State. However, 
even at this time, the MoD µhad still not received signal confirmation of the action and the 
FDVXDOWLHVIURPWKH7DVN)RUFH¶16 The early release of inaccurate news in this instance 
damaged the credibility of the MoD, especially when conflicting information from 
Argentina proved accurate. 
 
The issue of credibility was to prove to be a major consideration of the MoD over the weeks 
that the crisis lasted. The credibility of the British Government had been questioned from 
the beginning of the crisis 0XFK KDV EHHQ ZULWWHQ RQ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI WKH 0LQLVWU\¶V
credibility and its battle to maintain it.17 Patricia Karl argued that the credibility of the 
Government as a whole had been damaged before the conflict even started, since the British 
attempted to out-bluff Argentina when she looked set to invade.18 7KH0R'¶VFUHGLELOLW\
was affected as early as the first days of the crisis when it caused uproar by failing to correct 
reports that HMS Superb (a nuclear-powered submarine) had sailed for the Falklands.19 In 
reality she was destined for Faslane, news which was released by the MoD on 16 April.20 
 
The credibility of the MoD was important because it constituted a considerable advantage 
RYHUWKH$UJHQWLQHV)UHHGPDQMXGJHGWKDWWKHUDWLRQDOHEHKLQG0R'WKLQNLQJZDVWKDWµRQ
balance it was better to make a thin announcement early (particularly before the Argentines) 
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 McDonald, 9 May, TNA, Argentina. The Falklands crisis: visit of the Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs to New York; the Peruvian peace initiative; sinking of HMS Sheffield; continuing 
dialogue with the United States Secretary of State, PREM19/624 f.142. 
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 See: Adams, p.65.; Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, p.77.; Eds. Eddy et al., p.211.; Freedman, v.ii, 
p.461. 
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than a fuller one later¶21 The British media was sceptical of Argentine information, 
particularly when Argentine claims appeared ludicrous. The British media reported on 
$UJHQWLQD¶VIDQFLIXOFODLPVWKDWIRUH[DPSOHWKH$UJHQWLQH)OHHWKDGsunk HMS Invincible. 
The Daily Mirror XQHDUWKHGWKLVDVWKHµ%,**(67/,(2)7+(:$5¶DQGThe Sun pointed 
RXW µ*/$5,1*(55256¶ 22 The Daily Telegraph RXWOLQHGDQXPEHURIµ+(,*+762)
)$17$6<¶DVZHOODVµ',67O57('1(:6,1$5*(17,1$¶23 
 
2b. Incident Reporting from the Falklands 
As outlined above, it was essential that incidents were properly and swiftly reported to 
preserve the credibility of the MoD. Thus PR policy was adapted throughout the campaign, 
not to alleviate the considerable problems experienced by the Task Force or their 
contingent of journalists, but to suit the needs of the MoD. There is only one study which 
grapples with the subject of policy: The Fog of War.24 Yet the importance of incident 
reporting policy is neglected. Mercer et al. argue that there was a reorganisation of general 
µSROLF\¶LQ0D\. They attribute this reorganisation simply to the embarrassment 
brought about by the early and incorrect announcements concerning Narwhal¶VFDSWXUH. 
7KLVVWHPVIURPWKHFODLPGXULQJWKH+&'&WKDWµWKHFRQIXVLRQFRQFHUQLQJWKH
announcements on the Narwal [sic] prompted urgent consideration within MoD of incident 
UHSRUWLQJSURFHGXUHV«¶25 Equally, Morrison and Tumber considered that the Narwhal 
H[SHULHQFHKDGSURPSWHGµXUJHQWUHFRQVLGHUDWLRQ«RILWV >0R'¶V@ procedures for reporting 
LQFLGHQWV¶26 This claim is dominant within the historiography of the subject. However, it is 
the contention here that PR policy - expressly policy on incident reporting - was actually 
reassessed before the attack on Narwhal. If there was any event which affected the 
reorganisation of policy, it was the sinking of HMS Sheffield (exacerbated by the sinking 
of the General Belgrano on 2 May). The taking of the Narwhal did not spur reform of PR 
policy. It did, however, add impetus to changes already in place. This work constitutes the 
only thorough assessment on incident reporting systems used during the war. 
 
It has been established that during the Falklands MoDPR suffered from a lack of tangible 
information from the Fleet. After the guidelines of early April, which gave basic 
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instructions for handling the media contingent, there was little communication to the Task 
Force concerning policy issues until the subsequent month. There was, however, on 13 
April, a procedure established for the civil reporting of any military incidents.27 This 
document established the way in which the MoD would be notified of any incident in the 
6RXWK$WODQWLF7KHUHZDVDµQLJKW¶FKDLQDQGDµGD\¶FKDLQ± each time catered for 
appropriately (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). The details of the chain of reporting, however, 
started with the news arriving at CINCFLEET. There were no directions to the Task Force 
and there is no evidence that suggests the Task Force was ever made aware of the existence 
of this chain of reporting. The document, and the subsequent procedure, was provoked by 
McDonald who, in a minute on 11 April declared there would be problems with the 
µPHFKDQLFVRISROLWLFDOFOHDUDQFH¶28 The chain was actually devised, not by a member of 
MoDPR, but by the Acting Private Secretary of Sir John Nott, Nicholas Evans. He 
FRQFHLYHGWKHLGHDDQGVXJJHVWHGLWEHFDXVHµLWZRXOGVHHPWRPHVHQVLEOH¶29 So, as of 13 
April there were some parameters to adhere to when reporting incidents. However, the 
reporting chain laid out on 13 April proved to be inadequate. Cooper felt bound to review 
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Figure 3.2: Diagram to represent the µ1LJKW¶ reporting chain outlined to MoD on 13 April 198231 
  
There was no other reference to incident reporting within, or outside, the MoD, until 22 
April. By then a military campaign was probable ± with the impending recapture of South 
Georgia but days away. Mostly, though, MoDPR lamented the lack of information of 
anything from the Task Force which might attract media attention. On 22 April, McDonald 
told the CoS PHHWLQJWKDWµKHZDVWDNLQJVWHSVWRLPSURYHQRWLILFDWLRQE\WKH7DVN)RUFHRI
major press events, such as the interview given the previous day by the Commander of the 
Task Group of which he had no forewarning¶32  
 
By 22 April the MoD had developed the suspicion that incident reporting may be more 
problematic in the future. Although military incidents as such had not been experienced at 
that time (save the landing of Special Forces on South Georgia which was not publicised), 
incidents which attracted the interest of the media had not been suitably relayed to MoD, or 
MoDPR, in order for them to prepare for the inevitable questions such incidents would 
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2b (i). Incident Reporting: the µ6KHIILHOG¶DQGWKHµ%HOJUDQR¶ 
Between 22 April and the first days of May there was very little done within MoDPR to 
combat these flaws in policy. However, by mid-April incident reporting was certainly on 
the agenda. It was the events of 2-4 May which cemented MoD35¶VEHOLHIWKDWWKHV\VWHP
should be altered. On 2 April the Belgrano was sunk by a torpedo from the submarine, 
HMS Conqueror. The sinking of the Belgrano has attracted much, if not too much, 
attention within the history of the conflict.33 The absence of a proper incident reporting 
system was, in the case of the Belgrano, obvious. Nott made a statement in the Commons 
about the attack on 4 May. A fact not communicated to MoD was that the Belgrano had 
FKDQJHGLWVFRXUVH1RWW¶VVXEVHTXHQWVWDWHPHQWLQWKHHouse claimed that the surface 
group to which the Belgrano EHORQJHGZDVµFORVHWRWKHWRWDOH[FOXVLRQ]RQHDQGZDV
FORVLQJRQHOHPHQWVRIRXUWDVNIRUFH«¶34 The repercussion of inexact information flow 
from Northwood to the MoD was that the Secretary of State, and through him the 
Government, disseminated incorrect information on the campaign. 
 
The issue was compounded two days later when the Argentine air force mounted an attack 
against the British HMS Sheffield. The MoD announced the news of the fate of the 
Sheffield before Northwood and the Fleet desired.35 The Task Force journalists were 
forbidden to transmit copy on the attack. The final way in which the defects of the current 
reporting system were highlighted was the announcement of the news on British television 
before the House of Commons was informed. On 4 May the Sheffield was hit at 1400GMT. 
It was not until 1800GMT WKDWDPHHWLQJZDVFRQYHQHGLQ7KDWFKHU¶VRIILFHLQWKH
Commons in order to decide how best to handle the news. However, by 1940GMT, the 
%%&KDGEHHQLQIRUPHGE\µSROLWLFDOVRXUFHV¶RIWKHQDPHRIWKHVKLSDQGKDGEHHQJLYHQ
an indication of the extent of the damage. The House was in session that evening, but 
instead of making an announcement in the Commons, Nott agreed to allow McDonald to 
JREDFNWRWKH0R'DQGPDNHDVWDWHPHQWRQWKHLQFLGHQW7KH%%&¶V1LQH2¶&ORFN1HZV 
ZDVLQWHUUXSWHGE\WKHSUHVHQWHULQRUGHUWRDLU0F'RQDOG¶VVWDWHPHQWµ6RUU\WRLQWHUUXSW
John Cole there, buWZH¶YHMXVWKHDUGIURPWKH0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFHLQ/RQGRQWKDWWKH\
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announcement confirmed the earlier rumours broadcast. 
 
Those who were in the House of Commons, but who had heard reports of the attack on the 
television, demanded that Nott come back in order to inform the House of the situation. 
Denis Skinner MP VWRRGWRDVNµ$ERXWDQKRXUDJRLWZDVPHQWLRQHGRQWHOHYLVLRQWKDW
one of the British ships, HMS Sheffield, had been destroyed in the South Atlantic. Has the 
Prime Minister indicated whether she intends coming to the House tonight to explain 
SUHFLVHO\ZKDWKDSSHQHG"¶37 Demands grew as MPs awaited news of the vessel. The 
Deputy Speaker instructed the House that a statement might be made the next day, to 
which Leo $EVHLQTXLUHGµZKDWSRVVLEOHFRndition exists to justify the Rt. Hon. 
Gentleman's statement that tomorrow is the day to make a statement and not tonight when 
we are all assembled and when the nation expects a statement from a Minister, so that we 
all know who is responsible, what is to occur and what fresh initiative will take place 
EHIRUHIXUWKHUOLYHVDUHORVW"¶38 It was the commotion in the Commons which provoked 
1RWW¶VUeturn to make a statement at 2300. Nott DQQRXQFHGWKDWµLQWKHFRXUVHRILWVGXWLHV
within the total exclusion zone around the Falkland Islands, HMS Sheffield, a Type 42 
Destroyer, was attacked and hit late this afternoon by an Argentine missile. The ship 
caught fire, which spread out of control¶39 To make matters worse, the MoD had not yet 
put a casualty information cell in place to deal with the tragedy, so many families were 
forced to wait for news of their loved ones. 
 
Both the sinking of the Belgrano and the Sheffield highlighted that incident reporting was 
not running smoothly. The transmission of information in the case of the Belgrano was late 
and unsuitable for the statements and conferences which would have to be made by 
members of the MoD. Nott even announced erroneous facts about the way in which the 
ship was sunk. The Sheffield highlighted a range of different problems encountered by 
MoD, the most significant of which was the fact that MoD had no system for receiving 
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2b (ii). Incident Reporting: the Effect of the µ6KHIILHOG¶DQGWKHµ%HOJUDQR¶ 
Three days after HMS Sheffield was attacked, MoDPR embarked on a large-scale review 
of its incident reporting procedures. On 7 May the PUS, Cooper, requested that the 
department prepare nRWHVRQWKHµFXUUHQWSURFHGXUHVIRUGHDOLQJZLWKUHOHDVHRILQIRUPDWLRQ
DERXWRSHUDWLRQVLQWKH)DONODQG,VODQGVDQGPDNH«UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVDERXWKRZWKH\
PLJKWEHWLJKWHQHGXS¶40 The hope was that the appraisal of existing policy would clear up 
a number of issues. For example, the DS11 Duty Officer should manage the process of 
reporting incidents ± to prevent further embarrassment like that experienced over 
Sheffield.41 The appropriate Service Departments should be PDGHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUµFRYHULQJ
ZHOIDUHDQGSHUVRQQHOFRQVLGHUDWLRQV¶(VVHQWLDOO\WKHVXLWDEOH6HUYLFHZRXOGDVVXPH
control of the casualty reporting system. It was clear by 7 May that incident reporting 
arrangements were inadequate. James Morey Stewart, the Assistant Under-Secretary, 
'HIHQFH6WDIIZDVHIIHFWLYHO\&RRSHU¶VVHFRQGLQFRPPDQG+HZURWHWKDWµFXUUHQW
arrangements are essentially ad hoc and, as a result, delays which are damaging to our 
public case often arise¶.42 Stewart asked in a letter to the PUS whether the MoD might 
consider how EHVWWRHQVXUHµTXLFNDQGIUHTXHQWUHSRUWVIURPWKH7DVN)RUFH¶43 Stewart 
suggested the best way to readdress the speed at which information was passed from the 
Task Force to the appropriate people in the MoD, was to reorganise the structure of 
reporting procedure. The result of this suggestion was the creation of an alternative 
reporting chain to that outlined on 13 April. The chain was simpler, but relied very heavily 
on the role of, and the judgement of, the DS11 Duty Officer. This officer would have to 
consult with the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (ACDS) about which departments needed 
to be made aware of the incident. He would also clear with the appropriate Service 
Department that operations were underway to inform the next of kin (NoK) and release the 
names of casualties if relevant. The oIILFHUZRXOGWKHQJRRQWRLQIRUPµDVQHFHVVDU\¶WKH
Private Secretary of the Secretary of State, No.10, Cabinet Office and senior MoD officials 
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Figure 3.3: Diagram to Show the Procedures for Dealing with PR Aspects of Operation 
Corporate, 7 May 198244 
 
It was evident that one of the main motivations for this review was the need to announce 
news from the South Atlantic before Argentine accounts of events could be released. 
Stewart felt that when considering any changes in policy, the department should realise 
WKDWWKHLUSRVLWLRQUHTXLUHGWKH0R'µWRUHOHDVHLQIRUPDWLRQDVUDSLGO\DVSRVVLEOH«WR
FRXQWHU$UJHQWLQHGLVLQIRUPDWLRQ«¶45 But an aspect which may have had a significant 
LPSDFWRQ0R'¶VUHYLHZRISROLF\ZKLFKQRRWKHUKLVWRU\RIWKHVXEMHFWKDVEHHQDEOHWR
focus on, was the complaints made to the MoD by the editors of major news organisations 
about the incident reporting system. Frank Cooper HVWDEOLVKHG(GLWRUV¶0eetings at the 
start of the war.46 After meeting on 6 May, Cooper noted that there were a number of 
practical steps the MoD must take to ensure a smoother PR service. These steps included 
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unspectacular - diet to our own press¶ He alsRLGHQWLILHGWKHQHHGWRµPDNHGecisions about 
whether to release information quickly¶47 EGLWRUVWROG&RRSHUµ«WKHUHZDVDULVNRIWKH
UK starting to lose public and international sympathy through appearing to be holding 
back on news when the Argentines had no hesitation about deluging the media with 
misleading and inaccurate information¶48 Three specific points were mentioned which 
lends weight to the argument that edLWRUV¶FRPSODLQWVLQIOXHQFHGWKH0R'UHYLHZRI
policy, specifically incident reporting policy, on 7 May: 
  
A) Delays in announcing tKDWRSHUDWLRQVKDGWDNHQSODFH« 
B) ,QDELOLW\RI0R'WRFRQILUPRUGHQ\VWRULHVRULJLQDWLQJRYHUVHDV« 
C) The return of photographs and film from the Task Force and South Georgia was non-
H[LVWHQW«49 
 
Thus, the MoD was prompted to review policy on 7 May, not only by the embarrassment 
surrounding the announcement of the tragedies of Belgrano and Sheffield, but by forceful 
complaints by the HGLWRUVRI%ULWDLQ¶VPHGLDRXWOHWV 
 
ELLL,QFLGHQW5HSRUWLQJWKHµ1DUZKDO¶ 
The HCDC heard that it was the confusion surrounding the capture of the Argentine 
fishing vessel, the Narwhal, which motivated a review of policy in May 1982. The work of 
both Morrison and Tumber, and Mercer et al., argue this point.50 It was certainly true that 
the incident emphasised the problems MoD was experiencing with regard to incident 
reporting. However, it did not provoke the change, it merely accelerated the process. The 
day after Narwhal was attacked by the British, the CoS KHDUGWKHSRLQWPDGHWKDWµWKH
capture of the NARWAL the previous day had highlighted the difficulties of obtaining 
early and accurate reports from the Task Force¶51 The apprehension of Narwhal has been 
used by authors as a classic example of MoDPR getting its facts wrong during the course 
of the war.52 Whilst the Narwhal did not incite policy review, the implications the occasion 
had for incident reporting were nonetheless significant. On the day, the last MoD statement 
on the subject was issued at midnight.53 The fundamental problem, as outlined by the 
0R'ZDVLWµ«QHHGHGWRSURYLGHZKDWLQIRUPDWLRQZDVDWWKHWLPHDYDLODEOHDQGZHZHUH
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assured by the Naval Staff that this information particularly in respect of casualties ± was 
UHOLDEOH«¶54 The next day, Taylor - on the instructions of Cooper - met with the DPRs, the 
Secretary of the D-Notice Committee, Admiral William Ash and a number of IOs in an 
emergency meeting. They concentrated on the problem of speeding communications from 
the Task Force. The meeting identified that two courses of action were undesirable: 
GHIHQVLYHO\µWUDLOLQJEHKLQGVRPH$UJHQWLQHFODLP¶RUµZDLWLQJWRRORQJIRUHYHU\VLQJOH
detail to emerge before volunteering anything¶55 Due WRWKHSUHYLRXVGD\¶VHYHQWDVLJQDO
WRWKH7DVN)RUFHKDGEHHQGUDIWHGµVSHOOLQJRXWWKHHVVHQWLDOUHTXLUHPHQWIRURSHUDWLRQDO
flash signals to be made to CINCFLEET copy MODUK immediately an incident is in 
progress¶56 By copying all flash signals to the MoD, the intermediary role of Northwood 
would be eroded. The enhanced sense of urgency that the Narwhal created persuaded 
Cooper to host a meeting on the evening of 10 May, in order to further the discussions of 
that morning by Taylor and his cohort. Cooper met with Taylor, Nott, Chief of the Defence 
Staff (CDS), Admiral Lewin, and McDonald. 1RWWLGHQWLILHGZKDWZDVWKHµPRVWSUHVVLQJ
SUREOHP¶DVEHLQJWKHIDLOXUHRIWKHreporting chain to keep the MoD informed µin as 
speedy and full a way as they required for effective PR action¶57 At this meeting the draft 
signal for the Task Force was approved. The signal would remind the Fleet of the necessity 
of swift incident reporting:  
 
IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT MOD RECEIVES PROMPT AND CLEAR REPORTS OF 
ANY ENGAGEMENT OR OPERATIONAL INCIDENT NOT ONLY DO MINISTERS NEED 
TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, BUT THE ARGENTINIANS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO 
38772,00(',$7(3523$*$1'$86(,1)250$7,217+(<+$9(«58 
 
7KHVLJQDOZHQWRQWRDGPLWWKDWµ02'+$6BEEN EMBARRASSINGLY WRONG 
FOOTED ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION, MOST RECENTLY OVER THE 
NARWAL INCIDENT ON 9 MAY¶59 The use of the term µPRVWUHFHQWO\¶DVKDVEHHQ
argued here, suggests that the Narwhal was merely the latest incident, not the only one. 
What the signal demonstrated was the lack of guidelines which had hitherto been issued to 
the Fleet on incident reporting. The signal even instructed, in idiot-proof fashion, the right 
way in which to send a signal.60  
 








 D. Omand, 11 May, MoD, DEFE24/2266 f.E27/13 
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2b (iv). Incident Reporting: Reviewing Policy 
The most significant outcome of the meeting on the evening of 10 May was that an initial 
review of general policy was initiated. On 11 May Taylor issued a minute on PR to senior 
members of the MoD. It proposed three main points.61 Firstly, that flash signals to CPR 
MODUK should indicate the nature of copy to be filed from ships. The Senior Information 
Officer onboard should give the intended release time for the MoD to consider: a) 
simultaneous London release b) later London release or confirmation merely in answer to 
questions or c) if necessary, an immediate reply to CTG to impose an embargo. Secondly, 
MoD would undertake to transmit its intention to release material its end. Finally, the last 
point defined what Taylor envisaged the role of the MoD Press Centre to be. He wrote it 
µVKRXOGEHDEOHWRJLYHTXLFNDVVHVVPHQWVRIVRPHRSHUDWLRQDOHYHQWV«¶62  
 
This initial review of policy was an example of how MoD35¶VHOLWHwas not qualified to 
FRQVWUXFWWKHPLOLWDU\¶VPHGLDSROLF\7KLVdocument was a PR-friendly document. It 
aimed at alleviating the humiliating errors which were a product of incident reporting, as 
well as easing the transmission and release of Task Force copy. However, the initial 
suggestions offered by Taylor were rejected by Rear Admiral David Brown, ACDS 
(Operations). In communication between Brown and senior MoDPR staff, he calls the 11 
0D\UHYLHZµXQDFFHSWDEOH¶63 Rear Admiral Brown went on to point out that: 
 
The subsequent procedure suggested is both complex and unclear, leaving the Task Group 
Commander in the dark on each occasion until MOD has decided how to react to each and every 
incident. How the decision will be arrived at in MOD and by whom is not covered. The implication 
is that the decision would be made solely by the PR staff. This is obviously unsatisfactory from the 
operational and security points of view.64 
 
Brown carried particular weight within, not only the MoD, but the OD(SA). Brown had the 
fortunate task of briefing the OD(SA) on events in the South Atlantic. His objections to the 
plan rolled out by MoDPR was a significant blow for Taylor and his subordinates. Brown 
suggested an alternative system of incident reporting. The proposed process better served 
the military, but was less PR-RULHQWDWHG%URZQ¶s version would eventually, on 13 May, be 
disseminated to the Task Force as official procedure.  
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the incident reporting chain. The document outlined the civilian procedure once the news 
had been received from the Fleet. Under the new reporting system ACDS would be 
responsible for ascertaining the views of Service Departments and Fleet (and any other 
HQs) relevant to the release of news.65 The Duty Officer would still approach the relevant 
Service regarding questions of welfare and notification of the NoK. Similarly, the Duty 
Officer would maintain the responsibility of alerting the Secretary RI6WDWH¶VSULYDWHRIILFH
No.10, FCO and the Cabinet Office. Where the regulations seriously departed from those 
RI0D\ZDVUHJDUGLQJLQIRUPDWLRQZKLFKZRXOGKDYHDµKROG¶DSSOLHGWRLW$VVRRQDV
the Task Force transmitted a flash signal to CINCFLEET and MoD, the media onboard 
ZRXOGEHµLQKLELWHG¶IURPVHQGLQJFRS\7KH0R'Zould then decide whether to place a 
µKROG¶RQWKHQHZV7KHUHZHUHWZRFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQZKLFKDµKROG¶ZRXOGEHLPSRVHGRQ
the release of copy: where the Controller in the DSC was informed of Argentine losses 
which, for a particular reason, he felt should not be made public; and when the British 
H[SHULHQFHGµORVVGDPDJHFDVXDOW\¶,QWKHFDVHRI%ULWLVKORVVGDPDJHRUFDVXDOW\DµKROG¶
would be automatically enforced.66 The document also outlined the chain of reporting 
UHTXLUHGZKHQQRµKROG¶DSSOLHGsee Figures 3.4 and 3.5). When the Task Force signalled 
&,1&)/((7DQGWKH0R'WKH7DVN)RUFHMRXUQDOLVWV¶FRS\ZRXOGstill be restricted until 
the MoD signalled the Task Force with an intended time that it would release the news, 
then that the Task Force correspondents would be permitted to release copy. 
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Figure 3.5: 'LDJUDPRIUHSRUWLQJFKDLQLQµKROG¶DSSOLHG0D\68 
 
On 13 May the Task Force was relayed a copy of its instructions on the topic of incident 
reporting.69 Although the new incident reporting system ensured the MoD received news 
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more speedily, and the MoD and Fleet were clearer about their own responsibilities, one of 
the drawbacks of the modified system was that there were still potential delays for 
correspondents with the Task Force. On 14 May this point was highlighted by Graeme 
Hammond, a civilian PRO with the Force. Hammond was perhaps the finest of the 




OF SYSTEM WILL DEPEND ON AMOUNT OF DELAY BETWEEN YOUR 
6(1',1*$1'0<5(&(,9,1*5(/($6(6,*1$/6¶72 +DPPRQG¶VPHVVDJHUDWKHU
DVVXPHGWKDWµVXFFHVV¶LQWKLVFDVHUHODWHGWRWKHHIIHFWLYHUHOHDVHRIMRXUQDOLVWV¶FRS\
7KHGHILQLWLRQRIµVXFFHVV¶IURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHof the MoD, was more likely to involve 
MRXUQDOLVWV¶FRS\EHLQJGHOD\HGXQWLOLWKDGDQQRXQFHGWKHQHZVLQ/RQGRQDQGFKHFNHG
the incoming stories, avoiding any embarrassing faux pas such as those previously 
experienced.  
 
The major shortcoming of MoDPR throughout the war, was that it failed to consider policy 
in advance. It always reacted with policy to fit the campaign once a development had been 
made. For example, the final change to the incident reporting system was made on 21 May, 
the day the British landed at San Carlos. When the landing of British troops on the 
Falklands became a realistic prospect, PR policy was considered more critically. For 
example, Rear Admiral Anthony Whetstone, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Operations) and 
a member of the News RHOHDVH*URXSZURWHWR7D\ORURQ0D\WKDWµ,WKLQNZHVKRXOG
look seriously now at how we propose to deal with PR on the assumption that a landing on 
the Falkland Islands takes place¶73 Ahead of the landing, on 19 May the OD(SA) met and 
discussed the public presentation of the landing. The committee agreed to the MoD 
sending the Task Force instructions as to how the media should be briefed before the 21 
May.74 Later that same day the draft signal was circulated to the MoD.75  
 
On the day of the landings the incident reporting system was altered (for the last time 
during the conflict). The original document which detailed the changes was supplied on 19 
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May by the Assistant Private Secretary to John Nott, Jennifer Ridley. There was a serious 
lack of communication between MoD35DQGWKH6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH¶VRIILFH5LGOH\ZURWH
to the information staff proposing amendments to the civil reporting chain which was in 
SODFHRQ$SULO1RWW¶VRIILFHZDVXQDZDUHWKDWQHZLQFLGHQWUHSRUWLQJJXLGHOLQHVKDG
been sent to the Fleet and circulated to the MoD. Nevertheless, the reporting chain 
suggested by Ridley is considered for the land campaign (Figure 3.6). There was one main 
difference: the Resident Clerk (RC) would assume responsibility for notifying the Private 
Secretary of the Secretary of State for Defence. The Secretary would then inform Nott and 
advise him whether to inform the FCO and No.10 RCs. The Secretary would also be in 






Figure 3.6: Altered MoD civil reporting chain, 19 May for 21 May 198276 
 
During May there was a flurry of activity within the MoD in order to address the 
weaknesses of the incident reporting system. The reason incident reporting attracted so 
much attention from the MoD was because timely and accurate reporting of events would 
allow the MoD to maintain the credibility it so desperately needed to rebut information 
emanating from Argentina. The increased action in May, this thesis argues, was a direct 
result of the way information was handled following the sinking of the Belgrano and 
Sheffield. The British capture of the Narwhal merely accelerated the process of policy 
review. In light of the events of the previous week which had caused embarrassment, 
adapting incident reporting became a priority. The changes to incident reporting also 
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proposals reveals the importance of military considerations over those of PR. The 
succeeding policy, rolled out to the Task Force on 13 May, not only catered more to the 
superior military, but it actually made the process of filing copy more arduous and subject 
to greater delays than the previous system.  
 
3. Censorship Policy and the Task Force 
The second dominant feature of MoD35¶V6RXWK$WODQWLFSROLF\UHODWHGWRFHQVRUVKLS. As 
was established in Chapter Two, the initial guidelines on censorship were transmitted to 
the Task Force on 6 April, then 8 April.77 From 8 April to 12 May there were no new 
guidelines sent to the Fleet. Censorship has been the nucleus of many different assessments 
of the media and the MoD during the Falklands. Nearly all works which touch on the 
PHGLD¶VUROHLQWKHFULVLVSD\VLJQLILFDQWDWWHQWLRQWRKRZWKHFRUUHVSRQGHQWVZLWKWKH)leet 
were censored.78 Of course, discussion of regulations restricting the journalists was at the 
heart of most of their first-hand accounts.79 The only history which provided a 
comprehensive assessment of policy on censorship was The Fog of War. Broadly, they 
argue that the guidelines of 8 April were too wide-ranging. If the guidelines were 
interpreted literally then it was impossible for those in charge of censoring the 
correspondents to know exactly what the correspondents could report.80  
 
There were, according to Mercer et al., two categories of information the authorities sought 
to protect through the use of censorship. The first was political, and concerned the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VGLSORPDWLFVWDQFHLQDQ\QHJRWLDWLRQV7KLVWKH\VDLGZDVUHODWLYHO\VLPSOH
to protect since diplomacy, by its very nature, takes place discreetly. The second category 
was military. This category had the potential to involve things like troop movements, the 
use of equipment or machines, and a list of other information which might potentially 
hinder British success.81 What this chapter aims to contribute to the literature on censorship 
in the Falklands is a detailed assessment of what policy arrangements were made to 
facilitate censorship onboard and on land, and how those policy arrangements impacted the 
FDPSDLJQRUVKDSHGMRXUQDOLVWV¶H[SHULHQFHRQWKHJURXQG6RPHDVSHFWVRIGLVFXVVLRQZLOO
                                                 
77
 Referred to as the signal of 8 April. 
78
 See: Freedman, v.ii, pp.34-5.; 'RGGVµ&RQWHVWLQJ:DU¶S0HUFHUHWDOS+DUULVS Adams, 
p.160.  
79
 See: Nicholson, p.215.; Fox, p.10.; Hastings and Jenkins, p.209.; Hands and McGowan, p.277. 
80
 Mercer et al., p.156. 
81
 Ibid., p.155. 
71 
 
be intentionally brief since the subject is vast and many historians have already 
investigated the consequences of policy. This section argues that lack of policy directives 
from MoDPR, along with an increased autonomy given to the Services on and off the 
Falklands, led to inconsistent censorship across the board. Because people (in London and 
with the Task Force) were ill-qualified to direct PR policy, there was almost no 
consistency.  
 
3a. Censorship: Guidelines 
The signal of 8 April instructed that COs were to ensure correspondents reported 
responsibly and avoided speculation, COs could stop transmission if warning on 
VSHFXODWLRQZHUHQRWREVHUYHGDQGDOWKRXJK79DQGUDGLRµPD\EHPRUHGLIILFXOWWR
FRQWURO¶Information Officers µVKRXOGGRWKHLUEHVWWRHQVXUHJXLGHOLQHVDUHPHW82 Perhaps 
the most obvious implication of the signal of 8 April, however, was that segment which 
related to who would be responsible for censoring copy. The signal stated that the 
µminders¶ were not responsible for any security. Instead, COs would be accountable for the 
content of copy leaving their ships.83 During the passage to the Falklands, COs were often 
the captains of ships. Not only were captains untrained in dealing with the media, they 
suffered from a lack of guidelines. Guidelines sent on 8 April were often forgotten, many 
do not remember any guidelines being issued to the crew at all. The demanding roles 
assumed by captains, on top of their regular responsibilities, took its toll on captains and 
they increasingly turned to their subordinate officers for assistance in vetting copy. 
Captains¶ attitudes towards the media dictated how well-treated or successful the 
journalists were able to be. 
 
The House of Commons Defence Committee, in reference to the guidelines of 8 April, 
IRXQGWKDWµZKDWHYHUWKHULJKWVDQGZURQJVRIWKHVLWXDWLRQWKHLQVWUXFWLRQV of the Ministry 
of Defence to the Task Force Commanders were quite clear¶84 One area of consensus 
between members of the Services was that few of them recall seeing, or hearing, any 
guidelines which restricted their engagement with the media, or any instructions as to how 
to handle them.85 &DSWDLQ3HWHU'XQW:RRGZDUG¶V3HUVRQDO6WDII2IILFHUwhen asked if 
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he had seen guidelines said, µ,WKLQN,PXVWKDYHGRQHEXW,GLGQ
WNHHSWKHPDQG,FDQ
W
remember them. So if I did it was pretty cursory¶86 :RRGZDUG¶V Staff Operations Officer, 
Captain Jeremy Sanders, who worked alongside the signal equipment on HMS Hermes, 
believed that he had never seen any guidelines on what should or should not be said to the 
media.87 Even when 5 Infantry Brigade set sail on board the QEII on 12 May, its 
commander, Brigadier Tony Wilson, was given no guidelines whatsoever to equip him for 
dealing with the media. 
 
The captains who were to carry out censorship, and the majority of their men, had 
invariably not been given any sort of media training to prepare them for having the media 
aboard a vessel, much less for censoring its product. Both Alan Hooper and Mercer et al. 
have investigated what form of training the MoD provided their officers before 1982. Most 
KDGUHFHLYHGEXWDGD\¶VWUDLQLQJZKHQDWWHQGLQJDPDQGDWory course. Sometimes the 
media relations course was even optional.88  
 
Not only did captains with the Task Force suffer from a lack of training, but they also 
suffered from a lack of PR advice. Captain Jeremy Black, captain of Invincible, later 
related that he found the process of vetting challenging: µ«LWZDVVXUSULVLQJO\GLIILFXOW
you could easily gloss over something which was particularly important¶89 Of the most 
senior commanders on the Falklands - Woodward, Brigadier Julian Thompson, 
Commodore Michael Clapp, Major General Moore and Brigadier Wilson - only one had 
a civilian media adviser stationed with him. Woodward had an adviser for seven days 
after departing from Portsmouth on 5 April. The MoD PO who had sailed with the ship, 
Robin Barratt, left Hermes at Ascension Island. If experienced media advisers had sailed 
south with the Force, there is every possibility those vetting copy would have found it 
easier to adapt to their new roles.  
 
There is much evidence to suggest that the role of censor bestowed upon the captains of 
ships with media onboard was too much for them to manage. Michael Nicholson later 
regretted much of the angst he caused the Captain of Hermes, Linley Middleton, claiming 
KHKDGµPRUHWKDQHQRXJKRQKLVSODWH¶90 The Captain of HMS Fearless, Jeremy Larken, 
whose ship hosted journalists through much of the land campaign, remembered that by the 
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time he got to the Falklands, he had to read in excess of 1500 signals a day: µ:KHQHYHU,
JRWDVSDUHPLQXWH,VHHPHGWREHWXUQLQJRYHUVLJQDOV¶91 The literature on censorship in 
the Falklands has failed to identify an integral part of the censorship process. The duties 
of the captains became too much to bear as the campaign progressed. Increasingly, 
captains turned to their secretaries to help lighten the load. As early as 16 April Black 
demanded that all copy be cleared through his secretary, Richard Acland. Woodward 
turned over command of vetting to his secretary, Dunt. Brian Hanrahan of the BBC said 
µLWZDVRIWHQWKH$GPLUDO¶VVHFUHWDU\ZKRFKHFNed the information to be transmitted on 
behalf of the Admiral¶.92 Nicholson claimed that Dunt µVHUYHGDVKLVVKLHOG¶93 The MoD 
minder, Hammond VDLGWKDWMRXUQDOLVWV¶FRS\ZDVVXEPLWWHGWRKLPµ,WKHQVXEPLWWHGLWWR
WKH$GPLUDO¶VORJLVWLFVRIILFHUZKRZDV also his secretary), and in 90 per cent of the cases 
KHGLGDOOWKHPLOLWDU\YHWWLQJ¶.94 &DSWDLQ6DQGHUVUHPHPEHUHGWKDW'XQWWRRNRQµGHDOLQJ
ZLWKWKHSUHVV¶DVDQµDGGLWLRQDOWDVN¶95 Dunt viewed his role with classic military-
mindedness: µ,was not theiUPLQGHUDVVXFK,W
VZKDW,FDOOµGLYLVLRQDORIILFHU¶- so as one 
RIWKH$GPLUDO¶VVWDII,KDGWRKDYHVRPHVRUWRf responsibility for the press.96 
  
As Woodward pointed out in 1982, all the captains with journalists embarked were 
µRSHUDWLQJXQGHUWKHVDPHLQVWUXFWLRQV¶although those instructions, as Mercer et al. have 
argued, were interpreted differently.97 )LHOGKRXVHHYHQFODLPHGµ«with the benefit of 
hindsight I should have been very much better placed had the captains of the ships had well 
thought out and clear instructions as to how to handle the press under these particular 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV¶98 The most serious consequence of the MoD putting COs in charge of 
censorship was the inconsistencies which emerged as a result. It is a common assertion that 
the despatch of copy was dependent upon the ship from which it was sent and how 
favourably disposed a captain was towards the correspondents.99 The various attitudes of 
COs has been documented elsewhere.100 The MoD later judged that the µLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI
WKHVHFXULW\JXLGHOLQHVGLGYDU\,QVRPHFDVHVVKLSV¶FRPPDQGLQJRIILFHUVZHUHHYLGHQWO\
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inclined to bHPRUHUHVWULFWLYHWKDQ/RQGRQ¶101 Inconsistencies in censorship policy was 
one - if not the - major cause of the friction cultivated as the Fleet progressed south. 
 
Inconsistency in the approach COs took to censorship was a problem, particularly, while 
the journalists were onboard ships. When the COs on land became responsible for vetting 
copy they largely delegated the task to the PROs they had as part of their Brigade or 
Battalion. In addition, there were two main communications stations available at which 
journalists could file copy: Ajax Bay and Fearless which was stationed off the islands.  
 
DL&HQVRUVKLSWKHµ6KHIILHOG¶ 
The issue of inconsistency with regard to attitude was common knowledge within the 
MoD. Complaints had been heard by &RRSHUDWWKH(GLWRUV¶0eeting of 20 April. Cooper 
commented that µWKLVZDVLQHYLWDEOHVLQFHVRPHZRXOGEHLQPRUHVHQVLWLYHORFDWLRQVWKDQ
others and Commanding Officers varied in outlook; but MOD would try to get more 
consistency¶102 +RZHYHU0R'¶VDWWHPSWVWRVHFXUHDPRUHFRQVLVWHQWIRUPRIFHQVRUVKLS
did not materialise in policy until the middle of May. Although worries about censorship 
and operational security being released dominated consideration of the Task Force 
journalists, there was very little tangible policy which related to its administration.  
 
The major turning point for censorship policy was the attack on Sheffield.  The assault 
affected censorship in a similar way in which it affected policy on incident reporting: it 
encouraged the MoD to reconsider its guidelines. It was the first occasion of importance in 
the campaign where the ineffectiveness of censorship policy was perceptible. The 
journalists were not permitted to file any copy on the sinking of the Sheffield: there was a 
complete news blackout. The journalists heard the news broadcast to them on the BBC 
World Service. The most ironic aspect of this was that the initial reports which were 
banned from being transmitted were reassuring and less distressing than the news which 
emerged from Nott in the Commons and McDonald from the MoD.103 
 
The Sheffield was not the first incident in which the journalists were gagged by the MoD. 
Journalists had also been prevented from reporting Vulcan, long-range attacks on Stanley 
airfield on 1 May, and on the sinking of the Belgrano on 2 May. The events of 1 May were 
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were mounted from Ascension Island. A series of mid-air refuelling missions were carried 
out (11 in total). The raids, at the time, were the longest-raged bombing raids in history. 
John Witherow of The Times, explained how journalists had been silenced: 
 
We knew of the first attack on May 1 but we were told that, because it was top secret, we could not 
UHSRUWLW«:LWKLQKDOIDQKRXUWKH%%&:RUOG6HUYLFHZDVTXRting the Defence Ministry about the 
attack and we were confronted by bewildered and embarrassed naval officers.104 
 
By 14 May members of the Task Force were warning that: 
 
IF EMBARKED PRESS ARE MADE TO FEEL THAT BECAUSE OF THEIR POSITION WITH 
THE FLEET THEY ARE UNABLE TO GET WORD OF EVENTS TO THEIR OFFICES UNTIL 
SEVERAL HOURS AFTER A MOD STATEMENT IS ISSUED THEY ARE LIKELY TO 
CONCLUDE THAT THEY MIGHT AS WELL BE SAFELY AT HOME IN THE SUNSHINE.105 
 
The Sheffield was the first major event of significance in which the inconsistency of 
censorship was highlighted. Not only could copy from correspondents with the Task Force 
have reassured worries about events in the South Atlantic, but it could have had a valuable 
impact on British public support for the Task Force which ebbed after the loss of Sheffield 
± WKHILUVWRI+HU0DMHVW\¶VVKLSVWREHVXQNVLQFH 
 
A review of censorship policy occurred at the same time as the review of incident reporting 
from the Force. However, it was provoked by different considerations. The events 
surrounding the Sheffield had emphasised the inconsistencies of censorship with the Task 
Force. On 8 May the CoS made clear their thoughts on allowing journalists to transmit 
their stories before London had released the news. While it was acknowledged that there 
ZDVDQHHGWRµLPSURYHWKHJHQHUDOVLWXDWLRQLQUHJDUGWRWKHQHHGWRUHWDLQWKHJRRGZLOORI
WKHPHGLD¶µLWZDVLOOXVRU\IRUWKHHPEDUNHGFRUUHVSRQGHQWVWREHOLHYHWKDWWKH\ZRXOG
receive, and be able to release, the first news of any incident involving the Task Force¶106 
However, on 9 May CINCFLEET contacted the MoD representing worries about 
correspondents. Northwood stressed that the situation onboard was coming to the point 
ZKHUHWKHWURXEOHFRUUHVSRQGHQWVZHUHFDXVLQJµ,612:1(*$7ING BENEFITS OF 
+$9,1*(0%$5.('35(66¶107 Attention was also drawn to the problem of 
LQFRQVLVWHQFLHVEHWZHHQVKLSVµ&+(&.6$5(%(,1*$33/,('81(9(1/<,1
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DIFFERENT UNITS, ESCALATING PRESS FRUSTRATIONS IN SOME CASES AND 
ALLOWING SECURITY BREACHES IN OTHERS. SHIPS HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE 
OF WHAT IS BEING RELEASED BY MOD OR WHEN¶108 This complaint evoked a 
sense of urgency among the MoD. The situation was enflamed two days later by the 
publication of a first-KDQGDFFRXQWRIWKHMRXUQDOLVWV¶VWUXJJOHDJDLQVWGHOD\VDQG 
censorship. Alfred McIlroy, The Daily Telegraph man in the South Atlantic wrote a piece 
HQWLWOHGµ&21&(51$71(:6'(/$<6¶109 0F,OUR\FODLPHGWKDWµWKHVLWXDWLRQLVWKH
result of an apparent lack of co-ordination between the Ministry of Defence in London and 
the Royal Navy in how and when certain military developments can be released¶110 
 
One area of censorship which the MoD did attempt to address in early May 1982 was the 
naming of individuals within Task Force copy. Since the use of personal details in 
MRXUQDOLVWV¶SURGXFWKDGOLWWOHLPSDFWRQFHQVRUVKLSSROLF\DVDZKROHWKHVHFKDQJHVDUHQRW




The lack of PR guidelines from the MoD had a significant impact both on censorship and 
the censorers. The civilian PROs sent to the South Atlantic, or µminders¶, suffered from a 
lack of regulation and instruction. This thesis need not discuss the role of the minders in 
detail, since it has been the subject of much debate and criticism in the literature of the 
)DONODQGV'HVSLWHWKHFODLPE\%DGVH\WKDWµWKHLUV>WKHPLQGHUV¶@UHPDLQVRQHRIWKH
largely untold stRULHVRIWKHPHGLDVLGHRIWKH)DONODQGV¶WKHUHLVDn abundance of material 
on the experiences and capabilities of the civilian information officers.111 Two of the five 
minders sent were interviewed by the HCDC in 1982. Hammond and Martin Helm both 
submitted evidence to the inquiry. Task Force correspondents dedicated discussion to the 
minders in their accounts of the war.112 In addition to this, the minders were interviewed by 
Morrison and Tumber for their study.113 A number of works published since have supplied 
assessments of their effectiveness, including the Official History.114 Because there is an 
abundance of analysis of their role, the minders only attract minor discussion in this work, 
and only in regard to how they adhered to, or implemented, policy.  










 Eds. Eddy et al., p.212., Fox, p.37., Hastings, p.345. and Hastings and Jenkins, p.417. 
113
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The minders suffered from a lack of detailed instruction throughout the campaign. Helm, 
referring to the guidelines of 8 April, said WKDWµWKHUHwere basic guidelines given to us on 
what should be sent back and what should not¶115 In the communication sent to the Fleet 
on 6 April (and 8 April), COs were instructed that they should, through their information 
RIILFHUVµHQVXUHFRUUHVSRQGHQWVUHSRUWUHVSRQVLEO\DQGDYRLGVSHFXODWLRQ¶116  The signal 
went on to recommend that if ,2VZHUHQRWµWDNHQKHHGRI¶COs would be able to stop the 
transmission of copy. The only guidelines that referred specifically to the minders after 
that, directed that they were not to have charge of the process of vetting copy. On 27 April, 
for H[DPSOHDVLJQDOZDVVHQWVWDWLQJWKDWPLQGHUVVKRXOGJLYHµUHJXODUJXLGDQFH¶WRWKH
press, but they were not responsible for security:  
 
SCRUTINY OF PRESS MATERIAL LEAVING SHIPS IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
&200$1',1*2)),&(56«'(/(*$7,212)7+,6'87<,6127 TO BE MADE TO 
MOD PR OFFICERS AFLOAT WHO ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO IMPLEMENT SECURITY 
'87,(6«117 
 
Directives, then, were a little jumbled: the minders were to ensure that speculation was not 
entered into, but they were not supposed to vet copy. When the minders embarked on their 
journey with the Task Force they, like so many of the crew and journalists, left without a 
thorough briefing. Without clear and transparent directions, their role was to become one 
of the most confused of the war.  
 
One reason the MoD IHOWWKDWWKHPLQGHUVZHUHµXQTXDOLILHG¶WRFHQVRUPDWHULDOZDV
because they had very little, if any, operational knowledge.118 This argument has been a 
feature of many of those studies which deal with the PROs. Morrison and Tumber 
maintained that because they had no practical experience in, or knowledge of, the military, 
µLWZDVWKHUHIRUHDOOWKHPRUHGLIILFXOWIRUWKHPWRPDNHFRQVLVWHQWGHFLVLRQV¶119 As a 
consequence, their prescribed duty of ensuring that the journalists did not engage in 
speculation, or act irresponsibly by releasing sensitive information, was very difficult. The 
minders often became pernickety over details about which the journalists could not 
appreciate the danger. Bishop of The Observer claimed that the journalists µquickly 
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discovered that even the most trifling details were regarded by MoD men as potential 
newsy titbits for Argentine intelligence and they slashed away at the facts with 
enthusiasm¶120 The minders with the Task Force experienced a lack of specific and 
unambiguous instructions from which to perform their roles and they were hindered in 
what they were ordered to do by a lack of operational knowledge. 
 
3a (iii&HQVRUVKLSµ/RQGRQ¶3ROLF\ 
The minders with the Task Force, during and after the conflict, were accused of running 
/RQGRQ¶VSROLF\,QWKLVFDVHµ/RQGRQ¶UHIHUVWRWKH0R'+HQFHIRUZDUGµ/RQGRQ¶LV
XVHGWRUHSUHVHQWWKH0R'EHFDXVHPXFKRIWKHGRPLQDQWOLWHUDWXUHUHIHUVWRµ/RQGRQ¶V¶
policy when discussing policy implementation in the South Atlantic. This has been a 
prevalent line of argument among studies of the conflict.121 Academics have argued that 
the PR problems experienced in the South Atlantic were a direct result of policy instigated 
by the MoD in London. However, this thesis argues that PR policy from London was in 
short supply and, instead of simply implementing policy in the South Atlantic, the MoD 
actually allowed those members of the Task Force dealing with PR an impressive amount 
of authority over the censorship system in particular. The only exception to this was the 
Task Force minder, who was not allowed any autonomy and who had little choice but to 
carry out blindly the will of London. If µLondon¶ had initiated a more structured and 
detailed censorship policy, one which had been agreed to at the start of the war (or as near 
to the start as possible), it would have prevented much of the ensuing controversy. 
 
The minders have been inculpated by the correspondents themselves for senselessly 
inIOLFWLQJ/RQGRQ¶VRUGHUVAlistair McQueen of the Daily Mirror wrote that, since sailing, 
µVLJQDODIWHUVLJQDO- in code - has arrived on Canberra [sic] ordering Captain Christopher 
%XUQH«DQGWKHWHDPRI0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFH3UHVV2IILcers aboard to impose petty 
LQVWUXFWLRQVRQXV¶122 Hastings and Jenkins later described the only contribution to the 
reporting of the war the PROs PDGHZDVµULJRURXVO\WRHQIRUFHLQFUHDVLQJO\HUUDWLF
restrictions on outgoing news¶123 The main reason journalists suspected this was because 
the minders often referred the journalists back to London when they disputed a decision 
(made mostly by the CO0F*RZDQVDLGWKDWµWKHUHZDVDOZD\VDP\VWHULRXVPDQZLWK
CINCLEET or hiding in the bowels of the MoD who had seQWWKHPDPHVVDJH«¶ 
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One occasion when the minders translated their instructions too literally was during the 
Argentine surrender of the Falklands. The surrender of South Georgia had received 
international attention and had caused Argentina much embarrassment. The British wished 
to ensure nothing could endanger peace negotiations for the Falklands, particularly since 
the Argentine commander in Stanley, General Mario Menendez, was under orders from 
President General Leopoldo Galtieri not to concede. Instructions came initially from 
MoDPR, but were signalled to the Fleet from CINCFLEET, that there should be no media 
permitted into, or near negotiations.124 When the minders received this instruction it was 
GHFLGHGDFFRUGLQJWR+HOPWKDWµWKHUHZRXOGEHIRUDSHULRGDWRWDOEODQNHWEDQRQ
material actually leaving the FalklanGV¶125  
 
CRQIXVLRQZDVFUHDWHGE\WKHEDQRQMRXUQDOLVWV¶FRS\after the negotiations had closed. 
Nicholson maintained that he was prevented by a MoD PO from reporting the ceasefire on 
the evening of 14 June. Nicholson claimed that Helm misinterpreted instructions in a bid to 
carry out the directive to the letter.126 +HOPUHIXWHG1LFKROVRQ¶s account of the event, 
stating: µ,ZDVFDWHJRULFDOO\WROGQRWKLQJFRXOGJREDFN¶127 Whether or not Helm was 
carrying out orders, or whether he misinterpreted his instructions, the consequence was the 
same: Argentina announced the surrender before the British. 
 
The closest to an accurate description of the position of the minders came from Brian 
Hanrahan, of the BBC, ZKHQKHFODLPHGWKDWµWKHSROLF\ZDVEHLQJPDGHLQ/RQGRQDWD
considerable distance and they [the minders] were just given blanket directives which they 
KDGWRRSHUDWHDQGWKH\KDGQRGLVFUHWLRQ«¶128 Fred Emery, Executive Editor for news at 
The Times, was perhaps the first in the UK to question the role of the minders when he 
wrote on 10 June: µ1RWDQLPSUHVVLYHJURXSIURPWKHILUVW«6LQFH the task force entered 
the warzone these unhappy bureaucrats have become mere flotsam drifting meaninglessly 
IURPVKLSWRVKLSRFFDVLRQDOO\HQIRUFLQJWKHODWHVWUHVWULFWLRQVIURP/RQGRQ«¶129  
 
The only directive the minders were clear about was that they were there to carry out 
/RQGRQ¶VLQVWUXFWLRQV0HUFHUHWDO. quoted a confidential report to which the MoD 
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«KHGLGQRWIXOO\DSSUHFLDWHWKHFRQIOLFWVRISULRULWLHVfacing the command. He was not able to 
brief the journalists because he did not possess a sufficiently detailed knowledge or understanding 
of naval operations. For the same reason he could not have been used to vet copy, even if signalled 
instructions had not forbidden the allocation of such duties to MoD PR officers.130 
 
Caught between being unqualified and not having sufficient authority, the only option open 
to MoD minders was to enforce the instructions issued to them. 
 
Despite the minders being SURSRQHQWVRI/RQGRQ¶VSROLF\WKHUHLVHYLGHQFHWRVXJJHVWWKDW
contrary to the dominant line of argument amongst much of the literature, the MoD did not 
completely dictate policy in the South Atlantic. Much of the time, there was a sizeable 
degree of autonomy awarded to the men on the ground. Morrison and Tumber judged that 
the journalists were, at first, suspicious of the minders who seemed to be preventing them 
IURPVHQGLQJFRS\+RZHYHUWKH\DUJXHWKDWµ«LQIDFWLWZDV/RQGRQ¶131 There was 
certainly an element of confusion about who was running policy on the Falklands. Fox 
contended that even the authorities were confused and were unclear about who was in 
FKDUJHµFleet (at Northwood), MoD, the Task Force Commander, or the local command 
and the MoD prHVVRIILFHUV¶132  
 
3a (iY&HQVRUVKLSWKH0LOLWDU\µ0LQGHUV¶ 
The servicemen who played the most significant role in policy, particularly during the land 
campaign, were the relatively unfamiliar breed RIµPLOLWDU\PLQGHU¶RU352 attached to 
individual Brigades. In theory each ship should have had an officer who was trained in 
PHGLDUHODWLRQVZKRZRXOGVHUYHDVWKHVKLS¶V352+RZHYHUZKHWKHUDVKLSKDGVXFKDQ
officer or not was dependent RQERWKWKHVKLSDQGWKHFDSWDLQ$ERDUG0LGGOHWRQ¶V
command, Hermes, the men of the ship had very little idea of who - if, indeed, such a 
person existed - had the role of PRO. The Chief Aircraft Engineer on board, Trevor 
Whalen, said that he had never heard of anyone with that responsibility.133 The Chief Petty 
Officer, Iain Shickle, was similarly unaware of the post, or the man who filled it.134 There 
was, in fact, a PRO on Hermes, Commander Tony Moran. Although Moran did not feature 
                                                 
130
 Mercer et al., pp.88-89. 
131
 Morrison and Tumber, p.213. 
132
 Fox memorandum, HCDC, v.ii, p.141. 
133
 T. Whalen, Interview, 26 Aug. 2013. 
134
 I. Shickle, Interview, 26 Aug. 2013. 
81 
 
in evidence of the HCDC, and seems to have escaped most of the literature of the conflict, 
DQDUWLFOHLQTXRWHG1LFKROVRQDVVD\LQJWKDW0RUDQKHOSHGµWRFUHDWHDQGIRVWHU
VXVSLFLRQRQDOOVLGHV¶135 His negative attitude was further documented by an interview 
with Hermes¶,QWHOOLJHQFH2IILFHU5XSHUW1LFKRO136 In an interview, Moran himself 
DGPLWWHGWKDWKLVWUDLQLQJUHDOO\DPRXQWHGWRVSHQGLQJDPRUQLQJLQWKH1DY\'35¶V
office.137 On some of the other vessels the PRO was recognised as such, but did not have 
military authority. Lieutenant Bryant and Lieutenant Butler remembered HMS Brilliant¶V
PRO, Bob Davidson, the Duty Staff Officer.138 On HMS Andromeda the situation was 
FRPSDUDEOH1HLOµ1REE\¶+DOOZDVVWLOOLQWUDLQLQJWREHDQRIILFHULQ$SULO$VSDUW
of his responsibility on board he was appointed to the post of Deputy PRO.139 The PRO 
ZDVWKHVKLS¶VGRFWRU0RVWO\1REE\¶VGXWLHVFHQWUHGRQRUJDQLVLQJSHQSDOOHWWHUVZKLFK
had been flooding in from the Daily Star.140 0RVWVKLSV¶352VKDGRWKHUUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV
which dictate that, as the conflict progressed, and the strategic importance of their natural 
occupation amplified, the duties of the PRO were increasingly abandoned. If a ship had a 
PRO, he was likely not to be anyone with significant command, authority, or time, which 
PHDQWWKDWGXULQJWKHFRQIOLFWVKLSV¶352VSOD\ed a minor role.  
 
Conversely, as a direct result of experience in Northern Ireland, the Army and the Royal 
Marines had their own Service PROs, who were well known amongst the men, and who 
had the ear of their COs. It is generally accepted that operational PR was more successful 
on land than it was at sea. The Marine and Army PROs were the primary reason for this. 
With each of the two Brigade HQs on the Falklands there was a PRO: Captain David 
Nicholls with 3 Commando Brigade, and Lieutenant Colonel Dunn with 5 Infantry 
Brigade.141 The advantage afforded to these men was that they were, unlike the civilian 
minders, qualified in both spheres ± the military and PR. Another significant benefit was 
that each had solid relationships with their COs. Julian Thompson said in an interview 
following the war that: 
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I said he was to see me every day and that he was going to be part of the command team. He was to 
be totally in the picture as to what we were doing so the staff, who know him anyway, also know 
that he was trusted by me and part of the essential scene.142 
 
Thompson reiterated his confidence in Nicholls 32 years later. He said he never gave an 
LQWHUYLHZKLPVHOI7KRPSVRQYLHZHGWKDWLWZDVWKH352¶VGXW\WRWDNHGDLO\EULHILQJVDQG
to interact with the press.143 The relationships between PROs with the Marines and Army, 
conflicted sharply with that which was enjoyed on the ships. The land minders assumed the 
responsibility of handling day-to-day dealings with the press, briefing them and vetting 
their copy. The CO would be left to the principal concern of directing battle. This was not 
just the case for the two PROs attached to Brigade HQ. According to Fox, Colonel Tom 
Seccombe of the Marines, and Deputy Commander of 3 Commando Brigade, had become, 
whilst travellinJVRXWKµIHGXSZLWKWKHVTXDEEOHVRYHUILOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWVDQGWKHSHWW\
rules now being laid down by the MOD information officers..¶144 Seccombe ordered 
Major Mike Norman, who had been the commander of the Marines on the Falklands when 
the Argentines invaded, to take over supervision of the media attached to 3 Commando 
%ULJDGH)R[FDOOHG1RUPDQWKHµ6XSHU-PLQGHU¶± he was capable of correcting technical, 
military detail and also enjoyed rendering his grammatical expertise.145 The principal 
difference between the PR of the land campaign and that which was observed at sea, was 
that the role of managing the press had been delegated to officers with authority, access to 
COs and operational knowledge ± qualities to which the civilian minders could never 
really aspire. These officers allowed for a smoother PR service and freed their COs to run 
the war.  
 
Late in 1982 the HCDC recognised that Service PR2VµVKRXOGKDYHSOD\HGDELJJHU role¶ 
in the Falklands.146 They possessed a number of attributes which made them more 
endearing to the journalists, and more successful in administrating PR policy than the 
civilian minders. Other texts have explored the credentials of the Service PROs and for this 
reason, the debate pertaining to the superiority of the Service PROs is merely touched upon 
here. 147 There is a consensus that the Service PROs were superior to the civilian minders 
and generally better equipped for the job. Freedman considered that, because the military 
minders carried out their duties so efficiently, from the start, µVHQGLQJSXEOLFUHODWLRQV
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officers ± WKHµPLQGHUV¶[civilian] ± ZDVERXQGWRIDLO¶148 The testimony to the HCDC by 
journalists supported this notion. The evidence or memoranda supplied by Protheroe, PA, 
the Daily Star, Hastings, Bishop, Nicholson and Hanrahan all highlighted the weaknesses 
of the civilian minders compared to their military counterparts.149 
 
Military minders had more authority than their civilian equivalents for a number of 
reasons: they had operational knowledge, they were of the officer class and therefore had a 
natural standing, they were often able to organise transportation for journalists which the 
civilians were not and, most crucially, military minders had control over censorship. 
Whilst writings on the minders are common, accounts tend to place the role of these men 
into the greater context of PR policy. It is suggested here that the advent of the military 
minders signalled a phase in the policy of public relations in the conflict which was 
dominated by on-the-ground management. Whereas civilian minders were explicitly 
prohibited from engaging in the vetting process, military minders were able to partake in 
censorship because they had the operational knowledge to do so ± they could recognise a 
SKUDVHZKLFKPLJKWHQGDQJHUµRSHUDWLRQDOVHFXULW\¶DQGFRXOGLGHQWLI\LQIRUPDWLRQZKLFK
might be gratuitous to the Argentines. In many ways, as the campaign progressed, so too 
GLGWKHLQIOXHQFHRIWKH6HUYLFH352V2QHSURPLQHQWH[DPSOHRIKRZWKH6HUYLFH352V¶
authority may have exceeded that which was allotted to them is when it came to censoring 
copy. Captain Nicholls claimed in an interview that: µ:HFRXOGGHOHWHDQGGLGVR7KHPRVW
crucial area was future operations and indicating areas and strengths¶150 Military minders 
were not afraid to GHOHWHVHFWLRQVRIFRUUHVSRQGHQWV¶ZULWLQJXQGHUWKHSUHPLVHWKDWLWPLJKW
FRPSURPLVHVHFXULW\%LVKRSFODLPHGWKDWµRQFHZHJRWDVKRUHWKH0R'PHQERWKRQWKH
ground and in London appear to have stifled any suggestion that the campaign was doing 
anything but rolling inexorably towards victory¶151 On 27 May, Bishop authored an article 
which declared that the British advance was in danger of being bogged down. However, 
µE\WKHWLPHWKLVZDVUHOHDVHGLQ/RQGRQWKHUHIHUHQFHVKDGEHHQUHPRYHGDQGWKHSLHFH
began about halfway through on a more optimistic note¶152 Despite the warning of April, 
WKDWµ2)),&(566+28/'1276((.72,17(5)(5(:,7+7+(67</(25
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deletions were made.153 
 
The most significant turning point in how South Atlantic PR policy was administered in 
the warzone came on 12 May. One action signalled a distinct departure, not only from the 
SROLF\ZKLFKKDGEHHQSUHYLRXVO\DGKHUHGWREXWIURP/RQGRQ¶VFRQWURORI35SROicy. It is 
the contention here that guidelines dispensed to the Task Force on 12 May signalled the 
0R'¶VUHOXFWDQFHWRGLUHFWO\PDQDJH35DQGVLJQDOOHGDSKDVHRIDXWRQRP\IRUWKRVH
preparing to land on the islands. A document was distributed from Canberra to other Task 
)RUFHYHVVHOVRQ0D\7KHGRFXPHQWZDVHQWLWOHGµ8.3UHVVDVKRUHRIWKH)DONODQGV
*XLGHOLQHV¶154 Nicholls, aboard Canberra - the ship with the largest contingent of media 
aboard - was the creator of these guidelines. As previously explained, there had been no 
communication from London which had significantly updated the guidelines of 8 April. 
Nicholls, along with the three civilian minders on Canberra (Helm, George and Alan 
Percival), came up with the new regulations for reporting on land. The document was more 
structured in style and clearer in content than that of early April. The aims of the policy, 
the responsibilities of COs and how regular media interaction, such as briefings, 
communications, movements etc. should be approached, were all outlined in the document. 
The text was far more positive than the last had been. Instead of listing what could not be 
discussed in the presence of journalists, for example, the document outlined what should 
be done in order for PR policy to run more efficiently. For example, COs were to keep the 
MRXUQDOLVWVLQIRUPHGRIPLOLWDU\GHYHORSPHQWVDQGZHUHWRµJXLGHMRXUQDOLVWVRQZKDWWKH\
PD\RUPD\QRWUHSRUWRUSKRWRJUDSK«¶155 The importance of the media was explained at 
the start of the message:  
 
The journalists will have the important function of keeping the British public informed of 
developments on the island. They will also be in an excellent position to counter any Argentinian 
disinformation which is broadcast about our operations.156 
 
As an annex to the guidelines was a list of journalists and to which units they might be 
assigned for the duration of the land campaign (Figure 3.7). The unit to which a journalist 
was to be assigned was the topic of speculation as the Task Force neared the TEZ. Hastings 
ZURWH LQ DQ DUWLFOH SXEOLVKHG WKH GD\ DIWHU WKH ODQGLQJV WKDW µLW LV D MRXUQDOLVWLF UHIOH[
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remorselessly to harass the powers that be for the improbable, in the hope that after much 
haggling one will be granted a small portion of the possible¶157 He went on to explain that: 
 
«ZHKDYHIRXJKWIHURFLRXVO\IRUWKHULJKWWRUHSRUWDSRVVLEOH)DONODQGVODQGLQJIURPVRPHZKHUH
near the van. It was rather an alarming anti-climax when the staff considered, consulted, and came 
back to say that everybody would be delighted to take us, and would we like to go with the forward 
companies, or the next ones behind?158 
 
The process of assigning places with the land Forces was controlled by Thompson on 
board Fearless. His PRO, Nicholls, made recommendations and drew up the document 
OLVWLQJWKHDOORFDWLRQV7KRPSVRQVDLGµZHRUJDQLVHGWKHPDVEHVWZHFRXOG¶159 He 
personally took responsibility for the decisions regarding individual journalists and their 
unit distribution. That the MoD had no input in this arrangement demonstrated just how 
much power it had relinquished. Some of the correspondents had developed close 
relationships with particular units on the voyage south. Fox wrote of his dismay that he 
would disemEDUNZLWK3DUDZKHQKHKDGPDGHµWHQWDWLYHDUUDQJements to disembark 
with either 3 Para or 40 Commando¶, as he had µgot to know officers and men in both 
ZHOO¶160 In actual fact, Fox rationalised, Thompson thought KHµwould be one of the first 
ashore with 2 Para and would have a commanding view of the anchorage, being able to get 
despatches back for the BBC and World Service quite easily¶161 On 18 May a document 
on the PR organisation of the amphibious Force was sent to Neville Taylor. It was copied 
to the DPRs and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff. The document clarified which journalist 
would accompany which unit (see Figure 3.7).162 This was the first communication of the 
plan sent directly to MoDPR and further established how remote the MoD was from PR 
policy on the Falklands by the middle of May.  
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Press Team A 
Major Mike Norman  PRO Royal Marine 
Petty Officer Peter Holdgate Commando Forces Photographer 
Robert Fox  BBC Radio 
Alistair McQueen Daily Mirror 
Press Team B 
Alan Percival Civilian Senior Information Officer 
Sergeant Dave Munnelly PRO 3 Commando Brigade 
Tom Smith Noted as PA Photographer  
but from Daily Express 
Robert McGowan Daily Express 
40 Commando Royal Marines 
Patrick Bishop The Observer 
Jeremy Hands  ITN 
Bob Hammond Cameraman (ITN) 
John Martin Soundman (ITN) 
42 Commando Royal Marines 
John Shirley The Sunday Times 
Max Hastings Standard 
Kim Sabido IRN 
45 Commando Royal Marines 
Charles Lawrence The Daily Telegraph 
Ian Bruce Glasgow Herald 
2 Parachute Regiment 
David Norris Daily Mail 
3 Parachute Regiment 
Derek Hudson Yorkshire Post 
Leslie Dowd Reuters 
 
Figure 3.7: Distribution of journalists with landing units as recognised by MoD, 18 May 1982 
 
On the document, only 16 of 29 journalists with the Fleet were named. Based on only these 
16 names, the MoD contacted the Fleet to authorise the allocation of places. The MoD 
gave Nicholls and Thompson the authority to act at their discretion: 
 
FOLLOWING TELECON TODAY WE AGREE ALLOCATION OF PLACES FOR 
EMBARKED PRESS TO COVER FUTURE OPERATIONS SHOULD BE AT DISCRETION OF 
&7)¶ 
µ<286+28/'$*5((7+(',675,%87,212)0(',$5(35(6(17$7,9(6,17+(
LIGHT OF THEIR OWN PREFERENCE AND AVAILABLE AND SUITABLE LOCATIONS.163 
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The allocation of journalists to units was discussed in the EGLWRUV¶Meeting of 20 April. 
&RRSHUH[SODLQHGWKDWµ«ZLWKWKHDPDOJDPDWLRQRIWKHYDULRXVHOHPHQWVRIWKH7DVN
)RUFHVRPHUHGLVWULEXWLRQRIFRUUHVSRQGHQWVEHWZHHQVKLSVZDVWDNLQJSODFH«¶164 Cooper 
also justified a decision made in the South Atlantic which would come to plague five in the 
journalist¶V SDUW\+HWROGHGLWRUVWKDWµSULRULW\ZRXOGEHJLYHQWRWKRVHZKRKDGKDGOHVV
good access to material on the voyage south, eg those in CaQEHUUD¶165 
 
The missing names from the document of 18 May belonged to the BBC TV crew and their 
reporter, Hanrahan, and the five journalists who had travelled on HMS Invincible. 
Hanrahan, who was on Hermes, explained that he was not allowed to land with the 
amphibious group like the journalists on CanberraµIt had been agreed in our absence that 
the team that came down on the Canberra [sic] would cover the landing and the rest of us 
would stay with the Naval side of it and cover the Naval battle and WKHDLUEDWWOH¶166 The 
Hermes journalists were permitted onto the Falklands two days after the landings ± even 
then they were not allowed to stay on shore permanently until a full week after the 
landing.167  
 
The Invincible journalists, however, prevented from landing with the main force on 21 
May, landed first on 25 May, but were forcefully returned to the carrier because, they were 
told, they had insufficient kit to stay. It was not until 3 June that the five journalists would 
get ashore to report the campaign in earnest. The decision to permit only those who had 
travelled on Canberra was taken by Thompson and Nicholls. Those journalists aboard 
Canberra had not had as much access to information or been permitted to file as much 
copy as those on board Invincible. To readdress the balance, the decision was taken to send 
Canberra¶VMRXUQDOLVWVDVKRUHUHVWULFting those who had been more successful in the run-
up to the landings. The decision to enforce this policy was transmitted from Canberra to 
MODUK on 6 May. DPR1FRQWDFWHG&RRSHU¶VVHFUHWDU\LPPHGLDWHO\WRLQIRUPKLPWKDW
µEHFDXVHRILQKLELWLRQVSXWXSRQthe press embarked in SS CANBERRA due to her role, it 
has been suggested that this shall be the party to go ashore if and when there is a landing 
RQWKH)DONODQGV¶168 &DSWDLQ%ODFNFRQWDFWHG0R'35RQWKHMRXUQDOLVWV¶EHKDOI 
 
CTG 317.0 [Canberra] VIEW IS THAT HIS EMBARKED PRESS HAVE SO FAR HAD 
/,77/(725(3257$1''(6(59(),567*2$7/$1',1*6«0<&855(17
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INTENTION IS TO TRANSFER MY PRESS AND MOD REPRESENTATIVE TO RFA 
RESOURCE WHERE THEY WILL HAVE ACCESS TO MARISAT AND, PERHAPS, A 
BETTER CHANCE OF COVERING LANDINGS, PARTICULARLY AFTER DAY ONE.169 
 
%ODFN¶VSOHDVIHOORQGHDIHDUVDQGGHVSLWHKLPWUDQVIHUULQJKLVILYHMRXUQDOLVWVWR5)$
Resource the same day, they were not even to catch sight of the islands for another four 
days. The events which saw WKHµInvincible ILYH¶DVKRUHWKH)DONODQGVRQ-XQHKDYHEHHQ
investigated in several well-known works on the media and the Falklands. Perhaps the 
most compelling narrative can be located in µGotcha!¶ 
 
Thompson maintains that there was no conspiracy involved in the decision to send only 
Canberra¶VMRXUQDOLVWVDVKRUH170 In fact, there was another argument why the Invincible 
five should not have been permitted ashore: they were not properly trained. Moore said 
that there was: 
 
«DIHHOLQJDIWHUWKHODQGLQJ that the journalists who had been down with the military embarked in 
the amphibious and merchant vessels that the military forces were travelling in, had done a lot of 
training with them and had been at their briefings and were ready to go ashore with theP«171 
 
Taylor supported this view of proceedings, claiming that the press who had been on 
Invincible µwere not trained, were not equipped, were not familiarised, and we refused in 
London to issue instructions WKDWWKH\VKRXOGEHSXWDVKRUH¶172 Taylor gave the impression 
that London was very much in control of this area of policy. However, at the HCDC, no 
one in the MoD could effectively pin-point from where the decision had originated. Helm, 
civilian PRO, was told, when on Invincible, that the decision had been made for security 
reasons.173 McDonald said he brought up the issue at a CoS meeting to be instructed that 
there was a valid security reason why the option had been enforced.174  However, the 
decision did not emanate from the CoS. Lewin recounted WKDWWKHPDWWHUZDVµbrought to 
my attention and we passed it through the Commander in Chief down the line and the Task 
Force Commander came back with what to me was an extremely adequate reason and I 
ZRXOGEDFNKLPXSRQWKDW¶175 The decision to restrict the movements of the Invincible 
five, and promote those of the Canberra journalists, for whatever reason, was a significant 
effect of policy control being centred firmly in the South Atlantic by mid-May. 
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3b. Policy and the Landings 
The landings on the Falklands marked an important stage in PR policy. The new guidelines 
of 12 May made for a more efficient system of operation. Hastings and Jenkins judged that 
µLWLVH[WUDRUGLQDU\WKDWWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIQHZVPDQDJHPHQWZDVQRWUHFRJQLVHGORQJ
before the San Carlos landing, and a senior officer ± of at least the rank of colonel ± sent 
VRXWKWRKDQGOHLW¶176 The importance of PR had been increasingly recognised ± 
particularly in the South Atlantic, but also in CoS meetings. The system for 
communication and censorship when on land has been examined in a number of studies on 
the war. All the Task Force jRXUQDOLVWV¶ILUVW-hand accounts include discussion on how the 
PR land campaign differed from PR at sea.177 Therefore, it is not the intention to delve 
IXUWKHULQWRWKHMRXUQDOLVWV¶H[SHULHQFHVRQWKH)DONODQGVPHUHO\WRRXWOLQHWKH35SROLF\
which was set out at the start of the land operation.  
 
On 18 May a signal was circulated within the MoD which originated from Canberra. It 
outlined the immediate provisions for PR policy ashore the Falklands.178 During the initial 
stages of the landing the Amphibious Task Group, headed by Commodore Michael Clapp 
(CTG317.0) and 3 Commando Brigade (CTU317.1.1) would co-locate in Fearless. Once 3 
Commando was firmly established on land, CTU317.1.1 would move HQ ashore and press 
traffic on military communications would be passed through 317.0 in Fearless. Once 
Moore, Commander of the Land Forces, arrived, press traffic from both Brigades would 
pass through Fearless. The PR organisation is depicted in Figure 3.8. 
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Figure 3.8: Diagram to show the PR organisation of the amphibious force, 18 May 1982179 
 
The two Brigades, 3 Commando and 5 Infantry, were to run parallel policies when on the 
Falklands. Five Infantry sailed to the islands on board QEII. The Brigade did not arrive on 
the Falklands until 10 days after the initial landing - on 31 May. According to Mercer et 
al., the PROs1LFKROOVDQG,QIDQWU\%ULJDGH¶VPO, Dunn, were only in touch once during 
the course of the war, shortly before 5 Brigade landed.180 Nicholls related his arrangements 




The media experience on land has been well recorded. Typically, journalists would be 
attached to specific Units. It was envisaged that they would remain with their allocated unit 
throughout the campaign. Some did opt to stand by their Unit, for example Ian Bruce of the 
Glasgow Herald yomped across the width of the east island with 45 Commando. The 
Telegraph¶V Alfred McIlroy, and the Mail¶V'DYLG1RUULVSHUVLVWHGwith their Units, the 
Scots Guards and 2 Para respectively. 7KRVHZKRµXQLWKRSSHG¶IDUHGEHWWHULQWKDWWKH\
transmitted more copy ± the most prominent examples include Hastings and Fox. There 
were two ways to file copy for the print journalists on land: Ajax Bay and HMS Fearless. 
There was, of course, also the possibility that journalists might dictate copy via a 
MARISAT link. Radio reporters were forced to remain reliant on MARISAT, along with 
TV reporters, whose recorded images had to be sailed to Ascension, then flown to the UK. 
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PR policy during the land campaign remained consistent with the guidelines of 12 May 
until the end of the war. Of course, there were occasions on which exceptions were made. 
The most notorious example of this was on 31 May, after Hastings had landed on Mount 
Kent. The Special Air Service (SAS) permitted Hastings to transmit his copy on the 
Service, via its own secure communications with HQ in Hereford. At HQ they transcribed 
the report and then forwarded it on to the MoD.181 Subsequent articles published included, 
µ+2:7+(6$60$'(,7¶µ,JRLQZLWKWKH%ULWLVKGDUHGHYLOV¶DQGµ/HDUQLQJWKHOHWKDO
OHVVRQVRIPRGHUQZDU¶182 Although the report was delayed at the MoD for three days, the 
event had, for many, confirmed the fact that some journalists on the Falklands were doing 
better than others. This theory was cemented on 14 June when Hastings became the first 
man into Stanley.183 6XEVHTXHQWKHDGOLQHVSHQQHGE\+DVWLQJVLQFOXGHGµ0DUYHOORXV7KH
welcoPHIURPDMXELODQWSULHVW¶µ7DFWLFVDQGOXFNSD\RII¶DQGPRVWIDPRXVµ7+(),567
MAN IN STANLEY¶.184 
 
Policy regarding the censorship of information was, technically, adjusted only once 
throughout the conflict ± on 12 May by Thompson and Nicholls. It has commonly been 
supposed that PR policy was being run from London during the war. Even after the war 
this conjecture endured. Contrary to the majority of the literature, this thesis insists that the 
MoD awarded the men in the South Atlantic an increasing degree of power. When the 
Service PROs assumed greater control over PR policy during the land campaign, this 
signalled a departure from a MoD-run policy to one managed from within the warzone.  
 
3c. Censorship Twice Over 
Although the guidelines of 12 May marked a significant devolution of power to the 
Falklands arena in one respect, during May provisions were put in place to ensure the MoD 
had the final say, not on how censorship was executed in the South Atlantic, but on what 
was released. The BBC submitted to the HCDC that µRQHRIWKHPRVWGLVPD\LQJIHDWXUHVRI
the handling of information by the Ministry of Defence was the confusion that existed 
between those advising correspondents with the Task Force, and the further attempts at 
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³FHQVRUVKLS´E\WKH Ministry RI'HIHQFHLQ/RQGRQ¶185 µDouble vetting¶ was introduced 
on 21 May. It was a system whereby already censored copy or broadcasts from the 
Falklands would be checked again in London. Double vetting is a concept which is often 
mentioned in the literature of the Falklands - however, very few studies consider the 
phenomenon in any depth. Harris provided a preliminary discussion of the system, which 
was enhanced by the work of Mercer et al., with the help of MoDPR. Mercer et al., 
perhaps, provide the definitive account of the system which requires little improvement.186 
This work does not, in this instance, seek to expand the work to any extent, merely to 
supplement it with consideration of how the policy ran and how it complemented, or 
detracted from, simultaneous South Atlantic policy. 
 
There was considerable debate over where censorship was best placed ± with the Task 
Force or in London. Largely, the Task Force and Northwood were both in favour of 
FHQVRULQJMRXUQDOLVWV¶FRS\LQ/RQGRQOHDYLQJWKHPLOLWDU\IUHHWRFRQFHQWUDWHRQWKH
matter at hand. Generally, the MoD in Whitehall favoured censorship at the sharp end, on 
the front line. There seemed benefits to both concepts, and disagreements proceeded into 
May. Those who argued that censorship should take place with the Task Force validated 
their arguments by claiming that the military in the South Atlantic understood better what 
information might be dangerous to the conduct of the campaign. Hanrahan, when asked 
where he thought censorship was more critical UHSOLHGWKDWµThe critical end is the sharp 
end because the people there know what is damaging in military terms, when you remove 
LWWRWKHEOXQWHQG«WKHWHPSWDWLRQWRXVHLWIRUVRPHRWKHUSXUSRVHLVWRRJUHDW¶.187 
 
By and large, the majority of the MoD favoured censorship at the sharp end. Mercer 
DUJXHGWKDWWKH0R'VRXJKWWRµSODFHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUFHQVRUVKLSRQ1RUWKZRRGDQGWKH
Task Force¶188 Indeed, Taylor was personally in favour of censorship IURPWKHµIURQW¶,QD
letter to the PUS, GDWHG0D\7D\ORUH[SODLQHGWKDWµWKHTXHVWion of censorship is one on 
which FLEET feel strongly that responsibility should be moved to MOD to take the heat 
off CoS. I feel equally strongly that it is a function which should be and could be best done 
at the sharp end¶189 Nott¶V3ULYDWH6HFUHWDU\ demonstrated another reason why MoDPR 
was so keen to maintain censorship at the sharp end when he wrote to Taylor on 11 May 
declaring that: µ,WZDVIHOWWKDWWKHFRUUHVSRQGHQWVZRXOGDFFHSWVXFKFHQVRUVKLSPRUH
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readily if it was done on board ship, since the journalists shared the common dangers of all 
those with the Task Force¶190 However, advocates of censorship in London included both 
the military, and some members of the media in Britain. Woodward outlined how arduous 
censorship on the front line could be. One of the chief concerns was, whilst the South 
Atlantic censors could determine what might endanger military security, they could not be 
DZDUHRIZKDWPLJKWHQGDQJHUWKHGLSORPDWLFVLWXDWLRQµ«FHQVRUVKLSDWWKHIURQWHQGRI
the line is a very difficult tKLQJIRUXVWRGRHIIHFWLYHO\«,GRQRWWKLQNWKHUHLVDQ\ZD\LQ
which we can cope with political sensitivitLHVEDFNLQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶191 The Editor 
of The Times, Charles Douglas-Home thought that µFHQVRUVKLS«VKRXOGKDYHEHHQ
exercised in London and not actually at the Task Force. It seems to me it would have been 
SRVVLEOHLIDSULRULW\KDGEHHQJLYHQWRIDFLOLWDWLQJSUHVVFRYHUDJH«WRKDYHOHWDOOWKH
PDWHULDOFRPHWR/RQGRQDQGWKHVXSHUYLVLRQWREHH[HUFLVHGRQLWWKHQ«¶192 In fact, the 
Task Force and Northwood made representations to the MoD to move the focus of 
censorship to Britain. On 3 May Captain Black sent as urgent priority, a signal to the MoD 
requesting that copy be sent embargoed to the MoD for simultaneous release with MoD 
announcements.193 The MoD told the HCDC that this was refused. However, a week later, 
%ODFNVLJQDOOHGWKH0R'DJDLQVWDWLQJµI HAVE STILL NOT RECEIVED APPROVAL 
TO SEND COPY, VETTED ONLY FOR ACCURACY AND SECURITY, TO YOU FOR 
RELEASE CONCURRENTLY WITH MOD ANNOUNCEMENTS¶194 On 9 May 
Northwood went as far as signalling the MoD directly to suggest why a different procedure 
might benefit the MoD as well as the Task Force:  
 
STRONGLY RECOMMEND CORRECT SOLUTION IS FOR ALL COPY TO BE FILED TO 
MOD FOR SECURITY BY SPECIAL SOUTH ATLANTIC PRESS OFFICE. MARISAT. 
BROADCASTS COULD BE HELD BY TV UNTIL SIMILARLY CLEARED. IMMEDIATE 
OPERATIONAL SECURITY VETTING COULD BE DONE ONBOARD. THIS WILL A. 
ENSURE UNIFORM STANDARDS B. REMOVE MUCH OF LOAD FROM COS AND CAUSE 
OF IRRITATION TO PRESS ONBOARD C. CONFORM WITH EFFICIENT NORTHERN 
IRELAND PROCEDURE OPERATED BY DPR (ARMY) UNDERSTOOD TO BE 
ACCEPTABLE TO PRESS.195 
 
There is some debate as to when exactly double vetting began. Mercer et al. advanced the 
argument that vetting in London started before the 21 May when it became official. They 
FRQWHQGHGWKDWµIURPWKHILUVWZHHNORQJEHIRUHDVKRWZDVILUHGJXLGHOLQHVZHUHGUDZQXS
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by the MoD to control reporting by Task Force correspondents and public relation officers 
began to scrutinize copy ± in London as well as in the ships¶196 They went on to maintain 
WKDWµFRS\VHQWWKURXJKPLOLWDU\FKDQQHOVKDGEHHQFKHFNHGIURP$SULO¶197  Although the 
MoD submitted to the HCDC that the London stage of vetting was created on 21 May, 
Mercer et al. describe how women military officers attached to the DPRs, and IOs at MoD, 
would check all incoming copy.198 One of the DPRs conceded that: µ,WODLGXVRSHQWRWKH
criticism that the London vetting was concerned with political not operational interests¶199 
This thesis argues that, whilst the second tier of censorship had been established very early 
on in the conflict ± as Mercer et al. argue ± that second tier did not function seriously or 
thoroughly until the beginning of May. Harris reasoned that there were two events which 
altered MoD perceptions on the control of policy: Fieldhouse being informed via television 
of an event in the warzone, and the announcement of Conqueror as the submarine which 
sunk the Belgrano.  
 
On 1 May Fieldhouse is supposed to have been very angry at hearing the news on 
television that two Argentine Mirages had been shot down over the Falklands.200 However, 
Jonathon Band, Flag Officer to Fieldhouse during the war, remembered multiple occasions 
when the media reported news from within the TEZ before Northwood had been informed; 
for example, that troops were cross decking at Gritvyken when QEII arrived off South 
Georgia, the loss of the SS Atlantic Conveyor and a host of other incidents during the land 
FDPSDLJQEHFDXVHµRQFe they were on the Falklands it was easier for them to get their stuff 
DZD\¶201 The event which certainly did have a significant impact on the decision to 
implement an official tier of censorship in London was the naming of the Conqueror. On 3 
May Nicholson, aboard RFA Olmeda in order to file using her MARISAT system, 
overheard on the bridge the name of the submarine responsible for the attack. He broadcast 
WKHLQIRUPDWLRQLQDGHVSDWFKWR,71¶VNews at One. The HCDC noted in its report that the 
decision was taken as a result of the report by Nicholson.202 The reason the report was so 
significant was not only because the whereabouts of submarines was top secret, but 
because from other reports that day, Nicholson made it possible to establish exactly where 
individual Units were on the islands. As early as 2 May, McDonald felt the need to remind 
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the CoS meeting that MODPR could not edit reports sent by press representatives with the 
Task Force: µ'HWDLOHGUHSRUWV«VKRXOGEHYHWWHGIRUVHFXULW\EUHDFKHVXQGHU7DVN)Rrce 
arrangements before transmission¶.203 The gravity of the situation was noted on 4 May 
when it was decided that it was essential to devise µeffective controls over the security 
aspects of reports being sent from press corUHVSRQGHQWVZLWKWKH7DVN)RUFH¶204 Shortly 
after this affair, plans for a more considered form of London censorship were put in place.  
 
The women officers and IOs gave way to more senior men as censorship in London 
became a more official pursuit. The MoD understood that from 21 May onwards, at least 
RQHRIWKH'35VVDZWKHµHDUPDUNHGSUHVV¶VFRS\¶EHIRUHLWZDVSDVVHGWRWKHUHOHYDQW
publication.205 The most crucial issue with the second tier of censorship was the fact there 
was a complete absence of guidelines from which to apply censorship. One censor said 
they were told: µ,PDJLQH\RXDUHLQFRPPDQGGRZQWKHUH:KDWZRXOG\RXQRWZDQWWREH
NQRZQ"¶206 The Guardian FODLPHGDIWHUWKHHYHQWWKDWWKHµcensorship arrangements 
LPSRVHGLQ/RQGRQ«apart from the delay that they caused, also brought some irritation at 
the inconsistencies of the criteria laid down¶207 There were significant inconsistencies in 
how copy was treated in London ± what was edited and even what was deleted. Mercer et 
al. conducted a study into how copy was handled by the MoD between 8 April and 16 
June. They studied one fifth of the 627 despatches logged by the MoD and found that at 
least eight contained deletions.208 The extent to which the authors investigated the key 
issues surrounding double vetting was so thorough that no further examination is 
warranted.  
 
Evidence suggests that much of the trouble taken over censorship was unnecessary. It was 
the opinion of many who experienced the war that the Task Force journalists self-censored. 
AV3KLOLS7D\ORUSRLQWHGRXWµEXOOHWVDQGbombs do not discriminate between military 
SHUVRQQHODQGMRXUQDOLVWV¶209 7KH6WXG\*URXSRQ&HQVRUVKLSIRXQGWKDWµIHZLIDQ\
journalists would ever willingly publish information which would put lives at risk or 
damage operations¶.210 It was one thing for the journalists to self-censor when their lives 
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might be at stake, but it was another for them to be neutral. It was clear from the reporting 
of the correspondents that none could be neutral. Hastings even wrote articles entitled 
µ:K\QRQHRIXVFDQEHQHXWral in this war¶DQGµ:K\,¶PSURXGWRWDNH%ULWDLQ¶VVLGH¶.211 
Kim Sabido told his listeners: µ,I\RX¶UHXQGHUWKHLPSUHVVLRQWKDW,¶YHEHFRPHVRPHWKLQJ
RIDQXQFULWLFDO0DULQHJURXSLHRYHUWKHODVWFRXSOHRIZHHNV\RX¶GEHRQO\SDUWO\
right«ZKHQRQHLVEUought to realise«WKDWRQH¶VYHU\H[LVWHQFHGHSHQGVRQD%ULWLVK
victory, the angle on that SHUVSHFWLYHLVERXQGWRFKDQJH¶212 1LFKROVRQUHIOHFWHGWKDWµ«LW
was our war; it was my war. I felt it was as much my war as the marines and the paras 
because it was a British war¶.213 ,IWKHMRXUQDOLVWV¶ product needed censoring - and double 
censoring - it was probably only until the land campaign commenced and the bullets 
started flying. The policy of censorship is yet another example of how the MoD left it too 
late.  
 
Many authors, particularly those who specialise in the theory of media in times of war, 
have pointed out how controversial censorship was during the Falklands because it was 
inflicted on a democratic and free media.214 Another, less recognised reason why so much 
interest focused on the censorship of the media - indeed the media in general - was because 
the journalists with the Task Force, and the British media in general, drew wide attention 
to the problem. During the war there was a large quantity of articles produced which 
directly commented on ministry policy. One of the most renowned articles was written by 
McIlroy and published on 11 May. It placed the blame for delays in copy reaching the UK 
solely on the lack of co-ordination in the MoD.215 Sabido spoke openly about the 
difficulties facing correspondents.216 Commentators in Britain also had their say, 
condemning the mLQLVWU\IRUWKHLUFROOHDJXHV¶GLVFRPIRUW217 Cartoons were also produced 
(see Figure 3.9). The attention focused on the media, particularly the censorship of the 
media, during and after the Falklands War was partly due to the media highlighting its own 
plight against the MoD. 
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Mercer et al. proved that the second tier of censorship was inconsistent and even 
succumbed to deleting text.218 While most journalists might have accepted the need for a 
VHFRQGOHYHORIYHWWLQJPRVWDV3URWKHURHVXJJHVWHGµZRXOGOLNHWKHSHRSOHZKRDUH
RSHUDWLQJWKDWVHFRQGOHYHO«WREHYHU\PXFKPRUHFOHDULQWKHLUPLQGVDVWRZK\WKH\DUH
applying that, and not to indulge in observations about the taste and the tone of 
GHVSDWFKHV«¶219 It is the contention of this thesis that double vetting started in earnest at 
the beginning of May, though the practice of double checking copy had begun as early as 8 
April. The only reason the MoD needed to institute such a system was as a result of the 
lack of coherent censorship policy in the South Atlantic. If guidelines had been clearer, and 
the job had been given to the correct people, the inconsistencies witnessed in the 
censorship of copy would not have existed, making a second tier of vetting superfluous. In 
the event, censors in both the South Atlantic and in London suffered from a lack of clear 
guidelines which would dictate that PR policy did not run smoothly and had to be adapted 




Figure 3.9: 3%URRNHVµ7KH7LPHV¶-XO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In pursuing PR policy concerning the South Atlantic there were two distinct aspects which 
drew attention: censorship and incident reporting. In both areas, significant changes to 
policy were only implemented when action started in earnest, at the beginning of May, 
with the sinking of the Argentine cruiser, the General Belgrano. The fact that policy was 
only adapted in May 1982 made two factors clear. Firstly, policy, rather than being 
considered and applicable for the length of a potential campaign, was reactive in nature. 
Only when existing policy was tested to any real extent did the weaknesses, sometimes 
identified beforehand, become significant enough to provoke the MoD to reconsider 
procedure. The sinking of the Belgrano, and two days later, Sheffield, cemented the need 
for change in the process of incident reporting. Similarly, it was the announcement of the 
name of the submarine which sunk the Belgrano, and the inconsistencies made apparent by 
the sinking of the Sheffield, which drove a new phase of censorship ± double vetting. The 
second factor which became evident was that the MoD had not put in place sufficient 
guidelines for either the reporting of incidents or censorship throughout the first month of 
the conflict. The general policy guidelines transmitted on 8 April effectively constituted a 
list of things not to do. What was lacking was a coherent, clear and fool-proof set of 
instructions on just how MoD envisaged and expected PR policy to be run from the 
warzone. In the case of censorship, both those responsible in the South Atlantic, and those 
who adopted the responsibility in London, suffered from a lack of guidelines on how to 
censor material. The most serious element of this was that censors with the Task Force 
were inconsistent. However, there was also a dearth of advice ± during the first month at 
least ± on how the Fleet was expected to report events in the South Atlantic. If incident 
reporting had been considered before incidents started to occur, the MoD would have been 
better placed, not only to handle in-coming copy, but to announce accurate news promptly. 
Incident reporting constituted, perhaps, the most unforgivable area in which the MoD 
failed to prepare. Whereas censorship may have had to be tested, and adapted to suit the 
purpose, incident reporting was a fairly simple procedure which would most certainly have 
had to be addressed at some time. 
 
Throughout both strands of policy, the priorities of the MoD were clear. The MoD was not 
overly interested in promoting more efficient reporting of the campaign, it was primarily 
concerned with its own image. The credibility of the MoD was called into question on 
numerous occasions from the outset of the crisis. The MoD conducted a public battle with 
Argentina, outside the military sphere ± a battle to be the first of the belligerent countries 
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ZLWKWKHQHZV0R'¶VVHOI-interest was also evident from the amount of concentration 
focused on incident reporting over other issues like censorship. Certainly it was important 
that the British public, and the families of Task Force personnel, be informed of important 
news from the Task Force correctly and promptly. However, the MoD, apparently, had 
more to lose than just the race to announce updates: MoDPR was receiving increasing 
criticism as a result of its handling of a number of incidents including the Belgrano, the 
Sheffield and the capture of the Narwhal. The fact that incident reporting provoked a total 
review of policy on 11 May, demonstrates the significance attached to it. 
 
What is distinct is that the MoD did not control all aspects of information or PR policy in 
the South Atlantic. Contrary to the claims of several historians, this thesis argues that 
control over censorship policy ± and, increasingly, general policy ± was devolved to the 
men on the ground in the South Atlantic. It is key to note that the MoD only allowed the 
Task Force limited control over issues which had a direct impact on the standing of the 
MoD. Double censorship was brought in, just as the land campaign commenced, in order 
to protect the MoD from any omissions which may have caused it embarrassment ± 
operational information had already been deleted. The MoD treated policy within the 
ZDU]RQHDWDUP¶VOHQJWK\HWLQFLGHQWUHSRUWLQJSROLF\ZDVVWLOOHQIRUFHGIURP/RQGRQ
because it had an immediate effect on the public image and credibility of the Ministry. Any 
efforts made by those with the Task Force to find alternative solutions to manage PR (such 
as the suggestion of embargoing copy for simultaneous release with a MoD 




ailing organisation. Guidelines and plans for managing the media contingent with the Task 
Force were neglected in favour of the pursuit of a successful form of incident reporting. 
This thesis does not dispute the importance of obtaining reports of events from the 








MoD Public Relations Policy in Britain 
 
 
Cooper told the House of Commons Defence Committee that there were two groups of the 
media with which the MoD ZDVFRQFHUQHGµone out with the Task Force in the Falkland 
Islands and we had correspondents here trying to get as much into the press and media as 
WKH\SRVVLEOHFRXOG¶1 Chapter Three of this thesis dealt with MoD policy towards the 
media with the Task Force. This chapter relates to PR policy advanced by the ministry in 
Britain. Principally, it focuses on how the MoD provided for the British media, what 
facilities it provided and how exactly information was relayed to the expectant 
broadcasters and press. The facilities the MoD provided will be shown to have been 
delivered too late to have any significant effect on how the war was reported. The MoD 
PDLQWDLQHGOHVVRIDGLVFHUQLEOHµSROLF\¶LQ%ULWDLQWKDQLWGLGLQWKH6RXWK$WODQWLF7KHUH
were a series of highly important events which affected the way which information about 
WKHZDURUWKHZDULWVHOIFRXOGEHUHSRUWHG,QWKLVFKDSWHUWKHµSROLF\¶RIWKH0R'LV
analysed by the actions it took when faced with different events or issues. What remained 
constant with policy in the South Atlantic was that PR procedure was reactive. 
 
The academic subject field of the Falklands is littered with accounts of the Task Force 
journalists and their exploits. Yet a substantial percentage of those who have considered 
the media and the Falklands have also devoted attention to how the media was handled in 
Britain. The vast majority discuss the system of briefing. There are some key texts which 
contributed more than others. Mercer et al. provided a succinct overview of all 
Government policy ± including domestic policy. The account is an excellent synopsis of 
the topic, yet is restricted to comment on the organisation of MoDPR and its place within 
the superstructure of Government PR.2 Whereas Mercer et al. were at the forefront of 
analysis, their treatment of domestic media policy was limited by the fact that others had 
contributed extensively to the subject prior to its publication. Harris wrote 
comprehensively on the British media in 1983.3 He appraised the role of the MoD in the 
µLQIRUPDWLRQZDU¶:KLOHWKHUHZDVQRWPXFKFRPPHQWDU\RQWKHSROLF\ZKLFKZDV
implemented in Britain, there was extensive examination of the effect policy had on the 
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media. When Harris did contemplate the MoD, he primarily concerned himself with the 
organisation of the ministry ± predominantly the struggle for power between the ACPR, 
and the new Chief.4 In 1985, the Glasgow University Media Group¶V study was comprised 
of analysis of different aspects of television coverage.5 Necessarily, WKH*URXS¶VVWXG\ZDV
intrinsically concerned with the representation of information, and therefore involved 
assessment of the MoD.6 The literature of the 1980s was completed by Morrison and 
7XPEHU¶VZRUNZKLFKLQFOXGHGDFKDSWHUDVVLJQHGWRFHQVRUVKip and information 
policy, both in Britain and with the Task Force.7  
 
Thus there was penned a multitude of general comment on how the MoD behaved and how 
it handled the British media throughout the crisis. This chapter will present a general 
impression of how the MoD responded to the media in Britain during the war. 
Accordingly, some ground which was covered by previous texts will be reiterated. 
However, there are three ways in which this work will enhance the existing literature. 
Firstly, substantial attention is paid to &RRSHU¶VPHHWLQJVRIHGLWRUV. For the first time, 
QRWHVRQWKHFRQWHQWRI(GLWRUV¶0eetings have been accessed, allowing for closer scrutiny 
of the meetings and their role in controlling the media. Secondly, methods by which the 
MoD attempted to better regulate the release of information will be explored fully. The 
News Release Group and the Military Briefing Group are both considered in greater depth 
than any previous investigation. 
 
One issue which deserves attention and which should be explained before embarking on 
GLVFXVVLRQRIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\LQ%ULWDLQLVWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQµXQDWWULEXWDEOH¶
RUµQRQ-DWWULEXWDEOH¶DQGµRII-the-UHFRUG¶EULHILQJV0HUFHUHWDODUHWKHRQO\DXWKRUVZKLFK
consider definitions of these phrases. 7KH\DUJXHWKHUHLVDµVPDOOEXWFUXFLDO¶GLIIHUHQFH
between the two: non-DWWULEXWDEOHPHDQVWKDWµLQIRUPDWLRQFDQEHXVHGEXWQRWDWWULEXWHGWR
DQ\LGHQWLILDEOHVRXUFH¶RII-the-UHFRUGVKRXOGPHDQµMXVWWKDW¶µDOWKRXJKVXFKLQIRUPDWLRQ
can hamstring a jRXUQDOLVWZKRODWHUGLVFRYHUVLWIURPOHVVFRYHUWVRXUFHV¶8 This thesis 
adopts these definitions. Off-the-record information cannot be used at all by a journalist, 
unattributable information can, as long as the source is not identified.9   
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1. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Public Relations 
The role of the FCO in handling the media during the Falklands War is often neglected. 
One reason this has been the case is because the HCDC evaluated the handling of the 
media only by the MoD. The FCO was held largely responsible, in April 1982, for the 
Argentine invasion of the islands ± for neither anticipating nor guarding against it. During 
the first weekend of the crisis, the media in Britain led a campaign for WKHµJXLOW\PHQ¶
who had allowed the invasion to occur, to be expelled from their positions in the 
Government. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Peter Carrington, thus, was 
the first casualty of the war. It has been argued by historians, such as Badsey and Hastings 
and Jenkins, that CaUULQJWRQUHVLJQHGDVDGLUHFWUHVXOWRIWKHPHGLD¶VFUXVDGHWRRXWWKH
guilty.10 &HUWDLQO\WKHKXPLOLDWLRQRIDUWLFOHVVXFKDVµ7KH%ULWLVK/LRQLV&DXJKWZLWKKLV
7URXVHUV'RZQ¶DQGFDOOVIRU7KDWFKHUWRµ6DFNWKH*XLOW\0HQ¶, contributed to the 
resignations of Lord Carrington and his juniors at the FCO, Humphrey Atkins and Richard 
Luce.11 7KDWFKHUKHUVHOISHUKDSVSXWWKHVLWXDWLRQPRVWFOHDUO\µ+DYLQJVHHQ0RQGD\¶V
prHVV«KHGHFLGHGWKDWKHPXVWJR¶12 Once the Task Force set sail, the FCO was given less 
attention by the press. However, this did not mean that the FCO did not play a prominent 
role in media relations during the crisis. In fact, the FCO was attributed the responsibility 
of dealing with the British and foreign media for the entire first month of the war.  
 
The FCO has failed to attract much attention from historians of the media and war in the 
Falklands. Perhaps the most thorough coverage of the department and its role regarding the 
media was presented by the Official History.13 Mercer et al. did acknowledge that the FCO 
KDGDSDUWWRSOD\EXWWKDWLWOLPLWHGLWVHOIWRDSROLF\RIµEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶14 It is the 
contention here that the FCO did play a significant role in the handling of the media in 
1982. The most important impact it had was that it indulged the MoD and encouraged it to 
assume that the addressing of media policy was not urgent. A secondary impact was that 
the efficient running of the FCO News Department in the crisis provided a comparison to 
WKH0R'¶VKDQGOLQJRISXEOLFUHODWLRQV which ensured that the MoD was viewed more 
critically. 
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µµ:HWDNHWKHEODPHIRU)DONODQGV¶¶The Standard, 5 
Apr., p.1.   
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On the outbreak of the crisis, the FCO established an Emergency Unit to handle the 
everyday running of the department concerning matters related to the Falklands.15 The 
primary focus of this unit was to produce regular situation reports (Sitreps), and to process 
the information which the FCO received from abroad.16 The unit also briefed the OD(SA) 
on international opinion.17 Thatcher told Pym when the war was over that the Emergency 
UQLW¶VµGDLO\SURGXFWLRQRIbriefing for the meetings of OD6$ZDVLQYDOXDEOH«¶18 
According to Freedman, a Parliamentary and Press Group was responsible for the 
preparation of Parliamentary statements, and for public relations in general. Mostly, the 
group was responsible for keeping the FCO up to date on reaction in the Commons and 
Lords to media stories, or to events.19 The Parliamentary and Press Group, along with the 
Emergency Unit, an Information Policy Department and a Strategy Group, reported to a 
Steering Group (see Figure 1). The membership of this Steering Group included the Private 
Secretaries of various Ministerial Departments, including the MoD, FCO and Cabinet 
2IILFH0RUHVLJQLILFDQWWRPHGLDUHODWLRQVWKH)&2¶VUHJXODUDSSDUDWXVIRUGHDOLQJZLth 
the media, the FCO News Department, maintained its integral role throughout the entirety 
of the conflict.  
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Figure 1: Diagram to show the organisation of the FCO media apparatus, April 1982 20 
 
The News Department was established at the Foreign Office in 1916 and was largely 
responsible for carrying out propaganda work abroad.21 When, in 1918, the Ministry of 
Information (MoI) was disbanded, the News Department absorbed much of its work 
relating to overseas¶ publicity and the dissemination of information. The News Department 
also played an integral role in the Second World War, having amalgamated into its ranks 
the Crown Film Unit.22 In 1964 Ministers fended off attacks on the News Department in 
Parliament after the publication of the Plowden Report. The Plowden Committee, Max 
Beloff argued, was established for one specific factor ± the increasing difficulty felt at 
distinguishing between the nature of the work of the Foreign Office, and the work of the 
Commonwealth Relations Office.23 The Government accepted the findings of the 
Committee which made the recommendation that overseas¶ representation of the two 
offices should be merged into a single Diplomatic Service. This report prompted MPs to 
question the role of the News Department in Parliament. George Thomson MP, Minister of 
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State at the Foreign Office, said there was µno change in the machinery in relation to news 
and public rHODWLRQVLQWKH)RUHLJQ2IILFH«There is no change in the responsibility of the 
News Department for dealing with press inquiries about Her Majesty's Government's 
foreign policy¶24 The role of the News Department has attracted little attention from 
scholars. The role of the News Department in the Falklands War has attracted even less 
consideration. While the flow of information from Whitehall to the media has been 
examined by various authors, Yoel Cohen pointed RXWWKDWµ«WKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKH
News Department and news media has been ignored in the academic literature¶25 
 
)&2¶VHTXLYDOHQWWR0R'35ZDVLWV1HZV'HSDUWPHQW,WV+HDGLQZDV1LFKRODV
Fenn - its Deputy, Roger Westbrook. The Head of the News Department served as the 
official spokesman and Press Secretary to the Secretary of State.26 Lord Carrington 
resigned as Secretary of State on 5 April after intense criticism following the Argentine 
invasion of the Falklands. On Monday 5 April, the British media led an attack on 
Carrington for having neglected the issue of the islands.27 This induced him to offer his 
resignation to the Prime Minister later that day. Francis Pym became Foreign Secretary on 
6 April. Pym took a keen interest in the public presentation of foreign policy and regarded 
it as vital to its success.28 
 
Fenn and Westbrook worked closely with the Emergency Unit and Parliamentary and Press 
Group throughout the war. By no means did the News Department ± a department of 12 
men - have a monopoly over media relations in the FCO - Ministers and senior officials 
from the office maintained their own contact with the media, deciding when to give 
interviews or speeches. The head of the News Department, however, also served as the 
official spokesman of the department and was, more often than not, the host of the 1215 
GMT FCO news conferences. In addition to this, Fenn was the Press Secretary to the 
Secretary of State.29 Francis Pym relieved Lord Carrington of his role of Foreign Secretary 
on 6 April. Pym took a keen interest in the public presentation of foreign policy and 
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UHJDUGHGLWDVµFULWLFDOWRLWVVXFFHVV¶30 In fact, Pym often became involved in high profile 
media rows during the Falklands War.31 Perhaps the most prominent example of this was 
on 0D\$WDPHHWLQJRIWKH&RPPRQV¶)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV&RPPLWWHH3\PFRQGHPQHG




The Foreign Office had the dominant relationship with the media throughout April 1982. 
There were two chief reasons for this: the main focus of the crisis concerned diplomacy 
and the efforts to secure a negotiated settlement; and the MoD had few facilities in place to 
host the media throughout the first month of the conflict. The major implication of the 
)&2¶VOHDGLQJSRVLWLRQLQ$SULOZDVWKDWWKH0R'ZDVencouraged to take a back seat in 
British media relations, preventing it from preparing properly for the eventual conflict and 
the bombardment of increased press interest which would be attracted after the first signs 
of action in the South Atlantic. As early as the day of the invasion, Carrington told a 
meeting of the Cabinet: µ2IILFLDOVIURPERWK'HSDUWPHQWV>)&2DQG02'@ZHUHDOVR
considering how to handle relations with the media during a possibly prolonged crisis¶33 
However, there is no evidence that this was genuinely the case within the MoD on 2 April, 
since attention was firmly focused on accrediting journalists to the Task Force. During the 
first weeks of the crisis the demand for military news was to be satisfied by the MoD, and 
the demand for information on diplomatic efforts was to be provided by the FCO.34 It was 
right that the initiative should lie with the FCO at the beginning of the conflict, since the 
Task Force was seen as an adjunct to diplomacy. The efficiency of the Foreign Office 
media machine not only encouraged the MoD to take a secondary role in the first month of 
the conflict, but it also contrasted with the relative inefficiency of the MoD. 
 
The FCO media apparatus was much better equipped to deal with a crisis than the MoD. 
The News Department at FCO was run by experienced diplomats, unlike MoDPR, which 
was run by Information Officers. Members of the FCO were often required to do a tour in 
the News Department, then would be posted abroad in an embassy, or in another 
department of the FCO. Members of the News Department were often favoured by 
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journalists because they were given access to more information ± they were all on the 
distribution lists for relevant documents - and had a proficient knowledge of the Ministry.35 
In addition to this, the FCO had other resources at its disposal. For example, in a meeting 
of Information Officers on 19 April, the Central Office of Information representative 
described its main function as to support the FCO in presentation.36 Of course, the FCO did 
have a larger role to perform than the MoD when it came to public relations. The FCO had 
to ensure that posts abroad were kept fully briefed on all aspects of both diplomatic efforts 
DQGPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQV,QWKLVHQGHDYRXUWKH&R,ZDVWKH0LQLVWU\¶VIRUHPRVWVXSSRUW
The department was also given additional directives by the Chiefs of Staff - a 
representative of the Foreign Office often attended the meetings.37 During the course of the 
crisis there were over 90 guidance telegrams sent to missions abroad. There were also a 
number of background papers produced on specific, controversial topics.38 Evidence which 
demonstrated how the FCO kept posts abroad updated, and how it controlled the media 
line at home, is contained in a telegram of 18 April. The FCO informed the UK 
Ambassador to the US in Washington, Neville Henderson, WKDWµ7RKROGWKHSUHVVWRQLJKW
we are giving the following off the record guidance: - µWe have just received the proposals 
ZKLFK0U+DLJKDVEURXJKWRXWRI%XHQRV$LUHV7KH\DUHFRPSOH[DQGGLIILFXOW«:H
shall be studying them carefully, however, and shall be getting in touch again with Mr. 
+DLJ¶¶39 5HDOO\WKLVFRQVWLWXWHGDµKROGLQJVWDWHPHQW¶EXWJDYHDJRRGLQGLFDWLRQRIKRZ
the FCO was at the forefront of media relations in April 1982.  
 
The Foreign Office was fortunate in April 1982 in that it did not have to alter much of its 
regular procedure for dealing with the Press. As Mercer et al. QRWHGµ«WKH)&2QHZV
GHSDUWPHQWDGRSWHGYHU\PXFKDSROLF\RIEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO«¶40 Unattributable briefings 
were a staple of the department and were supplied to the media throughout the conflict at 
FCO (something for which the MoD has been famously criticised for neglecting to do). 
The regular 1215GMT official briefings ± mostly compered by Nicholas Fenn - remained in 
place and were added to by exSHUWVFRPPLVVLRQHGWRDVVLVWWKH)&2¶VEULHILQJRIWKH
British media. Charles Douglas-Home, the Editor of The TimesWROGWKH+&'&µThere 
was no marked change of gHDU«LQZKDWZHZHUHEHLQJWROG¶41 Another way in which the 
FCO adhered to its normal PR policy, and in which the MoD was shown up, related to 
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38
 Freedman, v.ii, p.26. 
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provision for foreign journalists. The FCO had more experience catering for the needs of 
foreign correspondents in London, and the amenities offered to foreign journalists during 
the war were extensive. Regular press conferences were available for British and foreign 
journalists alike. These briefings attracted a much larger attendance by foreign journalists 
than regular briefings.42 In addition, foreign journalist-specific, unattributable briefings 
were held ZLWKLQWKH)&2)LQDOO\WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V3UHVV6HFUHWDU\%HUQDUG,QJKDP
with the help of the Foreign Office, gave regular unattributable briefings for members of 
the Foreign Press Association.43 Although the FCO was accused by the Foreign Press 
AssoFLDWLRQRIEHLQJµXQKHlSIXO¶LQµPHGLDWLQJ¶ZLWKWKH0oD, its own relations with the 
association remained strong.44 So, not only did the FCO approach its public relations¶ 
policy in its normal way, but was able itself to boast additional services for both British 
and foreign correspondents in London. 
 
The organisation of the News Department at the FCO was far superior to its equivalent in 
the MoD. The FCO even had its own system of circular memos, distributed in-house, on 
press lines the ministry should take at various stages of the conflict. This system was 
entirely independent of that established by the Cabinet Office in the form of the South 
Atlantic Presentation Unit circular system.45 For example, the lines proposed on 18 April 
were: a) the line to be taken if Mr Haig was to come to London b) the line to be taken if Mr 
Haig was going to Washington, and c) what should be said if asked about possible action at 
the UN.46 In addition to this the department drafted announcements on events, taking into 
account a range of possible outcomes. For example, there were draft press lines and 
VWDWHPHQWVIRUPXODWHGLQWKHFDVHRIWKH+DLJSURSRVDOV¶IDLOXUHDWVHYHUDOGLIIHUHQW
junctures throughout April and even into May.47 
 
1a. Co-ordination between the FCO and MoD 
During the first month of the conflict there was limited co-ordination between the MoD 
DQG)&2,QJKDPUHFDOOHGWKDWZKDWKHµwanted the Foreign Office to be aware of was the 
defence dimension as well as the political GLPHQVLRQ«DQGVLPLODUO\WKH0R'¶48 However, 
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in practice, there was little communication on how best to implicate a consistent PR policy, 
and only public press conferences served as examples of collaboration.49 
 
,QFRQWUDVWWRWKH)&2¶s relationship with the MoD, the ministry did co-ordinate efficiently 
with other departments, for example, the Cabinet Office, and specifically with No.10. 
Mercer et al. FRQFHGHGWKDWGHVSLWHWKH)&2¶VSROLWLFDOGLIIHUHQFHVZLWKWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU
LWµPDLQWDLQHGFORVHDQGHIIHFtive links between its news department and the Downing 
Street Press Office¶.50 Evidence of this was a series of unattributable briefings held by 
Ingham with the assistance of the FCO, for foreign correspondents. In the observations of 
the HCDC presented to Parliament, it was affirmed that µ«WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V3UHVV
Office and the News Department of the Foreign Office kept in close touch with each other 
on an hour to hour basis¶51 In the HCDC it was accepted that the MoD acted alone.52 
 
Towards the end of April 1982, action in the South Atlantic began in earnest with the 
recapture of South Georgia. Events such as the Vulcan bombing raid of 1 May, the sinking 
of the Belgrano on 2 May and the sinking of Sheffield on 4 May, escalated the crisis into a 
serious miOLWDU\FRQIOLFW$V)UHHGPDQDVVHVVHGµDVWKHILJKWLQJEHJDQWKHEXUGHQIRUWKH
SUHVHQWDWLRQRIPLOLWDU\QHZV«IHOOWRWKH0R'¶53 On 3 May Nott held a press conference 
at the MoD. In his address to the media he acknowledged that: µ2YHUWKHSDVW>VLF@ZHeks 
since the invasion of the Falkland Islands my colleague the Foreign Secretary has rightly 
WDNHQWKHOHDGLQJUROHLQH[SODLQLQJ+0*¶VSROLFLHV«¶54 Nott also gave his first question 
and answer session of the war on 3 May.55 Thus, it was not until the second month of the 
war that the MoD assumed its public relations role with any seriousness. 
 
One argument which was expressed by Mercer et al. was that the MoD failed to make 
genuine preparations for handling and briefing the British media in the event of fighting 
over the islands because it did not expect a war. The authors exSODLQHGWKDWµRQHUHDVRQ
why the ministry was slow to gauge public interest was because it failed to anticipate the 
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eventual war¶56 Indeed, in 1RWW¶VSress conference of 3 May he was asked about a 
potential war. Nott insisted: µ7KHUHLVVWLOOWLPHIRUDSHDFHIXOVROXWLRQ¶57 Mercer et al. 
ZHQWRQWRSRLQWRXWWKDWµE\PLG-May any lingering doubts that the Falklands conflict 
would escalate into an all-out war had all but vanished¶58 Thus, in May 1982, the media 
baton was passed from the FCO to the MoD. 
 
2. MoD Facilities: Briefings 
The MoD had a hard act to follow, in early May 1982, when the focus of the war became 
purely military. This thesis FRQWHQGVWKDWWKH0R'¶VSURYLVLRQRIPHdia facilities was 
lacking from the start of the crisis. There are several features of the MoD PR effort which 
ZLOOEHH[DPLQHGWREHWWHUMXGJHWKH0R'¶VKDQGOLQJRIWKHPHGLD7KHEULHILQJVRIIHUHG
by the MoD will be considered here, and the conclusion advanced that an effective briefing 
procedure was put into effect too late. This was largely due to the fact that, in the early 
stages of the crisis, PR novices controlled policy. In addition to this, the emphasis on 
diplomacy in the first month of the war had ensured that demand for military information, 
while significant, was only a proportion of what it would be after initial action. Aside from 
the briefings supplied by the Ministry, this section will focus on the physical facilities 
provided by the MoD. The ministry established material amenities for the media on 2 May. 
This thesis advances the theory that those services were implemented tardily, and that 
much of what was offered to the media came, not as a result of the initiative of the 
Ministry, but at the insistence of the British media.  
 
The vast majority of the literature on the media in the war has attributed discussion to the 
topic of MoD briefings. Briefing is one of the most contentious issues facing study of the 
subject, and almost certainly the most contentious topic ZKHQFRQVLGHULQJWKH0R'¶V
domestic policy. All works - whether specific texts on the Falklands and the media, or 
general works on the media at war - have devoted a degree of attention to the 0R'¶V 
procedure for dispensing information. Perhaps the most comprehensive studies include the 
efforts of Harris, Mercer at al., and Morrison and Tumber.59 Overwhelmingly, the primary 
criticism which was advanced was that the MoD broke with its accepted style of briefing - 
unattributable briefing - in favour of on-the-record, daily press conferences. This, it has 
been argued, promoted an atmosphere of hostility between the MoD and the media and 
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denied the media information. Because the field has been saturated by such studies, 
comment here is limited.  
 
 2a. MoD Briefings 
Shortly after the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, McDonald, in his capacity as ACPR, 
took the decision to halt all unattributable briefings by the MoD and, instead, to supply 
only on-the-record briefings. Previously accredited defence correspondents were shocked 
to find the MoD had ceased all accreditation to the Ministry. In the months prior to the 
conflict, there had been established a series of unattributable briefings, including a monthly 
µGHHSEDFNJURXQG¶EULHILQJ7KLVEriefing was provided on the condition that all 
information would be embargoed for three days following the meeting.60 These briefings 
were intended to go some way to healing the previous rifts between the media and 
MoDPR.61 There was one principal reason why unattributable briefings were withdrawn: 
WKHLQIRUPDWLRQSURYLGHGE\WKH)&2ZDVGHHPHGE\WKH0R'WREHµHQRXJK¶IRUWKH
media. McDonald said that he cancelled unattributable briefings because µ«DWWKDWWLPH
the main initiative was with the Foreign Office and with diplomacy¶62 The Task Force was 
seen as a way of ensuring a diplomatic solution ± a threat of force which would persuade 
the Argentines to withdraw from the islands. McDonald pointed RXWµ7KH)RUHLJQ2IILFH
was having its regular briefings, and therefore it seemed to me that the MoD in its 
UROH«FRXOGUHVWULFWLWVHOIWRWKHRQ-the-record briefings¶63 A senior colleague of 
McDonald said: µ7KH)RUHLJQ2IILFHZHUHFRQWLQXLQJWRKDYHDWD more feverish pace 
QRUPDOXQDWWULEXWDEOHEULHILQJVDQGWKH7DVN)RUFH¶VSUHVHQFHZDVSDUWRIWKDW¶64 
 
It is important to note that McDonald was not in favour of continuing with only on-the-
record briefings for the entirety of the conflict. In May he fought hard to reinstate non-
attributable briefings, and to rectify the relationship with the media. For example, on 4 
May McDonald emphasised to the CoS how essential it was to retain the goodwill of the 
press.65 On 7 May McDonald went further and it was noted WKDWµ«WKHSRLQWZDVPDGH
[by McDonald] that we were in danger of ORVLQJWKHSXEOLFUHODWLRQVZDU¶66 McDonald 
VXJJHVWHGWKDWRQHZD\LQZKLFKDPRUHSRVLWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSPLJKWEHIRUJHGZDVE\µWKH
provision of facilities for background briefings¶ By May, McDonald had realised the 
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damage the retraction of unattributable briefings had done to the relationship between the 
MoD and the media and sought to rectify it. Even so, McDonald insisted that: µ,ZRXOGQRW
change my recommendation that for the first period all briefings should be kept on an on 
the record basis¶67 
 
There were two significant consequences of the cessation of unattributable briefings. 
Firstly, the move seriously affected the relationship between the MoD and the media. 
Secondly, journalists were deprived of information vital to their reporting of the war, 
causing much of the media to resort to alternative methods of filling µWKHQHZV¶. Other 
historians have highlighted the fact that the relationship between the MoD and the media 
was damaged in April 1982. Mercer et al. stated that the lack of non-attributable briefings 
lost the trust of defence correspondents.68 Ingham viewed the decision with pessimism 
IURPWKHVWDUW+HµFHUWDLQO\WRRNWKHYLHZWKDWZKHQ\RXDUHLQDFULVLVRIWKLVNLQGWKH last 
thing you do is withdraw your service to the media¶69 Cooper later regretted the decision, 
claiming that it µdid not help the relations between the Ministry of Defence and the 
SUHVV¶70 Following the report of the HCDC, Nott told the Commons the MoD accepted 
µWKH&RPPLWWHH¶VFRQFOXVLRQWKDWWKHWHPSRUDU\VXVSHQVLRQRIRII-the-record briefings was 
GHWULPHQWDOWRUHODWLRQVZLWKWKHPHGLD¶71 
 
Daily on-the-record briefings at the MoD commenced on 9 April (Figure 4.1). The purpose 
of these briefings, McDonald told the CoSZDVWRµPDLQWDLQDSRLQWRIFRQWDFWZLWKWKH
press¶72 The briefing was held at noon and soon became known to the journalists as the 
µR¶FORFNIROOLHV¶0F'RQDOGZRXOGDWWHQGWKHGDLO\CoS meeting at which there would 
be discussion of what information should be released that day. McDonald would clear his 
press statement with Cooper and Nott before having it typed ahead of midday.73 The daily 
statement was often vague and did not provide the correspondents with complete 
information required to compose full stories. Guardian journalist, Richard Norton-Taylor, 
wrote: µ:HUHSRUWHUVEDFNLQ/RQGRQKDGWRUHO\RQWKH0R'
VRIILFLDOVSRNHVPDQ«IRU
thin and heavily vetted daily summaries of the action¶74 McDonald allowed a 20-minute 
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question and answer (Q&A) period after briefings. However, these were often plagued by 
0F'RQDOG¶VIDLOXUHWRFRQILUPRUGHQ\UXPRXUDQGXQZLOOLQJQHVVWRPDNHDQVZHUVRQ-the-
record. Reuters claimed WKDWµVWDWHPHQWVE\WKHVSRNHVPDQRIten raised more questions 
then [sic] they answered¶.75 The briefings also heightened the atmosphere of competition 
amongst the journalists. Only one version of events was available, dictating that there was 
DOZD\VDUXVKWREHµILUVWZLWKWKHQHZV¶Figure 4.2). Hudson and Stanier judged WKDWµLW
LV«RIIWKHUHFRUGEULHILQJWKDWLVPHDWDQGGULQNWRWKHSUHVV¶76 The usual streams of 
information dried up in the MoD. When MoD PROs were prohibited from communicating 
directly with the media, defence correspondents were further crippled. As Hooper has 
MXGJHGWKLVPHDQWµ352VZHUHXQDEOHWRHQVXUHWKDWFRUUHVSRQGHQWVDQGUHSRUWHUVIXOO\








Figure 4.2: The scramble to get news out after a noon briefing79 
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2a (i). MoD Briefings: Media Speculation 
The dearth of information had a serious impact on the reporting of the campaign. Starved 
of material, the media increasingly turned to alternative sources, such as Argentine 
communiqués.80 Further, in order to fulfil their daily quota of material on the Falklands, 
the media resorted to speculation. Adams produced an unrivalled study of this 
phenomenon.81 She found that speculation over military topics damaged morale at home 
more than it impaired the progress of the Task Force. Yet the media was, and has been, 
heavily criticised for potentially endangering the lives of British servicemen.82 In a letter to 
The Times during the war, Nicholas Downie, correspondent for The New York Times, 
FRQFOXGHGWKDWµDOOVHFWLRQVRIWKHPHGLDFDQEHIDLUO\FULWLFLVHGIRUWKHPDQQHULQZKLFK
WKH\KDYHVSHFXODWHG«¶83 Another letter to the newspaper DVVXPHGWKDWµLWVHHPVXQOLNHO\
that the Intelligence Branch of the Argentinian Ministry of Defence has been unduly 
overworked at this time of crisis. The British media has kindly provided them with 
information on a scale which seems little short of hair-UDLVLQJ«¶84 Worries concerning 
speculation were raised in Parliament. On 20 May Lord Byers expressed his concern at 
µWKHSOHWKRUD of speculation in the press and the rest of the media on military tactics and 
RSWLRQVDYDLODEOH«¶85  
 
One of the most controversial aspects of speculation in the media was the use of retired 
military personnel as commentators, particularly on the television and radio, but also in the 
printed pUHVV)UHHGPDQZURWHWKDWµWKHSXEOLFRUDWOHDVWWKHPHGLDDSSHWLWHIRUQHZVZDV
hardly satisfied by the terse one-liners from official spokesmen and so had to be met by a 
huge army of unofficial commentators¶86 Adams carried out an extensive assessment of 
WKHUROHRIWKHVHµDUPFKDLUDGPLUDOV¶DVWKH\ZHUHFROORTXLDOO\NQRZQSUHYHQWLQJWKH need 
for further comment here.87  
 
The abandonment of unattributable briefings by the MoD had a severe impact on how the 
campaign was reported in Britain. The scarcity of hard information created by the MoD 
provoked the media to enter into conjecture, and to often repeat potentially harmful 
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rumours. Foster concluded that µLQVWHDGRIDFRQWUROOHGIORZRILQIRUPDWLRQLQDVLQJOH
GLUHFWLRQ0F'RQDOG¶VSROLF\HQVXUHGDIORRGRIVSHFXODWLRQJXDUDQWHHLQJDIDUIUHHU
treatment of potentially sensitive security issues¶88 After the war, the HCDC found that 




2a (ii). MoD Briefings: the Spokesman 
:KHQ0F'RQDOGLQLWLDWHGWKHµR¶FORFNIROOLHV¶KHDOVRDVVXPHGWKHUROHRI0R'
spokesman (Figure 4.3). He told the HCDC that µLWZDVSROLF\WKDWWKHUHVKRXOGEHRQH
main spokesman because in the on-the-record question and answer sessions it was very 
important indeed that there was a complete consistency of view¶90 McDonald attracted 
vast amounts of attention in his new-found role. The Sunday Times Insight Team felt that 
µiWZDV0F'RQDOGZKREHFDPHWKHPRVWSXEOLFH[SUHVVLRQRI&RRSHU¶VSROLF\¶91 His 
approach to reading the news - careful and sombre - was heavily criticised and even 




Figure 4.3: McDonald briefing the media93 
 
McDonald suffered one further criticism. He lacked experience as a spokesman, and 
experience appearing on television. McDonald told the HCDC, when asked if he had any 
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statements ± even if this meant it could report the bare minimum as a result. The MoD 
submitteGWRWKH+&'&WKDWµ'XULQJWKHPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVWRUHFRYHUWKH)DONODQG
Islands, our policy was to tell the truth as quickly and accurately as we could, consistent 
with the safety and security of our forces¶96 McDonald embodied the policy to tell nothing 
EXWWKHWUXWK1RWWODWHUFRQILUPHGWKDWµLWZDVSDLQIXOO\REYLRXVWRWKHZKROHZRUOGWKDW,DQ
could only speak the truth¶97 However, adherence to this policy meant that, often, 
McDonald had to resort to the phrase µQRFRPPHQW¶ZKHQDQVZHULQJTXHVWLRQV. The fact 
that Q&A sessions were also on-the-record meant that McDonald was left unable to 
counter much rumour or disinformation beyond this expression.98  
 
2a (iii). MoD Briefings: Reinstating Unattributable Briefings 
The MoD revived the system of unattributable briefings on 11 May with a special briefing 
provided by Cooper for defence correspondents. The popular conception as to why non-
attributable briefings were reinstated has been the increased involvement of Neville Taylor 
LQWKH0R'¶VGRPHVWLF media policy.  Dodds, for example, argued that it was as a direct 
UHVXOWRI7D\ORU¶VLQIOXHQFHWKDWWKHV\VWHPZDVDOWHUHG99 Others, such as Carruthers, have 
been bolder in their accusation that unattributable briefings were recovered in order to 
purposefully communicate misinformation to the media.100 However, this thesis suggests 
that there were three alternative reasons why unattributable briefings were restored. The 
MoD had experienced wide criticism ± particularly towards the end of April ± for the lack 
of information it was providing. This criticism induced a reappraisal within the MoD, and 
led to the restoration of the normal style of official statements, supplemented by non-
attributable briefings. In addition, there was heavy pressure placed on the MoD by the 
editors of national media organisations to better inform the media. Finally, the role the 
FCO had to play in briefing journalists was diminishing, and the burden had to be 
shouldered by the relevant ministry. Yet even when non-attributable briefings were 
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reinstated there were substantial difficulties which prevented them from being fully 
effective. It is argued by the time an effective system of unattributable briefings had been 
implemented, the damage to the relationship between the media and the MoD had been 
done. Provisions for both the regional and foreign press were seriously lacking and, 
significantly, the timing of briefings was erratic and their organisation poor.  
 
Taylor arrived at the MoD on 13 April.101 Taylor was not immediately given responsibility 
for the running of the entire department. He was in charge of all aspects of MoDPR except 
those relating to the Falklands. The reason this policy existed has been explored by other 
authors including Ingham, Mercer et al. and Harris.102 The first direct involvement Taylor 
had with )DONODQGV¶ policy was at the end of April. He was assigned the task of making 
arrangements for the establishment of a Press Centre at the MoD. Taylor slowly reaffirmed 
his position within the department, finally assuming control of all areas of MoDPR policy 
on 19 May. Taylor began to lobby Cooper to reinstate unattributable briefings almost as 
soon as he entered the department. As a seasoned PO, who had previously held roles in the 
MoD, Taylor realised the implications of withdrawing regular services to the media. 
However, he was unable to assert any real authority. In fact, it was not until as late as 24 
May that Taylor even sat in on a CoS meeting as the MoDPR representative. Mercer et al. 
SRLQWHGRXWWKDWµVRSUH-eminent had Macdonald been that Taylor on occasion had been 
forced to go down to the press centre to find out what his titular deputy was going to say; 
not only could he not influence the announcements but he was not even being informed 
about them¶103 Nicholas, Editor of ITN, told the HCDC that he did not attribute the CPR at 
0R'ZLWKµFKDQJLQJWKLQJVDURXQG¶104 Taylor most certainly had a positive effect on the 
organisation of WKH0LQLVWU\¶V35PDFKLQH<HW there were other significant reasons why 
unattributable briefings were revived. 
 
Criticism of the MoD was rife in April and early May 1982. The basic theme of this 
criticism continued for the duration of the conflict. The withdrawal of unattributable 
briefings in April had driven the media to publicly condemn the actions and policy of the 
MoD. For example, on 22 April, the Mirror printed WKDWµ«\RXPD\EHW\RXUVHFRQG-best 
boots that months or even years from now it will be revealed that while all this to-ing and 
fro-ing was goiQJRQWKHUHZDVDSLHFHRIWKHMLJVDZZHZHUHQ¶WWROGDERXW¶105 A Sun 
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columnist wrote an article, µ:+<7+(0<67(5<"¶, VWDWLQJµ,GRQ¶WNQRZZKHWKHUWKH
0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFHLVVSUHDGLQJIHDUDQGFRQIXVLRQLQWKHHQHP\¶VUDQNVEXWLWLVGRLQJD
first class MREDWKRPH¶.106 On 28 April, the Telegraph¶V'HIHQFH&RUUHVSRQGHQW0DMRU
General Edward Fursdon, criticised the lack of statements from the ministry in a front-
page-SLHFHFDOOHGµ:+,7(+$//:$,76,16,/(1&(¶107 One particular incident had a 
substantial effect on the reputation of the Ministry. When Sheffield was attacked on 4 May, 
the scarcity of news on casualties drove many to publish disapproving articles on the MoD. 
The Mirror ZDVLQVRPXFKRIDIUHQ]\LWDVNHGµ)RU*RG¶VVDNHDUHRXUPHQDOLYHRU
deaG"¶108 The Sun VLPLODUO\TXHVWLRQHGµ'($'25$/,9("¶DQGKHDYLO\GHQRXQFHGWKH
lack of information.109 The Times published less overt criticism but clearly emphasised the 
silence of the MoD.110  
 
Criticism of the MoD was a feature of press coverage throughout the war ± not just until 
unattributable briefings were restored.111 In fact, the day before the briefings were 
reinstated, a meeting of Information Officers discussed the extent of criticism over the 
integrity of Government presentation of news on the Falklands.112 The barrage of criticism 
WKH0R'¶VKDQGLQJRIPR attracted had a significant impact on the organisation of MoD 
policy. Increasingly, it was understood within the MoD, that it would need to maintain a 
more positive relationship with the media. A CoS meeting of 27 April heard that, while 
HPEDUJRHVPLJKWEHµVXSHUILFLDOO\DWWUDFWLYH¶WKH\ZHUHµXQOLNHO\WREHHIIHFWLYHDQGFRXOG
be counterproductive¶113 On 7 May the CoS were told WKH0R'µZHUHLQGDQJHURIORVLQJ
WKHSXEOLFUHODWLRQVZDU¶114 As criticism of the MoD intensified, the MoD increasingly 
understood the necessity of maintaining relations with the media ± a direct factor in the 
decision to re-establish unattributable briefings. 
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Freedman pointed out that, before 11 May, the only non-attributable briefings which had 
been provided had been given to editors.115 It is the contention here that the events of 
EGLWRUV¶Meetings had an impact on the decision to reinstate unattributable briefings at the 
MoD. At the very start of the conflict, Cooper had established regular meetings with the 
editors of national media organisations (and two international press agencies). The first 
meeting was held on 7 April. By the beginning of May, the editors were using these 
meetings to represent their concerns. One of the major concerns expressed at these 
meetings was the lack of comprehensive briefing. At a meeting on 20 April, editors 
instructed Cooper on how the facilities provided for their organisations were working. The 
general consensus was that the MoD needed to brief.116 At the meeting of 6 May, the 
editors really drove their point across. Cooper wrote tKDWKHKDGKDGDµPXFKURXJKHUULGH¶
than at any other meeting.117 &RRSHUWROGWKHHGLWRUVWKDWµVLQFHWKHODVWPHHWLQJWKHSDFHRI
events in the South Atlantic had quickenHG¶DQGDVWKH\KDGVXJJHVWHGWKH0R'ZDVQRZ
SUHSDULQJIRUWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIµDQDGGLWLRQDOVHUYLFHWRWKHPHGLD¶± µ0R'ZRXOGEHJLQWR
give specialised background briefings for groups of correspondents¶118 Following the 
meeting, Cooper detailed a list of practical steps he thought the MoD should now take. The 
VHFRQGSRLQWRQWKHOLVWGHPDQGHGWKDWµ:HPXVWJLYHYDULRXVJURXSVRIWKHSUHVVPRUH
background briefing. In particular, we must cosset the defence correspondents rather more 
and go into more technical detail with them using our own experts from throughout the 
Department¶119 At a meeting on 12 May, the PUS responded to the criticisms made by 
HGLWRUVWKHSUHYLRXVZHHN+HVWDWHGWKDWµ%DFNJURXQGEULHILQJVZHUHQRZEHLQJSURYLGHG
There had already been two for Defence Correspondents and these would continue twice 
weekly.120 It is evident that the grievances and protests of the editors had an impact on 
&RRSHU¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGVEULHILQJWKHPHGLDXQDWWULEXWDEO\$VDUHVXOWRIWKHPHHWLQJRI
May, Cooper realised that unattributable briefings were vital to the media, and fundamental 
in maintaining relations.  
 
The final factor in the adoption of unattributable briefings at the MoD was the diminishing 
role of the FCO in handling media relations. On 27 $SULO+DLJ¶VILQDOSHDFHSDFNDJHZDV
presented to London. By this time, the shuttle diplomacy between Britain and Argentina 
had produced few results and the US peace initiative was bankrupt. The US came down 
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firmly on the British side on 30 April. Although subsequent efforts were made to promote 
peaceful solutions to the crisis (notably the UN and Peruvian initiatives), it was evident 
that the crisis had deteriorated to the point when war was inevitable. At this point interest 
shifted from diplomatic endeavours to military ones, and the focus of the media turned 
fully to the MoD and its military machine. At this point it no longer mattered if the FCO 
was briefing journalists unattributably - the MoD was now in a position where it only 
could provide the information the media required. 
 
In the last month of the conflict there were more than a dozen unattributable briefings 
provided for various groups of correspondents.121 Which correspondents were to be briefed 
became a point of contention. On 11 May unattributable briefings began for British 
defence correspondents. Other correspondents ± for example, regional and foreign ± were 
not admitted to these briefings and were not granted their own briefings until more than a 
week later. However, when defence correspondents were readmitted to the trust of the 
MoD, the ministry found that their numbers had grown considerably. Publications and 
broadcasters which had previously lacked a defence correspondent had since nominated 
personnel to fill the vacancy, or created the position.122  
 
By far the greatest amount of unattributable briefings were given exclusively to defence 
correspondents.123 The Sunday People ZDVWROGLQWKHILUVWWZRZHHNVRI0D\WKDWµXQOHVVLW
appointed a defence correspondent it could not be allowed to attend official and off-the-
record briefings¶124 As a result, the publication appointed a correspondent. Mercer et al. 
HVWLPDWHGWKDWµ'HIHQFHFRUUHVSRQGHQWVUHJDLQHGWKHLUDFFHVVRQO\WRILQGWKDWLWKDGORVW
its exclusivity.125 Because of the number of journalists the MoD had to cater for, a two tier 
system of briefing was devised. Defence correspondents from the national daily 
newspapers, and from the larger broadcast programmes, were permitted into the first line 
of briefing. The second line was comprised of a mixture of Sunday and regional 
newspapers. This system, for many, proved unsatisfactory. Gordon Petrie of the Glasgow 
Herald FODLPHGWKDWµDespite assurances to the contrary, the No.2 list which comprised 
³UHJLRQDO´SUHVVZHUHUHJXODUO\EULHIHGE\ORZHU ranking personnel than those on the No.1 
list and at later timings¶126 Because the membership of the first line of correspondents was 
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limited mainly to the most nationally influential organisations, accusations emerged that 
WKHV\VWHPZDVµGLVFULPLQDWRU\rather than a method of restricting the size of the group¶127 
Much of the time, those who were unable to gain entrance to the first line meeting had to 
seek information from the journalists leaving the consultation in order to be able to access 
information in a timely manner.128 Thus, relations between the ministry and the media 
soured even after the re-establishment of unattributable briefings.  
 
The most disadvantaged organisations - because of this system of briefing - were the 
regionals. The MoD had, during the war, already demonstrated how little it grasped the 
significance of the provincial media.129 Briefings for the second line group did not 
commence until 18 May. These briefings lagged behind and were less frequent and 
sometimes less informative than the established defence cRUUHVSRQGHQWV¶EULHILQJV,Q
every instance, second line briefings took place after the first line - often placing the 
second line at considerable disadvantage. On one occasion the Newspaper Conference 
Chairman was contacted at home at 2200GMT on a Saturday night to be informed of a 
briefing the following day at 1045. The first line journalists had had their briefing at 1300 
on the Saturday.130 In addition, first line briefings were often hosted by more senior figures 
like Nott or Cooper, whereas the subsequent second line briefing might be taken by a 
junior. The Glasgow Herald, having sent its specialist, Ian Bruce, to the Falklands, was not 
permitted any access to the first line briefings. This had serious ramifications. On occasion, 
information was relayed to the first line which was not to the second. On 14 May the first 
line defence correspondents were briefed on the fact that an unexploded bomb (UXB) had 
hit HMS Glasgow. The journalists were asked not to publicise the name of the ship for 
security reasons. The Herald had not been privy to that information since her 
representative was part of the second line briefings. On 15 May the paper ran the story of 
the UXB, naming the ship.131 Not only did the system of briefing eventually implemented 
by the MoD fail to satisfy the media as a whole, but it also, to a certain extent, endangered 
the Task Force when information was improperly conveyed. 
 
Facilities for the foreign, as well as regional, media in Britain were also lacking. It was not 
until the end of May that a third set of unattributable briefings was initiated, specific to 
foreign correspondents. There was, however, one exception. Starting on 14 May, North 
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American correspondents were invited into private, unattributable briefings. Cooper 
himself even briefed this set of journalists ahead of the British regional media.132 There 
were two key reasons why US correspondents received such attention. Firstly, the British 
were keen to court the Americans, since her support was paramount to maintaining the 
FRXQWU\¶VRIILFLDODVVLVWDQFHLQWKHZDU6HFRQGO\WKH%ULWLVK(PEDVV\LQ$PHULFDRIWHQ
sent messages of complaint regarding the way US correspondents were being treated in 
London, or advice on how MoDPR could improve relations. For example, on 11 May, 
+HQGHUVRQFRQWDFWHGWKH0R'WRLQIRUPLWµ+$9(%((1:$7&+,1*86
TELEVISION COVERAGE OF EVENTS IN FALKLAND ISLANDS AND AM MUCH 
DISTURBED BY APPARENT INADEQUACY OF PRESS BRIEFING IN LONDON¶133 
This relationship between US correspondents and the MoD left the rest of the world at a 
loss. A representative of the German media even wrote to the MoD to protest at his 
FROOHDJXHV¶XQIDLUWUHDWPHQW134 The Foreign Press Association complained to the Ministry. 
Foreign journalists were left to the third line briefings which were few and far between and 
by no means as thorough or informative as the first, or even second, line briefings. 
 
One final issue plagued the newly established system - briefings were not µUHJXODU¶7KH\
were often called with little warning. Petrie informed the HCDC that briefings were often 
called at 10-PLQXWHV¶QRWLFH+HDOVRVDLGWKDWLWWRRNWZRZHHNVIRUWKH0R'VWDIIWR
institute a system of telephoning correspondents to advise them of briefing times.135 Jim 
Meacham of the Economist said that he did not attend all the available briefings: µ,GRQ¶W
think anybody did because we did not always know when they were going to happen¶136 
 
However, this argument fails to consider the timings involved in the Falklands. The islands 
are four hours behind the UK. During the war this had implications for the announcement 
of news from the region. Most action took place over night, which meant that it occurred 
during the small hours on the morning in Britain. By the time news was confirmed and the 
whole picture was understood, announcements were often made in late afternoon.137 In 
addition, when news of events did come during the day - for example the news of the 
Fitzroy disaster, or the news of the San Carlos landings - announcements were made as 
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soon as possible. It was not practical to delay an announcement for an hour to ensure all 
media representatives who wished to attend had arrived.  
 
The MoD has been widely criticised for having discontinued unattributable briefings at the 
start of the war. The implications of this decision were severe ± the media was forced to 
rely on speculation to compensate for the lack of information being provided to it by the 
MoD in its on-the-record briefings. Further to this, the relationship between the MoD and 
the media was, in cases, irrevocably harmed. When the briefings were reinstated it was not 
only as a result of the efforts of the new CPR. This thesis contends that three separate 
incentives played a part in ensuring the return of the briefings: the FCO was no longer able 
to sustain its unattributable briefings; the MoD had received increasing criticism from the 
media for its handling of the conflict and, by May, understood the importance of a positive 
relationship between the two; finally, pressure was placed on Cooper by editors to supply 
the media with more information. Yet when non-attributable briefings were re-established, 
the system actually served to further sour relations with a large percentage of the media. 
Not only were there different tiers of briefings which alienated much of the regional and 
Sunday media, but foreign correspondents were woefully neglected. 
 
3. MoD Facilities: Media Provision 
On 2 May the MoD opened an Emergency Press Centre. The centre became known as the 
µ&RQFRXUVH¶- EDVHGLQWKH0R'¶V&RQFRXUVH+DOO- and remained open until 18 June. The 
centre was available between 1000 and 2200GMT. For a short period in the war it was open 
for 24 hours a day.138 The Concourse attracted large media gatherings and became a hub 
for many of the correspondents covering the crisis. The Press Centre has been described to 
some extent in all the media-related texts on the Falklands. What is common is the lack of 
analysis of facilities offered by the MoD. Harris felt that µ«UHSRUWHUVKDGHYHU\WKLQJWKH\
needed except the one thing they wanted most: news¶139 The services offered by the MoD 
to the media in May 1982 were more than adequate in terms of physical resources. The 
Concourse boasted 24 pay phones (eight with direct lines to major news publications), 
visual data display screens which showed material on Falklands associated matters, 24 
typing positions (with typewriters), a copy and picture collection point for material arriving 
from the Fleet and a telephone message and paging service (Figure 4.4).140 The MoD 
offered studio facilities for both the BBC and Independent Radio News (IRN). For foreign 
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correspondents, direct feeds to outside control rooms were supplied.141 Finally, for 
television journalists, fixed camera positions were permitted for conferences and 
announcements, studio interview facilities within the MoD were supplied and space was 
found for the BBC and ITN to house three portable huts to use as broadcasting studios.142 
The MoD unquestionably catered for basic needs of the media. All amenities required for 





Figure 4.4: The Press Concourse143 
 
One criticism was the way in which copy from the South Atlantic was processed. PA was 
XQKDSS\DERXWWKHµFDVXDO¶ZD\WKH0R'WUHDWHGGLVSDWFKHVThe agency later submitted: 
µXVXDOO\DOOZHJRWZDVDWHOHSKRQHFDOOtelling us that copy from the Task Force was 
awaiting collection. We were not told whether the stories were from our own man, the 
content of the pieces, or how many there were. As a result we sometimes found ourselves 
setting a speed record to collect a worthless story¶144 Delivery of copy was often late. The 
MoD acknowledged that stories coming in at midnight (or around midnight) would often 
not be delivered to the Portakabin where copy was to be collected, until about 7am.145 The 
system for retrieving copy had its flaws. Often copy was delayed for more than 24 hours 
without the publication being notified. However, the physical facilities offered to the media 
in London, independent of those to retrieve Task Force copy, were more than adequate and 
allowed the media to function from within the MoD, almost as well as from its offices. The 
system of news release, briefings and the general policy of the MoD may have been 
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flawed, but, when instituted, the physical facilities provided for the media within the MoD 
main building were satisfactory. 
 
The timing of the provision of facilities has not been widely considered. Morrison and 
Tumber reasoned that as the campaign proceeded, noon briefings became more 
overcrowded and that, after the reWDNLQJRI6RXWK*HRUJLDWKH0R'µGHFLGHGWRVHWXSD
SUHVVFHQWUH«¶146 Indeed, the MoD itself admitted the largest gatherings took place during 
the first few days of the hostilities.147 After South Georgia, one briefing drew over 260 
members of the media. It was not until the MoD was confronted with large numbers of 
journalists on its doorstep that it prepared the Concourse. When describing the outbreak of 
hostilities, 0F'RQDOGUHFDOOHGµ$WWKDWSRLQWRIFRXUVHWKHZKROHRIWKH35FKDQJHG:H
had Concourse Hall open¶.148 There is evidence to suggest that facilities within the MoD 
had not been considered as late as 21 April. During a meeting with editors, Cooper stated 
WKDWµLIRSHUDWLRQVEHJDQDUDSLGQHZVUHOHDVHV\VWHPZRXOGEHHVVHQWLDO¶DQGµWKHUHPLJKW
need to be correspondents permanently based in MoD¶149 The opening of the Emergency 
Press Centre at the MoD was not an example of MoD organisation or preparedness. It was, 
in fact, a further example of how MoD policy was reactionary. 
 
There is evidence to suggest that not only was the MoD tardy in the approach to media 
facilities, but that those facilities were provided as a direct result of pressure from the 
media. Petrie told the HCDC that the MoD never made any attempt to anticipate the needs 
of the media.150 3URWKHURHFRQILUPHGWKDWµWKHUHGLGQRWVHHPWREHDQDGHTXDWHGHJUee of 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶DQGWKDWµLWZDVWKHEURDGFDVWHUVZKRSUHVVHGIRUWKHVHWWLQJXSRIDSUHVV
centre¶151 ITN added that the system for broadcasters was adopted because µHYHQWXDOO\
MoD were persuaded E\WKHEURDGFDVWHUV«¶152 Editors played a part in provoking action 
over the Press Centre in April. On 20 April the editors instructed Cooper that a media 
facility at the MoD was essential.153 The MoD µundertook to look into all these points¶154 
$WWKHQH[WPHHWLQJRIHGLWRUV&RRSHUWROGFRUUHVSRQGHQWVWKDWµDVVXggested, MOD had 
opened up a full press facility in the Concourse Hall¶155  
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The facilities allocated by the MoD in May were fairly extensive.156 However, it was 
fundamental to the effective media presentation of the war that these facilities exist. The 
MoD should have been aware of what the media needed at an earlier stage. The Emergency 
Press Centre and unattributable briefings should have been implemented (or in the case of 
the briefings, maintained) from the start of the conflict. In a crisis which involved 
diplomacy and a Task Force of a magnitude not witnessed since World War Two, the MoD 
and the FCO should both have offered comprehensive and ample facilities from the time, if 
not of the Argentine invasion, then of the sailing of the Fleet. 
 
3a. The Military Briefing Group  
The media demand for briefings was not limited to unattributable briefings. There was a 
need, amongst a generation which had grown up without national service, and with very 
little experience of military campaigns, for in-depth briefing from military experts. The 
role of military specialists in briefing the media is only touched upon in passing among 
most histories of the media and the conflict. While it is acknowledged that a group of 
military authorities were brought in order to eQKDQFHWKHPHGLD¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH
campaign, the way in which the group was constructed, or the reasons why, have been 
neglected by the literature. 
 
The isolation of the DPRs from the main thrust of the campaign for much of its duration 
dictated that they did not have as much access to hard data as desirable.157 The media, 
because of the dearth of information provided, and the lack of military expertise supplied, 
turned to retired servicemen in order to bring clarity to viewers, listeners or readers. The 
UROHRIµDUPFKDLUDGPLUDOV¶µDUPFKDLUVWUDWHJLVWV¶RUµDUPFKDLUDQDO\VWV¶ZDVLQWHJUDOWR
much of the early coverage of the war. Men who had been in command or members of the 
Armed Forces mere months beforehand speculated on the possible movements of the 
British and options open to them.158 In April, First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, 
was compelled to speak privately with (mostly) UHWLUHGQDYDOFRPPDQGHUVDERXWµSXEOLF
comments which might be construed as irresponsible¶159  Worries were advanced in 
PDUOLDPHQW1RWWWROGWKH+RXVHµ,WZRXOGEHRIDVVLVWDQFHWRXVLIUHWLUHG6HUYLFHRIILFHUV
and others would not speculate so widely«¶160  
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By May the MoD had realised the role that these servicemen were playing in educating the 
public. McDonald reported to the HCDC that when the campaign became a land operation, 
the MoD included briefings from military officers.161 Leach suggested to Cooper early in 
0D\WKDWµwe should get the concurrence of a small number of retired naval officers and we 
should have them makLQJLWFOHDUWRWKHPHGLDWKDWWKH\ZHUHDYDLODEOH«¶+HVXJJHVWHG
that the group themselves should be briefed DQGµwould be on their guard accordingly to 
stop the indiscriminate speculation¶162 A military group, instructed by the MoD and 
employed to brief the media would be an effective and more responsible way of coaching 
the media in military operations. After Leach had advanced the idea with Cooper, the PUS 
took the idea to editors on 6 May. The editors responded enthusiastically to the idea, 
OHDGLQJ&RRSHUWRQRWHDIWHUWKHPHHWLQJWKDWµ:HVKRXOGORRNDWKDYLQJDUDWKHUPRUH
select panel of armchair VWUDWHJLVWVZKRPZHFRXOGEULHI¶163 The following day, as part of 
a list of measures to improve media relations recommended to the CoS, the Military 
Briefing Group ZDVERUQ7KH&R6DSSURYHGWKHQRWLRQWKDWDµSDQHORIH[SHUWV¶DSSURYHG
E\WKH0R'ZRXOGEHJLYHQµEDFNJURXQGEULHILQJVLQGHSWK«WKHQEHDYDLODEOHWRPDNH
authoritative comment when required¶164 On 12 May, the meeting of the CoS authorised 
the Army Department to nominate to the PUS, a small panel of officers who had 
previously received media training. This panel would be made available to assist 
MODPR.165 
 
From conception to start, the Military Briefing Group took a little over three weeks to put 
LQWRSODFH2Q0D\&RORQHO-RKQµ0DUWLQ¶*DUURGColonel General Staff to the 
Commandant General Royal Marines, proposed the Naval contingent of the group should 
be led by Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Donkin RN, and comprised of Major General John 
Owen RM and Colonel Neil Maude RM. Garrod said the group had specialised and factual 
knowledge of relevant topics.166 It is not clear on which precise day the Military Briefing 
Group gave its first briefing. None of the literature included assessment that thorough, and 
the archives held both at Kew and the MoD give no indication as to the exact date. What is 
clear, however, is that the first briefing occurred after 21 May. An internal document 
issued that day listed all briefings which had taken place in the MoD since 11 May (not 
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including official announcements).167 The panel was certainly in action, however, by 30 
May, when it joined Cooper in briefing defence correspondents. Both Leach and Lewin 
were vocal about the effectiveness of the Military Briefing Group. Both felt that it was 
implemented far too late in the conflict to be of much significance. Leach said that the 
LQWURGXFWLRQRIWKHSDQHOµZDVDOLWWOHODWH¶168 /HZLQIHOWWKDWµE\WKDWWLPH«they [the 
PHGLD@KDGJRWWKHLUIDYRXULWHVDQGZHZHUHWRRODWH¶169 
 
Foster estimated that some of the media distrusted the group because it felt it was merely 
an opportunity for the MoD to spread misinformation.170 Mostly though, the panel restored 
a degree of trust between the media and the MoD. The BBC judged that: µ7KHRUJDQLVDWLRQ
of bi-weekly briefings by senior officials and servicemen marked the information 
watershed and seems to have reflected the belated realisation that modern communications 
and the expectations of the British public made it extremely unlikely Government could 
operate a coherent and comprehensive disinformation campaign¶.171 It is the claim here 
that the panel was established merely to act as an addition to regular briefings by supplying 
technical details which representatives of MoDPR could not manage. In this the panel was 
neither successful nor unsuccessful. It was introduced too late in the campaign to be of 
significant use to any broadcaster or publication. By the time the Military Briefing Group 
was presented, it had already, in the two months of war beforehand, located alternative 
sources of military information. In the same way that unattributable briefings were 
reinstated, and material facilities at the MoD were instituted too late in the campaign, the 
Military Briefing Group was tardily implemented. Perhaps this is the greatest error, since 
throughout April and May of 1982 the policy of the MoD starved journalists of information 




One initiative devised within the ministry at the beginning of the conflict was that Cooper 
should meet regularly with the editors of national media organisations (as well as 
international agencies like PA and Reuters). The role of the meetings was highly 
FRQWHQWLRXVGXULQJWKHZDU2QHRIWKHPRVWGLVFXVVHGLVVXHVUHODWLQJWRWKH0R'¶V
handling of the media was the accusation that Cooper used a specific meeting of editors to 
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misinform the media. On 20 May, the day before the San Carlos landings, Cooper told 
editors that they should not expect a D-Day-style reinvasion of the islands. The next day 
British forces commenced the biggest landing operation since June 1944.172 This 
controversy has led to considerable speculation about the part the meetings played in MoD 
media policy. However, there was very little detail made available to the HCDC on the 
content of EGLWRUV¶Meetings (save a section of transcript from the meeting of 20 April).173 
And subsequent histories have had to analyse the role of the meetings from little more than 
some broad accounts of the proceedings. The notes on these meetings have still not been 
made available to the National Archives, despite the 30-year rule regarding the release of 
historical documents. The only historian who had access to documents relating to EGLWRUV¶
Meetings was Freedman when he undertook to write the Official History. Freedman, in his 
extensive account of the war, is unable to dedicate much analysis to the function of these 
meetings and is limited to a brief appraisal.174 Inevitably then, with access to the MoD 
archives in Portsmouth, this thesis constitutes the most detailed consideration of the 
significance of the meetings and appraises the worth, and consequences of, the 
communication between the media and the MoD the meetings afforded. 
 
Mercer et al. produced the most extensive evaluation of EGLWRUV¶Meetings. Their evidence 
is largely derived from interviews conducted with various editors. The authors noted that 
WKHPHHWLQJVZHUHµFDOOHGWRGHIXVHWKHWHQVLRQEHWZHHQ*RYHUQPHQWDQGPHGLD«¶DQG
WKDWWKH\ZHUHµZLGHO\FULWLFLVHGE\FLYLOVHUYDQWVDVZHOODV(GLWRUVIRUEHLQJWRRODWH¶175 
The first official meeting of editors was held on 7 April.176 Of course, as mentioned earlier, 
McDonald had met certain editors on 3 April in order to discuss the needs of broadcasters 
with the Task Force0HUFHUHWDOZURWHWKDWµ,W has not been possible for the ministry to 
say how many editors attended that meeting [of 7 April] or what was discussed¶177 They 
LQGLFDWHGWKDWWKHILUVWPHHWLQJRIHGLWRUVZDVDQµLQFRPSOHWHJDWKHULQJ¶± this was for two 
reasons: the meeting was held in CoopHU¶VRIILFHZKHUHDVWKHWKLUGIORRUFRQIHUHQFHURRP
was utilised for the remainder of the conflict); and none of the editors interviewed in the 
FRXUVHRIWKHLUUHVHDUFKFRXOGµUHFDOODQ\PHHWLQJDWWKH0R'¶178  
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However, the agenda for the meeting of 7 April suggests the meeting was anything but 
insignificant. The meeting consisted of three parts: 1) an opening statement by Cooper 
which would be entirely private 2) a background briefing on the situation in the Falklands 
which could be used unattributably, and 3) a closing discussion which would, again, be 
private.179 What this first meeting represented was the first unattributable briefing given by 
the MoD. In addition, it also allowed Cooper to set out worries about the coverage of 
particular areas, including details of operational plans, capability, information about 
intelligence or communication or information about the locations of units.180 There was a 
VLQFHUHSOHDIRUVHFUHF\PDGHE\&RRSHU+HWROGHGLWRUVWKDWµLWZDVLPSOLFLWWKDWWKHIDFW
the meeting had taken place would not itself be published¶ Perhaps editors took this plea 
too seriously, since a proportion of the editors interviewed for Mercer et al¶s study were 
actually present at the meeting of 7 April.181 In addition to this, the meeting was by no 
means small. Recently accessed documents, courtesy of the ministry, indicate that there 
were 22 editors present at the first meeting. A register of those who were in attendance was 
kept for each meeting.182 Although later meetings did boast more editors, the number did 
not increase by a particularly significant figure ± attendance at subsequent meetings ranged 
from 23 to 28 editors. Precise dates of meetings were unavailable to Mercer et al., but they 
MXGJHGWKDWµWKHODWHFRPPHQFHPHQWRIUHJXODUPHHWLQJVZLWKHGLWRUVLVZLGHO\DFFHSWHGDV
DQHUURU¶183 Morrison and Tumber wrote that there were seven meetings between 7 April 
and 14 June.184 In actual fact there were only six meetings between those dates. The final, 
and seventh, meeting was held on 16 June. It is true that meetings were not established on 
DZHHNO\RUIRUWQLJKWO\EDVLVDQGWKHUHIRUHZHUHQRWVWULFWO\µUHJXODU¶+RZHYHU
throughout the campaign the editors met with Cooper roughly every two weeks, with the 
exception of the first three weeks in May in which Cooper held weekly meetings (6, 12 and 
20 May).  
 
There was an additional meeting between Nott and the editors of BBC News, ITN and PA 
on 11 May.185 This was the only interaction Nott had with editors ± he never attended 
EGLWRUV¶ Meetings. In fact, the MoD attendance at these meetings was indicative of the very 
distinct spheres of influence within the Ministry. The very fact that Cooper chaired 
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meetings instead of McDonald as ACPR, or Taylor as CPR, demonstrated the very 
significant responsibility assumed by Cooper. Cooper was assisted in these meetings by a 
succession of military personnel. In the first meeting of 7 April he was joined by the 
Director of Naval Warfare, the Secretary of the D-Notice Committee and DPR(N).186 CDS, 
/HZLQDWWHQGHGWKHPHHWLQJVRQWZRRFFDVLRQV+HVDLGWKLVZDVEHFDXVHKHµZDQWHGWRJHW
DFURVVGLUHFWO\WRHGLWRUV¶ZKDWKLVIHHOLQJs were.187 &RRSHU¶VGHSXW\LQthe EGLWRUV¶
Meetings was the AUS, Stewart.188 In this respect, the organisation and management of 
(GLWRUV¶0eetings circumvented any MoDPR involvement. 
 
The editors invited to attend all belonged to national or international organisations. There 
was no representation of the regional press at any meeting. Sunday newspapers, however, 
were on the register.189 Of the broadcasting companies, ITN, BBC and IRN were invited to 
attend. Of the agencies in attendance - Reuters and PA - only Editor-in-Chief of PA, David 
Chipp, was present at meetings. Editor-in-Chief of Reuters, Michael Reupke, aware that 
the meetings were for British editors, was uncomfortable attending. 5HXWHUV¶&KLHI
Correspondent, Graham Stewart, took his place. In addition to the daily national - and 
Sunday - newspapers, PA and Reuters, and broadcasting companies, newspaper 
organisations were permitted access to the meetings. The Newspaper Conference, 
1HZVSDSHU6RFLHW\DQG1HZVSDSHU3URSULHWRUV¶$VVRFLDWLRQZHUHDOOSUHVHQW190  
 
/DWHU(GLWRUV¶0eetings were criticised for being too large by the editors interviewed by 
Mercer et al.191 It could be argued that the sheer number of editors to whom Cooper was 
communicating, might have deterred him from taking them into his confidence. However, 
the exercise could not possibly have been run with less organisations present. One of the 
reasons the meetings were perceived to be worthwhile was that Cooper was able to address 
all elements of the media: broadcasters, publishers, agencies and conglomerates. If 
meetings had been conducted for each section privately, this would have caused 
discrepancies and given rise to potential accusations that more information was being 
shared with one constituent of the media over the others. The time it would have taken to 
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meet with each of these components of the media would not have been conducive to the 
efficient running of media policy. 
 
4a. (GLWRUV¶Meetings and the Task Force Journalists 
(GLWRUV¶0HHWLQJVDFWHGDVDEULGJHEHWZHHQWKRVHPHPEHUVRIWKHPHGLDZLth the Task 
Force and editors. The meetings allowed Cooper to explain the policies rolled out to 
correspondents in the South Atlantic, and allowed editors to voice any concerns. This was 
true to the extent that editors of organisations without a Task Force delegate often felt the 
meetings were fruitless. The Editor of The Observer said: µ7KH3HUPDQHQW6HFUHWDU\¶V
PHHWLQJVZLWK(GLWRUVZHUHPRVWO\XQSURGXFWLYH«0XFKRIWKHGLVFXVVLRQDWWKHVH
PHHWLQJV«FRQFHUQHGWUDQVPLVVLRQSUREOHPVWKDWFRXOGKDYHEHHQGHDOWZLWKPRUH
effectively by News Editors¶192 2Q$SULOWKH0R'¶VSROLF\WRZDUGVWKHUHOHDVHRIFRS\
from Task Force correspondents was outlined in a signal to the Task Force:  
 
MINISTRY POLICY IS TO DEPEND ON EDITORS, WHO HAVE BEEN GIVEN 
GUIDELINES PERSONALLY BY PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, TO 
CONSULT MOD WITH ANY DOUBTS ON MATERIAL RECEIVED FROM THEIR 
EMBARKED REPRESENTATIVES...193 
 
This signal demonstrated the importance of the link between editors and the MoD. The 
CoS often deflected discussion of issues with the Task Force journalists and suggested they 
EHUDLVHGµZLWKWKHHGLWRUVFRQFHUQHG¶194 The Fleet journalists were discussed at every 
meeting of editors. Evidence of this was that, ahead of the meeting of 6 May, DPR(N), 
Sutherland, requested a variety of information on issues which might be brought up with 
editors. The first two items which should be addressed, according to DPR(N) were: 
µ$UUDQJHPHQWVIRUVHQGLQJEDFNPDWHULDOSURGXFHGE\FRUUHVSRQGHQWVZLWKWKH7DVN
)RUFH¶DQGLQIRUPDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJSODFHVIRUFRrrespondents on board QEII µDQGRWKHU
SRVVLEOHDGGLWLRQVWRWKH7DVN)RUFH¶195 The information gathered by DPR(N), however, 
was not particularly helpful. In a letter from Sutherland to Cooper, Sutherland explained 
WKDWµ3DXO.HHO¶was accompanying the Fleet for The Guardian DQGµ7HUU\¶6QRZZDVIRU
The Sun.HQµ6RELGR¶, DQGWKHPHUJLQJRIPLQGHUVWREHFRPHµ5RELQ+DPPRQG¶
(Graeme Hammond and Robin Barratt), only served to confuse the situation further.196  
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An example of the effect editors could have on PR policy in the South Atlantic occurred at 
WKHHQGRI0D\FRQFHUQLQJWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIWKHµInvincible )LYH¶197 On 6 May editors 
FRPSODLQHGWR&RRSHUWKDWRUJDQLVDWLRQVZLWKFRUUHVSRQGHQWVµZLWKIRUZDUGHOHPHQWVRI
the Task Force near the Falklands had good access to news, while others had 
correspondents only in Canberra [sic] RII$VFHQVLRQZKRZHUHSURGXFLQJYHU\OLWWOH¶198 On 
20 May, following the recommendations regarding the allocation of journalists to units, 
&RRSHUH[SODLQHGWKDWµZLWKWKHDPDOJDPDWLRQof the various elements of the Task Force, 
some redistribution of correspondents between ships was taking place...¶ DQGWKDWµSULRULW\
would be given to those who had had less good access to material on the voyage south, eg 
those in Canberra¶ 199 The day before the landing the five journalists on board Invincible 
signalled their offices in London to complain that they were not being given the same 
access on the Falklands that Canberra journalists were being afforded: 
µ,1)250$7,9(/<)$&,/,7,(6/$1',1*:,6(2))(5('(0%$5.('35(66
&$1%(55$%(,1*'(1,('5(3($7'(1,('86«5(&200(1'6221(67
$1'85*(17(675(35(6(17$7,216<285(1'2851(('6¶200 On 28 May a 




NOW ON A SUPPLY SHIP IN THE TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE, DEVOID OF 
COMMUNICATIONS AND HAVE RECEIVED THROUGH THE CAPTAIN A SIGNAL FROM 
MOD SAYING WE MUST TRANSFER TO SHIPS THAT ARE NO LONGER IN THE 
$5($«2855(&200(1'$7,21,67+$7$//35(6685(6+28/'%($33/,(')25
EQUAL TREATMENT YOUR CORRESPONDENTS...201 
 
On 31 May the editors of the five newspapers - The Times, The Daily Telegraph, The 
Guardian, The Sun and the Daily Star - received copies of this signal. They were invited to 
PHHWZLWK&RRSHUSULYDWHO\WKDWHYHQLQJ&RRSHUDVVXUHGWKHHGLWRUVWKDWµKHZRXOGGR
HYHU\WKLQJSRVVLEOH¶202 The next day, no arrangements had yet been made which provoked 
the Editor of the Daily Star to write to Cooper:  
 
The level of thoughtlessness by your embarked Press Officers reaches a fresh senith [sic] daily. I 
DPVXUHWKDW\RXDOVRDUHZRUULHGE\WKLVDSSDOOLQJODFNRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGSURIHVVLRQDOLVP«$W
the present, however, we are left with having been ordered off the Falklands with, I understand, no 
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chance of returning for the next 10 days. We have one man with the Task Force. Some broadcasters 
have three. We are not asking for much. Only for fair treatment for our man.203 
 
Later that evening, at 1800GMT, Cooper admitted the editors once more to his office in 
order to discuss the situation further. Cooper told editors at this meeting, according to 
Hitchen:  
 
«WKDWKHZRXOGGRHYHU\WKLQJSRVVLEOHWRPDNHVXUHWKDWRXUSHRple were put back ashore, and he 
promised that not only would signals be sent immediately to the embarked MoD Press Officers and 
the Commander of the Land Forces, but that our correspondents would also be told of the 
arrangements to take them ashore.204 
 
The Invincible Five were moved from the carrier to RFA Stromness the very next day. On 
3 June all five landed safely on the islands. It will never be known with 100% accuracy 
whether the Invincible journalists, without the interjection of the editors, would have made 
it ashore the Falklands. However, the evidence suggests that, as a direct consequence of 
HGLWRUV¶SURWHVWVRQ0D\DQG-XQHDFWLRQZDVVZLIWO\WDNHQWRUHFWLI\WKHVLWXDWLRQ 
 
4b. (GLWRUV¶0HHWLQJV and MoD Policy 
Problems with MoD policy wHUHRIWHQLURQHGRXWLQ(GLWRUV¶0HHWLQJV,WZDVQRWMXVWWKH
media which benefitted from the meetings. Feedback supplied by editors at meetings was 
NH\WR0R'¶VUXQQLQJRIPHGLDSROLF\LQ%ULWDLQ$VPHQWLRQHGHDUOLHUWKHUHVSRQVHRI
editors to the withdrawal of unattributable briefing played a significant role in their 
restoration on 11 May. Contribution from editors also had an impact on the extent of 
physical facilities offered at the MoD. The true extent of ill-will between the media and the 
MoD, for example, was highlighted to Cooper in the meeting of 6 May. In a memo after 
WKHPHHWLQJ&RRSHUZURWHµ«,think we are losing ground. We need to regain it and be 
PRUHSRVLWLYHDQGUHVSRQGPRUHTXLFNO\¶205 At the meeting editors informed Cooper: 
µ«WKHUHZDs a risk of the UK starting to lose public and international sympathy through 
appearing to be holding back on news when the Argentines had no hesitation about 
GHOXJLQJWKHPHGLDZLWKPLVOHDGLQJDQGLQDFFXUDWHLQIRUPDWLRQ¶206 As a result of the 
consultation of 6 May, a list of measures was outlined which should be adopted in order to 
promote better relations with the media.207  
 
                                                 
203
 B. Hitchen to Cooper, 1 Jun., MoD, DEFE31/221 f.8. 
204
 Daily Star memorandum, HCDC, v.ii, p.115. 
205
 Cooper, 7 May, MoD, DEFE31/220 f.E6. 
206
 Note for the record, 7 May, MoD, DEFE31/221 f.3. 
207
 Cooper, 7 May, MoD, DEFE31/220 f.E6. 
135 
 
The following week, on 12 May, Cooper responded to the criticism levelled at the MoD 
the week before. He was able to tell editors that he had solved a number of issues about 
which they had complained. For example, Cooper said new instructions had been sent to 
the Task Force urging a more rapid release of operational news, background briefings were 
QRZEHLQJSURYLGHGDQGWKDWµHYHU\DYHQue had been explored to try to arrange for 
transmission of cine-ILOP«¶208 In a later meeting, on 20 May, Cooper further delighted in 
LQVWUXFWLQJHGLWRUVWKDWPRUHµSURJUHVVKDGEHHQPDGHLQVHYHUDODUHDVSUHYLRXVO\
GLVFXVVHG«¶209 Area of progress included the clarification of the system for releasing copy 
from ships, photographs of servicemen (specifically those who were casualties) would be 
provided to the media and problems with Customs¶ clearance of film footage from the 
South Atlantic had now been fully resolved.210  
 
(GLWRUV¶Meetings proved to be a hub of information for the PUS to tap into. Cooper was 
able to gauge media feeling and to act ± in most cases, swiftly ± when protests were made. 
Perhaps WKHPRVWVLJQLILFDQWDVSHFWRI(GLWRUV¶0eetings was that they allowed the MoD to 
implement guidelines and to lead editors on MoD policy independent of usual Government 
machinery. Cooper used meetings with editors to recommend to editors what type of 
information might, and might not be, published. The meetings also acted as a link between 
the CoS and the media in that Cooper would address any concerns of the committee with 
editors directly. In this respect, these meetings allowed the MoD a way to evade, not only 
MoDPR - ensuring his authority over all aspects of public relations - but also the system of 
Defence Notices (D-Notices) in Britain.  
 
The D-Notice system had been effective in Britain for 60 years. It was a system involving 
a voluntary code between the Government and the media. It was designed to prevent the 
inadvertent disclosure of information which might compromise British security. In the case 
of a particularly sensitive subject, the D-Notice Committee would issue a D-Notice. This 
notice would detail the risks of running stories on the subject in question. In essence the 
system amounted to a form of voluntary censorship. The system was not invoked at any 
time during the war.211 ,79GHFODUHGWKDWµLQVWHDGWKHad hoc V\VWHPRIFHQVRUVKLS«JUHZ
XSXQGHUWKHXPEUHOODRIWKH0R'¶212 There were occasions when Admiral Ash, the 
secretary of the committee, informally spoke with media organisations, either answering 
                                                 
208
 Note for the record, 13 May, MoD, DEFE31/221 f.4. 
209




 See Harris, p.108.; Carruthers, p.124.; Humphries, p.58. 
212
 ITV memorandum, HCDC, v.ii, p.71, q.d. 
136 
 
questions, or giving gentle guidance on various topics.213 In the place of D-Notices, the 
(GLWRUV¶0eetings acted as a forum for guidance on what should or should not be 
publicised. As early as 17 April the CoS depended on Cooper to address issues with the 
media. It was agreed he should discuss ZLWKHGLWRUVµWKHGHVLUDELOLW\RIDYRLGLQJWKH
publication of reports which might be construed as irUHVSRQVLEOH«¶214 On 10 May the 
OD(SA) discussed the problem of speculation in the Press. They committee felt that 
µ«SUREOHPVVKRXOGEHXUJHQWO\DGGUHVVHGE\WKH3HUPDQHQW8QGHU6HFUHWDU\RIWKH
Ministry of Defence, at one of his regular meetings with Editors«¶215 It is clear that 
guidance issued to editors was seen to negate the use of D-Notices from a meeting of the 
IG RQ0D\7KHPHHWLQJREVHUYHGWKDWµJXLGance had been given to editors four weeks 
beforehand¶. It was noted that it was still possible to employ D-Notices. However, up until 
that point the guidance to editors had sufficed.216 According to a Guardian correspondent, 
even when Admiral Ash spoke to journalists he referred them to guidance issued in 
(GLWRUV¶0eetings.217  
 
Cooper discussed initial guidelines with editors on 7 April. In that meeting it was 
VXJJHVWHGWKDWDVDJHQHUDOFULWHULRQµWKH\LPDJLQHGZKDWWKH\ZRXOGZDQWWRVHH
EURDGFDVWRULQSULQWLIWKH\KDGDVRQDERDUGWKH7DVN)RUFH¶218 On 20 April the PUS 
µUHTXHVWHGFDXWLRQRYHUWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRILQIRUPDWLRQWRGRZLWKRSHUDWLRQDOSODQV«¶DQG
requested restraint in three key areas: assistance provided to UK Forces by foreign 
countries; Argentine disinformation; and impending operations.219 Cooper implored editors 
to avoid particular mention of Chilean support.220 Whilst Chile publicly adopted a neutral 
stance during the conflict, her own dispute with Argentina over the Beagle Islands 
persuaded her to lend covert assistance to the UK by supplying intelligence on Argentine 
military movements and capacity.  
 
There were two occasions when the editors of media organisations were directly asked not 
to expose information of which they were aware. The first instance was concerning UXBs. 
The MoD was keen to preserve the information that Argentine bombs were failing to 
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explode. Defence correspondents were also entreated not to refer to UXBs in stories. The 
second instance was when editors were beseeched not to announce that landings at Bluff 
Cove would be taking place. On both these occasions, D-Notices could have been engaged, 
yet guidance issued to editors was seen as being adequate to prevent the publication or 
broadcast of sensitive details.  
 
(GLWRUV¶0HHWLQJVQRWRQO\E\passed the D-Notice system, but also usurped the role of the 
defence correspondent. Mercer et al. made a study of the position of the defence 
FRUUHVSRQGHQWDQGIRXQGWKDWWKHLUUROHZDVµZHDNHQHGE\WKHPDQQHULQZhich the 
PHHWLQJVZLWKHGLWRUVGHYHORSHG¶221 During the first month of the conflict only editors 
received a form of unattributable briefing. The majority of editors did not have training in 
GHIHQFHDIIDLUV2QHFLYLOVHUYDQWWROG0HUFHUHWDOWKDWµ7KHGHfence correspondents 




The extent to which the media co-operated with MoD-issued guidance has constituted a 
provocative subject. 7D\ORUUHODWHGWRWKH+&'&WKDWKHIRXQGHGLWRUVZHUHµH[FHSWLRQDOO\
co-RSHUDWLYH¶223 /HZLQVDLGKHIRXQGWKHPµH[WUHPHO\XQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶224 And there is 
evidence that the editors were grateful for the service afforded them. On 7 April the editors 
ZHUHVDLGWREHSRVLWLYHDQGµDSSUHFLDWLYHWKDWWKHPHHWLQJKDGWDNHQSODFH¶225 The editors 
later told Cooper WKDWWKH\µIRXQGPHHWLQJVWREHYHU\XVHIXO«¶226 As previously noted, the 
PDLQIRFXVRIWKHOLWHUDWXUH¶VDWWHQWLRQRI(GLWRUV¶0eetings has been concerning the extent 
to which editors were misinformed by the MoD. The main example used related to the 
landings at San Carlos. There were, however, other examples where either misinformation 
was offered to editors, or significant information was omitted from the meeting altogether. 
Hitchen said that: µ(GLWRUV¶EULHILQJVZHUHRIWHQTXLWHIDUFLFDOLQWKDWLQIRUPDWLRQZDV
GHOLEHUDWHO\ZLWKKHOG¶227 He gave the example of 6 May in which editors attending a 
meeting were totally ignorant of the fact that two Harriers had gone missing, despite the 
fact a press conference was occurring on the subject downstairs. In an interview with 
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0HUFHUHWDORQHHGLWRUVDLGWKDWWKHHSLVRGHµPDGHXVIHHO DEVROXWHIRROV¶228 The meeting 
of 20 May, in which the landings were discussed, left editors so sour that two ± Donald 
Trelford (The Observer) and Frank Giles (The Sunday Times) refused to return for 
subsequent meetings. Both Knightley, and Greenberg and Smith, have written on the 
extent to which the media was complacent in being controlled by the MoD.229 Knightley, 
LQDQDUWLFOHZULWWHQMXVWDIWHUWKHZDUZURWHWKDWµWKH0R'FRXOGQRWKDYHDFKLHYHGZKDWLW
did without some compliance from the British media; if it was rape, then it was rape with 
FRQWULEXWRU\QHJOLJHQFH¶230 
 
4c. (GLWRUV¶0HHWLQJV: Ministry-Media Relations 
Before the records of the meetings were accessed, the only real evidence one could obtain 
UHODWLQJWR(GLWRUV¶0HHWLQJVZDVHGLWRUV¶ own statements. Trelford told Mercer et al. that 
µWKHUHZDVQHYHUDQ\FKDQFHRIDVHULRXVGLVFXVVLRQEHFDXVHWKHPHHWLQJVFRQVWDQWO\
EHFDPHVODQJLQJPDWFKHV«¶231 7KHPDMRUGUDZEDFNRI&RRSHU¶VPHHWLQJVZLWKHGLWRUV
was that, particularly in the latter half of the crisis, they were increasingly confrontational 
and less advantageous. What was apparent was that the meetings progressively became 
fora at which editors could make known their grievances. Cooper said that the basic aim of 
WKHPHHWLQJVZDVµWRVRUWRXWZKDW\RXPLJKWFDOOODUJHSUREOHPV¶232 The first meeting at 
which irritations came to the surface was that of 6 May. The note on the meeting recorded 
WKDWµZKLOHH[FKDQJHV«ZHUHJRRG-natured, there was clearly a good deal of disquiet on the 
part of EditorVDQGFULWLFLVPRIWKHVSHHGDQGTXDOLW\RIQHZVSURYLGHGE\0R'¶233 It was 
at this time, in early May, that various members of the Government, including the Prime 
Minister, began to publicly condemn areas of the media for their coverage of the crisis.234 
However, there is a direct correlation between Government criticism of the media, and the 
increase in the adversarial nature of (GLWRUV¶0HHWLQJV2Q0D\µWKHUHZDVFOHDUIHHOLQJ
that the press was being criticised by Government but inadequately provided with 
LQIRUPDWLRQ¶235 
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Although tensions between the media and the MoD had been high before the start of May, 
relations with other ministries or departments had been fairly equivocal. A series of events 
served to change the status quo and pit the media against the Government over its coverage 
RIWKHFRQIOLFW2Q0D\WKH%%&¶VSURJUDPPHNewsnight, aired an episode which saw 
LWVSUHVHQWHU3HWHU6QRZUHIHUWRµWKH%ULWLVK¶7KDWHYHQLQJWKH$UJHQWLQHVKDGFODLPHG
that Hermes had been disabled. The British had publicly denied this claim. Snow declared 
on air:  
 
Now, there was already deep scepticism, to put it mildly, about the Argentine claim to have 
downed eleven aircraft. They have produced no further evidence to refute British denials on 
WKLV«6RDJDLQDQArgentine claim that appears to have no foundation. Until the British are 
demonstrated either to be deceiving us or to be concealing losses, we can only tend to give a lot 
more credence to the British version of events.236 
 
John Page, Conservative MP for Harrow West, complained about the content of the 
programme, maintaining that 6QRZ¶VFRPPHQWVYHUJHGRQWUHDVRQ237 Five days later an 
editorial in The Sun DVNHGµ:KDWLVLWEXWWUHDVRQWRWDONRQ79«questioning whether the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VYHUVLRQRIWKHVHDEDWWOHVZDVWREHEHOLHYHG"¶238 Harris wrote that up until 
this point in the conflict the BBC had been reporting the war ± µIURPWKLVSRLQWRQLWZDV
SDUWRILW¶239 Snow replied to criticism by writing to The Times:  
 
Our job is to report events, and constantly to examine the accuracy of accounts we are given of 
them. Our job also is constantly to question those who have the power to direct events, and to 
question the assumptions and assessments on which they make their decisions.240 
 
This incident was swiftly followed by controversy over The Sun¶VKHDGOLQHIROORZLQJWKH
sinking of the Belgrano. The Sun SXEOLVKHGDIURQWSDJHSURFODLPLQJYLFWRULRXVO\µ*RWFKD¶
(Figure 4.5).241 Harris gives the most detailed description of how the headline came to 
be.242 Although only around 100,000 copies of newspapers carrying the headline were 
GLVWULEXWHGWR6FRWODQGDQGWKHQRUWKRI(QJODQGWKHVXEVHTXHQWKHDGOLQHUHDGµ','
$5*,(6'52:1"¶FRQWURYHUV\VXUURXQGLQJWKHKHDGOLQHZDVULIH243 The latest 
biography of Thatcher, ZULWWHQE\&KDUOHV0RRUHMXGJHGWKDWµ«DOWKRXJKWKLV>WKH
headline] was later used as an example of callousness and jingoism, it did reflect 
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newspapers and broadcasting organisations are deeply divided; and are thus unsure what 
EDODQFHWRVWULNHEHWZHHQEOLQGSDWULRWLVPDQGFRQVWUXFWLYHFULWLFLVP¶245 
 
Figure 4.5: µ7KH6XQ¶3 May 1982 
  
On 4 May Nott rose in the Commons to criticise the media further, stating that it would be 
of use if the media would QRWµVSHFXODWHVRZLGHO\¶DQGLI the BBC and other media could 
KDYHµIHZHUSURJUDPPHVRIWKLVNLQG¶246 Winston Churchill MP, in an interview RQ,71¶V
News at Ten, SURIHVVHGKLPVHOIµGLVJXVWHG¶with the conduct of the media.247 By the time 
the editors met on 6 May, criticism of the media had reached a high point thus far. The 




from the editors about what we were doing and what ZHZHUHQRWGRLQJ«¶248 After 6 May 
&RRSHUZURWHWKDWKHµKDGDPXFKURXJKHUULGH¶249 The meeting of 9 June saw many more 
FRPSODLQWVVXUIDFH$FRPPHQWRQWKHPHHWLQJQRWHGWKDWµWKH(GLWRUVZHUHLQDQLJJOLQJ
mood (though few of them seemed to share the same QLJJOH¶250 It was not until the very 
last meeting of editors, on 16 June, that they became truly confrontational. With the end of 
the war, and the end of many of the media arrangements drawing to a close, neither the 
MoD, nor the media, were so reliant on the other side. In the meeting Cooper criticised the 
DFWLRQVRIWKHPHGLDRYHUWKHODVWFRXSOHRIPRQWKV7KLVOHGWRµVRPHIRUWKULJKW
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H[FKDQJHV¶251 Protheroe announced that WKHµODVWSODFH¶KH thought he would be accused of 
µDlack of patriotism¶ was in the MoD.252 Peter Woon, Editor of BBC Television News, 
alleged that the MoD had diverted film taken by the BBC cameraman in the Falklands.253 
According to DPR(A), who attended the meeting, Derek Jameson, Editor of the News of 
the World, told Cooper he could not make up his mind whether the actions were 
µFRQVSLUDF\RUDFRFN-XS¶7RZKLFK:RRQVXJJHVWHGµERWK¶254 
 
(GLWRUV¶0eetings carried with them benefits for both the media and the MoD. The media 
saw certain issues solved, about which they made representations to Cooper. Examples 
included the reinstatement of unattributable briefings by the MoD, an increase in physical 
facilities at the Ministry, and the solution to issues arising with the Task Force. The MoD 
was able to gain valuable feedback on their policy, both in the South Atlantic and in 
Britain. The ministry was able to bypass the regular machinery of the Government and the 
media ± circumventing the D-Notice system, and depreciating the role of defence 
correspondents. In addition, meetings enabled the MoD to give thorough guidance on what 
it did, or did not, want published. The most significant way in which the meetings 
detracted from their aim of promoting accordance between the ministry and media was the 
confrontational atmosphere created after the first week of May. 
 
5. The News Release Group 
It has been established that, in May, the MoD progressively realised the importance of 
media-relations. On 12 May Lewin met the editors, along with Cooper, for the first time. 
Editors complained about the embarrassment caused the previous week over the Harrier 
crash on which Cooper had neglected to brief them. Notes on the meeting recorded that 
µ386UHEXWWHGWKLVUHIHUULQJWRWKHQHHGWRLQIRUPQH[WRINLQ«¶255 A comment on the 
mood of the editors:  
 
Although the Editors seemed appreciative of the efforts being made to improve the provision of 
information by MOD, there was still a good deal of simmering discontent and suspicion that the 
Government was trying to control the flow of informDWLRQ«256 
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Having witnessed, first hand, the disquiet of editors, Lewin addressed the issue of media-
relations directly. On 17 April the CoS meeting documented that Lewin µsaid he would 
discuss with the Permanent Under Secretary the establishment within the Ministry of 
'HIHQFHRIDQRSHUDWLRQVFHOOWRKDQGOHSXEOLFUHODWLRQVPDWWHUV«¶257 The MoD submitted 
WRWKH+&'&WKDWIURP0D\µD1HZV5HOHDVH*URXSZDVHVWDEOLVKHGXQGHUWKH
FKDLUPDQVKLSRIWKH$VVLVWDQW8QGHU6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWHIRUWKH'HIHQFH6WDII«¶258 The 
NRG came into effect the day after Lewin contacted Cooper. 
 
The literature on the media and the Falklands is extremely light on the topic of the News 
Release Group. There were no documents made available on the group to the HCDC. The 
membership of the group consisted of internal staff from the MoD, so interviews on the 
VXEMHFWZHUHQRWUHDGLO\REWDLQDEOH:KLOHPRVWVWXGLHVPHQWLRQWKHJURXS¶VH[LVWHQFH
there are three works which reflect on the group a little further. Freedman, with access to 
the archives, noted the creation of the group and its effect within the MoD, which he 
judged to be limited.259 Mercer et al. acknowledged the group and assessed its 
implementation and general function, but analysis was restricted.260 Finally, Morrison and 
Tumber gathered some information on the group from anonymous interviews with MoD 
officials. They argued that the NRG was established to tighten up the process of collating 
statements.261 Morrison and Tumber went on to suggest that the NRG might have been 
limited in effect because immediate information often eluded the group. Copy was, in fact, 
referred to others - for example to Brigadier Ramsbotham - because they had better access 
to the hierarchy of Northwood.262 Having benefited from privileged access to the 
0LQLVWU\¶VUHFRUGVWKLVVHFWLRQLVWKHPRVWFRPSOHWHDSSUDLVDORIIHUHGRIWKHUROHRIWKH
NRG in the war. 
 
The NRG was created in an attempt to help speed the process of releasing news. Mercer et 
al. thRXJKWWKDWWKHJURXSZDVHVWDEOLVKHGµSDUWO\WRPROOLI\WKHPHGLDZKLFKKDGEHHQ
complaining about the lack of information, but primarily to appease the military who had 
EHHQSURWHVWLQJWKDWWRRPXFKLQIRUPDWLRQKDGEHHQJLYHQDZD\¶263 However, the chief 
reason the group was formed was to achieve a sense of order over the release of 
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information. The participation in the group of both military and civilian personnel was 
intended to ensure that decisions over the release of information could be informed by 
knowledge of risks involved - both political and military. A memo on incident reporting 
DQQRXQFHGWKHIRUPDWLRQRIWKH15*,WLQWURGXFHGWKHJURXSDVEHLQJHVWDEOLVKHGµWR
decide how to present information on a particular incident and the timing of its release to 
WKHSUHVV¶264 The date on which the NRG was created dictated that much of the 
documentation it produced, FRQFHUQHGFDVXDOW\ILJXUHVGXULQJWKHZDU7KHJURXS¶V
principal role was the creation of briefings, statements and announcements about events in 
the South Atlantic. To a certain extent, the NRG was a successful enterprise. In its short 
life it had a relatively significant impact on the internal organisation of PR in the MoD. 
+RZHYHUWKHUHZHUHWZRPDMRUIDFWRUVZKLFKOLPLWHGWKH15*¶VLQIOXHQFHPuch of the 
work the group produced could only be released when checked by senior figures within the 
ministry or the military; and a substantial amount of dominant figures ± particularly 
military personnel - had no clue the NRG even existed. 
 
Cooper stated that µZKHQWKHDFWLRQEHJDQWRZDUPXS¶WKH0R'HVWDEOLVKHGWKH15*DV
the responsibility of the Under Secretary¶265 7KHJURXSKHWROGWKHFRPPLWWHHµLQFOXGHG
35SHRSOHDQGWKHYDULRXVRSHUDWLRQDOSHRSOH«¶0RUULVRQDQG7XPEHUVDLGWKHUHZHUH
three members; the Under Secretary, Taylor and Rear-Admiral Anthony Whetstone, 
ACDS.266 In fact, the group, under the leadership of Stewart, comprised the CPR, ACDS, 
Christopher Jennings and, on occasion, McDonald and each of the DPRs. Cooper 
instructed Stewart: µ7KHUROe of the Group will be to decide what current operational 
information should be made available to the press and to FCO posts for dissemination 
overseas, and the timing of release¶267 Thus, in May 1982, apparatus was installed to 
facilitate the prompt and efficient release of information ± a significant internal move to 
adapt usual MoD policy. 
 
5a. The NRG: Casualty Reporting 
Because of the timing of the establishment of the NRG - just before the commencement of 
the land campaign - one of the most crucial roles the group performed in the later weeks of 
the crisis was linked to casualty reporting. Increasingly, documentation produced by the 
group, and circulated within the Ministry, concerned casualty numbers to be released. On 
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18 May Whetstone wrote that casualties should be expected DQGµ6RPHearly reports of the 
progress of events will probably be later proved inaccurate. However we cannot delay 
press announcements until we are sure of all the facts nor until accurate casualty figures 
are known, let alone that next of kin have been informed¶ 268 By the end of May, the MoD 
realised that its reporting of casualty figures and losses had not tallied up with the truth. On 
26 May Stewart was informed that µDVDJHQHUDOUXOHZHDUHDQQRXQFLQJRXUORVVHV«PRUH
RUOHVVDVWKH\RFFXU¶269 There was concern that helicopter losses from 25 May had not 
been announced. It was felt the MoD µshould not start to hoard unannounced losses which 
at some VWDJHZLOOEHNQRZQ«¶ The NRG had µORRNHGDWWKLVPDWWHUDQGFRQVLGHUHGKRZ
best to get the news out, given that there were no overriding operational reasons for 
ZLWKKROGLQJLW¶270 The following day it was established that µWKHWRWDOV>RIFDVXDOWLHVDQG
losses] given in internal briefings are different from the summation of what we have 
DQQRXQFHG¶271 &RRSHUDVNHGWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVWDIIWRSURYLGHWKH15*ZLWKDµVXPPDU\RI
ZKDWZHKDYHDOUHDG\DQQRXQFHG¶RQERWKWKH$UJHQWLQHDQG%ULWLVKVLGHV7KHJURXS
would then deal with the situation. 
 
The NRG produced a series of notes based on tables of casualties which it constructed 
from information provided.272 Late on 28 May Stewart was able to circulate a revised list 
of losses and casualties including tables on personnel, losses on both sides and losses of 
ships and fixed wing aircraft. Finally, on 28 May, the NRG had received all the relevant 
statistics from which to judge what policy should be pursued relating to the inconsistent 
data.273 Stewart recommended that:  
 




c) CPR did not believe that there was particular pressure for us to put anything out at 
this moment, but that circumstances over the next few days might make it more 
appropriate to do so 
 
6WHZDUWSURSRVHGWKDWWKH15*VKRXOGNHHSWKHLQIRUPDWLRQXSGDWHGDQGWKDWµZHVKRXOG
decide when DQGZKDWWRUHOHDVHDVZHMXGJHWKHQHHGDULVHV¶274 Thus, in May 1982 the 
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NRG adopted the role of policy adviser. In the second week of its existence (and, as will be 
demonstrated, the last), the NRG was acutely concerned with the release of casualty 
figures.  
 
On 8 June Argentine Skyhawks attacked British vessels at Fitzroy Bay.275 HMS Plymouth 
and RFA Sir Tristram were struck by UXBs. RFA Sir Galahad was bombed and 
abandoned whilst on fire. Until this point, policy on how to release casualty figures had, as 
was the case with other areas of policy, evolved on an ad hoc basis. On 5 May it was noted 
in a meeting of the IGWKDWµ6XEVHTXHQWO\WKH\>0R'@ZRXOGQHHGWRGHFLGHLQZKDWZD\
to release information about casualties¶276 After the discrepancies in casualty numbers was 
noted on 26 May, the IG VXJJHVWHGWKDWµ2QWKHTXHVWLRQRIWKHPHWKRGRIDQQRXQFLQJ
FDVXDOWLHVDQGORVVHVZHVKRXOGVD\WKDWZHDUHUHYLHZLQJWKHSRVLWLRQ¶277 The meeting 
heard from the MoD representative WKDWLWH[SHFWHGWRPDNHµVRPHSURJress towards a new 
SROLF\LQWKHFRXUVHRIWKHGD\«¶278 Later that day, Cooper informed Nott that there was to 
EHDµUHQHZDORISROLF\RQUHOHDVLQJLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWGDPDJHWRVKLSVDQGRWKHU
ORVVHV¶279 Cooper outlined three main considerations involved in this policy: operational, 
family and presentational factors. The new guidelines would work on the basis that the 
principle remained that an announcement would not be made until the NoK had been 
LQIRUPHG7KLVKRZHYHUZRXOGQRWEHSRVVLEOHµLQFHUWDLQFLUFXPVWDQFHVZKHQWKHUHDUH
RYHUULGLQJUHTXLUHPHQWVIRUDQDQQRXQFHPHQWWREHPDGH¶7KHUHZDVQRH[SODQDWLRQRI
what these requirements might involve. Yet the document did go on to outline how any 
future announcement should be made. The formulation of the announcement should be: 
 
Following [incident]/HMS[ ]/SS[ ]/MV[ ] has been damaged/lost. No additional information is yet 
available either in Whitehall or in the Service Information Centres [or, in the case of merchant 
ships, the appropriate authority]. Please do not ring them. As soon as we have any information, a 
further announcement will be made.280 
 
On 8 June, however, the announcement of casualties did not follow this format. McDonald 
made the announcement: 
 
The frigate, HMS Plymouth, suffered some damage, initial reports are that five casualties from 
HMS Plymouth have been removed to another ship and are receiving treatment. The logistic 
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landing ships, Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad, while unloading stores were also attacked and 
suffered some damage.281 
 
On 10 June an MoD statement confirmed that there were no deaths on Plymouth, but it was 
feared that casualties from the attacks on Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad µwere much 
heavier¶ - early reports indicated µa number of killed and injured¶282 The public had, 
however, been informed by the media that casualties were heavy on the landing ships since 




across the hold, pulling on their life jackets...283 
 
Newspaper reports on the morning of 10 June further suggested that casualties on the 
Royal Auxiliary ships were heavy.284 On 9 June the NRG had been appointed by CoS to 
SUHSDUHµIRULVVXHDVVRRQDVSRVVLEOHDVWDWHPHQWRQWKHFDVXDOWLHVLQ+06
3/<0287+¶285 The group had not been appointed to issue any statement on the losses 
incurred on the landing ships. Thus the effectiveness of the NRG, in this instance, was 
limited by the remit assigned to it by the CoS. Further to this, on 10 June, the CoS heard 
that tKH15*ZDVµUHYLHZLQJWKHSULQFLSOHWKDWVKRXOGEHIROORZHGLQDQQRXQFLQJ
casualties resulting from major incidents, in the light of criticisms of the way in which the 
QHZVDERXWWKHDWWDFNRQ%OXII&RYHKDGEHHQKDQGOHG¶286 However, the NRG was unable 
to formulate an official policy, since military considerations out-ranked PR 
considerations.287 After the disaster on 8 June, Moore signalled Northwood in the hope that 
it might withhold the details of the casualties sustained in order to encourage the 
Argentines to believe that the British had suffered a major setback which might prevent 
them from attacking Port Stanley in the near future.288 1RWWWROGMRXUQDOLVWVµ<RXFDQ
VSHFXODWHDV\RXZLVK¶ZKHQTXHVWLRQHGDERXWFDVXDOWLHV289 The NRG was prevented from 
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forming any real policy concerning the incident by the overriding military consideration. 
/HZLQWROGWKH+&'&WKDWµYHU\RIWHQDSLHFHRILQIRUPDWLRQZDVVRLPSRUWDQWLWZDVWDNHn 
RXWRIWKHLU>WKH15*¶V@KDQGVDQGWKH6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWHDQG,ZRXOGPHHWWRJHWher and 
GLVFXVVVRPHWKLQJWKDWKDGMXVWKDSSHQHGVRPHQHZVIODVKWKDWKDGFRPHLQ¶290 In the 
event, the Government only released the accurate Fitzroy figures on 13 June, after heavy 
media criticism and information released potentially by No.10 implied accurate figures.291 
 
During its existence, the NRG was intrinsically involved in how casualties in the South 
Atlantic were to be reported. On two major occasions the group was asked to address 
policy: after 26 May and the realisation that public announcements of casualties did not 
represent the reality of the situation; and after the Argentine attack at Fitzroy. However, in 
the second instance, the power of the NRG was curbed by military considerations. Yet the 
role of the group and its significance is quite clear. If the conflict had been prolonged, the 
work of the NRG in forming policy on casualty reporting may have been more vital to the 
information war. As it was, the group had a more significant and immediate task ± the 
preparation of more general statements and announcements at the MoD. 
 
5b. The NRG: MoD Statements and Briefings  
The chief, and most important, role the NRG had during the Falklands crisis was the 
organisation and planning of briefings, statements and announcements. The group had 
delegated authority from both Cooper and Lewin as CDS. It took the majority of its 
instruction on what information to handle from the CoS. Orders for the NRG from the CoS 
meetings were given to McDonald, who attended daily, and relayed to the group. It was 
available 24 hours a day. 7D\ORUUHPHPEHUHGµSome of us were available literally night 
and GD\E\VOHHSLQJLQWKHRIILFH«¶292 McDonald told the HCDC that the group met on an 
LPSURPSWXEDVLVEXWVRPHWLPHVµRQFHWZLFHRUWKUHHWLPHVDGD\WR put together the draft 
SUHVVUHOHDVHV¶293 The NRG was often asked to prepare specific briefings - even hosting 
some. Stewart and Taylor, for example, briefed non-NATO, international Defence 
Attachés on the Falklands on 25 May.294 On 26 May the NRG was asked to prepare an in-
depth briefing for defence correspondents on the overall success of naval operations to 
date.295 Later, it was instructed to prepare briefing on land operations.296 In June, the group 
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prepared briefings on the non-repatriation of prisoners of war, the return of Lieutenant 
Commander Astiz to Argentina, on the successful deployment of 5 Infantry Brigade and 
the work of the field hospital at San Carlos.297 On 9 June the group was asked, in 
conjunction with the Army Department and Fieldhouse, to prepare a presentation on the 
landing by 5 Infantry Brigade (this was not delivered due to the conflict over the 
announcement of casualty figures at Fitzroy).298 
 
As well as preparing briefings and briefing correspondents, the NRG assumed the 
responsibility of preparing statements and announcements. Again, orders to prepare 
information for release came primarily from the CoS. The CoS made 16 directives to the 
NRG between 26 May and 14 June.299 On 29 May the NRG prepared a statement on a 
reported clash between British ground forces on the islands.300 The NRG prepared 
statements on the Argentine bombing attack on MV British Wye and the reported leaflet 
raid over Port Stanley.301 The announcement of an attack by C130 aircraft on a US-owned 
Liberian-registered tanker from 8 June was prepared by the NRG. One of the last NRG-
prepared statements of the war was one that the MoD could neither confirm nor deny - 
Argentine reports of civilian casualties in Port Stanley.302 The work of the NRG was 
directed, primarily, by internal orders from Cooper, and commands originating from the 
CoS. The necessity of keeping the group on constant alert demonstrated its significance 
within the MoD. Essentially, the group assumed responsibility for task which had hitherto 
been completed in an improvised manner by MoDPR and the PUS. The formation of the 
group marked a period of more concentrated PR effort on the part of the MoD, as well as a 
period of more organised and focused policy.  
 
The NRG had an integral role in the reporting chain from the Task Force. On 19 May a 
communication was sent to information staff. It clarified the anticipated procedure for an 
announcement in the case of a full-scale amphibious landing on the Falklands. Once 
military considerations had been taken into account, an announcement could be made by 
WKH0R'&RS\IURP7DVN)RUFHMRXUQDOLVWVZRXOGDXWRPDWLFDOO\KDYHDµKROG¶SODFHGRQ
LW7KHµKROG¶ZRXOGµRQO\EHOLIWHGRQLQVWUXFWLRQVIURPWKH³1HZV5HOHDVH*URXS´«¶303 
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Thus, the NRG constituted an additional layer to the reporting procedure outlined in 
Chapter Three. Instead of the ACPR or CPR agreeing on the appropriate press line, 
checking it with No.10 and FCO and then checking it with Nott, the NRG assumed 
responsibility for creating the appropriate press line. Stewart wrote that the Duty Officer 
had to inform him of any LQFLGHQWUHSRUWµVRWKDWWKH1HZV5HOHDVH*URXSFDQEH
FRQYHQHG¶304 The NRG then checked the line with Nott and, finally, transmitted to the 
FCO and No.10 that the decision had been taken to release certain news.305 In an interview, 
Whetstone recalled: 
 
One of our main functions was to try, without releasing militarily sensitive material, to hammer out 
a policy for the release of news from Whitehall consistent with the reports of the correspondents 
with the Task Force. We had first to decide what could or could not be released; then to consider 
when and how it might be announced.306 
 
Once an announcement had been made in London, relevant information could then be 
released, and reports from the Task Force, once they had been double-vetted, could begin 
to be relayed to the relevant media. The influence of the NRG on the news reporting 
system was twofold: not only did it prepare much of the material to be released, but it also 
came to dictate when material could be distributed in Britain. These two areas of authority, 
second only to overriding military considerations, ensured the influence of the group.  
 
5c. The NRG: Restrictions 
There were two issues which restricted the authority and function of the NRG during the 
crisis. Firstly, all decisions made by the group, despite delegated authority from Cooper 
and Lewin, had to be double-checked and approved by Nott. Secondly, few military 





UHOHDVHVEHLQJVKRZQWRWKH6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH¶309 It was necessary for Nott to endorse a 
statement before it could be released. However, since Nott was at the meetings of CoS 
GLUHFWO\EHIRUHWKH0R'¶VQRRQVWatement (usually from 1000-1100GMT), the CoS played a 
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part in approving information too. Lewin reiterated that the CoS µwere giving advice to the 
Morey Stewart Committee, or indeed taking decisions for them. We [the CoS] were the 
superior committee to that committee as far as the noon statement was concerned because 
ZHKDGHLWKHUWKH6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWHRUKLV3ULYDWH6HFUHWDU\SUHVHQW¶EXWµWKHGHFLVLRQRQ
release was, of course, that of Nott¶.310 The authority of the NRG was thus restricted by the 
necessity of having every decision it made signed off by Nott, and often, also the CoS. 
 
One aspect which called into question the influence of the NRG was the fact that many 
prominent figures, particularly military personnel, were unaware that the group existed. At 
the HCDC neither Nott, nor Lewin, who had been inherently involved in the action of the 
group, could completely recall the name of the group. Lewin referred to the group as the 
µ0RUH\6WHZDUW&RPPLWWHH¶DQG1RWWFODLPHGµ,ZRUNHGWKURXJKWKH1HZV5HOHDVH
*URXS,WKLQNZHFDOOHGLW¶311 )UHHGPDQQRWHGWKDW&,1&)/((7µZDVQRWHYHQWROGWKDW
a QHZVUHOHDVHJURXSH[LVWHGLQ0R'XQWLOZHOODIWHULWKDGEHHQHVWDEOLVKHG¶312 Mercer et 
al. pointed out the group was not well known.313 In an interview, Woodward said:  
 
,I,ZHUHDVVXUHG«WKDW7RQ\:KHWVWRQH«ZRXOGKDYHEHHQVLWWLQJURXQGWKHWDEOH«WKDWKHwould 
have his due say and been allowed to put the military requirement either to hide it or release 
LW«WKHQ,ZRXOGKDYHEHHQKDSS\%XW,GLGQ¶WNQRZWKDWZDVKDSSHQLQJ314 
 
Lewin saidµ,ZRXOGQRWOLNHWRVXJJHVW0RUD\6WHZDUW¶V>VLF@QHZVUHOHDVHcommittee was 
DIRUPDOERG\WKH\PHWLQFRUULGRUVDQGURRPV«¶315 Thus, whilst the group worked 
tirelessly behind the scenes, its presence at MoD was largely unnoticed by those military 
men who did not attend CoS meetings. 
 
The NRG was a significant part of MoDPR organisation towards the end of the war. The 
fact that its formation was only considered during the last month of the war dictated that it 
had limited time in which to truly affect MoD policy. During its tenure its chief purpose 
was to prepare appropriate statements and briefings for the media. This it did with 
efficiency. In addition, the group was closely involved in the construction of casualty 
reporting policy. However, the group suffered from a number of limiting factors such as 
the requirement to have all work approved by Nott. It also received much of its direction 
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from the CoS and its work was restricted, rightly, by military considerations ± particularly 
in the case of the Fitzroy disaster. The fact that much of the military outside the CoS 
meetings was XQDZDUHRIWKHJURXS¶VH[LVWHQFHGLGQRWQHFHVVDULO\OLPLWLWVLQIOXHQFHRQ
the process of releasing news, EXWLWJDYHDQLQGLFDWLRQRIWKHQDWXUHRIWKHJURXS¶V
presence within the overall chain of command. Mercer et al. highlighted that the decision 
to reinstate such an organisation should any future crisis occur, demonstrated that the 
group was clearly regarded as a success.316 However, it could be argued that the late 
formation of the group prohibited it from becoming the successful organisation it had the 
potential to become. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Badsey judged that the difficulties in providing hard news from the Falklands gave greater 
prominence to the story from London.317 Examination of four national newspapers during 
the Falklands revealed that an average of 76% of articles published during the conflict 
originated from Britain.318 Thus, crucial to any study of the role of the media is 
consideration of domestic PR policy adopted by the British Government. A common theme 
presented in this chapter is that the MoD acted too late, in many instances, to form a 
coherent response to the media demands for information and for facilities.  
 
There was a distinct lack of provision made for the media by the MoD throughout the first 
month of the crisis. The most distressing and significant consequence of this was the 
decline in the relationship between the media and MoD. PA felt that µWKHPXWXDOWUXVW
confidence and sense of credibility that existed formerly between the MoD and the media 
KDVEHHQGDPDJHGSRVVLEO\LUUHYRFDEO\¶319 The abandonment of the accepted system of 
unattributable briefings left the media starved of information. The role of the FCO played a 
significant part in persuading the MoD that immediate action over public relations was not 
QHFHVVDU\,WDOVRSURYLGHGDFRPSDULVRQWRZKLFKWKH0R'¶VWUHDWPHQWRIWKHPHGLDFRXOG
be made. The MoD seemed content to leave PR up to the FCO, leaving itself in the 
unenviable situation, in May, of having to scramble to adapt to the altered political and 
military situation. Much of the services the MoD eventually offered were implemented too 
late to be of sufficient effect. Whilst the physical facilities within the MoD met the needs 
of the majority of the media after 2 May, what the media really craved was information. 
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Until unattributable briefings were reinstated on 11 May - and in the case of unattributable 
briefings for regional and foreign correspondents, much later, the media suffered from a 
data deficiency. 
 
The NRG PD\KDYHEHHQWKH0R'¶Vmost successful initiative. However, by the time it 
was brought in, on 18 May - under the initiative, not of the PR Department, but of Lewin - 
the group had little over a month in which to prove its worth. The effectiveness of the 
group was further limited by the restriction that it had to clear all decisions with the 
Secretary of State, and fact that it operated outside of the military system. Even though the 
group boasted among its membership the ACDS, much of the military were oblivious to 
WKHJURXS¶VH[LVWHQFH7KH0R'¶VDGGLWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQLQLWLDWLYHWKH0LOLWDU\%ULHILQJ
Group, was equally tardily implemented. By the time the panel was in place, as with 
unattributable briefings, many journalists had found alternative means of gathering military 
information. 
 
Another theme this chapter makes apparent is that the media itself played a significant part 
in affecting change. The MoD became increasingly aware, at the beginning of May, of the 
importance of positive relations with the media. A barrage of media criticism helped to 
provoke major change in the form of the restoration of unattributable briefings. The 
SUHVVXUHH[HUWHGLQ&RRSHU¶VPHHWLQJVZLWKHGLWRUVKDGQRWHZRUWK\HIIHFW1RWRQO\GLG
such meetings influence the re-establishment of non-attributable briefings, but issues 
relating to correspondents in the South Atlantic were rectified. This was most notably the 
FDVHFRQFHUQLQJWKHµInvincible )LYH¶7KHGLVTXLHWRIHGLWRUVRQ0D\DOVRKHOSed affect 
change in that it made clear to Lewin the gravity of the situation concerning the MoD and 
the media, resulting in the creation of the NRG. However, instead of the relationship 
between the two organisations easing, the EGLWRUV¶Meetings served to demonstrate the 
increasing hostility between the two. Conflict between the MoD and the media escalated at 
the start of May, principally due to mounting criticism of aspects of the media by the 
Government. There is, for example, a direct correlation between increased criticism of the 
media, and a rise in confrontation within meetings between Cooper and the editors.  
 
In many ways, the MoD response to the PR crisis bypassed the regular MODPR 
machinery. The actions of the NRG circumvented the reporting system previously 
implemented. It also bypassed MoDPR, instead, isolating both Taylor and McDonald in its 
PHPEHUVKLS&RRSHU¶V(GLWRUV¶0HHWLQJVQRWRQO\PDGH0R'PR redundant, in that the 
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PUS assumed total responsibility, but it circumvented the D-Notice system of voluntary 
censorship. Instead, the meetings acted as fora at which Cooper could disseminate 
JXLGHOLQHVWRHGLWRUV(GLWRUV¶0HHWLQJVWRDFHUWDLQH[WHQWDOVRWKUHDWHQHGWRPDNHWKH
role of defence correspondents superfluous. Editors were the only media representatives 
who received unattributable briefings throughout the duration of the crisis. Often, 
information was lost in transmission between editors at the briefings, and the defence 
correspondents writing stories.  
 
MoD domestic PR policy might have become more successful if the conflict had been 
prolonged. Towards the end of the war, the ministry had in place facilities and services for 
the media which might have given greater assistance to the reporting of the war had they 
been in place earlier. The Ministry, in June 1982, ironically, had all the pieces in place to 
run an efficient and effective PR policy: unattributable briefings, physical amenities in the 
MoD, a service to educate the media on military aspects of the campaign, a procedure for 
clearing copy and a vehicle to circulate imposed guidelines. By the 14 June the British 
Armed Forces in the South Atlantic had secured a victory. The MoD in Britain lagged 






Government Organisation and Co-ordination 
 
 
On 6 April the regular apparatus of Government reorganised itself in preparation for a 
FRQIOLFWZLWK$UJHQWLQD7KHµ:DU&DELQHW¶DVXE-committee of the Oversea Defence 
Committee was established.1 This chapter addresses the co-ordination and organisation of 
the Government in its effort to address the demand for information, and the desire for 
positive publicity. Inevitably, one of the central features is an appraisal of the organisations 
established solely to trade in media-related work: the Information Group, the South 
Atlantic Presentation Unit and the Parkinson Presentation Group. :KLOVWWKHVHJURXSV¶
existence has attracted recognition among central works, they have not been given detailed 
analysis. This thesis utilises the minutes of the IG, SAPU communication and circulars and 
the records concerning the PPG, as well as testimony from Parkinson himself, to examine 
the groups. It constitutes the first comprehensLYHVWXG\RIWKHJURXSV¶ZRUWKGXULQJWKH
war. It also examines the established groups, departments and persons which affected the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VPHGLDFDPSDLJQVXFKDV7KDWFKHU¶VChief Press Secretary and the Meetings 
of Information Officers.  
 
There has been a consensus among WKRVHDFDGHPLFVFRQFHQWUDWLQJRQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V
information policy during the war that the Government suffered from two fundamental 
hindrances: there was no co-ordination between departments; and there was no overall 
control over media SROLF\0HUFHUHWDOZURWHWKDWµ«LIWKHUHLVRQHSRLQWXSRQZKLFK
people are agreed, it is that Britain did not have an information policy«¶2 Freedman 
judged there was a lack of co-RUGLQDWLRQFODLPLQJWKDWµWKHUHZHUHDQXPEHURI
information poliFLHVLQFLUFXODWLRQDWWKHVDPHWLPH¶3 Finally, Morrison and Tumber 
DVVHUWHGWKDWµ7KHUHZDVVLPSO\QRSROLF\WKDWLVWKHNH\7KHUHZDVQRFHQWUDOL]HGV\VWHP
of control, no coRUGLQDWLRQEHWZHHQGHSDUWPHQWV¶4 This thesis submits that there were 
efforts advanced to ensure a co-ordinated system, for example, through the implementation 
of certain groups. However, these groups transpired to be of limited effect. 
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crisis, the information effort was co-ordinated on a daily basis by the No 10 Press 
2IILFH«¶5 Yet journalists felt that there was no coherent policy towards the media. David 
&KLSSZKHQDVNHGZKRZDVUXQQLQJSROLF\FODLPHGµ)UDQNO\,GRQRWNQRZ«WKHUHZDV
no coQWURORYHUWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVLGH¶6 Peter Preston, Editor of The Guardian, even 
VXJJHVWHGLWZDVµKHOSIXO¶WKDW*RYHUQPHQW'HSDUWPHQWVZHUHXQFR-ordinated because 
µ\RXFRXOGFRPSDUHVRXUFHV¶7 Because of this contradictory view, the role of No.10 has 
been speculated upon, but not confirmed. In addition to the evidence of the HCDC, the fact 




1. Number 10 
Historically, in peacetime, each department in Government was responsible for its own 
publicity and for keeping the public both informed of policy and up to date on relevant 
events. The 3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V2IILFHFDQEURDGO\EHGivided into five departments: The 
3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V3ULYDWH2IILFH7he PrLPH0LQLVWHU¶V3ROLWLFDO2IILFH7KH3UHVV2IILFH
TKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V3ROLF\8QLW3038; A department of a number of free-standing 
advisers.8 7KHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH*RYHUQPHQWDVDZKROHZDVVXSHUYLVHGE\7KDWFKHU¶V
Press Office at No.10.  
 
The Press Office in Downing Street dates back to 1931 - to the appointment of George 
6WHZDUGIRUPHUO\RIWKH)&2¶V1HZV'HSDUWPHQWWRWKHUROHRIµ&KLef Press Liaison 
2IILFHURI+LV0DMHVW\¶V*RYHUQPHQW¶9 During the 1930s, Steward assisted the Prime 
Minister, Neville Chamberlain, in publicising the policy of appeasement.10 Initially, 
Winston Churchill dispensed with the press function at No.10. However, he was later 
GULYHQWRDSSRLQW7KRPDV)LIH&ODUNWRDVLPLODUSRVLWLRQµ$GYLVHURQ3XEOLF5HODWLRQVWR
WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHUDQGWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶ZKLFKZRXOGEHRXWVLGHWKHUHPLWRI1R,Q
1945 Clement Attlee reintroduced the position of Press Secretary to No.10. Martin Burch 
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increasingly drawn into the cabinet system, and centred on WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V2IILFH¶11 
,QFUHDVLQJO\1R¶V3UHVV2IILFHDVVXPHGDFR-ordinating role. Harris wrote that the 
enablement of No.10 to impose its interpretation of events on the press marked the 
centralization of power in Downing Street. This, he claLPHGZDVDµVLJQLILFDQWEORZWRWKH
LQGHSHQGHQFHRIWKH&DELQHW¶12  
 
7KHH[WHQWRIWKH3UHVV2IILFH¶VSRZHUZDVGHSHQGHQWWKURXJKRXWWKH20th Century, on the 
personality of the Chief Press Secretary and his relationship with the Prime Minister.13 
Colin Seymour-Ure argued in his 2003 study on Prime Ministers and the media that the 
importance of the Press Secretary had not necessarily grown in proportion to the size of the 
3UHVV2IILFHµ7KH3UHVV6HFUHWDU\VKLSLWVHOIKDVIOXFWXDWHGLQWKHLPSRUWDQFHSULPH
mLQLVWHUVKDYHDWWDFKHGWRLW¶14 The role, it has been argued by academics such as Burch 
and Holliday and Seymour-Ure, involved four main roles: spokesman, adviser, 
intermediary and co-RUGLQDWRURIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VLQIRUPDWLRQVHUYLFHV15  
 
Perhaps the most IDPRXVRIDOO3UHVV6HFUHWDULHVZDV7KDWFKHU¶V&KLHI6LU%HUQDUG
Ingham. Ingham was the first CPS who himself attracted significant attention from the 
media. A fiery Yorkshireman, he had once been an industrial correspondent for The 
Guardian. He also served stints at both the Yorkshire Post and the Yorkshire Evening Post. 
Ingham is widely held to have been the anonymous, anti-&RQVHUYDWLYHFROXPQLVWµ$OELRQ¶
for the Leeds Weekly Citizen between 1964 and 1967. 16 He was a familiar face, always 
publicly at the side of Thatcher, who enticed comment in press columns and constituted a 
µWDUJHWIRUVQLSHUVLQSDUOLDPHQWDU\TXHVWLRQV¶ 17 When Ingham resigned in 1990 (from 
Head of Government Information Services), he was the only CPS ever to receive serious 
attention. Interest was so great that Robert Harris was moved to write his own biography of 
the CPS, Good and Faithful Servant, in 1990. The following year, Ingham successfully 
published his autobiography.18  
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At the helm of the Press Office in 1982 was the CPS, Ingham, supported by his Deputy 
CPS, Brian Mower (Figure 5.1). As part of the effort to co-ordinate Government 
information, the CPS hosted a weekly meeting of Chief Information Officers from 






Figure 5.1: Organisation of No.10 Press Office and its interaction with other groups20 
 
At the second meeting of the OD(SA) LWZDVGHFLGHGWKDWWKH&36VKRXOGRYHUVHHµthe 
HVWDEOLVKPHQWRIPDFKLQHU\IRUWKHµFHQWUDl control of public information«¶21 It was 
understood that responsibility for any endeavour concerning Government information was 
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1a. The Power of Number 10  
There were three reasons why the Press Office at No.10 was, typically, more influential 
than any other press or public relations department. Firstly, the unique role of the CPS 
HQVXUHGWKDWWKH3UHPLHU¶VGDLO\LQIRUPDWLRQRQPDWWHUVUHODWLQJWRWKHPHGLDFDPHDOPRVW
exclusively from her own Press Office. Secondly, the Lobby system in place in Britain 
warranted an unprecedented relationship between correspondents and the CPS.  Finally, 
since its appointment in 1931, the No.10 Press Office had routinely been the co-ordinating 
force of the GoverQPHQW¶VSXEOLFLW\HIIRUWThroughout the war, Ingham exerted his 
authority over various aspects involving the media: from attempting to secure more 
journalist places with the Fleet, to controlling when information was released. However, 
the influence which he was accustomed to exercising over other PR departments was 
challenged by the MoD, which was in command of the main thrust of Government PR. No 
longer was Ingham the outright leader of the information effort. 
 
1a (i). Institutionalised Power and Access to the Prime Minister 
The CPS enjoyed benefits which the Chiefs of other departments did not.24 Ingham wrote 
WKDWD&36µFDQUHOLJLRXVO\UHDG&DELQHWSDSHUVDQGPLQXWHVWKHPDLQSROLF\DQGDFWLRQ
WHOHJUDPVVHQWRXWDQGUHFHLYHGE\WKH)&2WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶VFRUUHVSRQGHQFHLQWHUQDO
Number 10 briefing papers, and bury himself deep in his Prime MiQLVWHU¶VPLQGE\
DWWHQGLQJORWVRIKHUPHHWLQJV¶25 More important than having increased access to 
information from all areas of Government, Ingham had the ear of the Prime Minister. 
Thatcher and Ingham had a productive and close relationship. Thatcher recognised that the 
SDLUZHUHVLPLODULQDWWLWXGH6KHRQFHUHPDUNHGµ7KHWKLQJDERXWXV%HUQDUGLVWKDW
QHLWKHURIXVDUHVPRRWKSHRSOH¶26 Ingham utilised his position. Harris¶VELRJUDSK\RI
Ingham KLJKOLJKWHGµ«LQDQ\GLVSXWHKHDOZD\VKDVDWKLVGLVSRVDl the ultimate deterrent: 
WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶27  
 
As a matter of routine, Ingham provided for Thatcher a daily press digest. Every morning, 
EHIRUH,QJKDP¶VGMT appointment to brief Lobby correspondents, Ingham would 
scour the newspapers and produce a summary for use by the Prime Minister.  This 
procedure was maintained during the War and was heavily weighted towards consideration 
of the crisis. The day after the recapture of South Georgia, Ingham reassured Thatcher that: 
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µ7UHDWPHQWLVDOPRVWHQWLUHO\WUiumphant with the Mirror, Guardian and and [sic] FT least 
HXSKRULFWRYDU\LQJGHJUHHV¶28 The digests also informed Thatcher what rumours were 
circulating and of the general mood. On 15 April Ingham wrote to Thatcher to inform her 
RIWKHµQHDUXQDQLPLW\¶Rf Parliament the papers were reporting.29 On 13 May he cautioned 
Thatcher that some members of the media - SDUWLFXODUO\WKHµSRSXODUV¶- felt there was µa 
VPHOORI0XQLFKLQWKHDLU¶30  
 
In addition to this, Ingham also took the lead in briefing Thatcher for some of her most 
famous interviews. For example, her interview with Glynn Mathias of ITN on 5 April and 
with Robert Kee for Panorama on 26 April.31 )XUWKHUWR,QJKDP¶VGLUHFWEULHILQJs, other 
areas of No.10 also deferred to Ingham. On the day of the Panorama interview the head of 
the PULPH0LQLVWHU¶V3ROLF\8QLW (PMPU), John Hoskyns, wrote to Ingham in order to 
convey the line which should be adopted during the interview.32 Ingham was also 
personally briefed by other departments. On 27 April, the FCO sent a briefing to Ingham 
on what information Anthony Parsons, British Ambassador to the UN, would like to be 
made available to the media.33 Other departments clearly acknowledged the authority of 
the Press Office: on 30 April a memo was sent to MoD staff ouWOLQLQJWKDW1R¶VSUHVV
department should be informed of any event as a matter of priority.34 
 
During the first weekend of the crisis, the power of Ingham was first exerted on the MoD. 
Nott wrote that the Friday witnessed WKHILUVWµVSDW¶EHWZHHQ0R'DQG No.10.35 After the 
announcement of the Task Force, the MoD was beseeched with requests. When it became 
clear that only a very small number of journalists would be accepted aboard, media 
organisations set about the petitioning of a higher authority - Downing Street. ITV stated 
that: 
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impression that events moved very quickly after that.36 
 
Hitchen was provoked to write directly to the Prime Minister, after representatives of 
MoDPR failed to assist him. He wrote:  
 
I believe that you will be horrified to learn that the Daily Star and three other British national daily 
QHZVSDSHUV«KDYHEHHQH[FOXGHGIURPVDLOLQJZLWKWKHQDYDO7DVN)RUFHRQWKHOXGLFURXVJURXQGV
that there is not enough room aboard the ships.37 
 
He went onµ3OHDVHKHOSXVWREHWKHUHZKHQ%ULWDLQ¶VSULGHLVUHVWRUHGE\WKHDUPHGPLJKW
which you promised tKHQDWLRQ2QO\\RXFDQJLYHWKHRUGHU«¶38 Hitchen later claimed: 
µ+DGLWQRWEHHQIRUWKHGLUHFWLQWHUYHQWLRQRIWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU«half the British Press 
would have been waving the Task Force goodbye from the quay-VLGH¶39  
 
Ingham spent most of the weekend fielding calls, but by Sunday, the whole weight of press 
disappointment fell on Downing Street.40 As a result, Ingham, without first consulting Mrs 
Thatcher, took it upon himself to contact the MoD directly. Ingham commented: 
 
I made it clear to the Ministry of Defence that we must have journalists on board. Having got the 
principle accepted, I then negotiated up the numbers, recognizing that there would be hell to pay if 
one newspaper group was put at a disadvantage...41 
 
The MoD later denied Ingham¶VLQIOuence in securing places for journalists. Cooper said: 
µWhen the nominations looked to us rather odd, it was we who increased them, not under 
SUHVVXUHIURPQXPEHU«and we then went up to the figure of 29...¶42 Nott said that 
µHGLWRUVPDGHWKHLUSURWests WR%HUQDUG,QJKDP«who sounded off loudly at such a paltry 
QXPEHU¶43 He went on: µI had a disagreement with the Navy, but I called rank and insisted 
that the key television channeOVDQGQHZVSDSHUVZHUHLQFOXGHG¶44 
 
Mercer et al. brought some clarity to the dispute which emerged over whether Nott or 
,QJKDPKDGJLYHQWKHRUGHUWRLQFUHDVHQXPEHUVµ1RWWKDGDOUHDG\LVVXHGWKHVDPHRUGHU
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commentators have subscribed to the view that Ingham was behind the increase in 
journalists.46 Yet, this example was to mark merely the start of a succession of incidents in 
which Ingham flexed his muscles.  
 
Ingham prevailed upon the MoD to, firstly, speed the departure of Taylor from the 
Department of Health when the crisis broke, and secondly, to install Taylor with full 
responsibility for Falklands-related policy. Ingham had helped Taylor secure the role of 
CPR the previous year. It was recorded that: µMr Ingham thinks that Mr Taylor would be 
an excellent candidate on level transfer for the post of Chief of Public Relations in 
Ministry of Defence which will be vacant at the end of the year«¶47 
 
When the crisis broke on 2 April, Ingham compelled the Department of Health and the 
MoD to facilitate the transfer of Taylor. On 13 April, Taylor was inducted into his new 
UROH,QJKDPUHFROOHFWHGµ,SUHYDLOHGXSRQWKHV\VWHPWRPRYH1HYLOOHWRWKH0R'«RQO\
WRILQGWKDW«a letter awaited him saying that he was in charge of everything but the 
)DONODQGV¶48 When Ingham was asked whether he had played a significant role in pressing 
MoD to award Taylor charge of Falklands PR, he confirmed he had.49 Taylor was given 
authority over Falklands PR on 18 May. The relationship between Ingham and Taylor 
benefited both. When the first pictures of the recapture of South Georgia were received at 
the MoD, Taylor sent them direct to No.10 with a handwritten note.50  
 
Ingham was forced to field media complaints against the MoD during the Falklands. He 
DOVRIRXQGWKDWKHµZDVJHWWLQJ an enormous amount of flak¶ which ought to be directed at 
MoDPR.51 He often had to relate to the IG what media complaints were being made at any 
time.52 2QHRIWKHSULQFLSDOFRPSODLQWVFRQFHUQHGWKH0R'¶VDEDQGRQPHQWRIQRQ-
attributable briefing.53 Harris claimed Cooper hDGDLPHGWRµQHXWUDOL]H,QJKDP¶54 
However, Ingham continued to give off-the-record briefings to journalists µEHFDXVHKH
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)UDQN¶VREMHFWLYHKDGEHHQWRneutralize me, this move served only to increase my 
LPSRUWDQFHWRMRXUQDOLVWVVLQFH,ZDVDWOHDVWIXQFWLRQLQJ¶56 Some have argued that Ingham 
was responsible for the commencement of 0R'¶Vunattributable briefings in May. 
Hastings and Jenkins maintained briefings were µresumed under pressure from the 
'RZQLQJ6WUHHWSUHVVRIILFHU«¶57 Cockerell et al. MXGJHGWKDW,QJKDP¶VLQIOXHQFHKDG
secured the return of non-DWWULEXWDEOHEULHILQJVWDWLQJWKDWµ1XPEHU7HQVXFFHHGHGLQ
UHYHUVLQJ0U0DF'RQDOG¶V>VLF@GHFLVLRQ¶58 The HCDC sat firmly on the fence when 
ascertaining Ingham¶V effect:  
 
It is less clear whether Mr. Ingham influenced the decision to resume off the record briefings 
although he clearly took the view that not to have held then was a mistake insofar as when there is 
a crisis, the last thing to do was to withdraw service from the media.59 
 
The power of Ingham is perhaps best observed in the creation of the PPG during the war. 
Frustration with the increased hostility between the MoD and No.10 Press Office provoked 
Ingham to address the issue of Government presentation directly with Thatcher. Parkinson 
himself felt that the group had been established to ease the rift between departments, and 
FODLPHGLWZDVHVWDEOLVKHGDWWKHEHTXHVWRI,QJKDPZKRZDVµWKHIDWKHURIWKHLGHD¶WKH
PPG is discussed later in this chapter).60 
 
1a (ii). The Lobby System: tKHµ,QJKDP+DOOHOXMDK&KRUXV¶ 
It was not only over the MoD that Ingham had the opportunity to exert authority. The 
accepted process of parliamentary briefing also served to allow the CPS a degree of control 
over the news generated by the conflict. The main channel through which the CPS and his 
equivalent numbers in other departments released information was through the 
Parliamentary Lobby.61  
 
The Lobby system is peculiar to Britain. In 1828 Parliament was opened to the reporting of 
the press. In 1886 the Lobby was formed.62 In the 1930s the first Press Secretary, George 
6WHZDUGVWDUWHGDVHULHVRIXQDWWULEXWDEOHSUHVV/REELHVµZKLFKZLWKRII-the-record 
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The Lobby system has developed as a way for Government to disseminate information it 
wants to be publicised. It is, in short, an instrument for the political control of the news 
agenda. It has been heavily criticised for its secretive nature and for increasing the danger 
of collusion between Government and journalists.64 The rules from which Lobby 
journalists operated were established after the Second World War.65 In 1982, the 
fouQGDWLRQVGHYHORSHGE\6WHZDUGLQWKHµVKDGEHHQEXLOWXSRQWRIRUPDV\VWHPE\
which Lobby correspondents were almost dependent on the daily 11am briefing by the 
CPS at Downing Street and 4pm briefing at the House of Commons.66 Cockerell et al. 
argued thDWWKH/REE\V\VWHPZDVWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶VµPRVWXVHIXOWRROIRUWKHSROLWLFDO
PDQDJHPHQWRIWKHQHZV¶67 7KHSROLWLFDOFRPPHQWDWRU$QGUHZ0DUUGHFODUHGWKDWµD
single private daily channel of communication between the most powerful figure in the 
country and every significant media outlet is an e[WUDRUGLQDULO\SRZHUIXOZHDSRQ¶68 
 
During the war, the Lobby system served to ensure Ingham retained superiority over 
MoDPR. The morning Lobby briefing by the CPS took place at Downing Street. In the 
Falklands this had a direct impact on the amount of journalists who attended MoD 
briefings. There was rarely time for correspondents to aWWHQG,QJKDP¶VEULHILQJDW
1100GMT, and then hot-foot it to the MoD for WKHµR¶FORFNIROO\¶. Since Ingham 
continued to brief unattributably, the benefits of attending his briefing often outweighed 
attending that of the MoD.69 A considerable drawback of the Lobby was that foreign 
journalists were inadequately catered for. Washington Post journalist, Leonard Downie, 
called the Lobby s\VWHPµLQVLGLRXV¶DQGXVHGKLVH[SHULHQFHGXULQJWKH)DONODQGVFULVLVWR
GHPRQVWUDWHKRZWKHV\VWHPµHQDEOHVWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWWRPDQDJHPXFKRIZKDWLV
UHSRUWHGE\WKHQDWLRQDOQHZVSDSHUVDQGWHOHYLVLRQDQGUDGLRQHWZRUNV¶70 During the 
Falklands crisis, the Lobby often worked in reverse and served to confirm rumour. One 
example of this was on 29 March. After journalists witnessed the departure of Superb from 
Gibraltar, colleagues in the Lobby were told that submarines were being dispatched 
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south.71 This confirmation resulted in the inaccurate reporting that Superb was headed for 
South Georgia.72 
 
The Lobby system allowed Ingham to control information disseminated to the media. It 
pitted the Press Office of No.10 directly against its equivalent at MoD. There were 
LQVWDQFHVZKHQ,QJKDP¶VEULHILQJRIWKH/REE\DSSHDUHGWRUHODWHLQIRUPDWLRQQRW\HW
imparted from MoD. On 16 April the CoS heard that, while the MoD had tried to minimise 
WKHµFULVLVDWPRVSKHUH¶1RKDGµSOD\HGXS¶VRPHaction.73 Many correspondents, after 
the war, identified that they were either better supported by Downing Street, or gained 
more information from it. Hastings claimed: µ'RZQLQJ6WUHHWSUHVVRIILFHUVZHUHJLYLQJ
better guidance to parliamentary correspondents than the Ministry of Defence was giving 
WRGHIHQFHFRUUHVSRQGHQWV¶74 The Defence Correspondent of The Sunday Times recalled 
that his two main sources were No.10 and the House.75 Further, the Daily Express felt 
µ«VLPLODUEULHILQJVEHLQJKHOGDW1XPEHUZHUHSURducing information which the 
0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFHZRXOGQRWFRQILUPRUGHQ\¶76  
 
Mercer et al. claimed there were two examples of when No.10 publicised information 
ahead of MoD.77 The HCDC found: µ,QWZRSDUWLFXODULQVWDQFHVWKHUHKDYHEHHQVSHFLILF
allegations that the Press Office at No.10 was giving a different version of events from that 
SXWRXWE\WKH0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFH¶78 Other historians and commentators such as 
Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, and Hudson and Stanier have reinforced this 
approach.79 The ILUVWH[DPSOHUHODWHGWR1R¶VEULHILQJRIjournalists on 24 May about 
the speed with which the initial landings were to be followed.  What was inferred by 
,QJKDP¶V FULWLFVZDV1Rµwanted the news spread that the attack was imminent, 
whereas the Ministry of Defence wanted to give the impression that there was a difficult 
build-XSWREHDFKLHYHGEHIRUHWKDWDGYDQFHFRXOGJRIRUZDUG«¶80 Ingham is accused of 
WHOOLQJMRXUQDOLVWVRQ0D\WKDW%ULWLVKWURRSVPLJKWEHLQ6WDQOH\µZLWKLQDIHZGD\V¶81 
This contrasted with the official MoD line. Nott told the Commons on 24 May that 
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µ«there can be no question of pressing the force commander to move forward 
SUHPDWXUHO\«¶82 Remarks on 24 May caused speculation over Goose Green as a possible 
battle site, since it was the closest strategic target to the landing site at San Carlos.  
 
This thesis dispels some of the confusion surrounding this event in order to suggest that 
No.10 was innocent of providing contradictory information to that which MoD had 
released. IQJKDP¶VLQLWLDOEULHILQJZDVDFWXDOO\KHOGRQ0D\83 Earlier that day 
newspapers carried headlines publicising the speed at which British troops were moving.84 
The information gleaned for these stories came from two sources ± neither of which were 
based at No.10. On 22 May Lewin gave a briefing to defence correspondents. He told 
WKHPµ:HDUHJRLQJWRPRYH± DQGPRYHIDVW¶85 The Observer UHSRUWHG/HZLQ¶V
comment, but also pointed out that Nott, at an MoD Briefing the previous day had µVDLG
that his assessmHQWZDVWKDW3RUW6WDQOH\FRXOGKROGRXWIRUPRUHWKDQDIHZGD\V¶86  
 
As a result of the ministry briefing held on 22 May, the major Sunday newspapers carried 
reports of troops on the islands. The Sunday Express reported troops were staging a 
µdetermined follow-up to a landing already seen as a shattering tactical victory...¶87 At the 
briefing Nott informed journalists: µYou can expect us to be very active in the next few 
GD\V¶88 Thus, on 22 May, before Ingham had actually briefed Lobby correspondents on the 
British intention to move swiftly, the MoD itself had made clear that action would be 
prompt.  
 
The second accusation levelled at No.10 was that casualty figures relating to the tragedy at 
Fitzroy were released, against the wishes of the MoD. Nott reflected WKDWµZHKDGD
FRQVWDQWSUREOHPWU\LQJWRSUHYHQW,QJKDP«IURPDGGLQJKLVODUJHO\XQLQIRUPHGRSLQLRQ
WRWKH1RVSLQ¶89 Mercer et al. judged that the attack on Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram 
µsparked the clearest failure of PR co-ordination within the government«¶90 As discussed 
in Chapter Four, the MoD sought to defer the release of figures in order to persuade the 
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Argentines the British had sustained heavier losses, encouraging them to relax defences. 
Hudson and Stanier claimed that Ingham publicised the figures in defiance of MoD.91 
Freedman and Gamba-6WRQHKRXVHMXGJHGWKDW,QJKDPDQQRXQFHGDQµDOPRVWFRUUHFW
ILJXUH¶LQRUGHUWRSUHVHUYH%ULWLVKPRUDOH, which was beginning to be affected by 
speculation.92 Adams DOVRIHOWWKDW,QJKDP¶VDQQRXQFHPHQWZDVGULYHQE\SROLWLFDO
motives.93 7KH0R'ODWHUFODLPHG1R¶VSUHPDWXUHGLVFORVXUHRIFDVXDOW\GDWD
demonstrated its ignorance of military considerations.94 The attack on the landing vessels 
took place on 8 June.95 Despite reports in British newspapers and from Reuters suggesting 
a death-toll of between 500 and 900, Nott refused to announce accurate information. He 
told the Commons on 10 June: µ,DPQRWSUHSDUHGDWWKLVVWDJHWRJLYHWKe total numbers of 
our casualties, and to do so could be of assistance to the enemy and put our men at greater 
ULVN¶96 
 
The MoD received precise casualty information on 9 June. The Prime Minister was 
notified - her Press Secretary was not. Ingham suggested that had he been kept up-to-date 
ZLWKWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRI0R'KHµPLJKWQRWKDYHGLVFXVVHGQXPEHUVRIFDVXDOWLHVZLWK
MRXUQDOLVWV¶97 One MoD Official saidµ:HKDGQRWDOHUWHG%HUQDUG«7KHUHZDVMXVWD
IDLOXUHDKXJHIDLOXUHRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQV¶98 On 11 June Ingham met with Lobby 
correspondents. Top of the agenda for correspondents was to unearth information on 
casualty figures. That morning The Sun had publLVKHGDOHDGDUWLFOHHQWLWOHGµ'($'¶99 
,QJKDPWROGFRUUHVSRQGHQWVKHµKRSHGWKDWILJXUHZRXOGSURYHWREHH[DJJHUDWHG¶100 He 
later consideredµ7KLVZDVWKHRQHRFFDVLRQWKDW,FDQUHFDOOZKHQ,GLGQRWJHWWKH
PHVVDJHHDUO\HQRXJK¶101 Taylor told the HCDC: µ%OXII&RYHEHFDPHWKHVXEMHFWRISUHWty 
KHDWHGGLVFXVVLRQEHWZHHQ%HUQDUG,QJKDPDQGP\VHOI«DQGLWEHFDPHREYLRXVLQWDONLQJ
WR%HUQDUG,QJKDPWKDWKHKDGQRWJLYHQWKHILJXUHV«¶102 Some actually suggested the 
MoD, rather than No.10, was responsible for leaking the figures.103 Newspapers also 
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reported the rift between the two departments.104 Instead of proving that No.10 played fast 
and loose with information pertaining to casualties, what analysis of the event highlighted 
was the remarkable lack of co-ordination between No.10 and the MoD. 
 
1a (iii). The Co-RUGLQDWLQJ5ROHRI1R¶V3UHVV2IILFH 
The Press Office at No.10 performed the regular responsibility of co-ordinating the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VLQIRUPDWLRQHIIRUW$VSDUWRIWKHMREGHVFULSWLRQRICPS, Ingham said he 
was responsible for co-ordination RIWKHµSUHVHQWDWLRQRI*RYHUQPHQWSROLF\DQG
PHDVXUHV¶105 There were two ways in which No.10 maintained its authority and oversaw 
the co-ordination and smooth running of Government information policy: the personal 
position of Ingham lent the position of CPS more authority which he was able to exercise 
over other Government Departments and their representatives; and the Meetings of 
Information Officers allowed the CPS and his office to fully co-ordinate the key 
Government deSDUWPHQWV¶LQIRUPDWLRQHIIRUWV106 
 
The chief vehicle by which the Press Secretary would drive this direction of central policy 
was the MIOs.107 Burch and Holliday judged that the central function of these meetings 
ZDVWRµFRRUGLQDWHWKHPDQDJHPHQWRIJRYHUQPHQWSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶.108 The group typically 
met every Monday. Its principal membership was made up of the Chief of each 
*RYHUQPHQW0LQLVWU\¶VSUHVVGHSDUWPHQW109 Ingham, as CPS, would chair the meetings, set 
the agenda and ensure decisions were followed through. The MIOs were operational before 
Ingham assumed his position as CPS. Ingham utilised the existing format and structure of 
PHHWLQJVWRGHYHORSWKH0,2VLQWRµDFOHDULQJ-house controlling and co-ordinating all 
LQIRUPDWLRQIORZLQJIURPJRYHUQPHQWWRWKHRXWVLGHZRUOG¶110 The control which 
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1b. The Co-ordinating Role of Number 10 during the Falklands 
7KHUROHRI1R¶V3UHVV2IILFHDQd the individual role of Ingham attracted attention, 
particularly at the inquiry of the HCDC. One of the main reasons attention was so rife was 
due to the conflicting evidence of the MoD and No.10. Cockerel et al. considered that this 
FRQIOLFWµPLUURUHGWKHFRQWradictory stories that were put out by the two sides«' 112 The 
VXEMHFWRI1R¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQRYHUDOO35SROLF\KDVHQWLFHGFRPPHQWIURPPRVW
authors, but no comprehensive study of its co-ordinating function has been offered.113 The 
focus of this examination is centred on the MIOs and the newly formed Information 
Group, as well as the relationship between MoDPR and No.10. 
 
1b (i). Meetings of Information Officers  
During the war, MIOs were of limited significance to the presentation of the war effort for 
two reasons: the IG was established by Ingham at the start of the war which assumed much 
of the co-RUGLQDWLQJWDVNVIURP0,2VDQGWKHPHHWLQJV¶DWWHQGDQFHZDVHUUDWLFDQG
loyalties divided.  
 
The IG was formed in response to direction from the OD(SA). It was suggested that the 
CPS might form a sub-committee of the MIO.114 The first IG was held on 8 April. Its 
membership was formed from six departments of Government: No.10, COI, FCO, the 
&DELQHW2IILFH02'DQG&KDQFHOORURIWKH'XFK\¶V2IILFH115 The SAPU was also 
represented at the IG (the SAPU is discussed later in this chapter). The most important 
impact the group had on the MIOs was that it removed the key players and isolated the 
topic of the Falklands. This is not to suggest that the MIOs were devoid of Falklands-
related debate. Indeed, the Falklands appeared on the agenda of every MIO during the war. 
It did not, however, always appear at the top of the agenda.116 Other issues demanded the 
attention of the MIOs such as the Middle East, the European Community, the Northern 
Ireland Bill, Parliament and the economy. Yet despite the MIOs¶ distance from the co-
ordination of the presentation of the Falklands, there was evidence to demonstrate its usual 
co-ordinating role on 19 April. Ingham led a call for the handling of the media in the crisis 
to be examined. The MoD was invited to produce, for discussion at a special meeting of 
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the MIO after the crisis, a paper which would outline emergency procedures for handling 
the media in a future military situation.117  
 
Another limiting factor which obstructed the efficiency of the MIO during the conflict was 
attendance. Ingham viewed his position as CPS, in relation to the department heads of 
information, as mirroring the position of the Prime Minister to his or her ministers.118 
However, Cockerell et al. pointed out that MIOs were often disunited; that loyalties tended 
to go individual ministers or departments. 119  This was certainly the case for specific 
departments. Of those six departments represented at the IG, only No.10, the FCO, the 
0R'DQGWKH&2,¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVZHUHUHJXODUDWWHQGHHVRIWKH0,2 120 The FCO, MoD 
and Central Office of Information (CoI) maintained a presence at the MIO to varying 
degrees. The Director General of the COI, John Groves, attended both MIO and IG 
meetings. Head of the FCO News Department, Fenn, did not attend any MIOs. Instead, 
Deputy Head, Westbrook, was present at four of eight meetings convened during the war. 
Taylor, as CPR, attended three of eight meetings - two of those took place when he was not 
responsible for Falklands presentation. For half the MIOs, there was no representative at 
all from the MoD. On two occasions, the absence of the MoD was specifically commented 
XSRQ,QJKDPRQ0D\µH[SUHVVHGWKHKRSHWKDWWKH\[MoD] would make every effort 
WREHUHSUHVHQWHGDWWKHKLJKHVWSRVVLEOHOHYHOLQIXWXUH¶121 The next week it was noted that 
µ
WKHPHHWLQJZRXOGKDYHZHOFRPHGDQRSSRUWXQLW\WREHEURXJKWXS-to-date on the 
PLOLWDU\VLWXDWLRQLQWKH)DONODQGV¶122 
 
The regular machinery for co-ordinating Government information was surpassed by the 
creation of a Falklands-specific sub-committee ± the IG. The benefits of Falklands-related 
discussion being largely removed from MIOs implied attendees of the meetings would be 
free to concentrate on other pressing issues. The lack of representation by senior figures 
from key departments during the war confirmed the meetings as a peripheral to the 
information effort in the war. However, the lack of attendance by MoD representatives 
marked more than just a belief that MIOs were superfluous - it also exemplified a rift 
between the Chair, Ingham, and the upper echelons of the MoD. 
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1b (ii). Co-ordination between No.10 and the MoD 
7KH+&'&FODLPHGWKDWDµVXEVWDQWLDO¶VRXUFHRIconcern was tKHµVWDWHRIFRRUGLQDWLRQ
EHWZHHQWKH0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFHDQG1R«¶123 Nott later said the MoD entirely 
FRQFXUUHGZLWKWKH&RPPLWWHH¶VDGYLFH µWKDW1R10 and the Ministry of Defence should 
RSHUDWH³LQWKHFORVHVWFRQMXQFWLRQ´«¶124 During the HCDC autopsy of WKH0R'¶V
handling of the media, representatives of the MoD denied that No.10 had a significant co-
ordinating role. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that Nott and Cooper purposefully 
rejected any organisation which would involve Ingham. Nott wrote: µ)Uank and I were 
determined to keep the press«as far as possible, away from No.10, with its obsession for 
EDFNJURXQGEULHILQJDQGIRUVSLQ¶125 Cooper reflected:  
 
I am sure that Number 10 has got to have a general co-ordinating function but it is a light one. It is 
not, in my view, a heavy one, because there is no way, when you are dealing with military matters, 
that whoever is in Number 10, however good he is, can ask the right questions.126 
 
The key issue which prevented No.10 from assuming its regular occupation was that most 
news, certainly after 30 April, was dealt with solely by MoD. Nott maintained: µNumber 10 
could not have taken charge oIWKLVWKLQJDQGUXQWKHWKLQJ¶- µ1XPEHUGLGQRWFR-
RUGLQDWH¶.127 However, Ingham, told the HCDC No.10 had performed a co-ordinating role 
µDWRIILFLDOOHYHO¶DQGargued the IG was pivotal.128 Matters were exasperated by Ingham¶V
suggestion that Cooper had not been properly briefed about the situation.129 Cooper 
responded: µ,KDYHQRWEHHQEULHIHG«because I do not require briefing on a subject of this 
kind ± certainly not from within my own Department or, indeed, from any other 
'HSDUWPHQW¶130  
 
There was speculation, during and after the war, that one reason Taylor was not 
immediately appointed charge of Falklands-related PR was because Cooper wanted to curb 
,QJKDP¶Vpotential influence.131 As previously discussed, Ingham played a prominent role 
in having Taylor appointed to the MoD. Cooper had been wary of Ingham before the war. 
,QJKDPIHOWWKLVZDVGXHWRµDQXQKHDOWK\UHVSHFWIRUP\DOOHJHGFDSDELOLWLHV«¶132 Both 
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Cooper and Ingham maintained close and separate relationships with Thatcher. There is the 
GLVWLQFWSRVVLELOLW\WKHSDLU¶VGLVOLNHIRURQHDQRWKHUPD\KDYHVWHPPHGIURPDPLVJXLGHG
sense of competition in this respect.133 Certainly Ingham felt that Cooper viewed him as his 
µFRPSHWLWRU¶134 TKHPRVWVLJQLILFDQWZD\LQZKLFK&RRSHUDIIHFWHG1R¶VFR-ordination 
of Government information was to deny McDonald from attending meetings of the IG. 
This dictated that the group was starved of MoD contribution.  
 
There was undoubtedly a degree of rivalry between the two departments ± personal and 
professional. Professionally, the MoD, arguably, resented the perceived need to have the 
information effort ± which was principally concerning information emanating from that 
ministry ± co-ordinated by an external department. Beyond that, those in the higher strata 
of the MoD ± the Secretary of the State and the PUS ± had a personal, and reciprocal, 
hostility towards the CPS.  
 
1c. The Information Group  
The Information Group, as mentioned, was established on 8 April.135 The group met 
sporadically throughout the conflict. Ingham told the HCDC that the group met 53 times 
between 8 April and 25 June.136 The minutes of the group recorded meetings until 22 
June.137 A total of 49 meetings were documented. There is no documentary evidence 
available to suggest the figure of 53 meetings was accurate. Forty three of the 49 meetings 
took place during the war. Initially, the group was to meet weekly, but it was agreed tri-
weekly meetings would be more effective.138 Later, Ingham convened meetings depending 
on events. For four weeks during the crisis the group met daily.139 In the first month of the 
crisis, the group met 12 times.140 Meetings of the IG were held LQ,QJKDP¶VRffice at 
1000GMT. 
 
The role of the group has been cautiously explored by a minority of works. Documentation 
pertaining to the group was never submitted to the HCDC. The IG was a sub-committee 
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under the jurisdiction of the Cabinet Office and under the leadership of Ingham. Perhaps 
the most obvious candidates to have explored the group in their work have done so. The 
Official History LQFOXGHGDVXPPDU\RIWKHJURXS¶VUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVEXWRIIHUHG no analysis 
as to its significance or productivity.141 +DUULVLQFOXGHGDSDUDJUDSKRQ,QJKDP¶V
chairmanship in his biography on Ingham. He suggested the construction of the group was 
DµSOR\¶WRµUXQWKHHQWLUHLQIRUPDWLRQHIIRUWIURP1XPEHU¶142 Mercer et al. argued that 
DWWHQGDQFHRIWKH0R'ZDVGLUHFWO\OLQNHGWRWKH0LQLVWU\¶VDWWHPSWVWRGHPRQVWUDWHLWV
independence from No.10.143 
 
Attendance was undoubtedly a significant issue, and one which will be explored further. 
However, other issues also affected WKHJURXS¶VFDSDELOLWLHV&RRSHUGHVFULEHGWKHJURXSDV
DµWRXFKLQJKDQGVH[HUFLVH¶,WZDVH[DFWO\WKDW7KH,*DFWHGDVDQLQIRUPDWLRQH[FKDQJH
between the departments most involved with the Falklands crisis. What increased the 
JURXS¶VLPSRUWDQFHZDVWKH IDFWWKDWLWZDVWKHµPDLQLQVWUXPHQWRIFR-RUGLQDWLRQ¶144 
There were, however, additional drawbacks to the group ± it was mostly reactive in nature 
and some of its responsibilities clashed with those of the SAPU. This thesis examines the 
significance of the group, in terms of how effectively it co-ordinated information, and its 
VKRUWFRPLQJV,WRIIHUVWKHRQO\FRPSUHKHQVLYHVFUXWLQ\RIWKHJURXS¶VLPSRUWDQFHWRWKH
Government PR effort. 
 
1c (i).  Attendance 
The subject which has invited the most comment in the literature is WKHJURXS¶V attendance. 
Firstly, because the meetings started at 1000GMT, Ingham was unable to observe the 
OD(SA). It also meant that there was no ministerial involvement in the group, since the 
relevant ministers belonged to the War Cabinet.145 Representatives from the COI, FCO, 
No.10, MoD and Cabinet Office were required to attend. From 16 April, members of the 
SAPU were included in meetings. After 18 May, so too were representatives of the 
&KDQFHOORURIWKH'XFK\RI/DQFDVWHU¶V2IILFH ± DPRYHZKLFKGHQRWHG&HFLO3DUNLQVRQ¶V
perceived role in Government PR.146  
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Harris claimed Cooper instructed McDonald - the only IO who attended CoS meetings - 
not to attend the IG. Consequentially, µ,QJKDP¶V³FR-RUGLQDWLQJFRPPLWWHH´ZDVOHIWZLWK
little to co-RUGLQDWH¶147 Things were not so simple. Ingham had his own access to 
information from the War Cabinet through Robert Armstrong (its Secretary) and Thatcher 
herself. Ingham claimed that the representatives the MoD sent to IG µhad been denied 
briefing¶148 The issue was not that information from the CoS was denied to the group - 
rather, that any member of the MoD with an up-to-date knowledge of MoD PR strategy 
was denied to the group. Conversely, &RRSHUWROGWKH+&'&µ:HQRUPDOO\VHQWWKH&KLHI
Press OfILFHUVRPHWLPHVWKH&35RFFDVLRQDOO\DFWLQJ&35«¶149 In fact, Taylor only 
attended the IG once. McDonald stopped participation altogether after 11 May. However, 
before then, he had attended eight of 20 possible assemblies. There is little evidence why 
McDonald ceased attending. One could speculate that it might concern the pressure 
Ingham placed on the MoD to re-instate unattributable briefing.150 However, if the absence 
of McDonald from this point on was protest, then it is curious that Taylor should make his 
only appearance on 16 May.151  
 
Unquestionably, from 11 May onwards, the MoD sent increasingly junior representatives 
to the IG.152 Of all departments represented, MoD had the greatest variation of personnel in 
attendance ± there was simply no consistency. Representatives of the MoD included Jack 
Gee (Chief Press Officer) and junior Press Officers.153 The major problem was that POs 
were poorly briefed. As discussed in Chapter Two, the role of MoDPR POs was limited by 
a lack of information. MoD representation compared poorly with that of other departments. 
Chiefly, Fenn, attended the IG. Westbrook was also a regular. On two occasions alternative 
FCO staff attended.154 The most frequent representation of the COI was provided by 
Groves.155 Thus, excluding the MoD, the backbone of the group - the COI, FCO and 
Cabinet Office - all sent predominantly high-ranking personnel.  
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1c (ii). Singing from the Same Hymn Sheet 
The decreasing attendance of senior MoD delegates at the meetings of the IG dictated the 
effectiveness of the group diminished. The principal role of the group was to act as a 
conference at which all information which might affect Government image could be 





make recommendations about the action required.156 
 
No.10 performed its co-ordinating function by using the meetings of the IG to make sure 
WKDWHDFKRIWKHPRVWVLJQLILFDQWGHSDUWPHQWVWRWKHFULVLVZHUHµVLQJLQJIURPWKHVDPH
VRQJVKHHW¶157 On 8 April, at the first meeting of the group, both MoD and FCO agreed to 
SDVVµDOOUHOHYDQWZULWWHQEULHIV¶WR1RDQGWKHJURXS1RZRXOGUHFLSURFDWHZLWK
UHJXODUµOREE\GH-EULHILQJ¶158 If a department could not provide the information required, 




was certainly a large degree of co-ordination in that context and there was certainly the opportunity 
to exchange views usefully.160 
 
The IG provided a forum at which department representatives could identify the key lines 
each department would adopt on a specific event. The greatest contribution on this front 
came from the MoD and the FCO. Both departments endeavoured to make the group, 
aware of upcoming announcements. The MoD did this until 12 May, when information 
provided by the ministry became scarce. It warned the group of announcements on 
Argentine prisoners, the departure of the QEII, Sheffield¶VVLQNLQJ and when statements 
would be made in the House.161 Not all announcements could be logged with the IG before 
they were made, but the group was made aware of planned announcements.  
 
Ingham also used meetings to make clear what the Government line should be on a specific 
day. For instance, on 21 April he identified the growing pressure to take the issue of the 
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Falklands back to the UN ± the group agreed to attempt to counter pressure.162 On 28 April 
LWZDVUHFRUGHGWKDWµ«WKHOLQHWREHGHSOR\HGE\SUHVVRIILFHUVZRXOGEH³7KH$PHULFDQ
Government put their formal proposals to the Argentine Government yesterday. They have 
now given us the text. The proposals are under coQVLGHUDWLRQ´¶.163 On 2 May Ingham 
declared: µ:HVKRXOGFRQWLQXHWRSXUVXHWKHOLQHWKDW6RYLHWVDQG$UJHQWLQHVZHUHVWUDQJH
bed-IHOORZV¶164 2Q0D\WKHJURXSKHDUGµ2XUOLQHPXVWFRQWLQXHWREHWKDWWKHEHVW
way to stabilise the position is to get the Argentines off the Islands as quickly as 
SRVVLEOH¶165  
 
As well as outlining the overall presentational line the departments, collectively, should 
take, Ingham identified what information he would make available in Lobby briefings. On 
6 May Ingham told the group he would indicate casualty details from the attack on 
Sheffield and the Belgrano at his 1100GMT briefing.166 On 7 June, Ingham made clear that 
KHZRXOGUDLVHWKHTXHVWLRQRI,UHODQG¶VYRWLQJZLWK5XVVLDDWWKH81167 He also informed 
the group of the contents of previous Lobby discussions. For example, on 29 April Ingham 
confirmed that he had implied the reason for the 48-hour-delay in announcing the TEZ was 
designed so the Task Force could be in a position to enforce it.168 On 26 May Ingham 
defended himself against rumours that he had told Lobby correspondents the names of 
ships involved in activity the previous day.169 This accusation came after Nott refused to 
LGHQWLI\DµEDGO\GDPDJHG¶VKLSRQWKHHYHQLQJ0D\1RWWLGHQWLILHGWKHVKLSDV+06
Coventry the following day.170 The IG was comprehensively briefed on the contents of 
Lobby briefings. Despite the fact the Lobby briefings would often develop and depart from 
the intended line, the IG was given frequent summaries.171 
 
The group performed another co-ordinating function in that it allowed departments to share 
interview schedules for ministers. The IG regularly heard when high-profile interviews 
were scheduled, and discussed the benefits of certain ministers or officials appearing on 
specific programmes. On 8 April McDonald told the group that Nott would appear on ABC 
Breakfast7KH)&2WROGWKHVDPHPHHWLQJWKDW3\PZDVFRQVLGHULQJDSSHDULQJRQµ%LOO¶
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>'DYLG@%ULQNOH\¶VVKRZ172 Interviews accepted by the Prime Minister were often 
discussed.173 And recommendations for possible future interviews were made. For 
example, it was proposed that Nott should accept an interview with Panorama ± which he 
did on 24 May.174 On 21 May the group suggested that Parkinson should accept invitations 
from Australian and Canadian broadcasting companies, as well as from IRN.175 
 
Perhaps one of the most significant ways in which the group provided for the co-ordination 
of Government was it permitted the applicable departments to share PR policies. The most 
crucial policy was that of the MoD. All information on events in the South Atlantic were 
relayed direct to Northwood, and from there to the Ministry. Up until 11 May, and the 
FHVVDWLRQRI0F'RQDOG¶VLQYROYHPHQWWKH,*ZDVNHSWLQIRUPHGRI0R'SROLF\176 At the 
very first meeting of the group, the MoD notified the group that Woodward had been given 
permission to exercise censorship, and defined facilities available on Ascension.177 On 22 
$SULOWKH0R'UHOD\HGSODQVIRUWKHUHSRUWLQJRIPLOLWDU\HYHQWVDQGµDVVXUHGWKH&KDLUPDQ
that No.10 would be LQIRUPHGUDSLGO\¶VKRXOGDQ\DFWLRQRFFXU178 The next day MoD 
reassured departments that all information divisions would be told immediately of any 
military engagement.179 On 3 May the MoD informed the IG that policy had been adopted 
whereby control of reports from Task Force journalists was exercised on the spot.180 A 
further update on this arrangement was supplied when McDonald, at his last meeting of the 
group, said that there was agreement on a new plan to ensure flash messages on incidents 
which the MoD could use immediately ± HQVXULQJ7DVN)RUFHUHSRUWHUV¶DFFRXQWVGLGQRW
appear before the Government had announced an event.181 However, after 11 May the 
policy of the MoD was barely discussed. This was an indication of how the withdrawal of 
a senior MoD figure from the meetings impacted them. For example, the groups were not 
informed of any casualty reporting policy developed by the NRG. 
 
It was not necessarily that the IG suffered from a lack of information on the overall picture, 
as some academics have implied.182 More, the lack of prominent MoD figures at meetings 
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dictated that the group was unaware of the PR strategy being adopted by the MoD. There 
were two implications for PR: departments were increasingly unaware of MoDPR policy ± 
how information was reported from the Fleet, policy concerning Task Force journalists and 
when pictures should be expected; and departments were unable to synchronise their 
information efforts with those of the MoD ± the result of which was a series of increasingly 
disjointed announcements, primarily from No.10.  
 
When McDonald attended meetings, the MoD contributed enormously to discussion. When 
more junior delegates attended, there was a huge discrepancy in how information was now 
communicated to the group. Often, the MoD representative was not in possession of 
required knowledge. On 28 May LWZDVQRWHGWKDWWKH0R'µKDGQRLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKH
PDWHULDOSRVVLEO\WREHVDOYDJHGIURPWKH$WODQWLF&RQYH\RU¶ ± when, in fact, it was known 
RQ0D\WKDWRI%ULWDLQ¶VKHOLFRSWHU capacity had been lost.183 On 1 June the MoD 
ZDVµQRWFOHDUUHJDUGLQJWKHZKLWHIODJLQFLGHQW¶DW*RRVH*UHHQ0R'DGGHGWKDWµLWZDV
QRWSRVVLEOHWRVD\SUHFLVHO\ZKHUHRXUWURRSVZHUH«¶184 The MoD was unable to confirm 
the presence of napalm at Goose Green, despite Nicholson having reported on it with the 
approval of Moore.185 This trend continued. On 8 June the MoD could not confirm reports 
of 0RRUH¶VVWDWHPHQWDVNLQJWKH$UJHQWLQH*DUULVRQWRVXUUHQGHUQRUFRXOGLWVHWWOHstories 
of 60 Argentines killed in recent days.186 Finally, on the day of the Argentine surrender, the 
MoD representative told the group that he was unsure about the provision of a ship for 
transporting journalists to the Falklands after the war, despite it being a subject for 
discussion at CoS meetings on 3 and 5 June.187 
 
Following 11 May, there was a series of controversial clashes between what information 
No.10 publicised and what information the MoD released. Earlier in this chapter, two 
significant accusations made against No.10 were outlined. On 23 May, before Ingham met 
with the Lobby, it was made clear WKDWµWKHGHFLVLRQKRZIDVWWRSUHVVDKHDGZDVRQHIRU
WKH&RPPDQGHUV¶188 7KLVVXSSRUWV,QJKDP¶VRZQFRQWHQWLRQWKDWKHKDGQRDJHQGDWR
emphasise the speed at which forces were likely to be moving on the islands.189  The 
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In the meetings of the IG - the group through which release of information should have 
been co-ordinated - WKHUHZDVQRPHQWLRQRIWKH0R'¶VGHFLVLRQQRWWRUHOHDVHFDVXDOW\
data concerning the Fitzroy tragedy7KHUHZDVQRPHQWLRQRI0R'¶VSROLF\RQWKHLVVXH
whatsoever, nor, at any time, did MoD request speculation on relevant numbers be 
encouraged. Indeed, on 9 June the MoD delegate UHSRUWHGWRWKH,*WKDWµWKH\>WKH0R'@
ZRXOGEHILOOLQJLQVRPHRIWKHGHWDLOVDERXWFDVXDOWLHVLQWKHFRXUVHRIWKHGD\¶191 Thus, 
on the same day the MoD policy not to release casualty figures emerged, the IG, and 
Ingham personally, was unaware of it. The following day the MoD representative proposed 
the IG VKRXOGµNQRFNGRZQDQ\VXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHLQFLGHQWKDGEHHQDVHWEDFNIRURXU
PLOLWDU\SUHSDUDWLRQV¶192 Thus the IG did not receive an accurate account of MoD casualty 
reporting policy. 
 
Instead of MoD policy being relayed to the IG, a direct communication was sent to 
Thatcher on 10 June from her Private Secretary. The communication outlined that C-in-C 
µwould like to leave open the idea that the casualty figures were considerably higher. He 
believes that this would help to confuse the Argentines who claim much higher 
casualties¶.193 The desire to withhold figures was discussed by the OD(SA) on 11 June, by 
which time Ingham had already prepared to brief Lobby correspondents. If the IG had been 
informed of the policy, Ingham might have withstood the pressure of the Lobby and 
offered no thoughts on accurate figures. Cooper later reflected that the IG underlined the 
basic problem: 
 
«WKRVHWDONLQJWRWKH press were not always au fait with the thinking at the highest levels of 
government, while the highest level did not always appreciate the presentational issues and 
possibilities raised by the items they were addressing.194 
 
The IG was designed to ensure that that those levels of Government would always be up-
to-date with the rest of Government presentation. Considering how policy was 
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communicated between 9 and 11 June, it is apparent that the MoD neglected to utilise this 
organisation.  
 
1c (iii). Further Limitations 
The effectiveness of the IG was further affected by two issues: the nature of the group was 
reactive; and, it could be argued, the authority of the group often overlapped with a 
separate presentational initiative ± the SAPU. Often, the group was left to respond to 
diplomatic or military events, without having first planned a relevant press line or strategy. 
Nott said WKH,*ZDVRIOLWWOHFRQVHTXHQFHEHFDXVHµ\RXFDQQRWFR-ordinate events in a war 
E\KDYLQJDFRPPLWWHHGRLW«<RXKDYHJRWWRGHDOZLWKWKLQJVZKLFKFRPHLQQLJKWDQG
GD\«¶195 A lot of the time the content of meetings was limited to hearing a summary, from 
each department present, of what had happened since the last meeting. The only way in 
which the group could be proactive was in the establishment of communal lines. These 
lines largely concerned overarching themes like the preference that Government 
presentation should refer to the restoration of British administration or how self-
determination and British administration should be defined.196 Planned lines persisted until 
after the close of hostilities on the islands.197 
 
Strictly speaking, an additional hindrance to the IG ± particularly its ability to construct PR 
lines ± could have been the existence of the SAPU. The SAPU distributed the lines 
ministers should take on the Falklands. There was conflict in as much as there were two 
areas from which PR lines were emanating. A comparison of information related by the 
SAPU indicates the extent to which authority between the two overlapped. SAPU lines 
were developed to inform ministers after an event. The IG heard what events had taken 
place and developed a wider media line. On 26 April the SAPU issued a circular. On the 
same day the IG met. The SAPU circular covered events which had led to the landing on 
South Georgia, %ULWDLQ¶Vlegal position and covered the subject of the British Antarctic 
Survey Team which had been stranded on South Georgia.198 The IG of the same day heard 
from the MoD on the events of 25 April and discussed the need for publicity concerning 
British use of the UN Security Council to help resolve the situation in order to counter the 
image that the landing on South Georgia was aggressive.199  
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The SAPU was principally an organisation to ensure informed Government. The IG was 
intended to co-ordinate press lines which resulted from the information later distributed by 
the SAPU. There was a stark contrast between the approaches of each organisation. The 
SAPU circulars were often distributed after the IG had discussed similar topics. For 
example, after the sinking of the Belgrano, the SAPU and IG handled the lines very 
differently. The IG met on 2 and 3 May to discuss how best to handle the presentation of 
the Belgrano.200  On 3 May the group emphasised that whether or not the vessel was inside 
RURXWVLGHWKH7(=WKHµGHIHQFH]RQH¶VXEVWDQWLDWHGWKHDFWLRQ201 On 3 May the SAPU 
issued a document which - among subjects like the movement of 5 Infantry Brigade, false 
$UJHQWLQHFODLPVDQG3\P¶VYLVLWWR:DVKLQJton - FRYHUHGµ0LOLWDU\$FWLRQIURP
0D\¶202 The Belgrano was discussed in a short paragraph covering events on the 
afternoon of 2 May. The main thrust of the paragraph was reinforcement of the idea that 
WKHYHVVHOVLQYROYHGµSRVHGDVLJQLILFDQWWKUHDWWRRXUVKLSV¶203 However, it was not until 5 
May that the actual sinking of the ship was explained in detail.204 The difference in 
approach to the sinking of the Belgrano is evidence of the lag in time before the SAPU 
issued lines for ministers to take. The IG outlined lines for relevant departments as early as 
two days beforehand.  
 
The Information Group was a channel through which the most significant departments to 
the crisis could synchronise their PR efforts. The principle was an intelligent one. The IG 
represented an endeavour to centrally organise Government policy. However, the ,*¶V 
effectiveness has been questioned, primarily due to WKH0R'¶VIOXFWXDQWDWWHQGDQFH 
Commentators like Mercer et al. and Harris have suggested that the impact of the group 
was limited because the MoD purposefully restrained its power by sending low-ranking 
representatives.205 This thesis contends that there was a watershed in thHJURXS¶VOLIH2Q
11 May ACPR stopped attending meetings. It was from this point onwards that the 
effectiveness of the IG was questionable.  
 
2. The South Atlantic Presentation Unit 
The most prominent academic accounts of the organisation of Government information 
policy during the war have paid less attention to the SAPU than any other group 
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constructed to deal with the issue. The chief reason for this neglect was that it fell under 
the purview of the Cabinet Office, rather than the MoD. The only discussion on the topic 
was supplied by Freedman in the Official History. Analysis is limited to one page and deals 
primarily with WKHXQLW¶V creation.206 Freedman¶V account was based on material from the 
Cabinet Office. Other studies, which have utilised, in the main, MoD source material, have 
thus failed to appreciate the unit to any significant extent. Mercer et al. made no reference 
whatsoever to the employment of the SAPU in co-ordinating public lines for ministers.207 
Equally, in the chapters offered by Morrison and Tumber on censorship and information 
policy there was no mention of the SAPU.208 As a result of this neglect, this thesis provides 
the most comprehensive analysis of the unit to date. 
 
Many historians and academics have considered the role the Cabinet played in the crisis. 
The creation and business of the War Cabinet, for example, has drawn attention from 
different types of literature: memoirs and political, military and cultural histories.209 
+RZHYHUWKH&DELQHW2IILFH¶VUROHLQKDQGOLQJWKHPHGLDKDVEHHQRYHUORRNHG7KHUHZDV
speculation during the war that the Cabinet itself was running all Government PR policy. 
Defence Correspondent, Jon Connell, claimed requests for information from the MoD 
µZHUHPHWZLWKWKHUHVSRQVHWKDWWKH&DELQHWZDVGLFWDWLQJSROLF\¶210 The Cabinet Office 
had certain influence when it came to Government information policy, but it by no means 
ran its own, or that of the Government. A member of the Cabinet Office sat in on all 
meetings of the IG from 14 April - mostly, the Secretary to the Cabinet, David Colvin. 
Cabinet Office representatives were also present at the meetings of both the Cabinet and 
the OD(SA). In this respect, the office was in an ideal position to co-ordinate policy. 
+RZHYHUWKHH[WHQWRIWKH&DELQHW2IILFH¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQSROLF\ZDVOLPLWHGWKURXJKRXW
the Falklands, to a small unit - the SAPU. 
 
2a. Creation 
On 6 April a meeting of Cabinet heard that Thatcher would arrange, not only a sub-
committee of the OD, the OD6$EXWDOVRDµSUHVHQWDWLRQXQLW¶211 The following day the 
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first meeting of the newly-formed OD(SA) heard that it had been decided to establish a 
unit µ«FRPSULVLQJone official at First Secretary/Principal level from each of the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence, located in the Cabinet Office¶.212 
 
7KHFUHDWLRQRIWKHXQLWZDVLQWHQGHGWRHDVHWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V35EXUGHQ- principally, at 
the beginning of April 1982, the unit was established to counter negative rumour. The 
OD(SA) was OHGWRXQGHUVWDQGWKDWWKHXQLWZDVSXWLQSODFHEHFDXVHµSRWHQWLDOO\GDPDJLQJ
UXPRXUVKDGEHHQFLUFXODWLQJLQ3DUOLDPHQWDQGLQWKH3UHVVDQGPHGLD«7KHSXUSRVHRI 
the unit would be to establish what rumours were circulating and as far as possible to 
FRXQWHUWKHP¶213 The main way in which the unit attempted to achieve its aim was by the 
collation of information to disprove injurious rumour. This information would be 
disseminated amongst the Government and used in interaction with the media. David 
Wright, the Secretary to the Secretary of Cabinet, stated on 8 April: µ7KHXQLWLVWRSURYLGH
to Ministers, and to the Press Officers of Departments concerned, material for public use to 
counter errors or inaccurate rumours concerning the Falkland Islands issue«¶214 
 
2QWKHVDPHGD\&ROYLQVXPPDULVHGWKHUROHRIWKHXQLWDVµ«PHHWLQJXQKHOSIXOUXPRXU
with a line for counter briefing; providing briefing lines for Ministers and Officials; and 
GHYHORSLQJVSHDNLQJQRWHVDVUHTXLUHG¶215 At the beginning of April there were several 
ideas as to how the unit might act to counter speculation. The main instrument through 
which the unit would work would be a series of documents sent to the private secretaries to 
Cabinet ministers and relevant PR departments. From there, it was the responsibility of 
private secretaries to distribute documents further ± dispersing the relevant information 
throughout Government.216  
 
2b. Membership 
The machinery used to identify rumour was established on 7 April. At a meeting between 
Colvin and Arthur µ-RKQ¶&ROHV3ULQFLSOH3ULYDWH6HFUHWDU\WR Thatcher, on the evening of 
7 April, Coles suggested that a four-PDQµLQWHOOLJHQFHJDWKHULQJQHW¶PLJKWEHHVWDEOLVKHG
iQRUGHUWRµto catch rumours, falsehoods and other damaging canards and feed them into 
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Parliamentary Private Secretary, the Parliamentary Private Secretaries of both Nott and 
Pym, and Michael Jopling, Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury and Conservative 
Chief Whip.218 The composition of the unit itself was established, when the OD(SA) 
meeting agreed to its creation.219 At the head of the unit was Robert Wade-Gery, Deputy 
Secretary of the Cabinet and, during the war, Co-Secretary to the War Cabinet. He, and the 
unit, answered directly to the Cabinet Secretary, Armstrong.220 The staff of the unit 
consisted of one MoD representative, Robert Hatfield, and one FCO representative, Simon 
Fuller.  In addition, two Cabinet Office personnel joined the unit: Colvin and Wright. 
Wright also acted as Secretary to the unit. Colvin took a more prominent role - he became 
the driving forceWKHXQLW¶VGHIactor leader. 
 
2c. The Role of Ingham 
The realm in which the SAPU was to act ensured that the unit was destined to cross 
borders of authority. When the OD(SA) considered the establishment of the unit, the point 
ZDVPDGHLQGLVFXVVLRQWKDWµIXUWKHUWKRXJKWwould need to be given«to the relationship 
between the Presentation Unit and the Meeting of ChiHI,QIRUPDWLRQ2IILFHV>VLF@¶221 The 
remit of the SAPU posed a threat to existing PR equipment of Government. The sub-
FRPPLWWHHKHDUGWKDWµ«WKHUHODWLRQVKLSRI any machinery established to the Presentation 
8QLWZRXOGQHHGWREHWDNHQXSZLWKWKH&KLHI3UHVV6HFUHWDU\WRWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶222 In 
order for the unit to avoid competing with any other bodies, namely MIOs, the unit was 
deferred to Ingham. The position of Ingham within the existing PR framework of 
*RYHUQPHQWZDVGHPRQVWUDWHGE\WKHSURYLVRWKDWWKHXQLW¶VSODFHEHµWDNHQXSZLWK¶KLP
directly. On the day the SAPU was officially formed, Ingham and Mower met with 
representatives of the SAPU ± Colvin, Fuller and Hatfield.223 The purpose of the meeting 
was to co-ordinate the PR efforts of the two groups: the IG and SAPU. Ingham highlighted 
the need to liaise and that it was important that the departments µHOLPLQDWHGGXSOLFDWLRQDQG
quickened the speed of respoQVH¶224 A number of agreements were made in order to better 
synchronize the groups. No.10 conceGHGWRVXSSO\&ROYLQZLWK7KDWFKHU¶VGDLO\µ3UHVV
'LJHVW¶DQGWKRVHSDUWVRI/REE\QRWHVUHIHUULQJWRWKH)DONODQGV,WZDVDOVRVHWWOHGWKDW
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Colvin, Hatfield and Fuller should attend meetings of the IG. Colvin attended the IG 
meetings until the end of the war. Across all 42 possible meetings Colvin might have 
attended, he was absent for only two. Fuller and Hatfield attended meetings from 16 
April.225  
 
The membership of the SAPU made up a considerable bulk of the membership of the IG. 
Although the SAPU was part of the Cabinet Office, not the No.10 Press Office, the IG 
VKRXOGEHYLHZHGDVWKHµIDWKHU¶JURXSRIWKH6$38,WZDVZLWKLQPHHWLQJVRIWKH,*WKDW
lines were often developed which would later be distributed to Government. For example, 
RQ$SULOWKH,*QRWHGµ,QFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKH)RUHLJQ6HFUHWDU\¶VYLVLWZHVKRXOG
maintain that he has left to take new proposals to Mr Haig and has no intention of talking 
GLUHFWO\RU³LQSUR[LPLW\´WR0U&RVWD0HQGH]¶226 The SAPU circular of the following 
day suggested the line that: µ0U3\PLVRQDVKRUWZRUNLQJYLVLW«+HKDVQRSODQVWRPHHW
WKH$UJHQWLQH)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHUZKRLVDOVRLQ:DVKLQJWRQ«¶227 Similarly, at the same 
PHHWLQJRIWKH,*LWZDVFRQFOXGHGWKDWµ:HVKRXOGQRWVXSSRUWWKHYLHZDWWULEXWHGWRWKH
C in C Task Force that Britain would have to wait for the Argentinians to strike first in any 
PLOLWDU\HQFRXQWHU¶228 ,QWKH6$38GRFXPHQWLWZDVFODLPHGµ$OORXUDFWLRQV«KDYHEHHQ
in exercise of our right of self-defence. We have the capability to enforce the zone 
DQG«ZHDUHSUHSDUHGWRILUHILUVWLQRUGHUWRGRVR¶229 On 5 May the IG felt it should 
µFRQWLQXHWRH[SUHVVFRQILGHQFHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDORSLQLRQVWD\LQJZLWK XV¶± in particular it 
VKRXOGKLJKOLJKWWKH(FRQRPLF&RPPXQLW\¶VVXSSRUW230 The SAPU lines of 6 May stated 
thatµ,WLVTXLWHFOHDUWKDWWKHUHUHPDLQVYHU\FRQVLGHUDEOHVXSSRUWIRU%ULWDLQRQWKH
IXQGDPHQWDOLVVXHV¶7KHOLQHZHQWRQWRJLYHH[DPSOHVRI(&, Commonwealth and US 
support.231 Further, on 27 May the IG observed that it should emphasise the importance of 
Security Council Resolution (SCR) 502, but that Argentine withdrawal was essential to a 
ceasefire. The group felt %ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQKDGEHHQµVWDWHGE\3DUVRQV¶DWWKH81232 That 
evening a SAPU-issued paper informed ministHUVµ%ULWDLQZHOFRPHV6&5«¶,WZHQW
RQWRTXRWH3DUVRQV¶81VSHHFKµWKHRQO\DFFHSWDEOHFRQGLWLRQIRUDFHDVHILUHLVWKDWLW
should be unequivocally linked with an immediate commencement of Argentine 
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ZLWKGUDZDO¶233 Thus, IG meetings acted almost as staging discussions for lines which 
would later appear in SAPU documentation. The SAPU was dependent on the existing 
structure of Government PR to function properly.  
 
2d. Procedural Problems 
The development of the SAPU was struck by several complications over the first week and 
a half of its occupation. The first lines for ministers were published and distributed on 11 
April. There were two documents sent on that day ± one in the morning and one at 
2100GMT. The problem experienced by the unit the day before was that communication 
had to be approved by the FCO and MoD at official level, then referred to Thatcher for 
further clearance.234 Thatcher accepted the circulars on the evening of 10 April.235 Between 
11 and 15 April, the date the next circular was released, the staff of the SAPU had 
identified the impossibility of gaining proper approval of all SAPU documents. Wade-Gery 
outlined the main issue: 
 
If the material they put out to Ministers is to have any real value, it had to be put out quickly. While 
the themes with which it deals are still fresh. On the other hand they have natural inhibitions as 
officials about laying down the line which Ministers are to take without first securing some degree 
of Ministerial approval. 
 
Wade-Gery outlined a number of alternatives to gaining Prime Ministerial approval:  
 
a) Carry on as now, accepting that delay will often result 
E$JUHHWKDWFOHDUDQFHIRUWKH8QLW¶VFLUFXODUVWR0LQLVWHUVFDQEHJLYH>VLF@DWRIILFLDOOHYHO« 
c) Arrange for each circular to be cleared either by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary or 
WKH'HIHQFH6HFUHWDU\«DFFHSWLQJWKDWWKLVPLJKWVRPHWLPHVLQYROYHXQGHVLUDEOHGHOD\ 
d) Have another try at press-ganging Mr Parkinson236 
 
The reference to Parkinson in this document is particularly interesting. Freedman claimed 
WKH6$38ZDVLQLWLDOO\UHVSRQVLEOHWR3DUNLQVRQEXW0LFKDHO3DOOLVHUVRRQµWRRNLW
RYHU¶237 Palliser had been PUS at the Foreign Office until earlier that year. During the war 
he became DVSHFLDOµDGYLVHU¶)URP$SULO3DOOLVHUDWWHQGHGPHHWLQJVRIWKH2'6$ 
Hastings and Jenkins believed it was Palliser who headed up what they termed a 
µFRPPXQLFDWLRQVJURXS¶ZLWKLQWKH&DELQHW2IILFH«¶238 There is little evidence to 
document Palliser¶VUROHLQ the SAPU. The only reference was given by Wade-Gery on 13 
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April when he suggested to Armstrong that the issue of SAPU procedure might be 
discussed with Palliser the following day.239 ,QGHHGGXULQJ3DOOLVHU¶VH[WHQVLYHLQWHUYLHZV
IRU&KXUFKLOO$UFKLYHV¶BDOHP, he, himself, did not mention any role in the Falklands 
relating to public presentation.240 Procedural difficulties in the SAPU were not addressed 
until 25 April. Between 11 and 25 April the SAPU issued five circular papers. On 25 April 
the War Cabinet invited Parkinson µWRXQGHUWDNH0LQLVWHULDOVupervision¶ of the SAPU.241 
This invitation was extended EHFDXVHWKHFRPPLWWHHIHOWµDVSHFLDOSROLWLFDOHIIRUWZRXOG
need to be made to ensure that the necessity and justifiability of British actions were fully 
XQGHUVWRRGE\SXEOLFRSLQLRQ¶242  
 
Upon the escalation of hostilities, the SAPU found it was of increased importance. There 
was amplified attention focused on it, since ministers¶ statements became more crucial. At 
the IG on 26 April WKHUHZDVGLVFXVVLRQDERXWµWKHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOGLIILFulty, given varying 
ministerial statements on our negotiating position. Mr Nott had said that if the Argentines 
ZRXOGZLWKGUDZWKHVLWXDWLRQZRXOGEHWUDQVIRUPHG«¶243 After the reinvasion of South 
Georgia the stakes had changed, thus the SAPU was more critical to the presentation of the 
campaign. On 10 May, for example, the Prime Minister told the OD6$WKDWµ«UHODWLRQV
ZLWKWKHPHGLDZHUHJLYLQJULVHWRFRQFHUQ¶244 The next day Thatcher repeated this 
senWLPHQWµFRQVLGHUDWLRQZRXOGQHHGWREHJLYHQWRWKHZD\LQZKLFKWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V
SROLF\REMHFWLYHVZHUHSXEOLFO\SUHVHQWHG¶245 The OD(SA) requested that Parkinson, in 
consultation with µ:LOOLH¶Whitelaw, Home Secretary, Pym and NottµPDNHSURSRVDOVRQ
thHSXEOLFSUHVHQWDWLRQRI*RYHUQPHQWSROLF\¶246 On 12 May a meeting was held between 
Parkinson and members of his office, the SAPU and Mower7KHPHHWLQJZDVKHOGµLQ
SXUVXDQFHRIDUHPLWIURP2'6$¶DQGWKHVXEMHFWZDVµWRFRQVLGHUKRZWKHSXEOLF
presentatLRQRIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKH)DONODQGVFULVLVPLJKWEHLPSURYHG¶247 
The timing of the meeting was significant in itself. Presentation was prioritised after a 
series of actions in the South Atlantic drew criticism in the media.248 By mid-May, the 
SAPU was deemed to be of limited effectiveness. In an attempt to address the efficiency of 
                                                 
239
 Wade-Gery to Armstrong, 13 Apr., TNA, CAB164/1611 f.3. 
240
 Palliser, Interview, C.A., 1999, DOHP 37/1. 
241




 IG, 26 May, TNA, CAB164/1622 f.50. 
244
 OD(SA), 10 May, TNA, CAB148/211 f.99. 
245




 Note on meeting hosted by Parkinson, 14 May, TNA, CAB164/1611 f.22M. 
248
 Events included the Black Buck raids and the sinking of the Belgrano, Sheffield, and Narwhal. 
187 
 
the unit, Thatcher appointed Parkinson its head. In the case of the SAPU, the reign of 
Parkinson over the unit was not of significant effect.  
 
2e. Evaluating Effectiveness  
Before Parkinson assumed responsibility for the SAPU on 12 May, there had been 19 
circulars over the course of 30 days. Between 12 May and the end of the conflict, on 14 
June, there were only 13 SAPU circulars. In the period before 12 May three of those 
circulars were limited, not to suggested lines, but to the dissemination of transcripts of 
interviews given by mLQLVWHUV&RQYHUVHO\VHYHQRISDSHUVDIWHU3DUNLQVRQ¶VWHQXUH
were devoted to such transcripts. The effectiveness of the SAPU cannot be easily 
measured. Certainly, when it was established, its import was emphasised among 
Government departments. In a letter to private secretaries Wright claimed: it was 
µLPSRUWDQWIRUWKHXQLW¶VHIIHFWLYHRSHUDWLRQWKDW'HSDUWPHQWVJLYHD high priority to 
DQVZHULQJTXHULHVIURPWKHXQLW¶249 During April, the SAPU worked productively. In 
theory it should have been a central hub of information, receiving reports Government-
wide. There was a modest string of successful lines. For example, on 18 April, the MoD 
ceased the full payment of overseas¶ allowance to members of the Task Force. There was 
extensive criticism from the media between 18 and 20 April.250 On 20 April an SAPU 
paper, responding to such articles, outlined the precise situation for ministersµ/2$LVQRW
SD\«As most ships will not call at any port they would not be entitled to LOA in any 
FDVH«WKH*RYHUQPHQWKDVGHFLGHGLQVWHDGWRSD\HYHU\RQHLQWKH7DVN)RUFHSHU
GD\¶251 An example of when the SAPU managed to get ahead of the news was concerning 
the death of an Argentine prisoner on South Georgia. On the morning of 28 April, the 
SAPU issued the following advice on lines to take:  
 
Incident took place on 26 April on South Georgia. Brazilian government already been asked to 
inform the Argentines. Few details available. Board of inquiry, required by Geneva Convention, 
has been set up already.252 
 
Later, a MoD announcement was made ± it had µ«QRWLILHGWKH%UD]LOLDQJRYHUQPHQWVR
that they can inform the Argentine authorities of a serious incident which took place on 
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consequent newspaper articles towed the official line.254 
 
The success, or relative effectiveness, of the SAPU throughout the first month of the crisis 
did not continue for the duration of the crisis. There were three issues which affected the 
6$38¶VHIIHFWLYHQHVVLQWKHVHFRQGKDOIRIWKHFRQIOLFWULYDOULHVDPRQg departments 
hindered its successful operation; the SAPU was subservient to a number of different 
groups - all of which had a vested interest in the running of the group; and the unit could 
not keep up with the speed of events.  
 
2e (i). Department Rivalries 
The effectiveness of the SAPU was limited, particularly as the campaign wore on, by 
rivalries between the various departments. Although measures were put in place to ensure 
the unit was given priority, often ministers felt more loyalty to their departmHQWµOLQH¶WKDQ
to that of the Government. Each department also had its own internal procedure for 
ensuring members spoke coherently to the press. For example, the FCO often produced its 
own line on certain issues. On 18 April a document was circulated noting lines proposed 
IRUWKDWGD\DQGWDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQW+DLJ¶VSRVVLEOHYLVLWWR/RQGRQWKDWGD\255 On 28 
April the PUS was sent internal lines to take if, for example, Argentina failed to accept the 
latest proposals put to her by Haig.256 The Emergency Unit of the FCO often distributed 
µ1RWHVWR3UHVV2IILFHUV¶LHµWKHQRWHVIURPZKLFKWKH1HZV'HSDUWPHQWZRXOG
VSHDN«¶257 The FCO also had its own system of circulating transcripts of interviews by 
ministers ± internally and to its ambassadors abroad.258 Thus, the SAPU was challenged by 
GHSDUWPHQWV¶LQWHUQDOHIIRUWVWRco-ordinate.  
 
2e (ii). Authority Issues 
Earlier in this chapter the conclusion was advanced that the SAPU worked as a subsidiary 
unit of the IG. However, it was not merely the IG which influenced or encroached on the 
authority of the unit. As well as taking directives from the IG, the SAPU also took direct 
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orders from the OD(SA). Both Parkinson and Palliser joined meetings of OD(SA). Wade-
Gery attended meetings as part of the secretariat. All three took commands to the unit. The 
OD(SA) often authorised an approach the Government should take and related it to the 
SAPU. On 19 April, for instance, the OD6$KHDUGWKDWµSUHVVJXLGDQFH¶VKRXOGEHLVVXHG
by ministers in London in certain terms ± terms which amounted to the expression that the 
µZLVKHV¶RIWKH,VODQGHUVZHUHSDUDPRXQWWRQHJRWLDWLRQV259 On 28 April Thatcher told her 
War Cabinet she would arrange for the press to be told that the Government had been 
informed of US peace proposals and that ministers should take the line that the proposals 
ZHUHEHLQJµFDUHIXOO\FRQVLGHUHG¶260  
 
The SAPU was further muddled by the Parkinson Presentation Group. When the group was 
HVWDEOLVKHGDIWHUWKHPHHWLQJRI0D\LWZDVGHFLGHGWKDWWKHJURXSµPLJKWEHVHUYLFHG¶
by the SAPU.261 For the already stretched staff of five, the SAPU now had to provide for a 
group which had a far larger remit than it was used to. The PPG was implemented to carry 
out decisions by the OD(SA), make contingency plans for PR, act as mediator between 
departments on presentational issues and to arrange the co-ordination of spokesmen and of 
ministerial activities.262 Increasingly, the SAPU became strained by the demands of so 
many different bodies - all of which (the IG, OD(SA) and PPG) were temporary bodies, 
convened specifically to deal with issues arising from the conflict. 
 
2e (iii). Lagging Behind 
The SAPU was effective in the first month of the crisis, but increasingly struggled as the 
pace of the conflict developed. After the Belgrano was sunk, the SAPU did not release a 
document on lines to take until 5 May, despite the incident causing much controversy in 
the media on 3 and 4 May.263 There were no lines disseminated on the British landing on 
the Falklands on 21 May. On 22 May the only document produced dealt with the 
statements made in the UN Security Council on 21 May.264 On top of this, following the 
disastrous events of 25 May ± which saw the sinking of both Coventry and Atlantic 
Conveyor ± there were no suggested lines communicated to ministers at all. Indeed, the 
subsequent circular, issued on 27 May, only dealt with SCR505 and the World Cup.265 
Additionally, there were no lines distributed which dealt directly with the battle of Goose 
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Green. The only lines transmitted which concerned the tragedy at Fitzroy were concerning 
the delay in announcing casualties and was issued on the last day of the war.266 The 
commencement of hostilities in the South Atlantic marked a point at which the SAPU 
ceased to provide a coherent line on the major issues.  
 
The SAPU contrasted with other bodies constructed for the purpose of dealing with 
presentation of the war directly - such as the News Release Group, PPG and the Military 
Briefing Group - because the need for such an organisation was identified at the start of the 
crisis. Although this was the case, the SAPU suffered from a number of limiting factors 
ZKLFKDIIHFWHGLWVHIILFLHQF\7KH6$38ZDVGHIHUHQWLDOWR,QJKDP¶VIG, and later to the 
PPG. Procedural problems plagued the unit during its early days ± issues which 
demonstrated the wider problems of co-ordination between groups and ministers. The 
effectiveness of the group diminished throughout the war and, in this respect, the unit 
marked a stark difference from those groups established later, but whose productivity 
increased towards the end of the war.  
 
3. The Role of Cecil Parkinson in Co-ordinating Government Information Policy 
At the HCDC hearing Christopher Patten, Conservative MP for Bath, asked Cooper 
whether there was a minister to co-ordinate Government information during the Falklands. 
&RRSHUUHSOLHGµ2K\HVKH>3DUNLQVRQ@ZDVDZDUHRIZKDWZDVJRLQJon because he was 
EULHIHGGDLO\«¶267 However, as late as 16 May The Sunday Telegraph reported that there 
ZDVµVWLOOQRGLUHFWPLQLVWHULDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶RYHUWKHLQIRUPDWLRQZDU268 Even after the 
war there was a lack of consensus over the role Parkinson played. Mercer et al. argued that 
3DUNLQVRQZDVGHIDFWRµ0LQLVWHUIRU,QIRUPDWLRQ¶GXULQJWKH)DONODQGV269 Later, Seymour-
Ure argued that Thatcher had to pay the price for not having a minister appointed in charge 
of media-relations during the war.270 This thesis aims to contribute significantly to the 
literature by assessing the role Parkinson was assigned to ascertain whether he affected the 
co-ordination of Government PR policy. It will consider when, and why, Parkinson 
became involved in PR policy. The argument will be advanced that there were two reasons 
IRU3DUNLQVRQ¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQWKHGHHSHQLQJULYDOU\EHWZHHQ1RDQGMoD - and 
complaints on this matter raised by Ingham; and the escalation of military conflict. Finally, 
WKLVFKDSWHUZLOOHYDOXDWHWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRI3DUNLQVRQ¶V35UROHDQGZLOOFRQFOXGHWKDW
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Parkinson prompted little significant change in the way information policy was co-
ordinated.  
 
3a. Presentation of the Government or Government presentation? 
When the OD(SA) was established, it included Whitelaw, Nott and Pym. After 
deliberation, Thatcher asked Cecil Parkinson, who had no ministerial responsibilities, to 
EHFRPHWKHILIWKPHPEHU7KDWFKHUODWHUUHDVRQHGWKDW3DUNLQVRQµQRWRQO\VKDUHGP\
SROLWLFDOLQVWLQFWVEXWZDVEULOOLDQWO\HIIHFWLYHLQGHDOLQJZLWKSXEOLFUHODWLRQV¶271 There has 
been wide accord amongst historians of the Falklands over why Parkinson was appointed 
WRWKH2'6$3DUNLQVRQ¶VSROLWLFDOV\PSDWKLHVOHYHOOHGWKHSOD\LQJILHOG± Whitelaw and 
3\PZHUHSROLWLFDOO\DOLJQHG3DUNLQVRQZRXOGMRLQ1RWW¶Vranks to even up the numbers.272 
Indeed, first-hand accounts testified to this.273  
 
Parkinson, far from being appointed, in effect, µMinister of Information¶, was actually 
appointed with a separate media role in mind. Parkinson was retained in the War Cabinet 
because he was best able to act as the OD(SA) spokesperson - WRSURPRWH*RYHUQPHQW¶V
policy by appearing in the media. Parkinson himself recalled that Thatcher told him he 
µFRXOGGHDOZLWKWKHPHGLDDQGSXWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFDVHRYHURQUDGLRDQGWHOHYLVLRQDQG
WRWKHSDUW\¶274 1RWWFRQILUPHGWKDW3DUNLQVRQµZDVQRWDSSRLQWHG«WRFR-ordinate as a 
0LQLVWHUWKHIORZRILQIRUPDWLRQ¶EXWKHµplayed a very valuable and important role in 
presHQWLQJWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VFDVH«¶275 It was because Parkinson had no departmental role 
that he wDVµDYDLODEOH¶WRGRPRUHPHGLDZRUN276 3DUNLQVRQUHFROOHFWHGWKDWKHGLGµDPDVV
RIEURDGFDVWLQJ«:KHQP\PRUHLPSRUWDQWFROOHDJXHVZHUHWU\LQJWRJHWVRPHVOHHS«,
would be appearing on ABC on their 10 R¶FORFNQHZV¶277 Indeed, Parkinson appeared on a 
score of British and American television programmes. One of the most controversial 
programmes on which he appeared was the Panorama HSLVRGHµ&DQ:H$YRLG:DU¶
broadcast on 10 May. It was controversial because it featured interviews with anti-war 
MPs. Interviews were WHPSHUHGE\3DUNLQVRQ¶VVWXGLRLQWHUYLHZSUHVHQWing the official 
Conservative line.278 On 26 May Parkinson praised the reporting of the correspondents 
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with the Task Force for their bravery in a televised speech.279 Parkinson appeared on the 
radio almost daily throughout the conflict and became, according to HarrisµWKH
*RYHUQPHQW¶VFKLHIPLQLVWHULDOVSRNHVPDQ¶280 (YHQWKH+&'&IRXQGWKDW3DUNLQVRQ¶V
WDVNZDVµ«TXLWHGLVWLQFWIURPWKHRYHUDOOFRRUGLQDWLRQRf government information 
SROLF\«¶281 
 
3b. Ministerial Input  
Parkinson, as previously discussed, was directed WRµXQGHUWDNH0LQLVWHULDOVXSHUYLVLRQ¶RI
the SAPU.282 However, it was not until the OD(SA) directive of 11 May, requiring 
3DUNLQVRQWRµPDNHSURSRVDOVRQWKHSXEOLFSUHVHQWDWLRQRI*RYHUQPHQWSROLF\¶WKDWKH
assumed any significant role in the co-ordination of overall Government PR policy.283 In 
fact, it was not until the meeting of 12 May, between Parkinson, the SAPU, No.10 and the 
Cabinet Office, that Parkinson actually formally met with members of the SAPU and 
No.10¶V 3UHVV2IILFH$FFRUGLQJWR,QJKDPLWZDVQRWXQWLOWKHµLQLWLDOGLSORPDWLFSKDVH¶
of the crisis was over that Parkinson was appointed to oversee any presentation. This, he 
FODLPHGµZDVDVXEVWDQWLDOVWHSIRUZDUG¶284  
 
The escalation in military action over the first ten days of May presented a threat to both 
*RYHUQPHQWVXSSRUWDQG%ULWRQV¶GHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDWIRUFHZDVWKHDSSURSULDWHZD\WR
settle the dispute. On 5 May the Conservatives had dropped 6% in popularity from 30 
April.285 TKH*RYHUQPHQW¶s presentation of the conflict, therefore, became all the more 
crucial to the war effort. On 11 May the OD(SA), with the knowledge that British 
reinforcements were boarding the QEII, which was due to sail the next day, made a 
commitment to improving PR by appointing an OD(SA) member to the situation.  
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The War Cabinet decision to employ Parkinson in this way was not provoked by purely 
military events. The first two weeks of May also marked a period of increased hostility 
between the Government and British media. On 2 May Newsnight¶V3HWHU6QRZhad 
questioned the authenticity of British accounts.286 Criticism from such MPs as John Page 
LQFLWHGDUWLFOHVOLNHWKDWZKLFKPDLQWDLQHGµ%%&µ1($57275($621¶6$<603¶287 
On 6 May Page asked Thatcher in the Commons whether she felt the British case was 
being presented in an appropriate manner.288 Thatcher replied that she understood 
Argentina was being treated, in the British media, with the same credibility as the British, 
which she demanded would gLYHµRIIHQFH¶289 That evening George Howard, Chairman of 
the BBC, gave a speech in which he claimed that the BBC was not, and could not be 
µneutral¶.290 The Commons debate incited yet more coverage of the split between the 
Government and the media, particularly the BBC.291 On 8 May Snow wrote to The Times:  
 
Our job is to report events, and constantly to examine the accuracy of accounts we are given of 
them. Our job also is constantly to question those who have the power to direct events, and to 
question the assumptions and assessments on which they make their decisions.292 
 
The following day Robert Adley, Conservative MP, lodged a formal protest over the 
%%&¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH)DONODQGV293 2Q0D\WKH:DU&DELQHWQRWHGWKDWµUHODWLRQVZLWK
WKHPHGLDZHUHJLYLQJULVHWRFRQFHUQ¶294 That night the controversial Panorama 
SURJUDPPHµ&DQ:H$YRLG:DU¶ZDVDLUHGRQ%%&79295 Reaction to the programme 
was extreme and almost immediate. John Page wrote to The Times on 11 May.296 That day 
the Commons heard the MP, Sally Oppenheim call Panorama µDQRGLRXVVXEYHUVLYH
WUDYHVW\¶297 7KDWFKHUVKDUHG2SSHQKHLP¶VµGHHSFRQFHUQ¶DQGVDLGWKDWPDQ\IHOWWKHFDVH
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BBC gave rise to yet more articles on the increasing divide between the BBC and the 
Government.299  
 
On 12 May the Conservative Party Media Committee met and hosted Howard and the 
Director-General Elect of the BBC, Alasdair Milne. The pair were subjected to a torrent of 
DEXVHLQZKDWRQHSDUWLFLSDQWWHUPHGµWKHPRVWH[WUDRUGLQDU\PHHWLQJHYHUKHOGE\WKH
SDUW\¶VPHGLDFRPPLWWHH¶300 Later, in an interview with ITN, Milne explainedµ,GRQ¶W
feel that the kind of viruOHQFHRIWKHFULWLFLVPWKLVDIWHUQRRQZDVMXVWLILHG«¶301 With the 
huge amount of attention the media and its handling of the conflict was receiving, by 11 
May, the situation was something of a domestic crisis. Over the following week 
Government PR policy would be tested to its limit when the vast majority of the media 
came to back the BBC.302 Indeed, on 12 May the OD(SA) QRWHGWKDWµPXFKRIWKHSUHVV
QRZDSSHDUHGWREHUHDG\WRGHIHQGWKH&RUSRUDWLRQDJDLQVWWKH*RYHUQPHQW«¶303 Of the 
printed media, The Guardian, Financial Times, The Times and The Sunday Times, and the 
Daily Mirror led the way in defending the BBC. All five publications printed lead articles 
condemning Government treatment of the BBC. The subject was also popular in the 
µOHWWHUV¶¶FROXPQV304 The increasingly hostile climate fostered between the BBC (and the 
wider media) and the Government made crucial that Government PR policy was re-
evaluated. Thus, when Parkinson was asked to carry out such a task, it was not just the 
escalation in military events which affected the move, but also events which saw the 
British media and the British Government pitted against each other. 
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The second reason why Parkinson was drawn into Government PR was a direct result of 
Ingham. As discussed earlier in this chapter, throughout the war the MoD sent increasingly 
junior representatives to the IG meetings ± partly as a result of the deepening rivalry 
between Cooper and Ingham. Mercer et al. considered that Ingham grew angry with the 
µGLVPLVVLYH¶DWWLWXGHRIWKH0R'DQGDVNHG7KDWFKHUµWROHQG0LQLVWHULDOZHLJKWWRKLV
HIIRUWV¶305 In his biography of Ingham, Harris held that Ingham complained to Thatcher 
DQGVKHZDVµV\PSDWKHWLF¶LQVWUXFWLQJ3DUNLQVRQWRµKHOSKLPRXW¶306 Parkinson said that, 
because of his involvement, the MoD µwould have to explain to a member of the Cabinet 
why a junior representative had been sent to the key co-RUGLQDWLQJPHHWLQJV¶307 It was 
clear that Ingham was becoming frustrated with the lack of ministerial involvement in PR 
policy and that he approached both the Prime Minister and Parkinson about this. On 7 
May, the IG noted WKH35HIIRUWZDVµVXIIHULQJIURPDODFNRI0LQLVWHULDOLQYROYHPHQWLQ
presentation, particularly in OD6$¶308 ,QJKDPWROGWKHJURXSWKDWKHLQWHQGHGµWRPLQXWH
the Prime Minister DERXWDOORIWKLV¶309 It was also evident that Ingham contacted 
Parkinson in order to voice concern. Indeed, on 10 May, Ingham told the IG that he was 
µwriting to the Chancellor of the Duchy about presentation in general and MOD difficulties 
LQSDUWLFXODU¶310 On 10 May Ingham did write to Parkinson. He complained that the MoD 
had not given presentation a high enough priority and its procedures were too 
cumbersome.311 Later, after meeting with Parkinson on 12 May, Ingham referred to the 
Chancellor of the Duchy aJDLQWHOOLQJWKHJURXSWKDWWKHLUGLVFXVVLRQVKDGEHHQµXVHIXO¶312 
7KHUHZDVDGLUHFWFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ,QJKDP¶VFRPSODLQWVWR7KDWFKHUDQG3DUNLQVRQ
and the appointment of Parkinson to oversee presentation. The communication and co-
operation between members of the IG - most notably the MoD and No.10 - was the 
primary cause for concern within the group. The need for a ministerial role increased as the 
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3c. The Parkinson Presentation Group 
On 25 April Parkinson was appointed as supervisor of the SAPU. There is evidence to 
suggest that Parkinson had resisted this responsibility earlier in the month, suggesting he 
did not perceive his role in the OD6$WREHRWKHUWKDQµ:DU&DELQHWVSRNHVSHUVRQ¶ In 
fact, Parkinson did not remember being approached in the first three weeks of April about 
this matter.314 On 13 April, when the SAPU reviewed its procedural problems concerning 
ministerial approval of circular lines, Wade-Gery submitted to Armstrong a number of 
alternatives to clearing lines with Thatcher. One alternative was to µKDYHDQRWKHUWU\DW
press-JDQJLQJ0U3DUNLQVRQ¶315 On 12 April Parkinson is purported to have spoken with 
Armstrong about the possibility of acting as a clearing minister for SAPU distributions.316 
It was not until after 25 April that Parkinson did assume the role about which he was 
approached on 12 April.317 On 11 May, Parkinson received instruction to review the public 
presentation of policy.318 The following day Parkinson convened a meeting between his 
own office, the Cabinet Office and No.10¶V 3UHVV2IILFH7KHDVVHPEO\PHWVSHFLILFDOO\µWR
FRQVLGHUKRZWKHSXEOLFSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQLQWhe Falklands crisis 
PLJKWEHLPSURYHG¶319 At this meeting a new group was established ± the PPG. The group 
ZRXOGEHDµPHFKDQLVPWRWDNHDQRYHUDOOYLHZRIWKHSXEOLFSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH
*RYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQ¶320 The group would consist of a mixed ministerial/official 
contingent and would be chaired by Parkinson himself. The purpose of the group was 
threefold: to follow up and implement decisions taken in the OD(SA); to make medium-
term contingency plans for the presentation of likely events; and to seek to resolve 
µGLIIHUHQFHVRIYLHZ¶EHWZHHQGHSDUWPHQWVRQSUHVHQWDWLRQDOPDWWHUV321 In reality there was 
only one chief concern: the improvement of relations between No.10 and the MoD ± more 
specifically Ingham and Cooper. The group re-established the authority of Ingham over 
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In a small percentage of the literature there has been speculation as to the exact role 
Parkinson played in PR. Mercer eWDOFODLPHG3DUNLQVRQ¶VUROHensured a better MoD turn-
out at IG meetings.323 Harris, in Gotcha!, pointed to his role as spokesperson, but neglected 
to mention any other part he may have played.324 In his biography of Ingham, Harris later 
paid a cursory mention to Parkinson, suggesting that his involvement in the crisis eased 
,QJKDP¶VVWUXJJOHZLWKWKH0R'325 The final academic to have considered 3DUNLQVRQ¶V
role was Freedman. Freedman dedicated limited discussion to the Chancellor of the 
'XFK\¶VSRVLWLRQEXWPDGH LWFOHDUWKDW3DUNLQVRQZDVODWHUµFUHGLWHGZLWKFOHDULQJWKHDLU
and improving co-RUGLQDWLRQ¶326 The role of the PPG was not the subject of any extensive 
comment in the first-hand-accounts of those associated with the group. Thatcher did not 
PHQWLRQ3DUNLQVRQ¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQ*RYHUQPHQW35SDVWUHPDUNLQJWKDWVKHPDGH
Parkinson an addition to the OD(SA), in part because he was media-savvy.327 In fact, 
Thatcher neglected Ingham altogether in her recollections on the Falklands.328 ,Q,QJKDP¶V
PHPRLUV3DUNLQVRQ¶VSDUWLQWKHFULVLVZDVUHGXFHGWREXWDSDUDJUDSK329 Most tellingly 
though, Parkinson, in his autobiographical account of the Falklands, failed to make any 
reference at all to the group he established on 12 May.330 
 
One of the main drawbacks of analysing the meetings of the PPG is that there exist no 
minutes. A number of notes on the meetings which were circulated subsequent to 
consultations exist, but no official record. This did not surprise Parkinson, who conceded 
that he did not think it was an accident that no minutes were taken: µ«LIWKHUHZDVD
dispute we would have it out. But nobody wanted to write minutes saying there had been a 
rRZEHWZHHQWKLVSHUVRQRUWKDW¶331 
 
3c (i). Attendance 
Despite claims to the contrary during the hearings of the HCDC, the PPG was not formed 
to carry out an overall co-ordinating role, nor did it, in practice, perform one. Its one 
function was to ease relations between MoD and No.10. Previously, WKH6$38¶VSURJUHVV
under Parkinson was examined. It was contended that neither the effectiveness, nor the 
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productivity of the unit, were affected to any extent whilst Parkinson was overseeing its 
productivity. The establishment of the PPG on 12 May had an equally limited effect on 
Government presentation policy. The most significant way in which the group was judged 
to have impacted the presentation of the Falklands crisis was concerning attendance at 
meetings of the IG. 3DUNLQVRQFRQILUPHGWKDWWKHPDLQDLPRIWKHJURXSZDVWRµMDFNXS
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶332 +DUULVDUJXHGWKDWDVDUHVXOWRIWKH33*µ&RRSHUWRRNWKHKLQWDQG
0F'RQDOGGXO\VWDUWHGDWWHQGLQJWKH'RZQLQJ6WUHHWFRPPLWWHH¶333 Mercer et al. 
maintained the samHDUJXPHQWµ3DUNLQVRQ¶VFRPPLWWHHGLGLQGHHGHQVXUHDEHWWHUWXUQ-out 
IURPWKH0R'DW,QJKDP¶VPHHWLQJV«¶334 Parkinson also felt that the group had the 
GHVLUHGHIIHFWDQGWKDWµRQFHHYHU\ERG\NQHZLWZDVIRUPHGZLWKWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V
authority ± people pUHWW\PXFKIHOOLQWROLQH¶335 However, this was not the case. It is true 
that there were only MoD absences before the establishment of the PPG. However, the 
quality of representation did not improve.336 
 
Between the first meeting of the IG, on 8 April, and 12 May, there were three MoD 
absences.337 There were no recorded absences thereafter. However, McDonald attended 
eight meetings, all of which fell before 12 May. After 12 May the CPR, Taylor, only 
attended once, on 16 May. After 16 May there was no MoD representation higher than the 
OHYHORI&KLHI3UHVV2IILFHU7KHUHLVHYLGHQFHWRVXJJHVWWKDW7D\ORU¶VDWWHQGDQFHRQ
0D\ZDVDGLUHFWUHVXOWRI3DUNLQVRQ¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQ2Q0D\3DUNLQVRQKHOGDVSHFLDO
meeting with Nott and Cooper on presentation of the conflict. The only day on which the 
CPR attended the IG coincided with the first ministerial meeting with the MoD concerning 
35'HVSLWH7D\ORU¶VRQHDSSHDUDQFHDWWKH,*, after 12 May the PPG did not influence 
attendance to any great extent. In fact, after the PPG was established, a greater variety of 
MoD officials attended IG meetings. Before the end of April only three different people 
has acted as representatives of the MoD: McDonald, Gee and, on one occasion, a PO. Yet 
during the meetings proceeding 12 May six different MoD delegates joined meetings 
sporadically.338 
 
Parkinson was not made aware of the fact that representation did not improve at the IG 
DIWHUWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKH33*+HIHOWWKDWµWKHPDQGDWHEHFDPHFOHDUNHHSLQWRXFK
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ZLWKHDFKRWKHU¶339 When asked whether alternative channels of communication opened up 
between Cooper and Ingham he thought it possible ± yet no evidence obtained from 
archives, nor the testimony submitted to the HCDC substantiated this. The contention that 
the PPG benefiteG35RUJDQLVDWLRQEHFDXVHLWH[HUWHGSUHVVXUHRQWKH0R'WRµLPSURYH
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶DW,*PHHWLQJVLVXQVXEVWDQWLDWHG7KHUHFRUGHGWXUQ-out of each meeting 
proved that attendance after the creation of the PPG was made up of less senior figures, 
and by a vaster array of representatives. 
 
The role of the PPG was further limited by the fact that it was introduced relatively late in 
the conflict. It only met three times. Freedman wrote that the group met four times.340 
However, that figure included the meeting of 12 May which did not involve all members of 
the PPG ± the MoD was not represented. Meetings were held on 19 May, 2 June and 14 
June. The relevance of the meeting held on 14 June could be disputed since the result of 
the meeting had no effect on Government PR policy during the conflict. There was 
supposed to be a meeting of the PPG on 8 June. However, a meeting of the IG was told the 
day before that 3DUNLQVRQµWKRXJKWLWXQQHFHVVDU\WRKROGDPHHWLQJWRGD\«¶341 On 8 June 
WKH,*DJUHHGZLWK3DUNLQVRQWKDWµLWZDVQRWQHFHVVDU\WRKROGDIXUWKHUPHHWLQJ«XQWLO
QH[W0RQGD\¶342 The most problematic element in judging the effect of the meetings of 
the PPG is that there is no documentary evidence available. Yet with only three meetings 
held, the scope for efficiency was considerably decreased. Indeed, Parkinson later 
confirmed WKHJURXS¶VUROHZDVOLPLWHG.343 He also stated that the need for the group 
GLPLQLVKHGDVWKHZDUZHQWRQFODLPLQJWKDWµLWJUDGXDOO\ZLWKHUHGRQWKHYLQHDVSHRSOH
UHDOL]HGLWZDVLQHYHU\RQH¶V interests to co-ordinate the presentation of policy; otherwise 
WKHGDQJHUZDVWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWZRXOGVRXQGGLVFRUGDQWDQGFRQIOLFWLQJQRWHV¶344 
 
3c (ii). A Co-ordinating Body? 
If the aim of the PPG was co-ordination of Government PR policy, the group was not 
successful. There were several differing points of view expressed during the HCDC 
inquiry. Cooper told the committee that he did not think there was even a need for a major 
co-ordinating role.345 Cooper said 3DUNLQVRQ¶V UROHZDVµDUHODWLYHO\OLPLWHG RQH¶346 Nott 
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felt there was a minister in charge of Government information policy, but that he was not 
involved in the Falklands.347 He protested: µ7RSXWD0LQLVWHUZKRLVDQon-Ministry of 
'HIHQFH0LQLVWHU«in charge of coordinating the issue of releases which are concerned 
DERXWPDWWHUVRIRSHUDWLRQVZRXOGEHDQDEVXUGLW\¶348 The committee reflected on the 
VXEMHFWLQLWVFRQFOXVLRQVµ,QWKLVFRQWH[WWKHVRPHZKDWP\VWHULRXVUROHSOD\HGE\WKH
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster«during the crisis is worth examining, if only 
EHFDXVHRXUZLWQHVVHVVKRZHGWKHPVHOYHVWREHFRQIXVHGDERXWLW¶349 Parkinson agreed 
ZLWK,QJKDP¶VHYDOXDWLRQWKDWKLVUROHZDVµOLPLWHG¶± he was there merely µDVDFRXUWRf 
appeal if anything went wrong, or one group was dissatisfied wiWKWKHRWKHU«¶350 
 
To some extent, overall co-ordination was absent from the start of the PPG. The meeting 
hosted by Parkinson on 12 May did not include the MoD. In fact, Parkinson did not meet 
with members of the MoD until 16 May. Parkinson met with Cooper and Nott to discuss 
µKRZWKHSXEOLFSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKH)DONODQGVFULVLVPLJKWEH
LPSURYHG¶351 This meeting was an extension of that which took place on 12 May. The 




The first meeting was scheduled for 19 May. On 17 May Parkinson held a drinks reception 
for a number of PUSs, including Cooper. Parkinson later recalled that at this event he made 
it clear that WKH0R'µwould have to explain¶ why junior representatives had been sent to 
WKHµNH\FR-RUGLQDWLQJPHHWLQJV¶.353 3DUNLQVRQ¶VDFWLRQVEHWZHHQDQG0D\
authenticate claims the primary reason IRUWKHJURXS¶VFUHDWLRQZDVWRHDVHUHODWLRQV
between No.10 and MoD. Parkinson saw each department separately, gauging responses 
ahead of the first meeting of his group. In this respect, the co-ordination supplied by the 
PPG was limited to inter-departmental co-ordination. While Haig had performed his shuttle 
GLSORPDF\DFURVVFRQWLQHQWV3DUNLQVRQSHUIRUPHGKLVEHKLQG:KLWHKDOO¶s closed doors. 
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Ingham, after all, was the spokesman for the OD(SA). The increased relationship between 
the IG and Parkinson was recorded in its minutes. After the PPG was established, some 
issues were reserved until they might be resolved at PPG, purely because the quality of the 
MoD representation at the IG had declined. For example, on 2 June the IG discussed the 
treatment of demands from foreign press for access to the Falklands after hostilities 
ceased.355 The MoD representative, who had never before attended a meeting, was unable 
to outline MoD plans on this subject. It was concluded that the matter would have to be 




Cabinet ± certainly that is what Thatcher intended when she invited him to join the 
OD(SA).356 3DUNLQVRQ¶VUROHLQ*RYHUQPHQWSUHVHQWDWLRQLQFUHDVHGWKURXJKRXW0D\, in 
conjunction with action on the Falklands. By 11 May, the military and political situation, 
with the Government increasingly lining itself against the media, dictated that presentation 
of the Government was given more serious attention. The 33*¶V SULPDU\JRDOZDVWRµEDQJ
KHDGVWRJHWKHU¶DQGWRIDFLOLWDWHFR-operation between the increasingly hostile MoD and 
No.10. 7KH+&'&IRXQGWKDWWKHUHKDGEHHQDµIDLOXUHRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQVEHWZHHQ1R
DQGWKH0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFH«¶357 <HWWKHFRPPLWWHHMXGJHGWKDWµWKHUROHHQYLVDJHGIRU
0U3DUNLQVRQZDVSUREDEO\QRWDYHU\VXEVWDQWLDORQH«¶358 The PPG did not contribute to 
overall policy co-ordination to any great extent. The PPG added an extra layer of 
bureaucracy to what was, by May, already chaotic organisation. Hastings told the HCDC 
that what was wrong ZLWKWKHZD\WKHPHGLDZDVKDQGOHGZDVWKDWµWKHUHZHUHIDUWRR
many people fishing in very murky waters and there was intense suspicion and ill-feeling 
EHWZHHQYDULRXVHOHPHQWV¶359 3DUNLQVRQ¶VFKLHIDLPZDVWRHDVHLQWHU-departmental 
tension. This goal may have been achieved in May. In June, however, the role of the PPG 
had declined so significantly that enmities between the MoD and No.10 resumed, 
particularly over the events of 8 June.  
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When the HCDC was commissioned to consider the way in which the media was handled 
during the Falklands, it focused on one ministry ± the MoD. The Sunday Times Insight 
7HDPUHPDUNHGµWKHSUHVVFROOHFWLYHO\IHOWWKDWWKHPLQLVWU\RIGHIHQFH [sic] had had a 
WHUULEOHZDU«¶360 However, the MoD was not the only Ministry, or department, which 
played an integral role in overall PR policy. The role of the FCO, for example, was 
considered in Chapter Four. This chapter examined the role of No.10¶V Press Office - as 
well as its Chief - and the usual structures of Government which had to adapt to the crisis. 
Most importantly, the chapter assessed and appraised the groups which were created to 
deal directly with the PR impact of the Falklands: the IG, SAPU and PPG. 
 
:RRGZDUGWROG03VWKDWµRXWRIRUJDQLVDWLRQWKHUHZRXOGFRPHEHWWHUUHODWLRQV¶361 At the 
outbreak of the crisis, the Government was not well organised to deal with the media 
DVSHFWRIDQ\UHPRWHFRQIOLFW0HUFHUHWDOFODLPHGWKDWµLIWKHUHLVRQHSRLQWXSRQZKLFK
people are agreed, it is that Britain did not have an information policy as such during the 
)DONODQGV:DU¶362 The chief reason there was no coherent PR policy to which every 
department should abide, was because each of the key departments involved in the crisis ± 
the MoD, FCO, Cabinet Office, SAPU and No.10 ± failed to work cordially with each 
other in pursuit of a shared publicity goal. Principally, the MoD and No.10 failed to assist 
the other ± instead, submitting to representation in a series of interdepartmental 
committees. The tensions between No.10 and the MoD were commented on by journalists 
after the war, narrated by the media at the time, and had a considerable impact on the way 
in which the war would be remembered. Strangely, the HCDC found that: 
 
Throughout the Falklands Operations, the senior Public Relations staff at the MoD, the Prime 
0LQLVWHU¶V3UHVV2IILFHDQGthe News Department of the Foreign Office kept in close touch with 
each other on an hour to hour basis.363 
 
Yet, as demonstrated here, the evidence suggests that daily contact did not constitute any 
great collaboration or telemutual assistance. There were, however, significant attempts 
made in order to better centralise and co-RUGLQDWHWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VLQIRUPDWLRQHIIRUW2Q
8 April the SAPU was created, under the Cabinet Office, with the sole purpose of keeping 
ministers informed of events, and the lines they should take on those events. The same day 
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the IG was formed as an extension of the regular MIOs. At the outset of the crisis two 
central bodies which would co-ordinate what information was to be released from the 
Government - how and when - were established on an inter-departmental basis. Both 
organisations, in theory, should have aided the efficient running of the Government 
information machine. The SAPU would ensure a coherent Government response to 
proceedings in the South Atlantic. The IG could act as a forum for the main departments, 
which were distributing information and dealing with journalists, to come together and 
plan proactively when news should be released, how, via what medium and who should be 
the one to announce it. In this respect, the groups established by the wider Government 
contrasted to those which were set-up exclusively in the MoD. External MoD groups were 
established at the start of the war, only to have their power dwindle and diminish. MoD-
centred groups, like the NRG and the Military Briefing Group, although formed late into 
the conflict, were, by the end of the war, beginning to flourish.  
 
The Information Group had the potential to ensure a co-ordinated, central PR policy in 
1982. However, it was never permitted to become such an entity, since the conflict 
between the MoD and No.10 (and between Cooper and Nott, and Ingham) dominated so 
much of the agenda. Increasingly, the representation of the MoD crippled the effectiveness 
of the IG, and prevented it from fulfilling any goal to unite the PR factions of the 
Government. The SAPU could have been an effective way to communicate happenings to 
ministers, and to ensure that any Government agent who spoke to the media would be 
towing the line. However, the efficiency of the SAPU dwindled as the conflict progressed. 
Circular documents decreased in volume and frequency and were hugely limited by 
procedural arrangements for their dissemination and by delays in accurate information. The 
role of Cecil Parkinson was not to act as manager of information policy, as has been 
commonly assumed, but to address the issues brought up, or highlighted by, the 
Information Group and to address the friction between the MoDPR and the No.10 Press 
Office.  
 
There were three distinct phases to the conflict in WHUPVRIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VDWWLWXGH
towards the importance of the media. The first phase lasted the entire month of April and 
was comprised of a very broad effort by the Government to ensure all its representatives 
µVDQJIURPWKHVDPHVRQJVKHHW¶7KHILUVt phase also demonstrated a lack of concerted 
effort to address future arrangements and co-operation past the establishment of the SAPU 
and IG. The second phase, the first two and a half weeks of May, saw the Government 
204 
 
assume an adversarial stance, pitting itself against the media in general, and the BBC in 
particular. This increase in hostility between the media and the Government correlated 
with an increase in the more material hostilities in the South Atlantic. The way in which 
prominent action from the Falklands was reported gave rise to a revision of PR policy 
across Government. In the MoD this revision saw amendments to many aspects of policy. 
Policy was also revised centrally. The introduction of Cecil Parkinson as a mediator 
marked a distinct shift LQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VDSSURDFKWRWKHPHGLD7KHILQDOSKDVH
observed a more conciliatory approach to Government-media relations. It was a phase 
distinguished by efforts to solve problems which were predictable and which had been 





Content Analysis  
 
 
The principle method by which historians can gauge the way the media reported a certain 
topic is through the employment of content analysis. This tool has been relatively under-
employed in historical assessments of the media and its role.1 In the case of the Falklands, 
the conduct of the media has been written on extensively, yet a comprehensive analysis of 
the three major media of the time - radio, television and print media - is absent. There have 
been works which tackled some form of content analysis, and which have contributed 
immeasurably to the understanding of the conflict as a media war - principally as a 
televisual war. There were four key studies, conducted throughout the 1980s, which 
utilised content analysis ± three focused primarily on television coverage of the war, the 
other on tabloid presentation of women during the conflict. In 1985 the GUMG published 
War and Peace News as a result of a content analysis which coQVLGHUHGERWKWKH%%&¶V
DQG,71¶VQLJKWO\QHZV2 In 1986, Valerie Adams engaged in a type of content analysis 
ZKHQGHDOLQJZLWKWKHVSHFXODWLRQRIµDUPFKDLUVWUDWHJLVWV¶3 Whilst Adams did not produce 
charts and graphs (nor did she use precise figures), shHGLGDVVHVVVWUDWHJLVWV¶WHOHYLVLRQ
appearances on programmes which included, but were not limited to, daily news bulletins. 
In 1988, Morrison and Tumber contributed to the literary field by conducting an extensive 
analysis of, again, the BBC and ITN nightly news.4 Finally, in 2011, Zoe Anderson 
published an article which examined the presentation of women by the media throughout 
the duration of the Falklands crisis.5 
 
Before April 1982, the GUMG had prepared for video recording of all BBC news and ITN 
programmes to start on 1 May.6 The group was to embark on research on how the 
presentation of the UN Second Special Session (June ± July 1982) compared to the 
presentation of the First Session (1978). However, the researchers became immersed in the 
unfurling conflict between Britain and Argentina in April. Consequentially, it made 
coverage of the Falklands central to a new study into how the war was reported on 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter One. 
2








 GUMG, p.iii. For more on the GUMG: A. Quinn, 30 Years of Bad News: The Glasgow University Media 
Group and the Intellectual History of Media and Cultural Studies, (University of Glasgow, 2010); N.B. 
7RGD\WKHJURXSLVNQRZQVLPSO\DVWKHµ*ODVJRZ0HGLD*URXS¶. 
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television.7 GUMG outlined three dimensions to its project: it wished to identify key 
explanatory themes; it would quantitatively assess the appearance of each explanation; and 
it would consider how each theme developed.8  
 
There were DQXPEHURIGUDZEDFNVWRWKH*80*¶VDQDO\VLV)LUVWO\DQGPRVWLPSRUWDQWO\
analysis was limited to the period between 1 May and 14 June. Essentially, 28 days of the 
conflict were neglected ± almost the entire first month. Although this might not have had 
PXFKLPSDFWRQWKHJURXS¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIKRZKRVWLOLWLHVZHUHUHSRUWHGLWPDGHIRUDQ
incomplete study. This is particularly the case since one of the aims of the study was to 
H[DPLQHWKHµEDODQFH¶EHWZHHQPLOLWDU\and diplomatic coverage of the conflict on 
television news.9 An additional complication was that there was no overarching analysis 
presented to mark the progression of themes, with no indication of the different phases of 
the war.  
 
Adams, without consciously embarking on the process of forming a content analysis, 
offered her own variety RIDQDO\VLVE\ORRNLQJFORVHO\DWWKHPHGLD¶VFRPPHQWDU\RIWKH
Falklands. Adams examined news broadcasts and current affairs programmes where 
µH[SHUW¶WHVWLPRQ\ was featured. Adams concluded from scrutinising primarily television, 
EXWDOVRSULQWPDWHULDOWKDWWKHµOD\PDQ¶ZKRIROORZHGDVPXFKprint and broadcast 
material as possible µVKRXOGKDYHKDGDURXJKLGHDRIWKHVL]HRIWKHQDYDODQGODQGIRUFHV
LQYROYHGDQGDFOHDULGHDRIWKHQXPEHURI+DUULHUV¶10 $GDPV¶ZRUNZDVOLWWHUHGZLWK
evidence from both TV and newspapers. One significant limitation was that it almost 
entirely overlooked the role of radio. Because Adams did not produce quantitative analysis 
of the information she considered, it suffered from generalisations. For example, when 
asVHVVLQJWKHSUHVVFRYHUDJHRIWKHILUVWZHHNRIWKHZDU$GDPVGHFODUHGWKDWµVRPHWKLQJ
like half the newspaper articles commenting on the operation [to launch the Task Force] 
GHDOWZLWKWKHIRUFHOHYHOVRIERWKVLGHV¶11 Although, in the strictest sense, AdDPV¶ZRUN
did not offer a reliable, systematic form of content analysis, what it did present was the 
most comprehensive overall analysis of the way television and the printed press presented 
British speculation. 
 
                                                 
7
 GUMG, p.iv. 
8
 Ibid.  
9
 Aims of the study: GUMG, p.v. 
10
 Adams, p.143. 
11
 Ibid., p.66.; N.B. Content analysis conducted for this thesis revealed that comment on British equipment, 
or preparation for a military conflict, ranked the fourth highest theme across both newspapers. 
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The third, and arguably most significant use of content analysis, was in Morrison and 
7XPEHU¶VZRUN12 The authors conducted a thorough assessment of the themes covered by 
news bulletins on ITV and BBC.13 The way in which casualties were reported on national 
news was also one of the subjects of the study.14 Further, the pair isolated the location of 
reports, measuring the origin of stories.15 The extent of the analysis was by far the greatest 
and most comprehensive offered. It included analysis of the length of time attributed to the 
Falklands, the language used to describe both British and Argentine equipment and the 
types of interviewees most frequently featured. What Morrison and Tumber contributed 
was a precise account of what was reported, by whom and using what language on popular 
television news. However, what would have made the research definitive would have been, 
DVZLWKWKH*80*¶VZRUNDQDGGLWLRQDODVVHVVPHQWRIWKHZHDOWKRIFXUUHQWDIIDLUV
programmes which dealt directly with the topic of the war.16 The analysis presented by this 
thesis utilised the work of Morrison and Tumber as a foundation for analysis of the printed 
press. 
 
The last of the key studies was that of Zoe Anderson.17 Anderson carried out an analysis of 
tabloid newspapers during the war. The aim of the article was to examine how women 
were represented by the press, and how that representation was indicative of a type of 
British nationalism.18 Four newspapers were treated as primary sources and subject to 
sampling: the Daily Star, Daily Mirror, The Sun and the Daily Mail. Anderson concluded 
that there were three main representations which women occupied in the tabloid media: as 
a national boundary marker ± ZKHUHWKHµUDSH¶RIWKHLVODQGVDPSOLILHGWKHOLQNEHWZHHQ
GHIHQFHRIµQDWLRQ¶DQGGHIHQFHRIµZRPHQ¶DVJRRGZLYHVJLUOIULHQGs or mothers ± the 
UHLQIRUFHPHQWRIUROHVRIµQDWLRQDOLVHG¶JHQGHUDQGDVSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKHZDUHIIRUW
                                                 
12
 Morrison and Tumber 
13
 Ibid., pp.274-278. 
14
 Ibid., p.281. 
15
 Ibid., pp.261-262. 
16
 For example: Panorama, Newsnight, Weekend World, World in Action and Question Time. 
17
 $QGHUVRQµ(PSLUH¶V)HWLVK¶SS-204. 
N.B. A study which dealt with a similar issue to thaWRI$QGHUVRQZDV/XF\1RDNHV¶WKHVLV/1RDNHV
Gender and British National Identity in Wartime: A Study of the Links between Gender and National Identity 





µ7KH6DPH2OG6WRU\"(QJOLVKQHVVWKHWDEORLGSUHVVDQGWKH:RUOG&XS¶Leisure Studies, 23, 1 (2004) 
pp.79-92.; Conboy, Tabloid Britain: Constructing a community through language (Routledge, 2006). 
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through sexualised patriotism ± women facilitated sexual objectification as a form of 
µQDWLRQDOVHUYLFH¶19  
 
There were a number of practical limitatiRQVWR$QGHUVRQ¶VDQDO\VLV)RULQVWDQFHWKH
process by which newspapers were sampled is not explicit. Although all papers tested were 
µWDEORLGV¶DQGWKHUHZHUHGHILQLQJIHDWXUHVZKLFKHDFKVKDUHGIRUPDWFRQWHQWDQG
audience), Anderson pointed out that VWDWLVWLFVRQWKHWLWOHVWKHPVHOYHVZHUHµVFDUFH¶20 For 
example, Anderson was unable to locate circulation figures for each of the papers tested 
during the period of the Falklands War. Instead, she used figures from 1983 and 1986.21 In 
addition, the four papers analysed were not representative of the most successful tabloid 
newspapers. Anderson did not assess the Daily Express. The Express had a greater 
circulation than either the Daily Star or Daily Mail.22 In addition, none of the Sunday 
tabloids were considered which, particularly when dealing with only a small sample, might 
have offered more comprehensive results. 
 
The two most prominent works, Journalists at War and War and Peace News, both 
concentrated attention exclusively on analysis of television news. Only Morrison and 
7XPEHU¶VZRUNZDVFRPSUHKHQVLYHLQLWVDQDO\VLVRIFRQWHQW± including assessment of by 
far the most variables. However, these news analyses had limitations ± for example, both 
analyses considered only evening news broadcasts.23 This chapter presents a thorough, 
thematic and rigorous analysis of the subject matter of a medium throughout the duration 
of the conflict. This thesis focuses on analysis of the content of the printed press from 2 
April to 14 June. The consequential results represent the most thorough and methodical 
evaluation of the themes and topics covered - and the format of - newspapers during the 
war. In addition, this analysis considers for the first time the origin of reports on the 
Falklands, the sources used and people who wrote them, as well as the more general 
features of coverage such as the length of a newspaper and the proportion of Falklands-
related news compared to alternative news. What makes the analysis more effective is the 
fact that it is possible to compare the results of both television and newspaper analysis. 
This thesis seeks not only to contribute further to the literature by extending analysis to the 
                                                 
19
 Arguments concerning national boundaries: Anderson, p.197.; arguments relating to sexualised patriotism: 
pp.199-200. 
20
 Anderson, p.193. 
21
 Average circulation figures during 1982: Daily Star: 1,339,216, Daily Mail: 1,877,192, Daily Mirror: 
3.309,271 and The Sun: 4,125,269. 
22
 The average circulation of the Daily Express in 1982 was 2,007,514, far more than the 'DLO\6WDU¶V
average circulation of 1,339,216, and the Daily Mail¶V. 
23
 Other bulletins: BBC ± 2QH2¶&ORFN1HZV and ITN ± News at One and News at 5.45. 
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printed press, but to supersede existing studies by contrasting media, thus challenging 
accepted theories. 
 
1. Content Analysis: The Falklands Media 
7HOHYLVLRQQHZV¶FRYHUDJHZDVDQGisUHJDUGHGDVWKHSXEOLF¶VPRVWVLJQLILFDQWVRXUFHRI
information. Nicholas, Editor of ITN, estimated that during the Falklands between 15 and 
16 million people saw one or other ITN programme in a day.24 Protheroe approximated 
that 10 WRPLOOLRQSHRSOHZDWFKHGWKH%%&¶VQLJKWO\QHZV25 There had been, before 
1982, a serious expansion of the number of British households which owned a TV licence. 
For example, in 1956, at the time of the Suez crisis, there were less than six million licence 
holders. In 1983 the figure had more than tripled to 18 million.26  
 
However, despite the increasing popularity of TV news, the Falklands undermined normal 
reporting procedure. The lack of moving images from the Falklands was a well-
documented phenomenon.27 Due to the lack of equipment to transmit film via satellite, by 
the time of the British victory, only three batches of film had reached Britain.28 ,WZDVQ¶W
until as late as 8 June that footage of the British landing on the islands arrived in Britain.29  
The credibility of TV in Britain was weakened by the fact that the predominantly visual 
medium was almost reduced to a radio role ± TV had been regarded as the most honest 
account of events exactly because of its visual element.30 The BBC and ITN purchased 
film from the Government, filmed before the conflict, in order to fill empty screens. 
Footage included WKHLVODQGV¶FRDVWOLQHVZLOGOLIHDQGKLVWRULFLPDJHVUHODWLQJWR%ULWLVK
settlement.31 The lack of television material has resulted in the Falklands conflict 
commonly being referred to DVDµ5DGLR:DU¶ 
 
The role of the radio in disseminating news had been dwindling. The radio had 
experienced a brief period of triumph following the Second World War, when it emerged 
as an essential method of communicating news. However, the popularity of the medium 
increasingly diminished as television became more accessible. Christopher Sterling, 
Professor of Media and Public Affairs, argued that the Falklands marked a highlight in the 
                                                 
24
 Nicholas, HCDC, v.ii, p.80, p.228.  
25
 Protheroe, HCDC, v.ii, p.52, q.140. 
26
 Harris, p.55. 
27





 µ)LUVWIRRWDJHRIODQGLQJVKRZQ¶The Times, 9 Jun., p.6.  
30
 Taylor, HCDC, v.ii, p.268, q.1031. 
31
 CoI invoice, 13 May, TNA, Pym Interview, INF6/2158 f.1.   
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development of British radio journalism.32 Much of the most significant news from the 
Falklands was actually broadcast first on radio ± be it on the overseas service or on 
domestic services. Radio stations were able to interrupt regular features in order to provide 
on-the-spot coverage of major breaking news.33 Valerie Geller, a broadcasting consultant, 
DVVHUWHGWKDWWKHPRVWSRZHUIXOWRROVRIUDGLRZHUHµLPPHGLDF\DQGLPDJHU\¶± both tools 
ZKLFKZHUHH[SORLWHGGXULQJWKH)DONODQGVZLWKVRXQGELWHVVXFKDVµ,FRXQWHGWKHPDOO
out, and I counteGWKHPDOOEDFN¶34 7KHPRVWUHVSHFWHGDFFRXQWRIWKHµUDGLRZDU¶ZDV
$ODVGDLU3LQNHUWRQ¶Vµ6WUDQJHUVLQWKH1LJKW¶35 Radio was a key factor in the dissemination 
of news during the Falklands. However, it has been relatively overlooked in much of the 
literature. It was the intention to include an analysis of the content of radio news bulletins 
in this work; however, timing parameters determined this would be impossible. For a truly 
inclusive assessment of the media in the Falklands, analysis of radio would be compared to 
that presented here, and to that presented by Morrison and Tumber.  
 
In 1982 it was estimated that over 31.3 million people read a national newspaper daily.36  
Whilst one can look to circulation figures for an indication of how popular the press, and 
particular publications were, we can never know how many people read a newspaper. 
Whilst The Sun, for example, may have had a circulation of 4 million readers, it is likely 
that copies were passed between friends and amongst family. The actual figure might be 
four times the circulation, for instance. 
 
Newspaper coverage of the Falklands becomes more significant when one considers that 
scrutiny of the press was - and is - rife amongst those scholars who have written on the 
media and the Falklands. The Sunday Times Insight Team, not surprisingly, was 
preoccupied with the press. Harris devoted a sizeable proportion of his work to Fleet 
Street. This has also been the case with those works which use the war as a case study.37 In 
addition to this, detailed study of newspaper coverage is essential because living memory 
still associates the media in the Falklands War with prominent headlines, editorials and 
articles. Headlines like 7KH6XQ¶Vµ*27&+$¶DQGµ67,&.,783<285-817$¶DORQJ
                                                 
32
 C. Sterling, Encyclopaedia of Radio (Routledge, 2004) p.384. 
33
 A. Boyd, P. Stewart and R. Alexander, Broadcast Journalism: Techniques of Radio and Television News 
(Taylor & Francis, 2012) p.240. 
34
 V. Geller, Creating Powerful Radio: Getting, Keeping and Growing Audiences; News, Talk, Information 
and Personality Broadcast (Taylor & Francis, 2009). 
35
 3LQNHUWRQµµ6WUDQJHUVLQWKH1LJKW¶¶, pp.344-375. 
36
 Harris, p.40. 
37
 See Knightley, pp.432-438.; Carruthers, pp.120-131.; Royle, pp.217-225. 
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with The Times editorials: µ:($5($//)$/./$1'(5612:¶DQGµ1$.('
$**5(66,21¶, have gone down in history as representative of the crisis.38  
  
2. The Construction of Content Analysis  
The collection and presentation of data analysed in this thesis took place over the course of 
a year. It benefits from a number of advantages which make it reliable. The formulation of 
the processes involved was considered carefully and a robust methodology is outlined in 
the following section. Being explicit about the collection of data is essential to the 
dependability of the results. Political scientist, Ole Holsti, wrote that the development of 
content analysis involves four main stages: 1) Formulating a problem or question 2) 
Deciding on the range and size of a sample 3) Counting within that sample and coding the 
data and 4) Interpreting (and writing up) the data.39 If we assume this, then each stage must 
be briefly explained in order to validate the results.  
 
2a. Formulating a Problem or Question 
This analysis was formed with certain questions in mind. The aim was to produce results 
comparable to those of television coverage.40 The research was to ascertain the origin of 
reports, the priority of Falklands-related news and to look at what type of coverage was 
offered. In order for this study to be evaluated with that of Morrison and Tumber, the 
WKHPHVDOORFDWHGWRHDFKVWRU\ZHUHEXLOWIURPWKHDXWKRUV¶RULJLQDOOLVWRIWKHPHV
Additional themes were included to cover as many outcomes as possible - the new figure 
totalling 214 options.41 These themes have been further explained for the results to be 
easily replicated ± central to the reliability of content analysis.42 Like the analysis featured 
in Journalists at War, one article or story may be attributed more than one theme. 
0RUULVRQDQG7XPEHUGLYLGHGWKHGD\V¶ZRUWKRIFRYHUDJHLQWRILYHWLPHSHULRGV





                                                 
38
 µ*27&+$¶The Sun, 4 May, p.1,; µ67,&.,783<285-817$¶The Sun, 20 Apr., p.1.; µ:($5(
$//)$/./$1'(5612:¶The Times, 5 Apr., p.9.; µ1$.('$**5(66,21¶The Times, 3 Apr., p.7. 
39
 O. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (London, 1969) p.142. 
40
 Results presented by Morrison and Tumber. 
41
 See Appendix 19. 
42
 See Appendix 23. 
43
 N.B. The date 15 June was not analysed in this research. 14 June marked the surrender of the Argentines, 
thus news the following day, it is believed, was not indicative of how the conflict was reported. 
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2b. Deciding on the Range and Size of a Sample 
Most content analyses use a method of sampling information to produce results indicative 
of an entire time period. However, since the Falklands was only 74 days long, and 
experienced fluctuations in events, military incidents and press activity, it is arguable that a 
sample would not be representative of the conflict. As such, this analysis takes into account 
HYHU\GD\EHWZHHQ$SULODQG-XQH7KHUHVXOWVRIHDFKGD\¶VDQDO\VLVZHUHVWRUHGLQD




It would have proved impossible to read and record every national publication printed 
during the period of the war. As such, the two tabloids and two broadsheets with the 
highest circulation were selected for analysis: The Sun and The Daily Mirror, The Times 
and The Daily Telegraph.45 Analysis was carried out on issues printed between Monday 
and Saturday. Sunday newspapers were excluded from these results for three reasons: 
firstly, Sunday newspapers tend to summarise reports already issued earlier in the week; 
secondly, some Sunday newspapers had higher circulation figures than the sister 
publications of titles used in this analysis - thus their inclusion in this analysis would have 
jeopardised the consistency of the results; and finally, Sunday newspapers are inclined to 
be substantive and lengthy - time constraints prohibited their inclusion. Circulation figures 
for each of the four newspapers included in the study can be found in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: &LUFXODWLRQILJXUHVRI%ULWDLQ¶VIRXUOHDGLQJQDWLRQDOQHZVSDSHUVLQ
1982 and during the months of the Falklands War  
 
Daily 
Mirror The Sun 
The Daily 
Telegraph The Times 
Average circulation  
throughout 1982 3,309,271 4,125,269 1,303,961 303,590 
Average circulation  
in April 1982 3,388,527 4,121,584 1,306,384 304,662 
Average circulation  
in May 1982 3,414,148 4,137,416 1,331,662 314,272 
Average circulation  
in June 1982 3,409,681 4,060,963 1,319,306 306,142 
 
                                                 
44
 See Appendix 20. 
45
 N.B. The Evening Standard actually had an average circulation which was higher than that of The Times in 
1982 (546,493). It was discounted from this research since it was classified as a regional newspaper. 
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In order to make the sample included in this analysis comparable with that of analysis of 
television news, the same method concerning dates was followed. In Journalists at War the 
duration of the conflict was divided into five distinct time periods.  These date brackets are 
observed in this content analysis. Each period covers various events which occurred in the 
campaign, making thematic analysis more effective.46  
 
Traditionally, a story is identified in a newspaper when a headline is present, or the space 
the story takes up is more than two column inches.47 In much of Falklands-related material, 
however, there were stories which measured less than two inches, but which had headlines. 
As a consequence, stories are included purely by the gauge of headline. Other 
specifications were that it must be written in complete sentences, it must not be part of an 
advertisement and it must be a whole story - in other words it must not promote a story 
featured elsewhere in the newspaper. This meant that lead stories on page one of a 
publication were counted only on Page One, and not attributed to the page on which they 
were continued. Stories or features which were not counted as general articles were either 
editorials or public opinion pieces (either letters or public opinion columns). These articles 




Other text omitted from the database was related to sports. All four newspapers carried 
designated sports pages. These pages, for the purpose of this study, were not classified as 
µQHZV¶. Three other major features were excluded from examination for the reason that 
they did QRWFRQVWLWXWHµQDWLRQDOQHZV¶7KHILUVWZDVWKHµDQQRXQFHPHQWSDJH¶SUesent in 
all four publications). 6HFRQGO\WKHµ(QWHUWDLQPHQW*XLGH¶LQThe Times and Television 
Guides in The Sun and the Daily Mirror, and The Daily Telegraph¶VHTXLYDOHQWSDJHZKLFh 
FDUULHGD79*XLGHDQGDVHFWLRQHQWLWOHGµ7KHDWUHV&LQHPDV$UW*DOOHULHV¶ZDV
discounted. Finally, stock exchange prices featured in The Times and The Daily Telegraph 
were not recorded. All other pages were analysed including the business sections, wRPHQ¶V
columns, arts¶ SDJHVDOOUHJXODUFROXPQLVWV¶SLHFHVDQGPRVWFUXFLDOO\DOOIHDWXUHGQHZV
The following is a summary of all aspects of reporting recorded: 
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 See Appendix 21. 
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 6/\QFKDQG/3HHUµ$QDO\]LQJ1HZVSDSHU&RQWHQW$+RZ-WR*XLGH¶Readership Institute Paper from 








Ɣ/HWWHUVWRWKH(GLWRURUSXEOLFRSLQLRQSLHFHVDQGKRZPDQ\RIERWK were Falklands-related 
 
Notes on Falklands-Related Articles: 
Ɣ7KHWLWOH 
Ɣ7KHRULJLQRIWKHVWRU\IURPZKLFKFRXQWU\RUFLW\WKHUHSRUWwas written) 
Ɣ :KHWKHU WKH UHSRUW RULJLQDWHG IURP MRXUQDOLVWV ZLWK WKH 7DVN )RUFH DQG LI VR ZKLFK
journalist 




2c. Counting Within that Sample and Coding the Data 
7KHDFWXDOSURFHVVLQYROYHGLQµFRGLQJ¶GDWDRr categorising data in order to facilitate 
further investigation, was simple. One of the main requirements of a reliable and objective 
content analysis is that all results should be able to be reproduced under the same 
conditions.48 The explanation of themes, as well as the research design concerned with this 
project, should allow other scholars to replicate these results ± even potentially to enhance 
them by adding analysis of other publications. What sets this investigation aside from 
others like it is that it has been carried out, from start to finish, by only one person. 
7\SLFDOO\FRQWHQWDQDO\VLVLVXQGHUWDNHQE\DJURXSRIµFRGHUV¶ZKRDUHJLYHQWUDLQLQJRQ
how coding should be completed for that particular project. This often leads to anomalies 
and does not account for differences in opinion, when even the slightest irregularity or 
variance can have a huge effect on results. Inter-coder agreement is critical in the conduct 
of content analysis. The fact that one person has carried out this research, a person who has 
applied the same attitude, assessments and judgements throughout, makes it an especially 
consistent piece of work.  
 
The content analysis presented in this thesis is the first of its kind. It allows for a wider, 
more detailed and more reliable indication of the news coverage of the war. There are, 
however, a number of ways in which it is flawed ± or at least it could be improved. These 
issues are highlighted here for the purpose of full disclosure, and to better equip future 
research which might use this thesis as a starting point. The analysis of the two most 
popular tabloid newspapers and two most popular broadsheets is extensive for a thesis of 
this size, but is by no means conclusive. What it offers is an insight into the best-selling 
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 Holsti, p.4. 
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QHZVSXEOLFDWLRQV¶FRYHUDJH- it is not indicative of all national newspapers. The Guardian, 
for example, took a completely different line to most other national dailies. Far from being 
MXVWµQHXWUDO¶The Guardian¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKHZDUKDVEHHQDFFXVHGRI being close to 
treason.49 There were nine national daily newspapers in 1982 ± they are listed in Table 6.2. 
In this study therefore, only just under 50% of possible test subjects have been examined. 
There is certainly scope for extending this research to give a complete view of newspaper 
coverage. Yet that should not detract from the results presented here. Of all national 
dailies, the four selected newspapers reached the highest proportion of the British public. 
The media in the Falklands should be assessed by those media which had the widest base. 
 











In addition to the fact that not every national daily was able to be examined, it would have 
been more effective had it been possible for this research to also take into account column 
inches. The inclusion of this factor would have enabled a more accurate analysis of the 
percentage of news space dominated by Falklands' coverage. As it was, much of this 
research had to be conducted using the internet, microfilm, photocopies and, in the case of 
The Daily Telegraph, original documents. The variety of resources used to access the 
information meant that reliable measurements could not be taken. Instead, the percentage 
of Falklands-related news was calculated according to the number of articles associated 
with the subject, in comparison to non-Falklands-related articles. Although not completely 
inclusive, it is, nevertheless, the most reliable and comprehensive study of newspaper 
coverage undertaken thus far. 
 
2d. Interpreting (and Writing Up) Data 
Understanding and translating unprocessed data is the final stage of content analysis. 
Through the use of Excel spreadsheets and a database created from the raw information 
collected, the results were collated and will be presented here. Interpreting data is a long 
                                                 
49
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and arduous process. What this thesis seeks to achieve is a summary of the key findings. 
Necessarily, and due to restraints on length, the full extent of analysis cannot be included 
here. 
 
3. Content Analysis Results 
The results of the content analysis conducted for this thesis are extensive and varied. In 
RUGHUWREHWWHUMXGJHWKHµPDLQ¶ILQGLQJVRIWKHUHVHDUFKWKLVFKDSWHUDVVHVVHVWKUHH
significant areas: the amount of Falklands-related coverage, the origins and location of 
news coverage and the main themes attributed to Falklands-related copy.  
 
3a. Total Amount of Falklands Coverage 
Morrison and Tumber found that, on average, the Falklands conflict accounted for 68.83% 
of all BBC and ITN nightly news coverage during the war (Table 6.3). Adams judged that 
News at Ten WHQGHGWRFDUU\DµJUHDWHUQXPEHr of items in correspondingly less depth than 
WKH%%&¶V1LQH2¶&ORFN1HZV¶.50 The BBC devoted almost 8% more time to the Falklands 
in its news bulletins than ITN.51 What Morrison and Tumber showed was that the crisis 
was covered extensively by television news, despite the lack of images from the frontline.  
 
Table 6.3: Percentage of Falklands-related material in news 
broadcasts during the Falklands conflict 52 
 BBC (%) ITN (%) 
Total BBC  
and ITN (%) 
2 April - 4 April 78 73.58 75.23 
5 April - 24 April  73.5 70.67 71.96 
25 April - 30 April 83.19 70.95 75.78 
1 May - 20 May 79.74 70.29 74.19 
21 May - 15 June 66.42 56.14 60.98 
Average total:  
2 April - 14 June 73.1 65.45 68.83 
 
The volume of newspaper coverage of the War was noticeably different from that of 
television news. Whereas the BBC and ITN devoted over two thirds of the prescribed time 
slot to discussion on the Falklands, newspaper coverage across all four newspapers was 
significantly lower. Table 6.4 shows how many articles were published in each newspaper 
during the five distinct phases of the war (noted in analysis graphs and tables as µ3RVVLEOH
AUWLFOHV¶)URPWKHUHLWWHOOVXVKRZPDQ\RIWKRVHDUWLFOHVZHUHEDVHGRn the Falklands 
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tell from this information is that the broadsheets contained a lower percentage of 
Falklands-related news than the tabloids. This might be explained by the argument that the 
tabloids focused on the war in the belief that it would aid circulation figures. Harris 
commented on the fact the tabloids had been locked in a vicious battle for readership 
before 1982. He highlighted the ongoing ploys to lure readers like bingo features and 
decreased prices.53 There was, however, a greater discrepancy concerning the percentage 
of coverage assigned to the conflict between The Times and The Daily Telegraph than 
there was between the Telegraph and The Sun. The Times devoted the least amount of 
analysis, as a percentage of overall coverage, to the Falklands. There are two possible 
explanations for this. Firstly, this might be explaLQHGE\WKHSXEOLFDWLRQ¶VGHVLUHWRIXOO\
cover all aspects of news ± not just the Falklands ± in a bid to preserve its international 
UHSXWDWLRQDV%ULWDLQ¶VSUH-eminent national newspaper. Secondly, the percentage of 
coverage devoted to the Falklands in The Times could have been low because the paper 
tended to print longer articles than other newspapers. Most simply, broadsheet stories tend 
to be longer because the papers are physically bigger (typically 11-12 inches wide and 20 
or more long). Tabloids (typically 11 by 17 inches) tend to feature shorter stories and often 
make use of a greater amount of images. Shelley McLachlan and Peter Golding carried out 
a content analysis, the aim of which was to assess whether the British press had been 
µWDEORLG-LVHG¶between 1952 and 1997. Research showed that the length of a story in The 
Times (measured by the amount of words) had fluctuated over a 45-year period from an 
average low of 150 words per story in 1952, to an average high of 400 words per story in 
1982.54 In 1982, the Daily Mirror, by contrast, only reached an average of 330 words per 
story.55 The Editor of The Times told the HCDC that he estimated the paper was including 
up to 10,000 words of material each day on the Falklands, whereas the tabloids might have 
only included 500 to 600 words.56  
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Table 6.4: Total newspaper coverage of the Falklands War 
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Table 6.5 compares the figures relating to the total percentage of coverage from both 
television news and newspapers. One can see, after the initial stage, when the Argentines 
invaded the islands, newspaper coverage increased over the duration of the war (despite 
two small drops in the percentage during the third and fifth periods). Overall, Falklands' 
coverage sat at an average of almost 19% of all print news. TV coverage, on the other 
hand, tended to fluctuate ± neither increasing, nor decreasing in volume over the course of 
the war. The most significant observation is that TV coverage actually dropped over 13% 
in the final stage of the war. Newspaper coverage, however, dropped less than 1% over the 
same time-frame. This information exhibits the difference between the agendas of two 
diverse media. During the final stage of the war (21 May ± 15 June) less time was spent 
reporting the Falklands on television. This was most likely due to the fact that, on 6 June, 
Israel invaded southern Lebanon, marking the start of the Lebanon War. For example, on 
seven occasions in the last period of the Falklands, the Lebanon story surpassed the 
)DONODQGV¶SULPDU\QHZVVWDWXVRQ79 (three times on BBC and four on ITN).57 The war in 
Lebanon provided television news with something it had been lacking: live images of 
conflict. Because the length of a television news bulletin is fixed, Lebanon forced down the 
percentage of Falklands' coverage. By contrast, in newspapers, the Lebanon War may have 
featured on page one, but there was not one day on which the Falklands did not feature on 
the front page (even alongside Lebanon). Newspapers had the ability to cover both the 
Lebanon and Falklands story at least equally; TV did not share this luxury. As Adams 
SRLQWHGRXWµ«GHWDLOHGDVVHVVPHQWV>RIWKHQHZV@«KDYHOLWWOHSODFHLQWHOHYLVLRQQHZV
SURJUDPPHV¶58 
Table 6.5: Comparison between total percentage of news coverage relating to the Falklands crisis 
on television and in print59 
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 Adams, p.74.  
59
 Figures pertaining to television are from Morrison and Tumber p.267. 
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The most striking difference was that the percentage of coverage devoted to the Falklands 
by television was significantly higher than that of newspapers ± as much as seven times 
higher in some cases. It is clear that television devoted more of its overall reporting to the 
Falklands. One reason for the major disparity between percentages is that television news 
was limited in length. Hooper considered that there were two major limiting factors to 
television news: time and structure.60 Newspapers, however, could accommodate more 
news. At times throughout the conflict both BBC and ITN extended their news 
programmes ± but not by a significant extent.61 Newspapers, on the other hand, could vary 
in length according to the volume of news. Throughout the conflict the average length of 
the four newspapers was 28 pages. From Figure 6.1 one can see that, mostly, the length of 
each newspaper remained fairly constant. However, there were peaks and troughs which 
represented an increase, or decrease, in the number of pages each newspaper carried. Peaks 
often coincided with Falklands-related events. This suggests that coverage of the Falklands 
was directly linked to the length of a newspaper. The period between 25 and 30 April, for 
H[DPSOHZLWQHVVHGDSHDNLQDOOIRXUQHZVSDSHUV¶OHQJWKV7KLVVWDJHRIWKHZDUVDZWKH
first real military activity of the conflict (since the Argentine invasion), and also the 
culmination of diplomatic efforts to avoid war: the recapture of South Georgia on 25 April, 
7KDWFKHU¶VFDOORQ$SULOIRUWKHPHGLDWRµUHMRLFH¶DWWKHQHZVRIWKH$UJHQWLQH
surrender at LeithWKHDUULYDORI+DLJ¶VµILQDOSDFNDJH¶LQ/RQGRQRQ$SULOWKHIRXUWK
House of Commons debate on the crisis on 29 April and the official US declaration of 
support for Britain on 30 April.62 
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Figure 6.1: Length of Newspapers throughout the Falklands War 
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During the war, across the four newspapers tested, there were nearly 26,000 articles, 19% 
of which were written on the Falklands.63 Perhaps what was most illuminating about 
content, however, was the subject matter of editorials during the conflict. An editorial is 
FRPPRQO\XQGHUVWRRGDVµDQHZVSDSHUDUWLFOHH[SUHVVLQJWKHHGLWRU¶VRSLQLRQRQDWRSLFDO
LVVXH¶64 More than just the eGLWRU¶VRSLQLRQDQHGLWRULDOZLOOW\SLFDOO\VLJQLI\WKHDWWLWXGH
and view to which the newspaper officially subscribes. Tabloid editorials had titles which 
UHIOHFWHGWKLVµ0LUURU&RPPHQW¶DQGµ7KH6XQ6D\V¶0RVWO\WKHFRQWHQWRIDQHGLWRULDO
will focus on what is considered to be most µQHZVZRUWK\¶65 Given the length of a paper 
was variable and inconsistent, one can, arguably, gain more from analysis of a constant: 
the editorial ± which only ever consisted of one page (or less). The Editorial was also 
SDUWLFXODUO\DWWUDFWLYHGXULQJWKHZDUEHFDXVHWKHµUHVWULFWLRQVRQKDUGQHZV«LQHYLWDEO\
gave a greater importance to editorialLVLQJDQGFRPPHQWDU\«¶66  
 
Table 6.6 displays the total amount of editorials published throughout the conflict and the 
number and percentage of those which related to the war. The amount of editorial space 
allocated to the Falklands in the case of the Daily Mirror is significantly higher than in any 
other newspaper, at virtually 80%. This figure presented an anomaly. The Daily Mirror, 
GXULQJWKH)DONODQGVXVXDOO\OLPLWHGLWVµFRPPHQW¶WRRQHSLHFHRIQHZV,WZDVWKHFDVHLQ
all three other papers that, over 72% of the time, editorial articles considered two, or more, 
issues.67 On average, across all four newspapers, the Falklands was considered the subject 
of nearly 50% of all editorial observation. This figure is substantial and gives an indication 
of to what extent the Falklands dominated the news agenda of the press. Although the 
proportion of all articles relating to the Falklands was as low as 19% in the context of an 
entire publication ± WKHQHZVSDSHUV¶RZQSURJUDPPHZDVGLFWDWHGE\WKH)DONODQGVFigure 
6.2 illustrates the divergence between the amount of articles based on the Falklands and the 
number of editorials dedicated to the subject. 
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 N.B. The Falklands often attracted comment in more than one editorial commentary: at times there were, 
for example, three issues considered in editorial columns ± and two related to the Falklands.  
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Table 6.6: Percentage of editorials published throughout the conflict and what percentage 




Editorials on  
the Falklands 
Percentage of  
Editorial Coverage 
Daily Mirror 49 39 79.59 
The Sun 122 54 44.26 
The Daily Telegraph 165 76 46.06 
The Times 149 55 36.91 





Figure 6.2: Percentage of Falklands-related articles and editorials 
 
During the war there was considerable comment about the way in which the issue was 
dominating the media. On the week ending 2 May, The Sunday Times MXGJHGµ7KLVZDV
WKHZHHNZKHQWKHZRUG³)DONODQGV´DFWXDOO\EHJDQWRUHSODFHWKHZRUG³1HZV´¶68 What 
is clear from this study is that newspapers were afforded the luxury of both 
comprehensively covering the crisis, and of offering thorough analysis on events outside 
that area. Certainly, during the months between April and July, one would have gained a 
greater range of information on non-Falklands-related material from the print media than 
from television. Academics and authors on the Falklands have agreed that it was not a 
televisual war.69 The dearth of images from the South Atlantic dictated the medium was 
limited to other visual aids like three-dimensional models, computer graphics and plotted 
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maps.70 The GUMG commented that television news seemed rarely to extend beyond 
statements from the MoD.71 On the contrary, for newspapers, the war was very much 
µEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶- the format was preserved and the impact of those limitations imposed 
on the media by poor communications with the Task Force was felt less severely by the 
print media than by TV news. 
 
3b. The Origins and Location of News Coverage 
The British media was heavily criticised during, and following, the war for relying too 
heavily on the use of Argentine information. A common theme throughout the literature is 
that the scarcity of information within Britain, and originating from the MoD, drove the 
media to seek alternative intelligence.72 Indeed, The Sunday Times Insight Team argued 
that, in the case of casualty information, the British media turned to Argentine sources 
because the MoD refused to give any indication of accurate figures.73 Knightley wrote that 
with a lack of news from the front, only two other sources of information remained: 
Argentina and MoD briefings.74 The credibility of the British was tested throughout the 
war.75 From the day of the Argentine invasion, the rapid nature of Argentine reporting 
threatened the credibility of British official sources. On 2 April the British Ambassador to 
Argentina, Anthony Williams, reported that: µ7RGD\¶VORFDOSUHVVDQGPHGLDEURDGFDVWV
virtually all triumphantly report Argentine military action against the Falkland Islands, 
WUHDWLQJWKLVDVDIDLWDFFRPSOL¶76 It was argued that Britain used Argentine information to 
report the invasion RI3RUW6WDQOH\7KHFRPPRQSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHHYHQWZDVRIµQRQ-
UHDFWLRQDQGVXUUHQGHU¶77 It was only when the Marines who defended the capital were 
UHSDWULDWHGWKDWVWRULHVRIUHVLVWDQFHFDPHWRWKHSXEOLF¶VDWWHQWLRQThis theme continued, 
since communications from the Task Force were poor, the British were rarely informed of 
events in the South Atlantic by one of their own. Even the Argentine surrender was 
reported first by Argentina. Kim Sabido with the Task Force noted: 
 
It's sad that petty restrictions imposed by the Ministry of Defence - and one can only assume given 
placid backing by the politicians in London - prevented the British people knowing of these 
tragedies from their own reporters.78 
                                                 
70
 Mercer et al., p.130. 
71
 GUMG, p.90. 
72
 For example: P. Taylor, p.117.; Harris, p.71.  
73
 Eds. Eddy et al, p.211. 
74
 Knightley, p.435. 
75
 See Chapters Two and Three. 
76
 A. Williams, 2 Apr., TNA, Argentine Invasion of the Falkland Islands, FCO7/4490 f.1. 
77
 Royle, p.222. 
78




Much of the reports which gained currency in Argentina, and were subsequently reported 
by British media, transpired WREHIDEULFDWLRQV2Q0D\WKH6$38UHIOHFWHGWKDWµ7KH
Argentines have been quick to put out false reports of various military encounters, greatly 
H[DJJHUDWLQJWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHLUIRUFHV¶79 Ian Mather, a journalist for The Observer 
who was imprisoned in Argentina during the wDUUHFDOOHGWKDWµFor most of the conflict 
the bulletins were pure fantasy. If one added up the number of Sea Harriers they claimed to 
KDYHVKRWGRZQWKH\H[FHHGHGE\VHYHUDOWLPHVWKHWRWDOSRVVHVVHGE\WKH5$)¶80 Nick 
Barker, Captain of HMS Endurance, who was listening to Argentine radio, ZURWHWKDWµRI
FRXUVH«RXUVKLSVZHUHVLQNLQJDOORYHUWKHSODFH¶81 The British media reported Argentine 
news at home. Captain Hugh Balfour of HMS Exeter remembered that his ship appeared in 
the British press on three occasions indicating that she had been sunk.82 
 
Despite criticism that the British media relied on Argentine sources, this thesis suggests 
that it was more responsible than has been imagined. There is evidence that the British 
media treated Argentine information responsibly and with scepticism. Douglas van Belle 
MXGJHGWKDWµWKHLQIUHTXHQWWLPHVZKHQ$UJHQWLQH sources were used, they were treated as 
unreliable, interpreted with speculation concerning the true intent of the statement, or 
YHULILHGIDFWXDOO\ZLWKRWKHUVRXUFHV¶83 OQ,79¶VODWHHYHQLQJQHZVRQ-XQHWKH
presenter spoke over Argentine film footage:  
 
These pictures are claimed by the Argentines to be the latest of their troops on the Falklands. 
7KRXJKZLWK%ULWLVKIRUFHVSRLVHGIRUDILQDODVVDXOWLW¶VXQOLNHO\WKDWWKHVHVROGLHUVRUWKH
islanders themselves, are as relaxed as this film suggests.84 
 
George Howard admitted µ«KDUGHGLWRULDOGHFLVLRQVKDGWREHPDGHDERXWUHSRUWLQJ
$UJHQWLQHYLHZV¶85 On 2 May guidelines were sent to all ITV employees:  
 
We are now facing the serious risk of disinformation emanating from Argentina about military 
operaWLRQVLQWKH6RXWK$WODQWLF«2QQRDFFRXQWDUHVXFKVWRULHVWREHWUDQVPLWWHG before the ITN 
Newsdesk or specialist correspondents have checked with the Ministry of Defence or other 
appropriate authorities. An inaccurate report would cause huge distress among relatives. Better to 
delay than be wrong.86 
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This chapter demonstrates that the amount of copy based on Argentine sources in 
newspapers was less than commonly assumed. Morrison and Tumber included in their 
study analysis on the distribution of reports according to their location. The raw data from 
their study was considered and has been calculated for purposes of comparison (Table 
6.7).87 The overwhelming majority of reports on television originated from Britain, not 
Buenos Aires.  The authors ascertained that there were three types of Argentine film which 
appeared on television during the conflict: Argentine film from the Falklands, British film 
shot in Argentina and American network film from Argentina.88 Instead of finding any 
information to support the commonly held assumption that the British relied on Argentine 
sources for the content of the news, Morrison and Tumber found that television news was 
based on only 9% of reports from Argentina (but from British correspondents). As little as 
just over 2% of the coverage of the Falklands was based on an Argentine source. Analysis 
of newspapers has shown that the results are similar (Table 6.8).  
  
Table 6.7: Percentage distribution of items by locations of report (television) 89 
  BBC (%) ITN (%) Total (%) 
Argentina 11.81 6.28 9.05 
Argentine Source 3.12 1.78 2.45 
Britain 70.72 74.91 72.82 
Other 0.56 0.96 0.76 
South America 2.93 2.75 2.84 
Task Force 11.35 12.85 12.1 
 
Less than 6% of copy on the Falklands, across all four newspapers, originated from 
Argentina. The vast majority of that same copy was penned by British journalists in 
Argentina.90 Nearly every publication had a staff journalist stationed in Argentina, if not at 
WKHVWDUWRIWKHZDUWKHQFHUWDLQO\E\LWVFRPSOHWLRQ'HVSLWHWKHSUHVHQFHRIWKHSDSHU¶V
µPDQLQ$UJHQWLQD¶'DYLG*UDYHVWKHQHZVSDSHUZKLFKUHOLHGWKHOHDVWRQPDWHULDOIURP
Argentina was The Sun (2%). The Sun was notorious for its nationalistic tendencies and 
actively promoted the war. That The Sun should avoid repeating the claims of the opposing 
side should not surprise. Foster claimed that the paper helped promote a µclimate of 
hysteria which was instrumental in shaping and charging an atmosphere hostile to 
GLVVHQW¶91 The tabloid newspapers featured Argentine material less than broadsheets. The 
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figures relating to The Times and The Daily Telegraph sit comfortably within the same 
percentile (between 7 and 8%). Broadsheet newspapers were more likely to use a range of 
sources and more likely to dissent from the accepted line ± putting the principle of 
µIUHHGRPRIWKHSUHVV¶EHIRUHDQREOLJDWLRQWRVXSSRUWGovernment. Badsey outlined that 
The Times in particular had a long history of distinguishing EHWZHHQLWVµWDVN«WRVXVWDLQ
WKHPRUDOHRIWKHQDWLRQ¶DQGµIDLUFULWLFLVPRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWRIWKHGD\¶92 
 
A smaller percentage of articles than those written in Argentina actually made use of an 
Argentine source.93 Thus the results of this content analysis confirm that newspapers, like 
television, did not rely on the use of Argentine sources to any great extent.94 Again, the 
tabloid newspapers made significantly less use of Argentine source material than the 
broadsheets. The fact that all four newspapers tested used Argentine source material in less 
than 8% of articles indicates that the criticism the media attracted for the supposed 
extensive use of Argentine sources was unfounded.95 
 
In both the case of television news and newspapers, the majority of Falklands-related 
coverage originated from Britain. Seventy-seven percent of newspaper copy stemmed from 
journalists based in Britain (Table 6.8). Television reports originated from Britain 75% of 
the time. The marginal difference between the two media is not considered important. 
Tabloid newspapers depended on their British contingent far more than the broadsheets. 
The Sun newspaper during the war was made up almost entirely from journalists writing in 
Britain (90% of articles originated from Britain). Eighty-five percent of articles offered by 
the Daily Mirror were from Britain. The amount of copy originating from Britain was less 
in the broadsheets (in The Times, 68% and The Daily Telegraph, 64%). The broadsheets 
made greater use of international reporters than the tabloids did. The Times regularly 
featured stories from its correspondents abroad.96 The Daily Telegraph had an equally 
widespread staff-base, with six reporters in Argentina at one time or another throughout the 
war. What one can conclude from the overall results is that the primary place of origin of 
the majority of material which was Falklands-related was Britain. 




 N.B. It is only possible to include an article as having used an Argentine source if it is openly declared, or 
it is explicit within the body of the text. In order to test the authenticity of this system a number of random 
articles deemed to use an Argentine Source were cross checked against the timing of reports emerging from 
Argentina, other articles and research into the origin of particular stories during the war. In almost 80% of 
tested articles, the theory that the source originated from Argentina was correct. 
94
 With the exception of the retrieval of casualty figures from Argentine sources. 
95
 N.B. It should be remembered that even when an article made use of an Argentine source, it might have 
been discounted as accurate intelligence, compared with British sources, or reported objectively in the same 
article. 
96





Table 6.8: Number and percentage of articles attributed to a location or source 
* Note that percentages are calculated from total locations possible, not total articles possible 
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Work which has centred on the media and the Falklands has typically highlighted the role 
of Task Force journalists.97 Almost all those works which include sections on the media in 
the conflict have paid attention to the plight of those correspondents.98 Task Force 
reporting of the conflict was plagued by a plethora of difficulties: delays in transmission, 
strict (and sometimes unnecessary) censorship and a lack of source material and 
information.99 Despite these obstacles, the reporting of the Task Force journalists has, 
VLQFHWKHZDUGRPLQDWHGHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHODUJHUPHGLD¶VUROHThe experiences of the Task 
Force journalists are hugely important to the literature ± especially considering their role as 
the first journalists to be embedded with a British force from the outset. It is the contention 
of this thesis, however, that the amount of physical copy sent back is disproportionate to 
the amount of analysis they have received. 
 
JXVWRYHURIWHOHYLVLRQ¶V)DONODQGV¶ coverage was transmitted from the South Atlantic 
(Table 6.7). This was quite a feat considering the first images from the Task Force were 
not shown until 13 May.100 The first combat pictures were not shown on British television 
until 29 May.101 Although images from the Task Force made up over 12% of TV material, 
the figure was as low as just under 4% in newspapers (Table 6.8). Whereas television and, 
to a lesser extent, radio relied on images and/or audio clips, newspapers could adapt if 
there was no word from their representative in the South Atlantic. Newspapers had to fill 
empty column inches, television had to fill dead air time ± one was easier than the other.  
 
The tabloids featured a smaller proportion of Task Force copy than broadsheets. In the case 
of the Daily Mirror, as little as 2.5% of all printed articles on the Falklands originated from 
the Task Force. In the case of the broadsheets the average percentage of copy devoted to 
that from the Task Force was 5%. The situation, however, was altered after 21 May. It was 
Government policy that all reports from the Task Force should be pooled after the British 
landings.102 Thus, consistently, more copy began to appear in newspapers after 21 May 
because each publication had access to more stories (Figure 6.3).103 Figure 6.4 gives an 
indication of how many of those reports shown in Figure 6.3 were actually pooled.  
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Gareth Parry, of The Guardian, WROGWKH+&'&µ2XUFRS\IORZVHHPHGWREHTXLWH
coQVLVWHQW¶104 Of the 4% of newspaper coverage which originated from the Task Force, the 
amount of copy which appeared in the press fluctuated considerably over the course of the 
war. Figure 6.3 UHSUHVHQWVWKHIUHTXHQF\DWZKLFK7DVN)RUFHMRXUQDOLVWV¶FRS\Zas printed 
across the four newspapers. On average, there would be a peak in the amount of copy 
featured in newspapers two days after a significant event took place in the Falklands: on 24 
May - after the San Carlos landings of 21 May; on 31 May ± after the Argentine surrender 
of Goose Green; on 10 June ± after the Argentine attack at Fitzroy. Some reporting trends 
were closer to events, for example, 26 April saw a high amount of copy following the 
recapture of South Georgia on 25 April, and 3 May saw an influx of copy after the sinking 
of the Belgrano. It should be considered as no coincidence that these two events were 
anomalies ± the MoD gained a reputation, during the war, of expediting positive news, and 
GHOD\LQJZKDWPLJKWEHFRQVLGHUHGµEDGQHZV¶105 
                                                 
104
 G. Parry, HCDC, v.ii, p.206, q.581. 
105
 0RUHRQWKHGHOD\RIµEDGQHZV¶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 231 
 
Figure 6.3: Frequency of copy originating from the Task Force throughout the Falklands conflict 
(all four newspapers) 
 232 
 
Figure 6.4: Percentage of reports originating from the Task Force to be pooled 
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3c. Main Themes Attributed to Falklands-Related Coverage  
The most extensive breakdown of television news coverage provided by Journalists at War 
was a thematic dissection of news bulletins. Morrison and Tumber constructed 169 themes 
to which stories on the Falklands could be allocated. When ascertaining the themes which 
attained the highest frequency scores the pair found that those themes which one might 
expect to have featured highly in coverage - reports on armed conflict, jingoism or 
patriotism - were not the themes overwhelmingly covered. Instead, the results showed that 
the primary themes discussed were diplomacy, the possibility of armed conflict and British 
military capacity and hardware (Table 6.9).106 Despite television in particular having been 
accused of failing to allocate adequate attention to the movement for peace, the primary 
WKHPHRIUHSRUWLQJZDVµGLSORPDF\DVDZD\RIVROYLQJWKHFULVLV¶ZLWKMXVWRYHURI
the frequency score.107 
 
Table 6.9: Main themes in order of relative frequency (television - BBC and ITN) 108 
Ranking Theme No. of  
Falklands- 
Related Bulletins 
% of all 
Falklands-
Related Bulletins 
1 Diplomacy as a way of solving problem 95 65.07 
2 
Military equipment - capacity, ships, planes 
(British) 92 63.01 
2 Possibility of fighting 92 63.01 
4 Task Force preparations, training, equipment 82 56.16 
4 Conditions of conflict - weather, terrain 82 56.16 
6 Details of operations, battles 77 52.74 
7 Sovereignty ± Argentinian 70 47.95 
8 Tactical discussions - military, battle plans 62 42.47 
9 Sovereignty ± British 61 41.78 
10 
Diplomacy - as a way of not solving 
problem 55 37.67 
11 
Military equipment - capacity, ships, planes 
(Argentina) 54 36.99 
12 
Support for British position - UN, EEC, 
world (except USA) 53 36.3 
12 Peace plans - UN - likelihood of failure 53 36.3 
14 US support for British position 49 33.56 
15 
State of British armed forces - ready ± 
positive 49 33.56 
 
 
                                                 
106




 Raw data taken from Morrison and Tumber, pp.274-278.  
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Most interestingly, the major theme covered by newspapers was one contributed by this 
thesis WR0RUULVRQDQG7XPEHU¶VRULJLQDOOLVWRIWKHPHVµ3DUOLDPHQWDU\HYHQWV¶ZDV
introduced as a category to cover those articles which referred to proceedings associated 
with the Falklands in Parliament or within the Government or Cabinet.109 These events 
were not covered by an existing category, as supplied in the original research. By far, the 
theme most regularly attributed to newspaper copy was that of Parliamentary events (Table 
6.10). The reason newspapers carried more Parliament-related comment was principally 
due to two factors: in the regular format of most newspapers there was a feature page (at 
least) devoted to proceedings in Parliament. The fact the Commons sat on 42 days 
throughout the war ± all of which involved discussion of the Falklands (whether in a 
specific debate or not) ± determined that regular features on Parliament were overrun by 
Falklands-related discussion. Newspapers also had more scope to indulge in commentary 
of Parliament than television, which was forced to focus on more popular issues like 
preparation of the Task Force, military equipment, tactical discussion and details of 
operations. 
 
Table 6.10: Main themes in order of relative frequency (newspapers - all four tested) 
Ranking Theme           No. of  Falklands- 
Related Articles 
% of all 
Falklands-
Related Articles 
1 Parliamentary events 577 11.93 
2 Military equipment ± British 461 9.53 
3 Diplomacy - the way of solving the crisis 365 7.55 
4 Reports on armed conflict 355 7.34 
5 Economic implications of crisis 313 6.47 
6 Possibility of armed conflict or war 277 5.73 
7 Patriotism 268 5.54 
8 Speculation - British action 243 5.03 
9 Education on war 240 4.96 
10 Support for Britain - UN, EEC, world 204 4.22 
11 Reporting on UN events 199 4.12 
12 Effect in Britain - N* 195 4.03 
13 Lack of support for Britain - UN, EEC, world 183 3.78 
14 Bravery ± British 172 3.56 
15 Conditions of conflict 171 3.54 
 
  *Negative 
 
7KHWRSWZRWKHPHVLQQHZVSDSHUVRWKHUWKDQµ3DUOLDPHQWDU\HYHQWV¶ZHUHWKHVDPHDV
those of television bulletins: discussion on military equipment belonging to the British and 
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diplomacy as a way of solving the crisis. In some respects then, coverage of the war by 
television and newspapers was similar ± but it was by no means identical in its 
composition. Apart from the top three themes in each study, the preceding themes mark a 
stark difference in the frequency of themes given attention on TV and themes included in 
newspaper coverage. Of 15 top themes outlined for both TV and newspapers (Tables 6.9 
and 6.10), only four were common to both media. There were far more military-related 
themes connected with television than with newspapers. Of the 20 most common themes 
attributed to television news coverage, 11 focused on military aspects of the war.110 
 
By contrast, newspaper discussion tended to be based more on three different elements: 
diplomacy, support for Britain and scepticism about the implications of the war. 
Diplomacy as a way of solving the crisis was in the top three themes of each medium. 
Other themes accompanied this in newspapers. For example, the 15 themes with the 
highest frequencies in newspapers also included reports on action and events in and 
surrounding the UN. Two of the top themes also involved discussion on %ULWDLQ¶V
international support. Support for the British case was also a central subject to newspaper 
copy ± high-scoring themes like patriotism and support for Britain with the UN, European 
Economic Community (EEC) and among the rest of the world attested to this. Finally, 
there were more subjects which indicated a sceptical tone covered by newspapers. There 
was, in general, more discussion in newspapers of the implications of the war in Britain. 
For example, two themes which featured in the top 15 of all newspaper coverage were the 
economic implications of the crisis and the negative effect it might have on Britain. Of the 
20 most common themes associated with newspaper coverage, six tended more toward the 
long-term consequences of the war.111 
 
The differences in the reporting of the conflict were indicative of the different challenges 
and aims of each type of medium. Television news was designed, not only to inform its 
audience, but to entertain it. Newspapers, in a sense, were under less pressure to keep their 
UHDGHUV¶DWWHQWLRQ$WHOHYLVLRQQHZVUHSRUWKDGDOLPLWHGWime in which it could be viewed 
- a newspaper could be read at any time and as little or as much attention or focus could be 
placed on a story as required. This is arguably why television centred on prevalent themes 
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± attracting large percentages of overall reporting. The most prevalent television themes 
featured percentages of around 50 to 60 percent. By contrast, newspDSHUV¶SUHYDOHQW
themes attracted only between five and 11 percent. Overall, in newspapers, subjects were 
discussed in greater detail, a wider range of themes were involved and issues were treated 
more comprehensively. In addition, content analysis of newspaper coverage in the war, 
like analysis of television coverage, has shown that, contrary to popular arguments that the 
media reporting of the war was centred on stories relating to patriotism or jingoism, or 
centred too heavily on pro-Argentine material, the coverage of the Falklands highlighted 
the diplomatic effort to reach a peaceful settlement. 
 
3c (i). The Frequency of Themes in the Broadsheets and the Tabloids 
Of course it was not just between television and newspaper coverage that differences in 
WKHPDWLFDSSURDFKHVH[LVWHG(DFKLQGLYLGXDOSXEOLFDWLRQ¶VWUHDWPHQWRIWKHwar was 
distinct. In this section the two broadsheets and two tabloids analysed are compared. It is 
by no means suggested that µWKHWDEORLGV¶LQWKLVFDVHDUHUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHHQWLUH
WDEORLGPDUNHWGXULQJWKHZDUQRUVKRXOGµWKHEURDGVKHHWV¶EHFRQVLGHUHGWRUHSUHVHQWWKDW
style of paper. What this section provides is an initial examination of the thematic 
difference between the newspapers tested in this study.  
 
The broadsheets reported the Falklands fairly similarly in terms of themes. As one can 
observe from Figure 6.5 the top four themes featured in both The Times and The Daily 
Telegraph were the same. The other themes which made up the top 20 were similar, but 
appeared with different frequencies. For example, 27 of the 40 highest frequency themes 
across both papers were the same. It could, however, be argued that The Daily Telegraph 
reported more fully, carrying, on average, more articles per subject than The Times. Yet 
confirmation of this could not be positive unless one managed to ascertain the column 






Having established that both broadsheet newspapers analysed explored similar themes, the 
type of themes most subscribed to require further attention. As with the results from all 
four newspapers, the theme both papers concentrated on the most was µParliamentary 
events¶. The other top three themes were the same as those observed across all papers 
(Table 6.10). 'LVFXVVLRQRQ%ULWLVKPLOLWDU\HTXLSPHQWFDSDFLW\DQGWKH7DVN)RUFH¶V
strength, and articles which considered the use of diplomacy as a way of settling the 
dispute were the most frequent themes respectively. There were four broad subjects 
associated with the themes scoring the highest frequencies for the broadsheets: the 
diplomatic efforts to end the war, support for the British cause, narrative of conflict and 
speculation on the long-term connotations of the war.  
 
The diplomatic effort was perhaps the most well-covered theme across both broadsheets. 
Parliamentary events was the most mentioned theme in both newspapers: in The Times 
16%, and in the Telegraph 11.24%. Comments on diplomacy which urged that it was a 
suitable way in which to end the crisis was the second highest ranking theme in The Times 
and third highest in The Daily Telegraph. In addition, reports on action in the UN - one of 
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the key organisations involved in the diplomatic effort during the war - featured strongly: 
10th in The Times and ninth in the Telegraph.  
 
7KHUHZDVFHUWDLQO\DQHOHPHQWRIVXSSRUWIRUWKH%ULWLVKFDXVHLQWKHEURDGVKHHWV¶
coverage of the conflict. It was said that the Telegraph µDFKLHYHGDIHHOLQJRITXLHW
UHDVRQHGVHDPOHVVVXSSRUWRIJRYHUQPHQWSROLFLHV«¶112 This was indicated in these 
results. There was, for example, contemplation of, and dialogue on, the support Britain 
attracted from around the world ± principally from the UN and EEC.113 The need to 
combat aggression ± a theme which was largely aimed at the British need to make a stand 
against the Argentine occupation of the islands ± was a common theme in both 
newspapers, figuring eighth in The Times¶WRSDQG18th in The Daily Telegraph¶V 
 
The military aspect of the conflict was a consistent focus in both broadsheets. Considerable 
attention was paid to the study of British military equipment. The subject ranked second 
and third in The Daily Telegraph and The Times respectively. Reports on armed conflict 
were also represented solidly. Articles on battles or military encounters were the fifth and 
sixth highest frequency themes in the Telegraph and The Times. Further, the possibility of 
conflict ranked seventh in The Times and eighth in the Telegraph and featured most 
strongly in the period between 4 and 24 April.  
 
Finally, the broadsheets were more speculative in their treatment of the implications of the 
war, and the enduring consequences for Britain.114 In both broadsheets analysed the theme 
of economic implications involved in the war was prevalent. It featured fourth in both 
SXEOLFDWLRQV¶UHVXOWV± The Times VDZRILWV)DONODQGV¶FRPPHQWDU\GHYRWHGWRWKH
theme, The Daily Telegraph, 6.69%. There were two periods in which economic 
implications were featured most: in the period from 5-24 April, and from 1-20 May. This is 
not surprising when one considers that the first period related to when the Task Force was 
prepared and sailed - ships were taken up from trade and a large number of the British 
Force was mustered. Speculation over the cost of the operation was bound to appear 
repeatedly. The second period saw the first tangible British losses - Sheffield, a series of 
British aircraft losses which resulted in the deaths of 21 Britons, and HMS Glasgow. It was 
also the phase of the war which saw the reinforcement of the British in the South Atlantic 
with the sailing of the QEII.115 The effect the war might have in Britain constituted two 
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 See Appendix One. 
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different themes ± it could be reported in either a negative or positive way. On average, the 
broadsheets highlighted the negative impact the war might have in Britain. In The Times 
the theme was included in 4.4% of possible material and ranked 17th in the top 20 themes 
featured throughout the war. In The Daily Telegraph, the theme ranked higher, at 14th, and 
GHPDQGHGRI)DONODQGV¶SUHVHQWDWLRQThe long-term aspects of the conflict were 
further emphasised by both dailies when they considered the long-term, political 
repercussions for the Falkland Islands themselves (the theme ranked 15th for The Times and 
18th for the Telegraph). Thus, overall, there was a considerable similarity of the thematic 
approaches adopted by both broadsheets analysed. Broadly, the newspapers followed 
comparable, and at some points, parallel themes.  
 
One could consider the arrangement of the two tabloids might be without correlation. The 
Daily Mirror and The Sun took very different stances on the Falklands ± they had diverse 
attitudes from the beginning. Whilst the Daily Mirror did not oppose the sending of the 
Task Force, it did consistently question the need for violence and was sceptical about 
whether, especially following the attack on HMS Sheffield, the cost of the war was 
justified. The Sun, on the other hand, saw the conflict in terms which were very much 
black and white: it was the Argentines or the British.  
 
The situation between the two papers was further complicated by a public row. After the 
publication of a Daily Mirror editorial on 6 May, which was provoked by the loss of the 
Belgrano and Sheffield DQGHQWLWOHGµ7KHNLOOLQJKDVWRVWRS¶The Sun embarked on a 
mission to identify the Mirror as a traitor.116 The Sun editorial the following day claimed 
µthere are traitors in our midst¶.117 In reply to this accusation the Mirror printed a piece 
which was titled, and in which it depicted The Sun DVµ7+(+$5/272))/((767¶118 
The disagreement between the two publications as to how best to cover the war, and in 
what way reporting should be conducted, dictated that one might suppose there should not 
be as many similarities between the themes of coverage.119 However, this was not the case. 
The reporting of the war was not completely divergent. There were a number of ways in 
which the thematic content of The Sun and the Mirror were similar. Most obviously, and as 
Figure 6.6 demonstrates, three of the four highest frequency themes were the same in both 
publications: reports on armed conflict, the use of British military equipment and 
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There were also a number of themes which, broadly speaking, fitted into two wide 
categories and which both tabloid newspapers followed: themes which related to the 
military aspects of the war; and those themes which supported the British ± particularly the 
men of the Task Force.  
 
The tabloid newspapers dedicated more discussion to the military aspects of the British 
campaign than the broadsheets. µ$UPHGFRQIOLFW¶ was the highest frequency theme 
throughout the Mirror¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKHZDUDQGWKHWKLUGPRVWH[DPLQHGWKHPHLQThe 
Sun. This result is not to say that the way in which these reports were presented was the 
same. The Daily Mirror was more critical of the war and tended to emphasise British 
losses. For example, of the top 20 themes for the Mirror, British casualties - light and 
heavy - both made up around 3.1% of Falklands coverage.120 The Sun also showcased a 
significant number of articles on heavy British casualties - the theme ranking 20th in the 
papers most frequently used themes. In the broadsheets, the subject received nowhere near 
the amount of attention it was offered by the tabloids (1.49% and 1.96% of the Telegraph 
and The Times¶FRYHUDJHUHVSHFWLYHO\). One reason for this was because the broadsheets 
tended to place one article listing losses, usually on the front page of any particular edition. 
The tabloids, on the other hand, tended to speculate more wildly about British fatalities or 
the number of wounded. They also tended to repeat the same news more often ± this was 
WKHFDVHZLWKVXEMHFWVZKLFKPLJKWEHFRQVLGHUHGPRUHµVHQVDWLRQDO¶ZKLFKUHDGHUVZRXOG
be most interested in. As with the broadsheets, the tabloids concentrated attention on 
British military equipment. The theme was the second highest frequency theme adopted by 
The Sun and The Mirror. In The Sun the percentage of total coverage was as high as 11.6% 
(6.52% in The Mirror).  
 
One of the most controversial aspects of the war, and the chief VXEMHFWPDWWHURI$GDPV¶
work, was the speculation of the media concerning military movements.121 Neither 
EURDGVKHHWV¶ highest frequency themes included speculation on the British or Argentine 
position. In the tabloids, however, speculation on British military action figured highly, 
ranking 11th in The Sun and 12th in the Telegraph. In The Sun as much as 5.31% of all 
Falklands-related copy included speculation over some aspect of the British campaign. In 
The Daily Mirror 3.41% of material made use of speculation. This evidence indicates that, 
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contrary to conclusions adopted by some authors as to the speculative nature of the entire 
press, the tabloid newspapers engaged in the act to a far greater extent than broadsheets.122 
This, of course, is not to say that The Times and the Telegraph did not engage in 






Both tested tabloids were supportive of the British cause to some extent - they did not 
necessarily endorse the action of the Government, but were fully invested in British 
Servicemen. A considerable amount of human interest material was published in reference 
to the Task Force. Tabloid newspapers have a history of utilising µKXPDQLQWHUHVW¶VWRULHV
A human interest story is one which appeals to the reader by describing the experiences, or 
emotions of, an individual to which they can relate.123  
 
During the war, stories relating to the families of Task Force personnel had a prominent 
position in both tabloids. These stories often centred on the wives and girlfriends of the 
Task Force. This analysis allowed for features on families to have been presented in either 
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a positive or negative way (either, for example, emphasising their resilience or their loss). 
In The Sun, 9.93% of Falklands¶ articles contained a theme relating to the positive 
representation of Task Force families (fifth highest frequency). In the Mirror, the theme 
was the sixth highest frequency, totalling 5.27% of all Falklands coverage. The positive 
theme of family did not feature at all in the top 20 of either broadsheet. It should be noted 
that, as well as reporting on families in a positive way, the tabloid publications also 
reported negatively. The Mirror reported negative aspects relating to families to a greater 
extent than those which were positive (4.5% of coverage and ranked fifth). In The Sun, 
quite predictably, the figure was not so high ± negative reporting of Task Force families 
was the 10th most frequently discussed theme. 
 
Positive characteristics of the Task Force were also emphasised by the tabloids. The 
bravery of Servicemen was highlighted by both papers. The theme occurred sixth and 
seventh in the frequency analysis of themes for The Sun and the Mirror. In broadsheets, 
bravery of British troops, although not neglected, was a less featured theme ± ranked 16th 
in the Telegraph, and did not feature in 7KH7LPHV¶ top 20. The positive portrayal of 
officers with the Task Force was also a prevalent theme in both The Sun and Daily Mirror. 
Results allowed for, again, the positive or negative portrayal of officers. Both papers 
carried a considerable amount of articles presenting officers in a positive light ± the 15th 
highest recurring theme in The Sun and 10th in the Mirror. The final theme which the 
tabloid papers pursued which showed, to some extent, their loyalty to the Task Force was 
µ%ULWLVKFRQILGHQFH¶. Stories carrying this theme allXGHGWRHLWKHUWKHQDWLRQ¶VFRQILGHQFH
LQD%ULWLVKYLFWRU\WKH7DVN)RUFH¶VFRQILGHQFHLQDQ$UJHQWLQHGHIHDW, RUWKHSDSHU¶V own 
confidence in the success of a British campaign. In both papers the theme was the 15th 
highest ranking theme (3.77% of coverage in The Sun and 3.1% in the Mirror). Of course, 
it is crucial to bear in mind that the Mirror was less likely to bestow its own confidence in 
the British military effort than it was to report the confidence of the nation or those with 
the Task Force.  
 
Despite the obvious differences in moral views over the use of violence, the content 
analysis of The Sun and Daily Mirror reveals that there were a number of significant 
convergences between the two tabloids' reporting of the Falklands. Similar has been 
proven for The Times and The Daily Telegraph. Naturally, when covering a conflict, there 
are a number of themes which are bound to recur more frequently than others: reports on 
armed conflict, discussion of military capabilities or equipment, debate over the use of 
aggression. However, most surprisingly, the theme of Parliamentary events by far 
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superseded any other theme in terms of its regularity. Emphasis on democracy and 
%ULWDLQ¶VGHPRFUDWLFSURFHVVZDVDEXQGDQW± and contrasted well with the depiction of the 
Argentine junta as a tyrannical, fascist dictatorship. Fairly obviously, the tabloid 
QHZVSDSHUVLGHQWLILHGPRUHZLWKWKHPHPEHUVRIWKH7DVN)RUFHDQGXVHGPRUHµKXPDQ
LQWHUHVW¶SLHFHVWRHQWHUWDLQWKHLUUHDGHUVKLS7KHIDFWWKDWthe top three themes for both the 
tabloids and broadsheets were the same as those abundant in themes attributed to television 
news was indicative, not of a particular stance adopted by an organisation but, simply, that 
each was reporting a war. 
 
3c (ii). Prevalent Themes in Different Periods of the War 
A thematic approach to the assessment of news coverage of the Falklands conflict is 
essential to a thorough understanding of the role of the media. It is useful, then, to consider 
which themes were the most regularly employed during different stages of the war. Table 
6.11 gives, as an average of all four newspapers, the three themes scoring the highest 
frequencies during the five periods of the war considered. 
  
Table 6.11: Highest ranking three themes across each time period (all four tested newspapers) 
Period   Rank Theme        





2 April - 4 April 
1 Diplomacy - the way 2.25 3.17 
1 History of Falklands 2.25 3.17 
1 Parliamentary events 2.25 3.17 
1 Reports on armed conflict 2.25 3.17 
5 April - 24 April 
1 Parliamentary events 39.25 3.22 
2 Military equipment ± British 31.5 2.58 
3 Possibility of armed conflict or war 29.75 2.44 
25 April - 30 
April 
1 Parliamentary events 30.75 30.98 
2 Diplomacy - the way 22.75 22.92 
3 Support for Britain - UN, EEC, World 14.75 14.86 
1 May - 20 May 
1 Parliamentary events 69.5 18.87 
2 Military equipment ± British 49.75 13.5 
3 Economic implications of crisis 39.5 10.72 
21 May - 14 June 
1 Parliamentary events 86.75 20.71 
2 Reports on armed conflict 59 14.08 
3 Military equipment ± British 56.5 13.49 
 
 
The most prominent aspect of Table 6.11 is that, in all five separate periods of the war, the 
comment on events in and around Parliament was featured most frequently. Since the 
Conservative victory in the 1983 general election, many academics have attributed success 
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WRDSKHQRPHQRQFDOOHGWKHµ)DONODQGV)DFWRU¶124 It has been supposed that triumph in the 
Falklands, and the euphoria which ensued, had a direct impact on the electoral fortunes of 
the Tories. During the crisis itself, a series of by-elections led to speculation over how the 
war might affect the standing of the Government. Rivalries between the two leading parties 
were also a source of interest. Demands within the Commons for a peaceful solution to the 
crisis were the subjects of many articles. There were also editorials featured specifically on 
the role of Parliament in times of war. The Telegraph carried the editorial, 
µ3$5/,$0(17$1':$5¶and The Times IHDWXUHGDSLHFHHQWLWOHGµ3$5/,$0(17¶6
5(63216,%,/,7<¶125 7KHH[LVWLQJOLWHUDWXUHKDVIDLOHGWRDGGUHVVWKHPHGLD¶V
preoccupation during the Falklands crisis with the effects of the war on domestic life. This, 
coupled with the information that an overwhelming percentage of news reports originated 
IURP%ULWDLQVXJJHVWVWKDWWKH%ULWLVKPHGLD¶VUHSRUWLQJRIWKH)DONODQGVWHQGHGWRIRFXV
mainly on events related to the war, but in Britain. 
 
British military equipment was most frequently referred to throughout the periods between 
5 and 24 April, 1 and 20 May, and 21 May and 14 June. The primary reason for this was 
that, in the first period, the Task Force sailed ± leaving the media to hypothesize over, and 
report on, British military capacity. In the second (1-20 May), the first major British losses 
of the war occurred ± inviting the media to comment on the equipment available to fight a 
campaign. The final of the three periods was the last of the war ± when some of the most 
crucial British (and Argentine) losses occurred: HMS Antrim, Antelope, Coventry, 
Broadsword, Plymouth, Glamorgan, SS Atlantic Conveyor and RFA Sir Galahad and Sir 
Tristram - which attracted copious commentary on British equipment.126  
 
It is interesting that diplomacy as a way of solving the crisis only featured in the top 
themes in the periods 2-4 April and 25-30 April. Not only were these two periods the 
shortest offered in the investigation, but they both occurred immediately following 
significant action in the South Atlantic. The first, 2-4 April, saw the press speculate on the 
future of the islands, the rights and wrongs of British sovereignty and as to the causes of 
the Argentine invasion. It was swiftly announced that Britain would send a Force to the 
Falklands, and most publications urged caution. The second period was dominated by the 
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first significant British action of the war ± the recapture of South Georgia. This act of force 
from the British provoked heightened demands that a diplomatic resolution be found. 
 
It seems incredible that, when analysing coverage of a war, reports on armed conflict only 
entered the top ranking themes during two periods: at the beginning and end of the crisis 
(2-4 April and 21 May ± 14 June). This evidence lends weight to the earlier conclusion that 
the majority of British press coverage of the conflict was centred on non-combat-related 
commentary ± instead it was focused on Parliamentary events in Britain and on diplomatic 
efforts.  
 
3c (iii). Press Coverage and Peace Initiatives 
The art of diplomacy as a way to rectify the situation in the Falklands was a dominant 
theme in both television and newspaper coverage. What is particularly notable, however, is 
the importance attached to the various peace initiatives. In this study themes were allocated 
to the various peace plans: those attributed to Haig, the UN and Peru.127 From there, the 
categories were divided into whether they were portrayed as a possible success or failure. 
An extra theme was added to account for neutral reporting of the Haig peace plan, since it 
was the most extensively covered of the plans. Mostly, the coverage of the peace initiatives 
is unsurprising: the Haig and UN schemes gained more currency than that of Peru; 
television devoted more time to the discussion of each of the initiatives than newspapers; 
and the potential (or real) failure of various proposals were given more attention than their 
possible success. What was unanticipated was the uniformity of the treatment of each of 
the peace initiatives between the tabloids and broadsheets. 
  
                                                 
127
 )RULQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHYDULRXVSURSRVDOVRIIHUHG3DUVRQVµ7KH)DONODQGV&ULVLVLQWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV¶
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with theme Television themes Ranking 
Percentage of  
bulletins with  
theme 
Peace Plan - Haig 
± Failure 33 2.23 
Peace Plan - UN - 
Failure 13 36.30 
Peace Plan - UN ± 
Failure 38 1.99 
Peace Plan - Haig - 
Failure 17 32.88 
Peace Plan - UN ± 
Success 84 0.91 
Peace Plan - Haig - 
Success 42 16.44 
Peace Plan - Peru ± 
Failure 99 0.72 
Peace Plan - UN - 
Success 44 15.75 
Peace Plan - Haig 
± Success 116 0.6 
Peace Plan - Peru - 
Failure 97 7.53 
Peace Plan - Haig 
± Neutral 122 0.56 
Peace Plan - Peru - 
Success 132 3.42 
Peace Plan - Peru ± 




Table 6.12 demonstrates the frequency of themes related to the various peace initiatives 
offered over the course of the war. Overall, it is clear that the failure of peace plans 
attracted the most attention from both newspapers and television. This is not exceptional, 
since each of the peace proposals failed to avert armed conflict. It is interesting, though, 
that the possible success of the UN peace proposal was discussed more thoroughly in print 
than the failure of the Peruvian plan. Although there was a large margin between the 
amount of content on the failure of the UN and Haig plans, and the potential success of the 
UN programme, the amount of debate surrounding the theme suggests that the UN plan 
was presented in the press as perhaps the most viable option. 
 
TelHYLVLRQ¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKHSHDFHSODQVZDVFHUWDLQO\PRUHIRFXVHGWKDQQHZVSDSHU
attention. Both television and newspaper reporting converged on the potential failure of 
both the Haig and UN plan. However, the frequencies at which the plans were discussed 
varied greatly. Table 6.12 shows how diverse the rankings were. What is clear is that a far 
greater percentage of all Falklands coverage was devoted to the peace initiatives on 
television ± 36.30% of coverage carried the theme. Although, as has been established, 
newspapers were able to cover a greater range of themes, the discrepancies in both 
percentages and rankings proves that the peace initiatives were attributed far less attention 
in print than on the small screen. 
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Table 6.13: Frequency of articles relating to peace initiatives in the Falklands War  
Daily Mirror The Sun  
Theme 
Percentage  
of coverage Theme 
Percentage  
of coverage 
Peace Plan - UN ± Failure 2.02 Peace Plan - UN - Failure 2.10 
Peace Plan - Haig - Failure 1.40 Peace Plan - Haig - Failure 2.10 
Peace Plan - UN - Success 0.62 Peace Plan - Haig - Success 0.42 
Peace Plan - Peru - Failure 0.62 Peace Plan - Haig - Neutral 0.28 
Peace Plan - Haig - Neutral 0.62 Peace Plan - Peru - Failure 0.14 
Peace Plan - Haig - Success 0.31 Peace Plan - UN - Success 0.00 
Peace Plan - Peru - Success 0.16 Peace Plan - Peru - Success 0.00 
The Daily Telegraph The Times 
Theme 
Percentage  
of coverage Theme 
Percentage  
of coverage 
Peace Plan - UN ± Failure 1.75 Peace Plan - UN - Failure 3.32 
Peace Plan - Haig - Failure 1.55 Peace Plan - Haig - Failure 3.05 
Peace Plan - UN - Success 0.75 Peace Plan - UN - Success 1.69 
Peace Plan - Haig - Success 0.75 Peace Plan - Peru - Failure 1.08 
Peace Plan - Peru - Failure 0.70 Peace Plan - Haig - Success 0.61 
Peace Plan - Haig - Neutral 0.70 Peace Plan - Haig - Neutral 0.47 
Peace Plan - Peru - Success 0.10 Peace Plan - Peru - Success 0.07 
 
 
What was more surprising than any other finding on the attention paid to the peace 
initiatives was how standardised the results for both the tabloids and broadsheets were. 
Table 6.13 details the thematic results for each of the four papers tested. Across all four the 
top two themes were consistent: the failure of both the UN and Haig peace plans. Across 
The Times, the Telegraph and The Mirror, the third highest frequency peace-related theme 
was also the same ± speculation on the success of the UN initiative. The Sun on the other 
hand, persistently considered the Haig proposals to a greater extent than other newspapers 
and marks the most divergence from the uniform picture produced by the other papers. A 
possible explanation for this could have been the fact that, after the Americans openly 
sided with the British on 30 April, The Sun, paid decreasing attention to any efforts to 
secure a diplomatic solution, and turned to discussion of the military alternatives. The 
greatest concentration of articles on peace initiatives appeared in The Sun, for example, 
during the period from 5 -24 April. Despite The Sun¶VGHYLDWLRQIURPWKHPRUHFRQVLVWHQW
results in the analysis, the paper still presented four themes of the seven in the same 
position as another publication. Across the board, the least handled theme was the 
prospective success of the Peruvian peace plan. The Peruvian plan appeared as the plan 
least discussed in all newspapers and on television. The Peruvian plan was in play for less 
time, for example, than the Haig plan, and also was the final peace effort of the war, finally 
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collapsing after the sinking of the Belgrano and the Sheffield.  Thus, all four newspapers 
presented the peace initiatives, with the exception of The Sun after 30 April, with a rare 
degree of consistency. 
 
3c (iv). Patriotism and Jingoism 
The theory that the British press was jingoistic in its treatment of the Falklands, has been 
prevalent in literature of the conflict.129 0HPRULHVFRORXUHGE\LQGLYLGXDOSXEOLFDWLRQV¶
exploits have tarred coverage of the whole campaign. The Sun, in particular, has been 
criticised for its behaviour during the war. A string of inappropriate headlines were 
published ± headlines which, to this day, remain representative of press conduct in the 
crisis ± VXFKDVµ67,&.,783<285-817$¶DQGµ*27&+$¶130 The Sun also initiated 
a number of campaigns or features based on the war. The most notable was the campaign 
WRµVSRQVRUDVLGHZLQGHU¶. The Sun offered the public the chance to write slogans on 
PLVVLOHV7KHILUVWVLGHZLQGHUZDVVSRQVRUHGE\WKHSDSHUDQGUHDGµXS\RXUV*DOWLHUL¶ 
Snow, aboard Invincible, wrote a story on the missile bringing down an Argentine 
bomber.131  The publication alsRLQLWLDWHGDUHJXODUVHULHVRIµ$UJ\%DUJLH¶MRNHV5HDGHUV
were invited to send in xenophobic jokes for a reward of £5 if they were used. It is the 
contention of this thesis that such campaigns and instances have dominated analysis of 
coverage ± and unjustly.  
 
Broadcast media specifically was criticised for being too neutral in its treatment of the 
war.132 Morrison and Tumber found that the language of television reports based in Britain 
was mostly neutral.133 No such analysis of newspapers could be feasibly conducted here ± 
largely because the amount of text which would have to be analysed and its neutrality 
examined+RZHYHULIRQHFRQVLGHUVWKHWUHDWPHQWRIWKHWKHPHRIµSDWULRWLVP¶E\ERWK
television and publications, one can lend a degree of weight to the argument that television 
took a relatively neutral stance in comparison with newspapers. The theme of patriotism 
covered stories relating to feelings of patriotism within Britain, internationally and within 
the Task Force, as well as specifically describing patriotic deeds at home.134 As a theme, 
patriotism featured as low as 27th in the frequency ratings for television. In comparison, 
patriotism was a consistently high-scoring theme across all four papers. As one might 
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expect, the top theme commented on, or portrayed, in The Sun was patriotism. As much as 
RIWKHSDSHU¶VWRWDOFRYHUDJHPDGHXVHRIWKHtheme (Figure 6.7). No other 
newspaper featured the theme as much. Patriotism was the 11th and 12th highest frequency 
themes in The Times and the Telegraph respectively.135 For The Mirror, only referring to 
the theme in 2.95% of coverage, the theme ranked 20th. The results of analysis in this case, 
may be particularly misleading ± suggesting that it was only The Sun which indulged in a 
heightened sense of patriotism. The Daily Star and the Daily Mail have, too, been 
condemned for their overly patriotic approach to the conflict. Having evaluated the highest 
circulation tabloids, this analysis does not analyse the amount of patriotic fervour 
expressed by alternative tabloids. The Mirror, particularly in this instance, is not 
QHFHVVDULO\LQGLFDWLYHRIWKHWDEORLGSUHVV$V+DUULVVXUPLVHGµ7KHMirror found itself 
caught between its dislike for Mrs Thatcher and its detesWDWLRQRI*HQHUDO*DOWLHUL¶136 
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Figure 6.8: The use or discussion of jingoism in newspapers
Jingoism - discussion of Jingoism - the use of
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A common complaint of critics of the press during the Falklands was that it was too 
µMLQJRLVWLF¶5LFKDUG.HHEOHZURWHWKDWWKHUHZDVMRXUQDOLVWLFµK\SHU-MLQJRLVP¶GXULQJWKH
ZDUDQGµFUXGH³HQHP\´EDLWLQJRIWKHSRSV>SRSXODUSUHVV@¶137 Greenberg and Smith felt 
that, with the exception of the Daily Mirrorµ)OHHW6WUHHW¶V³popular´ tabloid newspapers 
went in search of something better than bingo to boost their circulations: They found it: 
MLQJR¶138 Jingoism can be defined DVWKHGLVSOD\RIµH[WUHPHSDWULRWLVP¶139 Certainly, The 
Sun contained the most amount of jingoistic dialogue (Figure 6.8). There were two themes 
allotted to jingoism in this research: either a story could be jingoistic in character, or it 
could include discussion of jingoism. Both themes made up a very small percentage of the 
WRWDOSRVVLEOH$QDUWLFOHZDVMLQJRLVWLFLQOHVVWKDQRIDOO)DONODQGV¶FRYHUDJH
Discussion of the subject featured slightly higher at 0.58%. Figure 6.8 determines how 
discussion of jingoism, rather than the use of jingoistic tone, dominated coverage related to 
the subject, particularly in The Times. Jingoism was seen, and is seen, as a central feature 
of Falklands¶ news reporting ± yet other themes attracted far more attention in the printed 
press and have failed to be adequately contemplated.  
 
3c (v). The Media on the Media 
,WZDVQRWRQO\WKHSXEOLF*RYHUQPHQWDQGDFDGHPLFVZKRGUHZDWWHQWLRQWRWKHPHGLD¶V
reporting of the Falklands at the time. The media also evaluated its own role. Of particular 
note is the fact that Morrison and Tumber, whilst including categories on communication 
difficulties and FHQVRUVKLSQHJOHFWHGWRFRQVLGHUWKHPHGLD¶VFRPPHQWRQLWVRZn role. 
Indeed, much of the literature pertaining to the media neglects the way in which the media 
reported its own news, other than the row between the BBC and the Government, or the 
row between The Sun, The Guardian and the Mirror.140  
 
For the purpose of this research, new categories were created to monitor press comment on 
the media: criticism and praise of journalism in Britain, criticism and praise of reporting 
from the Task Force journalists and criticism or praise of the way in which the MoD was 
handling the media. The greatest attention, in newspapers, was paid to matters relating to 
the criticism of British journalism (Table 6.14). Government criticism of the media 
demanded its own category, since reporting of the conflict between the MoD and the 
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media, and the Government and broadcasters, demanded considerable thought. The issue 
of the role of the media during the war was clearly important at the time. Of all 213 themes 
on Falklands-related news, criticism of British journalism was the 22nd highest frequency 
theme. Considering the damning review of MoD competency most journalists gave the 
HCDC, the number of articles which included criticism of the MoD were not as high as 
one might have expected. Certainly the fact that there were only four of 4835 Falklands-
connected stories which included any positive media-related appraisal of the MoD is not 
astounding.  
 
Table 6.14: Frequency of media-related articles in Falklands¶ coverage  









Average Theme  
Ranking across  
Newspapers 
Media - criticism of British journalism 144 2.98 22 
MoD - media-related criticism  96 1.99 37 
Media - praise of British journalism 66 1.37 66 
Importance of the media 65 1.34 67 
Government criticism of the media 58 1.2 72 
Media - praise of journalism from Task 
Force 15 0.31 147 
MoD - media-related praise 11 0.23 165 
Media - criticism of journalism from Task 




What the application of content analysis can add to research on the media during the 
Falklands is a strong set of quantitative data which can support, or contest, analyses which 
PLJKWRWKHUZLVHKDYHEHHQFODVVHGDVµVXEMHFWLYH¶7KLVUHVHDUFKVSHFLILFDOO\adds a new 
dimension to study of the topic by contributing data which is easily comparable to that on 
television.  
 
Most broadly, the results outlined in this chapter have demonstrated that television devoted 
a higher percentage of its content to the Falklands, but newspapers covered the conflict 
more fully.141 The length of a newspaper on any given day was directly relative to events 
in the South Atlantic. Newspapers allocated more space per issue to the Falklands than any 
other story. Thus both media were dominated by the issue of the Falklands throughout the 
entirety of the war. 
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Analysis of the origins of reports featured in newspapers exposes the literature as having 
focused mistakenly on a number of issues. Contrary to the assertions of previous studies, 
reports on the Falklands originated overwhelmingly from Britain. In addition, they centred 
on domestic concerns relating to the war. The source from which information was gathered 
has traditionally been a point of contention. The media received criticism for relying too 
heavily on Argentine sources, yet this study finds that the printed press did not use an 
abnormal amount of sources originating from Argentina. In fact, use of material from 
Argentina was considerably less frequent than one might expect. The frequency of reports 
from the Task Force also suggests, in spite of conflicting claims, that there was steady 
representation of the work of those journalists with the Task Force in British newspapers.  
 
In addition to examining the structure of the news, this analysis addresses the composition 
of reports by considering each story thematically. This thesis maintains that the prevalent 
themes associated with news coverage of the Falklands were primarily ones which affected 
%ULWDLQ¶Vdomestic situation: Parliamentary events, the economic implications of the war, 
the effect the war might have on Britain and the efforts to secure a diplomatic solution to 
the crisis. Although, generally, the printed press demonstrated its commitment to the use of 
diplomacy to resolve the dispute between 2 April and 30 April, what this study establishes 
is that the press largely abandoned its allegiance to democratic methods of resolution when 
the United States sided firmly with Britain. Analysis of the various peace initiatives (the 
+DLJVKXWWOHWKH81¶VSODQDQGWKH3HUXYLDQSODQKDVLQGLFDWHGWKHYDVWGLIIHUHQFHLQWKH
way each plan was presented to the public. 
 
Analysis of the various stages of the war produced findings which, in many ways, were to 
EHH[SHFWHGRUFRXOGKDYHEHHQSUHGLFWHG)RUH[DPSOH%ULWDLQ¶VXVHRIPLOLWDU\
equipment as a theme featured in the top three topics in the period in which the Task Force 
was sailing to the South Atlantic and after 1 May, when the conflict escalated and both 
Britain and Argentina began to experience military losses. Speculation as to the possibility 
of armed conflict or a war was similarly predictable in its rankings. Although much time 
was devoted to ponderings as to whether or not there would be engagement (ranked 6th in 
the frequency of themes as a whole), the only period in which it actually featured in the top 
three themes was when diplomacy was at its peak, with the shuttle diplomacy of Haig, 
between 5 and 24 April. Additionally, reports on armed conflict figured most prominently 
in the final stage of the war.  
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Students of the Falklands War and the media have been fortunate to benefit from a number 
of significant studies which utilised the technique of content analysis. Each had merits, yet 
none provided a significant appraisal of the content of the printed press. The thematic, 
formulaic and stylistic breakdown of a selection of newspapers during the war has 














1. Addressing the Research Questions 
This study aimed to address a number of key research areas: the development of 
Government media policy throughout the Falklands conflict; the information and 
presentation policy to which wider Government ± not just the Ministry of Defence ± 
subscribed during the crisis; the series of organisations, or groups, established to deal 
directly with media-related issues; and finally, it has striven to address the existing 
assumptions about the content and tone of the printed press through the use of content 
analysis.  
 
There were two distinct spheres directly affected by the media policy adopted by the MoD 
during the Falklands War: policy relating to the journalists who accompanied the Task 
Force to the South Atlantic ± a policy which took immediate priority and dominated the 
attention of MoDPR, certainly until May 1982; and policy concerning media reporting on 
the crisis from Britain.  
 
7KLVWKHVLVEURDGO\DUJXHVWKDWWKH0R'¶VPHGLDSROLF\EHFDPHPRUHFRQVLGHUHGDQG
reflective of the nature of a limited campaign, from the middle of May onwards. The 
length of the war prohibited the measures, put in place by the MoD in mid to late May, 
from having a significant impact, or from being as successful as it might have been, had 
the conflict been prolonged. At the beginning of the crisis, the MoD was prevented from 
creating any form of coherent and effective policy. This had the most drastic repercussions 
on the way in which policy regarding the Task Force journalists would develop. At the 
beginning of April 1982, MoDPR did not have an articulate or rational media plan in place 
which could be engaged in response to the instigation of a limited conflict. In addition, the 
department responsible for establishing such a plan found itself without a permanent chief 
at its helm, without suitable media expertise and taken over by civil servants, desperate to 
contribute to the crisis, but whose regular functions had been seized by the war machinery 
of the MoD ± the Chiefs of Staff. These disadvantages manifested themselves and became 




and ITN) over the week following the Argentine invasion; its failure to organise a fair and 
transparent accreditation system;  and the fact that only two policy dimensions were 
considered in any depth - communications and censorship.  
 
7KH0R'¶V7DVN)RUFHSROLF\WKURXJKRXW$SULOZDVSODJXHGE\DQXPEHURIGLIILFXOWLHV
Communication between the Fleet and MoD was poor. This was one element which would 
remain unresolved throughout the entirety of the conflict, but which presented some of the 
most contentious aspects of policy throughout the first month of the crisis, when successive 
attempts to address issues of transmission failed. Censorship also posed a significant 
challenge to MoDPR. No coherent, or central, policy was developed in response to the 
question of censorship. The policy created over the first weekend of the crisis would lead 
to inconsistencies, errors and inaccuracies throughout the conflict. 
 
7KLVWKHVLVFRQWULEXWHVDGHWDLOHGDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKH0LQLVWU\¶V7DVN
Force policy. It was often argued by journalists who covered the war from the South 
Atlantic that the civilian public relations team which accompanied them was an extension 
RIWKH0R'DQGJXLOW\RIUXQQLQJµ/RQGRQSROLF\¶7KLVWKHVLVFRQWHQGVWKDWWKHUHZDVQR
VXFKWKLQJDVWKHµ/RQGRQSROLF\¶,QIDFWSROLF\IURP/RQGRQZDVLQVKRUWVXSSO\Dnd the 
MoD actually allowed those members of the Task Force dealing with PR an impressive 
amount of authority over, for example, the movements of journalists, the allocation of 
journalists to units and across ships and, most crucially, over censorship policy. 
Essentially, it is proposed that there were two central lines of policy ± that relating to 
incident reporting policy, and that related to the censorship of the Task Force journalists.1 
 
This work charts arrangements for censorship and concludes that policy towards censor 
restrictions became more effective and productive as the conflict progressed ± particularly 
when the land campaign commenced on the islands. This, it is argued, was not due to the 
achievements of any MoDPR directives, but rather as a direct result of a devolvement of 
power over provisions for censorship to the men on the ground in the South Atlantic ± the 
µPLOLWDU\PLQGHUV¶2 The policy constructed by PROs on the Falklands on 12 May, and 
imposed from 21 May onwards, had the potential to foster a censorship system which was, 
at least, productive in ensuring the regular transmission of Task Force copy. However, the 
censorship process was unnecessarily complicated by the addition of a supplementary layer 
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 See Chapter Three. 
2
 See Chapter Three. 
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of censorship in London from 21 May. This additional tier of suppression led to a complete 
lack of policy consistency. 
 
Policy concerning Task Force journalists was more consistent, if not from 12 May - when 
&DSWDLQ1LFKROOVDQGWKUHHµPLQGHUV¶FRQVWUXFWHGWKHSROLF\JXLGHOLQHVZKLFKZRXOG
remain to the end of the war - then certainly from the time of the San Carlos landings. The 
7DVN)RUFHMRXUQDOLVWV¶H[SHULHQFHVPD\QRWKDYHEHHQXQLIRUPEXWSROLF\ZDVFOHDUHU
widely recognised and more applicable to the situation. 
 
Incident reporting - what this thesis judges to be a preoccupation of the MoD when 
constructing Task Force media policy - certainly underwent serious review and became 
more efficient following a series of events at the beginning of May 1982. Task Force 
policy was the only area of overall MoD media policy in which changes in procedure 
began as early as the end of April. However, change was preceeded by a series of policy 
reviews ± official policy was not altered until mid-May, spurred by the impending 
landings. Amendments to policy were implemented to incident reporting first, it is argued, 
because it was the issue which bore the greatest impact on the credibility and public image 
of the MoD. A review of incident reporting was established as early as 7 May, subsequent 
to the sinking of both the ARA General Belgrano and HMS Sheffield. The sinking of the 
Argentine fishing vessel, the NarwhalDGGHGLPSHWXVWRWKH0R'¶VSRVLWLRQWKDWWKHZD\
in which incidents in the warzone were to be reported needed to be swiftly addressed.  
 
The major shortcoming of MoD policy was that it was reactive. However, once sufficient 
time had passed, and the Ministry had acclimatised to the situation, one can see that a 
µSURSHU¶SURFHGXUH± one in which a sense of efficiency and clarity emerged ± actually 
materialised. The reactive element of policy development was present not only in policy 
relating to the Task Force journalists, but also to that pertaining to the media in Britain. 
7KLVWKHVLVDUJXHVWKDWWKH0R'¶VODFNof provision for media facilities throughout the first 
month of the crisis was demonstrative of the lack of consideration awarded to the media ± 
never mind the British media - in the initial phase of the conflict. This thesis asserts that 
this was made clear through a variety of actions: the cessation of unattributable briefings at 
the MoD, the lack of information ± or corroborative information ± permitted to journalists 
and the poor allowance made for regional and foreign media organisations, for example.3  
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 See Chapter Four. 
 257 
 
Throughout May 1982 a number of events in the South Atlantic - or measures taken by the 
MoD - served to alleviate the considerable strain under which MoDPR was placed and to 
create a more efficient system of public relations. However, even these exploits did little to 
repair the relationship between the media and MoD which had, by then, soured to an extent 
that, for at least the duration of the remainder of the conflict, relations were hostile. 
Perhaps the most significant achievement of the MoD was the reinstatement of 
unattributable briefings from 11 May. The introduction of a Military Briefing Group in the 
third week of May, and a News Release Group on 18 May, both marked advances in MoD 
policy which witnessed a departure from an apathetic approach to media management in 
April, to a new and valuable attitude of attentiveness and assistance.4 
 
It is the contention of this thesis that the improved attitude of the MoD towards the media 
during May 1982 was not necessarily a result of the acumen of MoDPR, but rather because 
of a number of external factors. An example of such factors includes the role of Neville 
Taylor, as Chief of Public Relations at the MoD, after he became chief of all matters 
directly relating to Falklands PR. In addition, the swelling criticism levelled at the MoD in 
the media during the first weeks of May ± and more directly articulated by Editors at their 
meetings with Sir Frank Cooper ± served to add impetus to the changes which the MoD 
would adopt later that month. Whatever the motivation, this thesis maintains that the 
middle of May (11-0D\PDUNHGDVLJQLILFDQWDGYDQFHRIWKH0R'¶VSROLF\LQFDWHULQJ
for media in Britain. 
 
'HVSLWHLPSURYHPHQWVLQWKH0R'¶VSROLF\GHFLVLRQVWKHVXFFHVVRIWKHLQLWLDWLYHV
embarked upon in mid-May was mixed. The Military Briefing Group was provided to the 
media too late in the campaign to be of much effect. By that time, much of the media had 
located alternative sources of military intelligence. Further to this, by the last week in May 
most journalists knew what to expect from the conflict on the Falklands ± the war was 
going one way; towards Stanley, and towards victory. If the war had been extended ± if the 
war for the mountains had been more ferocious, or had the British faced more determined 
or heavier resistance at Goose Green or Teal Inlet - the need for a specialist group of 
military experts to brief the media may have been greater. The News Release Group, on 
the other hand, had a more tangible impact ± especially in the area of casualty reporting. 
The group also adopted a more integral role within the MoDPR structure, producing 
increasing numbers of official briefings, statements and announcements to the media. In 
                                                 
4







briefing system.  
 
This thesis proposes that, conversely to the experience of the MoD, the initiatives to aid 
Government-media relations which had their roots in wider Government - the Cabinet 
2IILFH¶V6RXWK$WODQWLF3UHVHQWDWLRQ8QLW1R¶Voffshoot of the Meetings of Information 
2IILFHUVWKH,QIRUPDWLRQ*URXSDQGWKH&KDQFHOORURIWKH'XFK\RI/DQFDVWHU¶V2IILFH¶V
Parkinson Presentation Group ± all fell short of the mark fairly early in their existence.5  
 
The SAPU was established as early as 6 April with the intention of promoting positive 
Government presentation by countering rumour and disseminating lines for ministers to 
take. However, by 12 May it had already significantly depreciated in worth ± a fact marked 
E\WKH2'6$¶VLQVLVWHQFHWKDW&HFLO3DUNLQVRQWDNHUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWKHRXWSXWRIWKH
group from that date. The SAPU was also afflicted by administrative difficulties ± 
difficulties apparent from the time it issued its first circular on 11 April.  
 
The Information Group, established as a result of an OD(SA) meeting of 7 April and 
intended to be a forum at which the central departments involved in the conflict might 
strategise a united, Government media policy, equally declined in effectiveness. The 
principal issues which affected the efficiency and productivity of the IG were related to the 
membership and authority of the group. The fact that the MoD sent increasingly junior 
representatives and limited representation at the highest levels on only a handful of 
occasions at the beginning of the crisis meant the rest of Government was largely unaware 
RIWKH0R'¶V35DSSURDFK7KH,*ZDVDOVROLPLWHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWLWRYHUODSSHGZLWK
other groups like the SAPU and was unable to adequately plan ahead.  
 
The Parkinson Presentation Group was perhaps the shortest-lived of all bodies set up 
outside the remit of the Ministry of Defence. It was created in direct response to the 
flagging efforts of the Information Group and the internal squabbles between, principally, 
No.10 and Bernard Ingham, and the MoD and Frank Cooper. It lasted long enough to 
FRQYHQHDWRWDORIWKUHHPHHWLQJVRQO\WRµZLWKHUDZD\¶LQWKHIDFHRIZKDW/RUG3DUNLQVRQ
                                                 
5
 See Chapter Five. 
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WHUPVµLQFUHDVHGFR-RSHUDWLRQ¶6 However, this thesis illustrates that the problems inherent 
LQWKH,*GLGQRWUHFHGHDVDUHVXOWRIWKHµEDQJLQJWRJHWKHURIKHDGV¶VXSSOLHGE\WKH33*
but preserved until the close of the conflict. Not only, then, was the PPG limited in scope 
and duration, but also in effect.  
 
One important tenet of this thesis is discussion on the way in which Government policy 
was hindered by the lack of central organisation and co-operation between departments. 
This situation was not only secured by the failure of central co-ordinating machinery in the 
shape of groups like the Information Group and the SAPU, but also by the organisational 
EDFNJURXQGDQGDELOLW\RIWKHSXEOLFUHODWLRQV¶VHFWLRQVRIWKRVHGHSDUWPHQWVLQWHJUDOO\
involved in forming the presentational policy of the British Government. In April 1982 
MoDPR was unsuitable to lead Government media policy in response to the Falklands 
crisis. Its poor-footing at the start of the conflict had lasting ramifications on the 
development of Ministry policy. The FCO News Department was far better placed, in 
1982, to cope with the media requirements presented by a crisis of the magnitude of the 
Falklands (Appendix 12). The key impediment to the successful formulation of a united 
information policy was the divisional and adversarial nature of the relationship between 
MoDPR ± led by Cooper and Nott ± and its equivalent parties in other departments. The 
MoD failed to co-ordinate properly with the FCO throughout the first month of the crisis, 
leaving the presentation burden of the Falklands to the News Department. The MoD also 
failed to use this time adequately to prepare for when this burden would, inevitably, be 
shifted ± when the fighting started. The issue which, above all others, had the greatest 
impact on the co-ordination of the Government information effort was that the MoD ± 
principally Cooper ± ZDVLQGLIIHUHQWDQGDWWLPHVRSHQO\KRVWLOHWRWKHHIIRUWVRI1R¶V
Press Office to initiate an amalgamated Government approach to the media ± specifically 
,QJKDP¶VHIIRUWV7KHODFNRIRSHQGLDORJXHFRQVXOWDWLRQ and collaboration dictated that 
media policy throughout the Falklands was never that of a united Government. It was 
always fractured along department lines ± and even, on occasion, along personal lines. 
While most of the Conservative Party agreed on the need to oust the Argentines from the 
Falklands, there was barely any agreement between departments on a central media policy 
which might be observed during the operation to regain the islands.  
 
7KLVWKHVLVPDLQWDLQVWKDW,QJKDP¶Vrole was pivotal to wider Government efforts to 
centralise policy efforts. He did not, as much of the literature has indicated, merely flex his 
                                                 
6
 Parkinson, Interview. 
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muscles at the beginning of the crisis, in a bid to secure journalist places with the Task 
Force, and at the end - whHQKHµGHILHG¶WKH0R'WRDQQRXQFHWKH)LW]UR\FDVXDOW\
figures.7 It is contended here that Ingham had, before 1982, consolidated power throughout 
his time as Chief Press Secretary (from 1979). The Falklands provided an arena in which 
one could witness the true remit of his authority. This was seen principally through his 
entrenched position as chair of the MIOs ± and in the Falklands its adjunct, the Information 
*URXS%XWLWZDVDOVRPDGHFOHDUE\,QJKDP¶VGRPLQDQFHRYHUWKH6$38DQGKLVSHUVRQDO




One of the central research goals of this thesis was to appraise the content of the printed 
press during the conflict to compare those results with ones collated as an outcome of 
examination of television news broadcasts.9 This thesis provides evidence which 
contributes to a re-evaluation of much of the assumptions regarding the press advanced 
over the last three decades. There are four key areas in which the content analysis 
contained in this thesis has yielded particularly major results. Firstly, it was discovered 
that, although television news dedicated a higher percentage of its overall coverage to the 
topic of the Falklands on average, newspapers reported the war more fully ± covering a 
greater range of themes and compensating for the amount of Falklands-related news on any 
given day by extending its length. A more constant source of measurement ± newspaper 
editorials ± indicated that as much as 50% of core attention was directed at any one time 
during the crisis, on the battle to reclaim the Falklands. Secondly, whereas it was 
commonly presumed that the British press relied on Argentine information because of the 
dearth of news emanating from the MoD in London, this analysis demonstrates that the 
British press actually only used Argentine information for less than 6% of all Falklands 
stories. In addition, this thesis presents the argument that when British newspapers and TV 
did make use of Argentine material, they handled it responsibly. 
 
The third result which deserves specific attention was that the press used a far lower 
percentage of Task Force material in its discussion of the war than did television news. 
This result would possibly have been even more disparate if in the research of this thesis, 
                                                 
7
 See Chapter Five. 
8
 OD(SA), 7 Apr., TNA, CAB148/218 f.4.; OD(SA), 11 May, TNA, CAB148/211 f.103. 
9
 Primarily results obtained by Morrison and Tumber ± see Chapter Six. 
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column inches could have been measured. Copy from the Task Force was, generally, 
shorter than that scripted elsewhere. One of the most significant advancements made by 
this study concerns its findings on the themes the printed press most - or least - reported. 
For example, contrary to popular conjecture relating to the press, there was not an 
abundance of jingoistic material. An article was jingoistic in tone in less than 0.15% of 
print material on the Falklands. There was also an overwhelming preoccupation amongst 
the press with subjects which reflected the long-term implications of the conflict, or the 
domestic repercussions a war might have on Britain. In addition, the study is the only 
H[LVWLQJTXDQWLWDWLYHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHZD\LQZKLFKWKHSUHVVUHSRUWHGWKHµPHGLDZDU¶
during the Falklands. Of all commentary on the media during the conflict, the press 
concentrated on how British journalism was criticised ± either by the Government or the 
public. The press also, however, included a fairly substantial percentage of focus on media-
related issues highlighting criticism of the way in which the MoD handled the media.  
 
2. Possible Advancements and Areas for Future Study 
There are a number of areas in which this research could be significantly improved ± or 
ways it could be extended. There are two main foci of concern. Firstly, the length of a PhD 
thesis prohibits further discussion of crucial elements to this research. For example, more 
extensive and detailed discussion of the role of the Foreign Office and Northwood in PR 
policy, as well as other elements relating to Number 10, would have benefited this thesis 
further. Comprehensive notes on such topics, along with other information can be located 
in the Appendices of this thesis (see Appendices Five, Seven, 12, 15, 16). The second area 
in which significant developments might be made is in the content analysis. Although 
much of this was pointed out in the relevant chapter, a more comprehensive study would 
have been one which could have measured the percentage of Falklands-related material by 
column inches, and not just by the presence of an article. A more punctilious study would 
make use of a larger sample of daily newspapers and contribute results in column inches.  
 
This research provides a solid basis for further works on the subject. Although, at first 
glance, the subject field appears saturated with evaluations of the media and the Falklands, 
there are a number of studies yet to be considered, and for which this thesis might act as a 
foundation. The work of the FCO News Department throughout the crisis, for example, 
warrants further attention (see Appendix 12 of this work for a preliminary account). In 
addition, assessment of the roles of individual civil servants who worked on media policy 
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would be educative ± Robert Wade-Grey, David Colvin and RoberW$UPVWURQJ¶VUROHVIRU
example. 
 
Perhaps what students of the media in the Falklands crave is information on, and the truth 
about, the more controversial episodes during the war ± the BBC World Service and MoD 
roles in the premature announcement of the capture of Goose Green, for example, or the 
0R'¶VµPDQLSXODWLRQ¶RIWKHPHGLDRYHUWKH6DQ&DUORVODQGLQJV7KHVHLQFLGHQWV
although memorable and, of course, of considerable import, should not be allowed to 
dominate investigation (especially since there is little documentation or evidence of 
substance to be offered that has not yet been analysed in depth). Other areas concerning the 
media during the campaign in need of further contemplation include: the role of the media 
in advancing or diminishing the sugJHVWLRQRI&KLOH¶VDVVLVWDQFHLQWKHFDPSDLJQZLWKWKH
case study of the crashed British helicopter found in Chile featuring prominently); the 
function of British psychological operations during the Falklands (specifically a detailed 
analysis of the workings and success of Radio Atlantico del Sur); the early warning of the 
Argentine invasion provided by both the British and Argentine press; an evaluation of the 
%%&¶VH[WHUQDOVHUYLFHVGXULQJWKHFDPSDLJQDFRPSDUDWLYHZRUNRIWKHPHGLDRI
Argentina and Britain during the war is also desirable. Indeed, one element which this 
thesis has only been able to touch upon is the way in which the British media reported 
from Argentina. A thorough analysis of the way in which the Argentine media presented 
the crisis, as well as the manner in which British journalists reported from Argentina, 
would be advantageous. 
 
 In terms of content analysis, not only would a complete assessment of the printed press (as 
outlined above) be an ideal addition to the wider literature, but an analysis of the subject 
matter of radio news bulletins would provide an optimal basis from which to compare 
media and from which one could offer more extensive theories on the role of the media 
during the Falklands.  
 
3. Concluding Statements 
7KHV¶OLWHUDWXUHFRQFHUQLQJWKHPHGLDGXULQJWKH)DONODQGVFRQIOLFWZDVWKRURXJKLQ
its treatment of the subject. :RUNVVLQFHWKH¶80s have served largely to rehash previous 
research. This thesis constitutes the first thorough reappraisal of those judgements offered 
by the decade in which the war occurred. To what has already been published in the field, 
this thesis contributes a careful and documented analysis of the development of both MoD 
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policy and wider Government policy throughout the conflict. It is unique in its treatment of 
those groups established specifically to trade in media relations and it presents new 
conclusions about the suitability and effectiveness of the way in which the Government ± 
not just the MoD ± KDQGOHGWKHµSUHVVDQGSXEOLFLQIRUPDWLRQ¶GXULQJWKH)DONODQGV:DU10 
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Media-related Events Political/ Military Events 
Wednesday 17 March 
According to Admiral Jorge Anaya, a BBC report on HMS 
Superb¶VGHSDUWXUHIRUWKH)DONODQGVis broadcast 
 
Friday 19 March 
  Argentine scrap metal merchants land on South 
Georgia 
  Bahia Buen Suceso leaves Leith harbour on South 
Georgia. Forty eight scrap merchants remain 
behind 
Thursday 25 March 
  Bahia Paraiso lands Argentine Marines in Leith 
Sunday 28 March 
  Argentine invasion fleet sets sail 
  British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, sends 
a letter to US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig 
Monday 29 March 
  British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, takes 
the decision to send Royal Navy nuclear attack 
submarines to the South Atlantic 
Wednesday 31 March 
  The Joint Intelligence Committee assess that 
recent incidents on South Georgia were not part 
of any deliberate ploy 
  British intelligence confirms an Argentine 
invasion of the Falklands is imminent 
  Chief of Naval Staff and First Sea Lord, Admiral 
Sir Henry Leach, meets with Thatcher and 
Secretary of State for Defence, John Nott, where 
the decision is made to send a Task Force to the 
South Atlantic 
Thursday 1 April 
  The Cabinet meets to discuss the crisis 
  The Oversea Defence Committee meet 
  The UN Secretary General, Javier Pérez de 
Cuéllar, summons the Argentine and British 
representatives (Eduardo Roca and Anthony 
Parsons) to appeal for restraint 
  UN Council meets for informal discussions 
concerning the crisis. UN Security Council then 
meets publicly 
  Parsons and his team draft a text of Resolution 
502 during the evening 




Friday 2 April 
Chiefs of Staff meeting agrees that six journalists should 
travel with the Task Force  
Argentine forces invade the Falkland Islands 
  Cabinet meets and the Task Force is discussed at 
0945GMT. Cabinet meets again and the Task 
Force is approved at 1930GMT 
  UN Security Council meets. Parsons submits the 
draft of Resolution 502. No vote is taken on 502. 
The expected visit of the Foreign Minister of 
Argentina, Nicanor Costa Méndez, is given as the 
reason 
Saturday 3 April 
Ian McDonald, Acting Chief of Public Relations at the 
MoD, meets with BBC and ITN regarding their 
representation with the Task Force and pooling 
arrangements 
Emergency Commons¶ debate takes place. The 
invasion and the sailing of the Task Force is 
announced 
 
  Costa Méndez speaks to the UN Security Council. 
Resolution 502, demanding an immediate 
Argentine withdrawal from the Falklands, is 
passed with 10 votes 
  Argentine forces invade South Georgia 
Sunday 4 April 
Lord Carrington sends a message to the Falkland Islanders 
on the weekly radio programme, Calling the Falklands 
 
Nott is interviewed by Brian Walden on ITV's Weekend 
World 
 
Monday 5 April 
Presenter of BBC TV's Panorama, Robert Kee, interviews 
Lord Carrington 
First meeting of the Oversea Defence Committee 
on the Falklands 
BBC World Service broadcasts begin to include messages 
to Britons in Argentina 
The carrier group (HMS Hermes and HMS 
Invincible) sail from Portsmouth 
The Foreign Office and the MoD host a joint press 
conference marking the return of Governor Rex Hunt and 
Major Mike Norman to the UK 
Rear Admiral J. F. 'Sandy' Woodward is 
appointed to command the Task Force 
 Lord Carrington resigns his position as Foreign 
Secretary 
Tuesday 6 April 
The Cabinet approves the creation of the South Atlantic 
Presentation Unit 
Thatcher meets with Harold Wilson and discusses 
the composition of a 'War Cabinet' 
The first PR instructions from the MoD are sent to the Task 
Force 
The 'War Cabinet' is officially established as a 
sub-committee of the Oversea Defence 
Committee 
Cecil Parkinson becomes Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster and Paymaster General 
Francis Pym becomes Foreign Secretary  
Wednesday 7 April 
Captain Jeremy Black, of HMS Invincible, opts to provide 
solely off-the-record briefings 
Second Commons¶ debate 
Sir Frank Cooper, Permanent Under-Secretary at the MoD, 
hosts first Editors' Meeting 
A Maritime Exclusion Zone around the  
Falklands is announced 
  US President, Ronald Reagan, approves a peace  
initiative by Haig 
Thursday 8 April 
McDonald meets with BBC and ITN regarding 
communications with the Task Force journalists and the 
SCOT satellite 
Haig arrives in London for the first stage of his  




A memo is circulated to Private Secretaries detailing the 
creation of the SAPU 
Thatcher announces an inquiry into the events 
leading up to the crisis 
The Information Group meets UN Secretary General establishes a task group 
headed by Under-Secretary Rafee Ahmed of 
Pakistan 
Initial PR instructions are transmitted to additional units in 
the Task Force 
 
The SAPU is officially established and a SAPU circular 
paper on the establishment of the unit is disseminated  
 
The Prime Minister's Chief Press Secretary, Bernard 
Ingham, meets with representatives of the SAPU 
 
Friday 9 April (Good Friday) 
Daily, on-the-record, briefings commence at the MoD SS Canberra sails for the South Atlantic 
Initial PR instructions from the MoD are sent to  
28 vessels with the Task Force 
The European Economic Community approves  
sanctions against Argentina 
Saturday 10 April 
The Sun reporter with the Task Force, Tony Snow, writes an 
article on flying with Prince Andrew 
Haig arrives in Buenos Aires 
Sunday 11 April (Easter Sunday) 
Two engineers are sent to RAF base, Oakhanger, to adapt 
equipment to receive images transmitted from the Task 
Force 
HMS Splendid and HMS Spartan arrive off the 
Falkland Islands 
SAPU disseminates its first circular paper  
CoS meeting rules that journalists should not be permitted 
to land at Ascension Island 
 
Monday 12 April (Easter Monday) 
HMS Hermes arrives off Ascension MEZ around the Falklands comes into force  
  Submarine, HMS Conqueror, arrives off South  
Georgia 
  Haig returns to London 
Tuesday 13 April 
British media reports that submarines have arrived off the 
Argentine coast 
 
Neville Taylor becomes Chief of Public Relations at the 
MoD, but does not assume responsibility for the running of 
Falklands-related PR 
 
MoD Civilian Public Relations Officer (PRO), Robin 
Barrat, flies to HMS Invincible to meet with PRO, Rodger 
Goodwin. The decision is made that journalists aboard 
HMS Hermes should fly to HMS Invincible to film and 
interview Captain Black 
 
Procedure for the civil reporting of military incidents in the 
UK is established 
 
Wednesday 14 April 
Thatcher and Haig speak on the telephone about  
the crisis 
Third Commons Debate 
Information Group meets The Argentine Fleet leaves Puerto Belgrano 
  Haig returns to Washington to brief President  
Reagan 
Thursday 15 April 
Cooper hosts Editors' Meeting British destroyer group takes up a holding 
position in the mid-Atlantic 
SAPU circular paper disseminated  Haig travels to Buenos Aires 
Friday 16 April 
HMS Invincible arrives off Ascension  
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Captain Black demands that all copy produced onboard 
HMS Invincible be cleared by his Secretary, Richard 
Acland  
 
OD(SA) decides Task Force journalists should not be 
permitted access to Ascension Island 
 
The true movements of HMS Superb surface  
Information Group meets  
Saturday 17 April 
  Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, Commander-in-
Chief Fleet, arrives at Ascension  
  Fieldhouse chairs a conference at Ascension  
with Woodward and 3 Commando Brigade 
  Haig presents the Argentine Junta with a 5-Point-
Plan 
Sunday 18 April 
The telephone line at Ascension is cut to ensure no  
journalists can make out-going calls 
The main Task Force sails from Ascension 
Monday 19 April 
RFA Sir Lancelot and RFA Stromness arrives  
off Ascension 
OD(SA) authorises the operation to recapture 
South Georgia (Operation Paraquet) 
SAPU circular paper disseminated  The Argentine response to the 5-Point-Plan is 
passed to London 
Information Group meets UN Secretary General submits, to Argentina and 
Britain, a list of ways in which the UN might help 
resolve the crisis 
Meeting of Information Officers  
Tuesday 20 April 
SS Canberra arrives off Ascension Haig returns to Washington 
Cooper hosts Editors' Meeting  
SAPU circular paper disseminated   
Wednesday 21 April 
SS Canberra journalists are transferred to HMS Fearless 
for a briefing on the landing options with Commodore 
Amphibious Warfare and Commander Land Forces, 
Commander 3 Commando Brigade, Commodore Michael 
Clapp and Brigadier Julian Thompson 
Operation Paraquet begins 
The MoD publicly admits the submarine, HMS Superb, is 
not in the South Atlantic 
 
Woodward gives first television interview on board HMS 
Hermes 
 
Information Group meets  
Thursday 22 April 
The MoD revises South Atlantic incident  
reporting policy 
Pym arrives in Washington to consult with Haig 
and to submit the British response to the 5-Point 
Plan 
Information Group meets SAS troops land on Fortuna Glacier, South 
Georgia, but later have to be rescued. Two 
Harriers crash in the rescue effort, but there are no 
casualties 
Friday 23 April 
SAPU circular paper disseminated   
Information Group meets  
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Saturday 24 April 
McDonald fails to satisfy questions at the MoD daily 
briefing about a possible recapture of South Georgia 
Pym Returns to London 
  Woodward's Task Group rendezvous with mid-
Atlantic destroyers 
  Pym and Thatcher clash in OD(SA) meeting on  
whether or not to accept the latest Argentine 
proposals 
Sunday 25 April 
Facilities for the international media are established in the 
south entrance hall of the MoD 
South Georgia is recaptured 
Nott announces the recapture of South Georgia outside 
No.10. Thatcher tells reporters to 'rejoice' at the news 
Argentine submarine, Santa Fe, is driven into 
harbour by British fire 
OD(SA) invites Parkinson to undertake ministerial 
supervision of SAPU 
 
Monday 26 April 
Robert Kee interviews Thatcher on Panorama Formal Argentine surrender of Leith on South 
Georgia 
A request radio programme is launched by the BBC in 
conjunction with BBC External Services - presented by 
Sarah Kennedy 
An Argentine soldier is shot dead on South 
Georgia and an inquiry into the event is ordered 
The BBC World Service replaces its thrice weekly  
broadcast to the Falklands with a daily transmission  
Thatcher gives a statement on South Georgia to 
the Commons. Mention of the aborted SAS 
landing on South Georgia is omitted 




Information Group meets  
Meeting of Information Officers  
Tuesday 27 April 
Information Group meets Chiefs of Staff present plans for a British landing 
on the Falklands (Operation Sutton) to OD(SA) 
  Haig's 'Final Package' is sent to London 
Wednesday 28 April 
SAPU circular paper disseminated  A Total Exclusion Zone around the Falklands  
is announced 
Information Group meets  
Thursday 29 April 
The BBC is given permission by the Government to  
operate a satellite from Ascension 
Fourth Commons debate 
Information Group meets  
Friday 30 April 
SAPU circular paper disseminated  US openly sides with Britain over the crisis 
Information Group meets TEZ comes into force 
  Major General Jeremy Moore, Commander of the  
Land Forces, arrives at Ascension for a 
conference with Brigadier Thompson 
  Argentina announces its own exclusion zone 
  Main Task Group reaches the area of the 
Falklands 
Saturday 1 May 
Fieldhouse finds out from television news that British 
troops had successfully shot down Argentine aircraft  




SAPU circular paper disseminated  Moore is appointed Land Deputy to C-in-C Fleet 
  Vulcan bombing raid on Stanley Airfield 
  Harrier attack on Goose Green Airfield 
  Pym returns to Washington to consult with the US 
as an 'ally' 
Sunday 2 May 
Newsnight episode is aired in which the presenter,  
Peter Snow, refers to 'the British' 
OD(SA) gives the order to sink the Argentine 
cruiser, ARA General Belgrano 
MoD open the Emergency Press Centre (the Concourse) The General Belgrano is sunk by the British  
submarine, HMS Conqueror 
Task Force journalists are not permitted to report the attack 
on General Belgrano 
UN Secretary General issues Pym with a new set 
of  µLGHDV¶ for a negotiated settlement 
Information Group meets  
Monday 3 May 
Captain Black sends a signal to Northwood suggesting 
journalists' copy be sent to London then released 
simultaneously with the announcement of the event it 
describes 
Argentine patrol boats are attacked 
Nott gives a briefing to defence correspondents in the 
Concourse Hall of the MOD Main Building - 2030GMT 
The Argentine Junta rejects the Peruvian peace  
initiative, citing the attack on the General 
Belgrano as the reason why 
In the Commons, John Page MP criticises the conduct of the 
BBC and news media 
 
Thatcher is interviewed on Panorama  
Michael Nicholson, Task Force reporter,  
broadcasts the name of the submarine which sunk General 
Belgrano 
 
SAPU circular paper disseminated   
Information Group meets  
Tuesday 4 May 
The BBC finds out about the attack on HMS Sheffield from 
political sources - 1940GMT 
HMS Sheffield is hit by an Exocet missile and  
abandoned 
McDonald announces the loss of the Sheffield in an evening 
press conference which interrupts the Nine O'Clock News 
Thatcher calls an emergency meeting in her room  
in the Commons in response to the attack on  
Sheffield - 1800GMT 
Nott announces that 12 men were unaccounted  
for after the attack on Sheffield - 2300GMT 
 
Information Group meets  
Wednesday 5 May 
Nott makes a statement in the Commons giving more details 
on the loss of Sheffield. 1RWWDOVRTXRWHVWKH%%&¶VToday 
SURJUDPPHLQWKH&RPPRQVDQGVD\VLWVSUHVHQWHGµYHU\
IDLUDQGUHDVRQDEOHFRPPHQW¶ 
Cabinet meets to discuss the US/Peruvian 
proposals as a result of Pym's visit to Washington 
SAPU circular paper disseminated  Argentina agrees to proceed with negotiations on 
the basis of the UN 'ideas' for peace 
Information Group meets  
Thursday 6 May 
Daily Star reporter, Mick Seamark's, article, 'Day Thirty 
Two: Death Stares us in the Face' prompts Captain Black to 
stress to the HMS Invincible journalists the need to avoid 
damaging the moral of the servicemen and the morale of 
their families 
Two Harriers from HMS Invincible crash in fog 
off the Falklands 
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Task Force journalists are not permitted to report the loss of 
two Harriers. However, the news is broadcast in the last 
segment of ITN's News at Ten 
The Argentine Junta reject the Peruvian plan for a 
second time 
At Prime Minister's Questions John Page MP criticises the 
media coverage of the Falklands. Thatcher admits concern 
that the British and Argentine forces are being treated as 
'equals' in the media 
Britain agrees to proceed with negotiations based 
on the 'ideas' of the UN 
Cooper hosts Editors' Meeting  
During a speech to the Chartered Building Societies' 
Institute, the Chairman of the Board of  
Governors of the BBC, George Howard, responds to 
Thatcher's criticism in the House of Commons that day 
 
Winston Churchill MP appears on ITN's News at Ten and 
criticises the media 
 
SAPU circular paper disseminated   
Information Group meets  
Friday 7 May 
Twice weekly background briefings for British  
defence correspondents begin 
OD(SA) meets twice to confer on military and 
diplomatic events 
A signal is sent by the Task Group Commander reporting 
that the media contingent of the Task Force is extremely 
dissatisfied with what it considers to be unreasonable 
restraints placed on  reporting by MoDUK 
The Peruvian peace initiative collapses 
CoS meeting approves the establishment of a Military 
Briefing Group 
The TEZ is extended to 12 miles off the 
Argentine coast 
Commander Nigel 'Sharky' Ward complains to Black that 
he was accosted by Snow and Seamark demanding 
interviews about missing Harrier pilots 
Special Forces land on Pebble Island  
The Sun publishes an editorial, 'Dare call it treason', 
accusing other publications of being treacherous in their 
coverage  
 
Cooper requests a review of current PR procedures within 
the MoD 
 
SAPU circular paper disseminated   
Information Group meets  
Saturday 8 May 
British evening news carries footage of Argentine seamen's 
funerals and a press conference from Buenos Aires 
The Landing Force sails from Ascension 
The Sun starts to refer to itself as 'the paper that supports 
our boys' 
 
The Daily Mirror publishes an article in response to The 
Sun
Vµ'DUHFDOOLWWUHDVRQ¶ editorial, naming the paper the 
'Harlot of Fleet Street¶ 
 
The Times features a letter from Peter Snow, presenter of 
Newsnight 
 
Hunt broadcasts a message to the Falkland Islanders on the 
BBC World Service on behalf of the Queen 
 
Sunday 9 May 
MoD announces that Narwhal has been hit but there  
are no casualties 
Argentine fishing vessel, Narwhal, is attacked by  
Harriers 
Argentina runs a 24-hour TV appeal for the war  
effort, sponsored by large international brands 
HMS Sheffield sinks 
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Robert Adley MP lodges a formal protest over the  
%%&¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH)DONODQGVZLWK6LU,DQ 
Trethowan, Director General of the BBC 
Final plans are drawn up for the San Carlos 
landings 
Nott appears on ITV's Weekend World  
Parkinson is interviewed by Gordon Clough on  
BBC Radio's World This Weekend 
 
Information Group meets  
Monday 10 May 
McDonald is forced to announce that information on the 
attack on Narwhal was incorrect - there were 14 casualties 
 
Controversial episode of Panorama, 'Can we Avoid War?' 
is aired 
 
The BBC issues a statement maintaining that it is not 
neutral in the conflict 
 
Pym attacks the BBC at a meeting of the All-Party 
Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 
 
Nott meets with Taylor and Cooper to discuss PR policy  
SAPU circular paper disseminated   
Information Group meets  
Meeting of Information Officers  
Tuesday 11 May 
At Prime Minister's questions Sally Oppenheim MP  
criticises the previous night's episode of Panorama. 
Thatcher tells the Commons she shares a deep concern 
about the content of the programme 
 
OD(SA) asks Parkinson to address the presentation of the 
Falklands 
 
Cooper hosts the first off-the-record briefing for British 
defence correspondents 
 
Nott hosts a special meeting with editors from BBC, ITN 
and PA 
 
The Times features a letter from John Page MP criticising 
the BBC 
 
Richard Francis, Managing Editor of BBC Radio, speaks 
out in defence of BBC 
 
SAPU circular paper disseminated   
Information Group meets  
Wednesday 12 May 
Cooper hosts Editors' Meetings SS QEII sails from Southampton 
Parkinson hosts a meeting with representatives of the 
Cabinet Office, SAPU and No.10 Press Office 
HMS Glasgow is hit by a UXB 
Guidelines are constructed on censorship and PR by 
military public relations officers in the South Atlantic 
The Argentine Junta concedes to UN Secretary 
General that sovereignty is not a precondition 
George Howard, BBC Chairman, and Alasdair Milne, BBC 
Director-General, address a meeting of the Conservative 
Media Committee 
 
Milne gives a series of media interviews concerning 




Cabinet discuss the coverage of the BBC and concludes that 
FULWLFLVPVKRXOGFRPHIURPWKHJHQHUDOSXEOLFµOHVWLWEH




CoS meeting suggests nominations for the Military Briefing 
Group 
 
Information Group meets  
Thursday 13 May 
BBC is given permission to establish a TV link from 
Ascension to the UK. Permission to film is refused 
Fifth Commons¶ debate 
Independent survey is carried out for the BBC Audience 
Selection Company  
 
HMS Hermes journalists are permitted onboard HMS 
Invincible in order to interview survivors from the Narwhal. 
Captain Black is outraged Nicholson is aboard Invincible 
 
Unattributable press briefing given to defence 
correspondents by James Morey Stewart on air-to-air 
refuelling 
 
Procedure is established by MoD for the reporting of 
incidents  
 
BBC is criticised in the House of Commons  
The first film from the Task Force is screened on British 
television (film is a fortnight old) 
 
MoD policy on incident reporting is transmitted to the Task 
Force 
 
Information Group meets  
Friday 14 May 
McDonald takes the weekend off to visit his mother in 
Glasgow 
Special Forces night raid on Pebble Island 
The Times features letters from the Presenter of Panorama, 
Robert Kee, and the programme's editor, George Carey, 
regarding their roles in the Panorama programme of 10 
May 
Parsons and British Ambassador to the UK, 
Neville Henderson, are called back to London for 
consultation 
The BBC's Today programme is heavily criticised by  
Viscount Trenchard in the House of Lords 
 
Unattributable press briefing given to defence 
correspondents by Cooper. UXBs are mentioned in the 
briefing 
 
North American correspondents receive their first off-the-
record briefing from the MoD (chaired by Stewart) 
 
Prince Charles defends the BBC while addressing the Open 
University 
 
It is revealed that Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, 
warned ITN to censor an interview with Galtieri 
 
A technical conference is held by Commander Peter 
Longhurst, and attended by BBC and ITN 
 
SAPU circular paper disseminated   
Saturday 15 May 
Goodwin is instructed that copy on Pebble Island is too long 
and detailed. Goodwin and Alfred McIlroy spend the 




Nicholson commences an unscripted commentary on an 
Argentine air attack whilst submitting copy 
 
National Union of Journalists (Lime Grove Branch) send a 
letter to the BBC in support of George Carey 
 
Sunday 16 May 
Parkinson meets with Cooper and Nott to discuss the public 
presentation of the Falklands crisis 
OD(SA) draws up the final British proposals for 
the UN Secretary General 
Pictures of the Argentine surrender on South Georgia 
appear in the Sunday papers 
 
Information Group meets  
Monday 17 May 
MoD releases a statement about the helicopter crash of 22 
April 
Parsons returns to New York 
Lewin approaches Cooper about establishing an  
operations cell to handle PR in MoD 
A Sea King helicopter crashes - leaving no 
casualties 
Panorama is presented by Richard Lindley  
Thatcher is interviewed on IRN Radio  
Meeting of Information Officers  
Tuesday 18 May 
The News Release Group is established within the  
MoD 
OD (SA) meets the Chiefs of Staff - the decision 
is taken to land on the Falklands 
Taylor assumes responsibility for PR concerning the 
Falklands campaign 
The Amphibious and Carrier Groups rendezvous 
Ian Trethowan, Director-General of the BBC, addresses the 
All-Party Media Group 
Parsons is informed by Pérez de Cuéllar that the 
Argentine response to the British peace proposal 
amounted to rejection 
Project Moonshine (Radio Atlantico del Sur) is given 
official approval 
 
MoD announce the loss of the Sea King helicopter on 17 
May 
 
A journalist with the Task Force uses the MARISAT link 
on HMS Olmeda to contact his girlfriend 
 
Unattributable press briefing is given to the provincial press 
by Taylor on Harriers with the Task Force 
 
Unattributable press briefing is given to defence 
correspondents by Stewart. Nott attends for a proportion of 
the briefing 
 
SAPU circular paper disseminated   
Information Group meets  
Wednesday 19 May 
Radio Atlantico del Sur makes its first broadcast OD (SA) gives Woodward the go-ahead to land 
on the Falklands 
Parkinson hosts the first meeting of the PPG Parsons receives a full text of the Argentine 
response to the British peace proposal which 
amounts to a clear rejection of the terms 
SAPU circular paper disseminated   
Information Group meets  
Thursday 20 May 
Black orders Invincible journalists be transferred to RFA 
Resource after guidance from Goodwin 
OD(SA) meets before assembly of the Cabinet - 
Pym appeals for compromise 
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Unattributable briefing is given to defence correspondents 
on the air defence of the Task Force. The briefing is 
repeated for regional correspondents by Stewart 
CoS meet to finalise the landing details 
Neil Thorne MP tells the Commons the BBC's coverage of 
the Falklands crisis has improved 
Thatcher informs the Commons that the  
latest peace initiative has failed 
SAPU circular paper disseminated  A helicopter crashes off the Falklands killing 21 
of 30 onboard 
Information Group meets  
Friday 21 May 
Double-vetting of Task Force journalists' copy  
commences in London 
British forces land on the Falklands at San Carlos 
MoD announce that a number of raids are taking place on 
the Falklands. The loss of the helicopter on 20 May is 
announced  
Open debate commences at the UN Security 
Council  
Cooper hosts off-the-record briefing for Editors HMS Ardent is sunk 
MoD makes public details of the complications involved in 
transmitting pictures from the South Atlantic 
HMS Argonaut is hit by a UXB 
Kee resigns from his position as presenter of BBC's 
Panorama 
HMS Antrim is hit by a UXB 
SAPU circular paper disseminated  Sixteen Argentine aircraft are downed by the 
British 
Pym is interviewed on BBC Radio's Today  
Information Group meets  
Saturday 22 May 
Unattributable press briefing is given to American 
correspondents. UXBs are mentioned 
 
SAPU circular paper disseminated   
Sunday 23 May 
Photograph entitled µ&XSSDIRUD%UDYH3DUD¶, taken by the 
Daily Express photographer with the Task Force, Tom 
Smith, appears in the Sunday Mirror 
HMS Antelope is hit by UXB 
Parkinson is interviewed on radio and reassures listeners 
that the war is not intended to be long and drawn out 
Anti-war rally takes place in Hyde Park 
MoD press release mentions UXBs three times  
Chiefs of Staff decide that UXBs should no longer be 
referred to by the media or the MoD 
 
British defence correspondents are briefed by Captain 
Livesey, Director of Naval Warfare, as to the danger of 
publicising Argentine UXBs and requests no mention of the 
term be made 
 
Tony Benn MP accuses The Sun of wanting a junta-style 
dictatorship in Britain during an anti-war rally 
 
Pym is interviewed by ABC's This Week with  
David Brinkley 
 
Information Group meets  
Monday 24 May 
Nott is interviewed on Panorama RFA Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram hit by UXBs 
RFA Resource enters San Carlos waters with the  
'Invincible five' onboard 
 
Taylor attends a CoS meeting for the first time  





Pym is interviewed on IRN Radio  
Information Group meets  
Meeting of Information Officers  
Tuesday 25 May 
Nott annoXQFHVWKHORVVRIDVKLSRQ,71¶s News at Ten, but 
chose not to name her 
HMS Coventry is hit, and later sunk, by a UXB 
7KHµInvincible ILYH¶go ashore to be told there is not 
enough kit available for them to stay on the Islands 
HMS Broadsword is hit by a UXB 
SAPU circular paper disseminated  SS Atlantic Conveyor is sunk 
Information Group meets  
Wednesday 26 May 
Nott names the ship lost the previous day as HMS Coventry 
and admits his mistake in not naming her sooner 
The OD(SA) questions the lack of movement  
from the Bridgehead 
The µInvincible ILYH¶ are transported to RFA Sir Geraint UN Resolution 505 bids Pérez de Cuéllar to seek 
a settlement on behalf of the UN 
Parkinson pays tribute to the bravery of the Task Force 
journalists 
 
Nott addresses a meeting of Tory backbenchers in which he 
repoUWHGO\SURPLVHVWKHUHZRXOGEHµELJQHZVYHU\VRRQ¶ 
 
Pym is interviewed on the BBC Overseas  
Service by Gordon Martin 
 
Information Group meets  
Thursday 27 May 
Pym is interviewed on TV Eye 3 Para and 45 Commando set out for Teal Inlet 
The BBC World Service reports that British troops of the 
2nd Parachute Regiment are five miles north of Goose 
Green and Darwin 
SAS land in strength on Mount Kent 
MoD adapts casualty reporting policy 2 Para set out for Goose Green  
SAPU circular paper disseminated   
Pym is interviewed by Lew Gardner on ITV's TV Eye  
Information Group meets  
Friday 28 May 
µInvincible ILYH¶ send a signal to their London offices for 
assistance in securing earliest return to land 
5 Brigade reach South Georgia and transfer to  
alternative ships 
News Release Group submits recommendations on  
casualty reporting 
The battle for Goose Green commences 
MoD announce that operations on the Falklands are in 
progress - 1330GMT 
MoD announce that Goose Green has been taken, that 
prisoners have been taken, that casualties are light and that 
the next of kin are being informed - 2145GMT 
 
Vice Admiral Robert Squires, Flag Officer Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, criticises the media at the conference of 
the Royal British Legion 
 
Information Group meets  
Saturday 29 May 
  Goose Green is successfully captured by 2 Para 




Sunday 30 May 
Unattributable press briefing is given to defence 
correspondents by Cooper (attended by Taylor) 
Moore arrives at San Carlos Bay and assumes 
control of the Land Forces on the Falklands 
Monday 31 May 
Max Hastings, Task Force reporter, is permitted to  
transmit copy via SAS communications 
42 Commando land on Mount Kent 
Editors of the 'Invincible five' receive a signal from their 
journalists with the Task Force complaining about their lack 
of access to the islands. Cooper is contacted by editors 
concerning the treatment and movement of the 'Invincible 
five' - 1600GMT. Cooper meets with editors to discuss the 
plight of the 'Invincible five' - 1800GMT 
 
Tuesday 1 June 
Cooper meets with editors to further discuss the 'Invincible 
five' 
5 Brigade disembarks at San Carlos 
Reports of napalm found at Goose Green begin to surface in 
London - 2030GMT 
The OD(SA) debate the FCO/Washington Peace 
Plan 
A senior Naval Officer requests deletion of references to 
napalm. The BBC and ITN protest this decision - 2055GMT 
Lord Shackleton is ordered to carry out a further  
report on the Falkland Islands 
MoD clears the use of the napalm story - 2110GMT  
Unattributable Q&A session is hosted for defence 
correspondents by Cooper 
 
Information Group meets  
Wednesday 2 June 
µInvincible ILYH¶ are moved to RFA Stromness UN Security Council offers its peace proposal 
Unattributable briefing is given to American correspondents 
by Cooper 
Unattributable briefing is given to British provincial press 
by Cooper 
2 Para is transported to Bluff Cove 
Thatcher attends a dinner with the Association of  
American Correspondents 
Argentine military envoys arrive at the UN 
SAPU circular paper disseminated   
Thatcher appears on West German television and records a 
broadcast for the BBC's Latin American Service  
 
Parkinson hosts a meeting of the PPG  
Thursday 3 June 
RFA Stromness moves inshore and the 'Invincible five' land 
on the Falklands 
Versailles G7 summit opens 
SAPU circular paper disseminated  Reagan's 'Five-Point-Plan' is given to Britain 
Information Group meets  
Friday 4 June 
Unattributable briefing is given to defence correspondents 
by Cooper 
Thatcher attends G7 summit 
Information Group meets Britain vetoes a ceasefire resolution in the UN 
  US vetoes the ceasefire resolution in the Security  
Council. She later tries to alter her veto 
Saturday 5 June 
  Scots and Welsh Guards embark on Royal Fleet  
Auxiliary ships destined for Fitzroy 
Sunday 6 June 
  Scots and Welsh Guards land at Fitzroy 
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Monday 7 June 
SAPU circular paper disseminated  President Reagan arrives in Britain 
Information Group meets  
Meeting of Information Officers  
Tuesday 8 June 
Moore requests the casualties sustained by landing craft not 
be revealed to the media 
HMS Plymouth is hit by a UXB 
Film footage of the San Carlos landings is shown for the 
first time on British television 
RFA Sir Tristram is hit by a UXB 
Pym is interviewed on the BBC World Service RFA Sir Galahad is bombed and abandoned 
whilst on fire - later sunk 
Information Group meets Moore finalises the battle plan for attack on 
Stanley 
Wednesday 9 June 
Cooper hosts Editors' Meeting  
Former editor of The Times, Sir William Rees-Mogg, 
delivers a speech to a lunch of PA members in which he 
praises the work of the Task Force journalists 
 
SAPU circular paper disseminated   
Information Group meets  
Thursday 10 June 
It is announced that there will be an inquiry into the  
MoD's handling of press and public information 
Thatcher warns, speaking after the NATO summit 
in Bonn, that there might be considerable 
casualties as a result of the attack at Fitzroy 
Information Group meets  
Friday 11 June 
Pym is interviewed by Trevor McDonald on ITN The battle for Port Stanley commences 
Saturday 12 June 
Forty eight hour news blackout is imposed on the Task 
Force 
Thatcher and Nott visit Northwood 
  HMS Glamorgan is hit by a bomb 
  Mount Longdon and Harriet taken by the Task 
Force 
Sunday 13 June 
Accurate casualty figures relating to the Fitzroy disaster are 
released 
Mount Tumbledown, Mount William and 
Wireless Ridge are taken by the Task Force 
Monday 14 June 
Hastings becomes the 'first man' into Port Stanley Argentine surrender at Port Stanley 
Information Group meets  
Meeting of Information Officers  
Parkinson hosts a meeting of the PPG  
Tuesday 15 June 
Information Group meets  
Wednesday 16 June 
Cooper hosts final Editors' Meeting  
Information Group meets  
Friday 18 June 










British Broadcasting Corporation 
George Howard  Chairman, BBC 
Sir Ian Trethowan Director General, BBC 
Alasdair Milne Director General Elect, BBC 
Alan Protheroe Assistant Director General and Deputy Head of 
Current Affairs, BBC 
David Holmes Director-General's Chief Assistant 
BBC Television 
Peter Woon Editor, BBC TV News 
Ron Neil Editor, BBC TV, Newsnight (up to 6 May) 
David Lloyd Editor, BBC TV, Newsnight (7 May onwards) 
George Carey Editor, BBC TV, Panorama 
Aubrey Singer Managing Director, BBC TV 
Rik Thompson Foreign Editor, BBC TV News 
Ken Oxley Chief Engineer, BBC TV News 
Christopher Wain Defence Correspondent, BBC TV News 
Keith Graves Diplomatic Correspondent, BBC TV News 
Peter Snow Presenter, BBC TV, Newsnight 
Robert Kee Presenter, BBC TV, Panorama 
Michael Cockerell Reporter, BBC TV, Panorama 
Sir Robin Day Presenter, BBC TV, Question Time and The 
World at One 
BBC Radio 
Richard Francis Editor, BBC Radio 
Larry Hodgson  Editor, BBC Radio 
John Wilson Editor, News and Current Affairs 
Bob Kearsley Editor, BBC Radio News  
Christopher Lee Defence Correspondent, BBC Radio  
David McNeil Diplomatic Correspondent, BBC Radio 4 
Brian Redhead Presenter, Today programme 
BBC External Services 
Ken Brazier Editor, BBC News External Services 
Terry Heran Deputy Editor 
Gordon Martin Diplomatic Correspondent,  
BBC Overseas Service 
Independent Television 
David Nicholas Editor, ITN 
John Horrabin Editor, ITN 
Geoffrey Archer Defence Correspondent, ITN 
Trevor McDonald Defence Correspondent, ITN 
Michael Brunson Diplomatic Correspondent, ITN, News at Ten 
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David Walter Reporter, ITN, News at Ten 
Independent Broadcasting Authority 
Sir Brian Young Director General, IBA 
David Glencross Deputy Director, IBA 
VISNEWS 
Mike Daigneault Editor-in-Chief 
London Weekend Television 
Brian Walden Presenter, LWT, Weekend World 
Independent Radio News 
Peter Thornton Deputy Editor 
Jim Hancock Presenter, IRN 
Newspaper Associations or Agencies 
Terence Pierce-Goulding Director, Commonwealth Press Union 
Michael Reupke Editor-in-Chief, Reuters 
Graham Stewart Chief Correspondent, Reuters 
Alexander McDonald  Chairman, Newspaper Conference  
Mark Barrington-Ward Vice Chairman, Newspaper Conference 
David Chipp  Editor-in-Chief, Press Association  
Ray Smith Chief News Editor, Press Association 
Robert (Bob) Hutchinson Defence Correspondent, Press Association 
John Le Page Director, Newspaper Proprietors' Association 
Arthur Gawen Chairman, Newspaper Proprietors' Association 
Gordon Page Secretary, Newspaper Society 
Newspaper Editors 
Andrew Knight Economist 
Anthony Shrimsley Mail on Sunday 
Arnold Kemp Glasgow Herald 
Brian Hitchen  
Lloyd Turner 
Editor, Daily Star 
London Editor, Daily Star 
Charles Douglas-Home The Times 
Christopher Ward Daily Express 
Cyril Kersh Sunday Mirror 
David English Daily Mail 
Derek Jameson News of the World 
Donald Trelford The Observer 
Frank Giles The Sunday Times 
Geoffrey Owen Financial Times 
John Thompson The Sunday Telegraph 
Kelvin McKenzie The Sun 
Louis Kirby Evening Standard 
Nick Lloyd Sunday People 
Peter Preston The Guardian 
Robert Edwards Sunday Mirror 
William Deedes The Daily Telegraph 
Defence Correspondents 
Air Commodore G. S. Cooper (Air 
Correspondent) 
The Daily Telegraph 
Andrew Wilson The Observer 
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Anthony Smith Daily Star 
Bridget Bloom Financial Times 
David Fairhall The Guardian 
Ellis Plaice  Daily Mirror 
Frank Robson (Air Correspondent) Daily Express 
Gordon Petrie (Acting Defence 
Correspondent) 
Glasgow Herald 
Harvey Eliot Daily Mail 
Henry Stanhope The Times 
Jim Meacham  The Economist 
Jon Connell The Sunday Times 
Major General Edward Fursdon  
(Defence Correspondent) 
The Daily Telegraph 
Michael Evans Daily Express 
R. H. Greenfield The Sunday Telegraph 
Tony Smith Daily Star 
Correspondents in Argentina 
Amit Roy Daily Mail 
Christopher Thomas The Times 
David Graves The Sun 
Hugh O'Shaughnessy Financial Times and The Observer 
Ian Mather The Observer 
Isabel Hilton The Sunday Times 
Keith Dovkants The Standard 
Kenneth Clarke The Daily Telegraph 
Michael Field The Daily Telegraph 
Neil Wallis Daily Star 
Paul Connew Daily Mirror 
Ross Benson Daily Express 
Ted Oliver Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday 
Correspondents in America 
Angus MacPherson Washington Correspondent, Daily Mail 
Harold Jackson Washington Correspondent, The Guardian 
Ian Ball New York Correspondent, The Daily 
Telegraph 
Jeremy Campbell Washington Correspondent, The Standard 
Moshin Ali Washington Correspondent, The Times 
Nicholas Ashford Washington Correspondent, The Times 
Nigel Nelson Washington Correspondent, Daily Mirror 
Zoriana Pysariwsky New York Correspondent, The Times 
Political Correspondents and Political Editors 
Adam Raphael Editor, The Observer 
Alan Cochrane Correspondent, Daily Express 
Andrew Taylor Correspondent, Daily Express 
Anthony Bevins Correspondent, The Times 
Georgia Jones Correspondent, The Sunday Telegraph 
Gordon Greig Editor, Daily Mail 
James Wightman Correspondent, The Daily Telegraph 
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Jill Hartley Correspondent, Daily Star 
John Warden Editor, Daily Express 
Philip Webster Correspondent, The Times 
Simon Jenkins Political Editor, Economist 
Terrance Lancaster  Editor, Daily Mirror 
Foreign Correspondents in London 
Nicholas Downie New York Times 
Other Journalists of Note 
Bill Hagerty Assistant Editor, Sunday Mirror 
David Shapland Deputy Editor, The Sun 
David Tytler Associate Editor, Daily Mail 
Dudley Fishburn Executive Editor, Economist 
Edward Dickinson Deputy Editor, Daily Express 
Ernest Barrington Associate Editor, Sunday People 
Fred Emery  Executive Editor, The Times 
Henry Macrory Chief Leader Writer, Sunday Express 
Iain Walker News Editor, Mail on Sunday 
Ian Lindsay-Smith Executive Editor, The Observer 
John Grant Deputy Editor, The Times 
Ken Donlan Assistant Editor, The Sun 
Magnus Linklater Assistant Editor (Features) The Sunday Times 
Mike Toner Executive Editor, Sunday Express 
Peregrine Worsthorne Associate Editor, The Sunday Telegraph 
Peter Thompson Deputy Editor, Daily Mirror 
Peter Wilson News Editor, Sunday Mirror 
Philip Kellor Deputy News Editor, Daily Star 
Philip Wrack Deputy Editor, News of the World 
Richard Stott Deputy Editor, Daily Mirror 
Robert McWilliams Deputy Editor, Sunday Express 
Robin Lustig Assistant Editor, The Observer 
Richard Norton-Taylor Whitehall Correspondent, The Guardian 
Roy Wright Deputy Editor, New Standard 
Vic Birkin Deputy Editor, Sunday Mirror 
Diplomatic Correspondents 
  
Christopher Forbes-Adam Yorkshire Post 
David Adamson The Daily Telegraph 
Fred Wills Daily Mirror 
John Dickie Daily Mail 
Leo Murray Liverpool Daily Post 
Nicholas Colchester Financial Times 
Patrick Keatley The Guardian 
Robert Stephens The Observer 
Rosemary Righter The Sunday Times 





Political and Military 
 
War Cabinet (OD(SA)) 
Margaret Thatcher Prime Minister 
William Whitelaw Home Secretary 
John Nott Secretary of State for Defence 
Francis Pym Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
(6 April 1982 - 11 June 1983) 
Cecil Parkinson Paymaster General, Chancellor of the Duchy  
of Lancaster and Conservative Party Chairman 
The Rt. Hon. Sir Michael Havers QC MP Attorney General 
Advisers 
Sir Michael Palliser Ex Permanent Secretary of Foreign and  
Commonwealth Office and Special  
Consultant to the Prime Minister 
Persons Involved in the Diplomatic Effort 
Nicholas Henderson British Ambassador to the USA 
Anthony Parsons British Representative at the UN 
Ronald Reagan President of the USA 
Alexander Haig US Secretary of State 
Anthony Williams British Ambassador to Argentina 
Cabinet Office Officials 
Sir Robert Armstrong Cabinet Secretary and Co-Secretary to the War 
Cabinet 
Robert Wade-Gery Deputy Secretary of the Cabinet  
and Co-Secretary to the War Cabinet 
David Colvin Cabinet Secretary and part of the SAPU 
Simon Fuller South Atlantic Presentation Unit 
Robert Hatfield South Atlantic Presentation Unit 
Prominent Members of Parliament 
David Steel Leader of the Liberal Party 
Michael Foot Leader of the Labour Party 
Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith  Chairman of the Conservative Media Group 
Cranley Onslow Chairman of the 1922 Committee of  
Conservative Backbenchers 
Michael Jopling  Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury  
and Conservative Chief Whip 
Alan Clark  Conservative 
Anthony Foulkes  Labour 
David Winnick  Labour 
Eldon Griffiths  Conservative 
John Page  Conservative 
John Stokes Conservative 
Sally Oppenheimer Conservative 
Sir Anthony Meyer Conservative 
Tam Dalyell Labour 
Winston Churchill Conservative 
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Number 10, Downing Street 
Arthur 'John' Coles Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister 
Ian Gow Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Prime Minister 
Michael Pattison Private Secretary to the Prime Minister (Home 
Affairs) 
John Hoskyns Head of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit 
Bernard Ingham Chief Press Secretary 
Brian Mower Deputy Chief Press Secretary 
Hugh Colver Press Officer 
Ian Kydd Press Officer 
Liz Drummond Press Officer 
Sheenagh Wallace Press Officer 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
Lord Peter Carrington Secretary of State (4 May 1979 - 5 April 1982) 
Sir Anthony Acland Permanent Under-Secretary 
John Holmes Assistant Private Secretary to the Secretary of State 
P. Robin Fearn Head of the South Atlantic Department 
Nicholas Fenn Head of the News Department 
Roger Westbrook Deputy Head of the News Department 
Peter Marshall News Department  
A. Anthony Joy News Department  
Christopher Wilton News Department  
Alan Payne Emergency Unit 
Henry Hogger Emergency Unit 
Central Office of Information 
John Groves Director General, COI and Head of the  
Government Information Service 
Ministry of Defence Officials in London 
Sir Frank Cooper Permanent Under-Secretary  
David Omand Private Secretary to the Secretary of State 
Jennifer Ridley Assistant Private Secretary 
Colonel John Martin Garrod Colonel General Staff to the  
Commandant General Royal Marines 
Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Donkin Royal Marine - Military Briefing Group 
Colonel Neil Maude Royal Marine - Military Briefing Group 
Major General John Owen Royal Marine - Military Briefing Group 
Commander Peter Longhurst Directorate of Naval Operational Requirements 
Rear Admiral William Ash Secretary of the D-Notice Committee 
James Morey Stewart Assistant Under-Secretary  
Ministry of Defence Public Relations Department 
Neville Taylor Chief of Public Relations 
Ian McDonald Acting Chief of Public Relations/ Deputy Chief of 
Public Relations 
Brigadier David Ramsbotham Director of Public Relations (Army) 
Captain Ian Sutherland Director of Public Relations (Navy) 
Air Commodore John Miller Director of Public Relations (Royal Air Force) 
Jack Gee Chief Press Officer 
M. Pentreath Press Officer  
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F. E Dodman Press Officer 
R. Moore Press Officer 
Christopher Worrall Press Officer 
Ministry of Defence Public Relations Officers in the South Atlantic 
Graeme Hammond HMS Hermes 
Martin Helm SS Canberra 
Allan George SS Canberra 
Robin Barrett HMS Hermes 
Roger Goodwin HMS Invincible 
Alan Percival SS Canberra 
Brian Barton QEII 
Chiefs of Staff 
Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Terence Lewin Chief of Defence Staff 
Admiral Sir Henry Leach First Sea Lord 
General Sir Edwin Bramall Chief of the General Staff 
Air Chief Marshall Sir Michael Beetham Chief of the Air Staff 
Vice Admiral Sir William Stanley Vice Chief of Naval Staff 
Military Commanders in Britain 
Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse Commander-in-Chief of Fleet 
Lieutenant Jonathon Band Flag Lieutenant to Commander-in-Chief Fleet 
Vice Admiral Robert Squires Flag Officer Scotland and Northern Ireland 
Military Commanders in the South Atlantic: Land Forces 
Major General Jeremy Moore Commander, Land Forces 
Brigadier Julian Thompson RM Commander, 3 Commando Brigade 
Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm Hunt 40 Commando RM 
Lieutenant Colonel Nick Vaux 42 Commando RM 
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Whitehead 45 Commando RM 
Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Jones Commander, 2nd Battalion Parachute Regiment 
Major Christopher Keeble Second in Command, 2nd Battalion Parachute 
Regiment 
Captain John Crosland 2nd Battalion Parachute Regiment 
Lieutenant Colonel Hew Pike 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment 
Brigadier Anthony Wilson Commander, 5 Infantry Brigade 
Military Commanders in the South Atlantic: Naval Force 
Rear Admiral John 'Sandy' Woodward Commander, Task Group 
Captain Peter Woodhead Chief of Staff to Flag Officer 
Captain Peter Dunt Secretary to Woodward and Group Logistics Officer 
Captain Jeremy Sanders Staff Officer (Operations) to Woodward 
Commodore Michael Clapp Commodore Amphibious Warfare 
Captain Linley Middleton Captain HMS Hermes 
Captain Jeremy J. Black Captain HMS Invincible  
Captain Christopher Burne Senior Naval Officer SS Canberra 
Captain Martin Reed Merchant Navy aboard SS Canberra 
Captain David Hart Dyke Captain HMS Coventry 
Captain Sam Salt Captain HMS Sheffield 
Captain John Coward Captain HMS Brilliant 
Captain Hugh Balfour Captain HMS Exeter 
Captain Nicholas Barker Captain HMS Endurance 
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Other Relevant Members of the Armed Forces in the South Atlantic 
Canon Roger Devonshire Chaplain on HMS Hermes 
Lieutenant Alan 'Wiggy' Bennett Piolet based on HMS Brilliant 
Lieutenant Barry Bryant Piolet based on HMS Brilliant 
Lieutenant Nicholas Butler Piolet based on HMS Brilliant 
Captain Jeremy Larken Captain HMS Fearless 
Captain James Weatherall Captain HMS Andromeda 
Neil 'Nobby' Hall Officer on HMS Andromeda 
Armed Forces¶ Public Relations Officers 
Captain David Nicholls Royal Marines 
Lieutenant Colonel David Dunn 5 Infantry Brigade Headquarters  
Major Mike Norman Royal Marines and ex Commanding Officer of Naval 
Party 8901 
Sergeant David Menelly Royal Marines 
Captain Bob Derby Parachute Regiment 













BBC TV Brian Hanrahan Reporter HMS Hermes 
 John Jockell Cameraman HMS Hermes 
 Bernard Hesketh Soundman HMS Hermes 
 Mark Singleton Engineer HMS Hermes 
BBC Radio Robert Fox Reporter SS Canberra 
ITN Michael Nicholson Reporter HMS Hermes 
 Jeremy Hands Reporter SS Canberra 
 Bob Hammond Cameraman SS Canberra 
 John Martin Soundman SS Canberra 
IRN Kim Sabido Reporter SS Canberra 
National Daily Newspapers 
The Times John Witherow Reporter HMS Invincible 
The Guardian Gareth Parry Reporter HMS Invincible 
The Daily Telegraph Alfred McIlroy Reporter HMS Invincible 
The Sun Tony Snow Reporter HMS Invincible 
Daily Star Michael Seamark Reporter HMS Invincible 
Daily Mail David Norris Reporter HMS Stromness to  
SS Canberra 
Daily Express Robert McGowan Reporter RFA Sir Lancelot  to  
SS Canberra 
Daily Express Tom Smith Photographer RFA Sir Lancelot to  
SS Canberra 
Daily Mirror Alistair McQueen Reporter SS Canberra 
National Sunday Newspapers 
The Sunday Times John Shirley  Reporter SS Canberra 
The Observer Patrick Bishop Reporter SS Canberra 
The Sunday Telegraph Charles Lawrence Reporter SS Canberra 
Regional Newspapers 
Standard Max Hastings Reporter SS Canberra 
Glasgow Herald Ian Bruce Reporter SS Canberra 
Wolverhampton  
Express and Star 
Martin Lowe  
replaced by Derek 
Hudson (Yorkshire 
Post) 
Reporter SS Canberra 
Media Agencies 
Reuters Leslie Dowd Reporter SS Canberra 













The History of the Ministry of Defence Public Relations Department 
 
 
The MoD was a relatively youthful organisation when the Falklands crisis broke. Post 
:RUOG:DU7ZRDQGXSXQWLOWKHFRXQWU\¶VGHIHQFHRUJDQLVDWLRQ consisted of five 
Government Departments of State: the Admiralty, the Air Ministry, the Ministry of 
Aviation, the War Office and the Ministry of Defence. In 1964 the MoD, Admiralty, War 
Office and Air Ministry unified under the banner of the Ministry of Defence. Later, in 
1971, the Ministry of Aviation (by 1971, known as the Ministry of Aviation Supply) was 
amalgamated into the greater defence establishment, creating the Ministry of Defence 
which would come to oversee information policy during the Falklands War.1 The MoD, 
thus, was a monolithic creature. John Nott, Secretary of State for Defence during the 
Falklands, later wrote of his ascendance to the department in January 1981 and reflected 
WKDWWKH0R'ZDVµ«a bureaucratic and lumbering monster ± tribal in its attitudes and 
rivalries«¶2 The nature of the organisation as a whole, rife with rivalries and competition 
between the Services, dictated that departments were not renowned for communication and 
co-operation.  
 
The Public Relations Department was, comparatively, of little consequence in the overall 
MoD hierarchy. Theoretically the Chief of Public Relations at the MoD was answerable 
only to the Secretary of State, the Chief of Defence Staff and the Permanent Under-
Secretary (see Figure 1). In practice, his authority within the organisation was limited. The 
PR department of the MoD was a predominantly civilian division of a principally military 
establishment. The tension and friction between the civilian and military branches of the 
Ministry have been well documented.3 MoDPR fell uncomfortably between the two, being 
comprised of both civilian and military staff. Although there was debate about the 
competency of civilian staff managing military PR, the head of MoDPR made clear his 
thoughts on the matter during his evidence to the House of Commons Defence Committee 
inquiry: µ,ZRXOGQRWP\VHOIDUJXHWKDWDOOWKHSXEOLFUHODWLRQVWDVNVLQWKH0LQLVWU\RI
                                                 
1
 MoD, History of the Ministry of Defence, Dec. 2012 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49053/history_of_mod.pdf> 
[Accessed 11 Aug. 2014]. 
2
 Nott, p.222. 
3
 )RUH[DPSOH'%RUHQµ(VWDEOLVKLQJ&LYLOLDQ6XSUHPDF\,QIOXHQFHZLWKLQ%ULWDLQ¶V0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFH




Defence, even in an operational situation, are the sole prerogative of the military. I think 
WKHUHLVDGLIIHUHQWMREZKLFKFDQDQGVKRXOGEHGRQHE\WKHFLYLOLDQ¶4  
 
The function of MoDPR was twofold: to supply information to the media, and to ensure 
WKH0LQLVWU\¶VFDVHZDVSUHVHQWHGeffectively and disseminated through the media.5  At the 
head of MoDPR was the Chief of Public Relations, a member of the Government 
Information Service, directly answerable to the Permanent Under-Secretary for Defence. 
7KH&35¶V immediate subordinate was the Deputy Chief of Public Relations. During the 
Falklands conflict the department found itself in an intermediary position between CPRs. 
Leslie Jeanes had been responsible for the department until the start of 1982. By April of 
that year the department was still without a permanent head and under the control of the 
GHSDUWPHQW¶V'HSXW\Acting Chief of Public Relations, Ian McDonald.6   
                                                 
4
 Taylor, HCDC, v.ii, p.373, q.1566. 
5
 HCDC, v.i, p.ix, q.18.  
6





Figure 1: Organisational Chart of the Ministry of Defence in April 1982 
 
0F'RQDOG¶VLPPHGLDWe inferiors were the Directors of Public Relations for each of the 
three Services. The Directors of Public Relations for the Navy (DPR(N)), Army (DPR(A)) 
and Air Force (DPR(RAF)) were required to be of certain ranks: Captain RN, Brigadier 
and Air Commodore respectively. Although the DPRs were directly responsible to the 




to his RZQ&KLHIRI6WDIIDQGQRWWRWKH&LYLO6HUYLFH¶7 Technically this was not the case. 
The DPRs were responsible to the CPR. However, they were selected by their Chief of 
Staff (in consultation with CPR), their military training dictated their allegiance be with 
their commanding officer and it was their own Chief of Staff who would likely dictate the 
progress of their career in the long-term.8 
 
The lower levels of the MoDPR hierarchy were supported by MoD Press Officers (see 
Figure 2). The vast majority of employees based in the headquarters of MoDPR, the 
Defence Press Office, were Press Officers. They were civilian staff who managed the day-
to-day running of the department; answering telephone calls, organising press visits to 





Figure 2: Organisational Chart of the Public Relations Department of the Ministry of Defence in 
April 19829 
 
                                                 
7
 Hudson and Stanier, p.180. 
8
 For information on DPRs: Mercer et al., pp.72-78. 
9
 Information from Hooper, pp.198-199. 
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The composition of MoDPR has constituted a small point of contention amongst authors. 
George Boyce DUJXHGWKDWWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSublicity work was hampered by a series of 
cuts in staff during 1981.10 The greater MoD had been subject to extensive reductions as a 
result of the 1981 Defence Review, carried out by Nott and published in June of the same 
year. However, the PR department had emerged from the cutbacks relatively unscathed. In 
1982 the new CPR of the department told the House of Commons Defence Committee that 
MoDPR employed around 80 members of staff at headquarters in London ± 40 of whom 
were professional information staff and 12 of whom were serving officers.11 In one of the 
two MoD commissioned histories it was argued that the MoD employed more staff in its 
public relations department than any other Ministry (this was based on information 
supplied directly by the MoD). However, whilst MoDPR did employ the services of nearly 
five times the amount of press and information officers as the Home Office, the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry could boast more PR staff (see Figure 3). On 6 May 1982, John Stokes, 
Conservative MP for Halesowen and Stourbridge, requested that the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, list by Government department the number of Press Officers 
employed and the cost for those employees over the last year. Mr Hayhoe, Conservative 
MP for Brentford and Isleworth, replied that µ7KHUHDUHQRJUDGHVRUJURXSVRIVWDIILQWKH
Civil ServicHGHVLJQDWHGDV³SUHVVRIILFHUV´. Press office work in Government departments 
is normally carried out by members of the information officer group. Information officers 
are engaged on a wide variety of duties including Government publicity, recruitment 
advertising and exhibitions as well as press office work. Those performing press office 
work could not be identified centrally without incurring dLVSURSRUWLRQDWHFRVW¶12 The basic 
cost to the tax payer for the salaries of the information officer group of staff was £11.9 
million in 1982. 
  
                                                 
10
 Boyce, p.151. 
11
 Taylor, HCDC, v.ii, p.370, q.1535.  
12
 HC Deb., 6 May 1982, v.xxiii, c.120. 
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Figure 3: Table to show information and press staff employed by Government Ministries in 
January 1982 13 
Department 
Staff in post  
1 January 1982* Department 
Staff in post  
1 January 1982* 
Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food 17 Central Office of Information 469 
Defence 146 Trade and Industry 157 
Education and Science 13 Transport 18 
Employment Group 77 Welsh Office 20 
Energy 21 Scottish Office 19 
Environment 44 Population Censuses and Surveys 45 
Health and Social Security 17 Other Departments 74 
Home Office 25 TOTAL 1,162 
* Full-time equivalents; part-timers counted as half units. Figures at 1 January 1982 were provisional. 
 
The MoD and the Media before the War 
The relationship between the military and the media before April 1982 had been a 
combination of the successful and the unproductive, according to the Service involved. Of 
course, gauging the views and attitudes of the Services ± or even one Service ± is a 
particularly troublesome task.  One must necessarily fall prey to generalisation when 
considering a single-Service attitude, since, in 1982, WKHµPLOLWDU\¶FRQVLVWHGRIDERXW
325,000 people. The TA alone was made up of 70,000 personnel.14 Attitudes to the media 
varied further between regiments, squadrons, units and ships. Whilst understanding the 
GDQJHUVRIJHQHUDOLW\LWLVSRVVLEOHWRGHWHUPLQHHDFKRIWKH6HUYLFHV¶EURDGSRVLWLRQRQ
public relaWLRQV0XFKKDVEHHQZULWWHQRQLQGLYLGXDO6HUYLFHV¶DELOLW\WRGHDOHIIHFWLYHO\
with the media. The consensus among historians - and the consensus among members of 
the military - has been that the Army was better equipped to handle the media due, largely, 
WRLWVH[SHULHQFHRIZRUNLQJFORVHO\ZLWKMRXUQDOLVWVGXULQJµ7KH7URXEOHV¶LQ1RUWKHUQ
,UHODQG7KHFRQVHQVXVH[WHQGVWRWKHDWWLWXGHRIWKH1DY\ZKLFKZDVGHHPHGWKHµSecret 
SeUYLFH¶15 Max Hastings, a journalist with the Task Force, accused the Navy of being 
µELWWHUO\RSSRVHGWRSXEOLFLW\IRULWVRZQVDNH¶16 7KH1DY\¶VILUVW-hand encounters with 
the media had been limited to a few NATO exercises and restricted contact in the Cod War 
of the 1970s.17 The Royal Air Force had always maintained a low-key relationship with the 
PHGLD7KHQDWXUHRIWKH5$)¶VUROHLQFRQIOLFWGLFWDWHGWKDWMRXUQDOLVWVFRXOGQRWVKDGRZ




 Mercer et al., p.62.; Statement on the Defence Estimates 1982, Cmnd.8529. (HMSO, 1981) p.12. 
15
 Consensus exists among: Hooper; Hastings and Jenkins; Freedman, v.ii.; Harris. Military consensus: 
0RRUHµ7KH)DONODQGV:DU¶Consensus in interviews: J. Band, Interview; Thompson, Interview; Clapp, 
Interview; and in first-hand accounts: Fox; Bishop and Witherow. 
16
 Hastings, HCDC, v.ii, p.214, q.656. 
17
 For information on the media and the Cod War: Morrison and Tumber, pp.191-193. 
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members of the Service. Their comparatively limited role in the Falklands War has 
determined that the attitude of the Service is considered by historians of the media and war 
of less consequence to the conflict than those of the Army and Navy.18 So, in April 1982, 
the British media faced a responsive Army which understood the necessity of a healthy and 
positive relationship with it, and a Navy which shunned publicity and longed to remain out 
of the spotlight ± free from attention and free, most importantly perhaps, from judgement. 
 
7KHLQGLYLGXDO6HUYLFHV¶DWWLWXGHVWRZDUGV, and relationships with, the media are 
UHFRJQLVHG7KHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKH0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFH¶VFHQWUDOERG\IRUGHDOLQJ
with PR and the Media constitutes a less-trodden academic landscape. Yet the previous 
relationship between the two became significant when the war began. As was pointed out 
in the findings of the House of Commons Defence Committee, the arrangements for the 
media  had to be made with great urgency, and in those strenuous circumstances µ«WKH
state of relations between the Ministry of Defence and the press prior to the emergency 
DVVXPHVDODUJHUVLJQLILFDQFH¶19 Very few works on the role of the media in the war deal 
directly with the previous co-operation between MoDPR and the media. Mercer et al. is the 
exception. The authors argue that the MoDPR department was not wholly unpopular with 
MRXUQDOLVWVSULRUWRWKHVWDUWRIWKHZDU7KHPHGLD¶VUDSSRUWZLWK,DQ0F'RQDOGLVH[SORUHG
IXUWKHUDOVR,WLVFODLPHGWKDW0F'RQDOG¶VILQDQFLDOH[SHUWLVHDVVLVWHGGHIHQFH
correspondents in their bid to cover the Defence Review, thus McDonald was not in any 
ZD\µXQSRSXODU¶20 However, the evidence submitted to the HCDC following the war told a 
different story altogether. Admiral Sir Henry Leach, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval 
Staff in 1982, told the &RPPLWWHHWKDWµ«the general relationship between the Ministry of 
Defence and the media was somewhat short of the ideal prior to the campaign. I think this 
OHGWRDIHHOLQJFHUWDLQO\WKLVZDVP\MXGJHPHQWRILWRIVRPHWKLQJRID³ZHDQGWKH\´
situation wKLFK,WKLQNLVXQGHVLUDEOH¶21 This view was supported by the testimony of the 
Editor of The Times, Charles Douglas-+RPHZKRVDLGWKHUHODWLRQVKLSµ«was always 
based on a certain degree of scepticism and a feeling that perhaps one as a journalist was 
never HQFRXUDJHGWRSHQHWUDWHYHU\IDULQWRWKHZRUNLQJVRIGHIHQFH¶22 Henry Stanhope, 
Defence Correspondent for The Times in 1982, believes that the relationship between the 
                                                 
18
 More recently the RAF in the campaign has attracted more attention: J. Pook, RAF Harrier Ground Attack 
Falklands (Pen & Sword Aviation, 2007); K. Darling, RAF Strike Command 1968-2007: Aircraft, Men and 
Action (Pen & Sword Aviation, 2012). 
19
 HCDC, v.i, p.xxi, q.45.  
20
 Mercer et al., p.34. For details of the MoD-media relationship prior to the War: Mercer et al., pp.28-36. 
21
 Leach, HCDC, v.ii, p.340, q.1379. 
22
 Douglas-Home, HCDC, v.ii, p.359, q.1487. 
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MoD and the media (the press at least) was a constant. The MoD kept the journalists at 
DUP¶VOHQJWKEHIRUHWKHZDUDQGWKH\FRQWLQXHGWRGRVRWKURXJKRXW23 Indeed, the Director 
of Public Relations (Army), Brigadier Ramsbotham, told a conference of Information 
2IILFHUVLQ2EHUDPPHUJDXDWWKHµ1$726FKRRO¶WKDWLQWHUPVRIRSHUDWLRQDO35Whe 
0LQLVWU\ZDVµFOXHOHVVOHDGHUOHVVDQGUXGGHUOHVV¶7KH%ULJDGLHUDSSDUHQWO\DGGHGµ*RG
KHOSXVLIDQ\WKLQJKDSSHQVLQWKHQH[WIHZPRQWKV¶24 Thus MoDPR stood, at the start line 
of war, on the back foot with the media, divided by competition and separated by distinct 
attitudes towards publicity. Any future co-operation with the media was plagued by the 
tribulations of the past and doomed to fail given the aims each side would have on the first 
day of the crisis. As the Sunday Times Insight Team was to emphasise, the fundamental 
goals of the two organisations were distinct: µ7KHEDWWOHOLQHVEHWZHHQWKHPLQLVWU\DQGWKH
media, however, had been drawn virtually from the start of the conflict. As in all wars the 
interests of the two were entirely divergent: one wanted the suppression of facts, the other 













                                                 
23
 H. Stanhope, Interview, 21 Aug. 2013. 
24
 Conference of Information Officers, Oberammergau, 1982, cited in Mercer et al., p.35. 
25





Signal of 6 and 8 April 
 
 
FM CINCFLEET  
TO RBDFNJ/ CTG 317.8 
TG 317.8 
RBDA[W/ CBFSU ASCENSION 
BT 





1. Need for tight security during Operation Corporate cannot be too highly stressed. 
Following guidance is to be disseminated as appropriate to ships companies and staffs. 
 
2. General guidance on security when dealing with the press is given in BR4005, Chapt 3. 
 
3. Ships companies of ships with members of the press embarked are to be reminded of 
basic rules and are to be specifically briefed to avoid talking to or being overheard by press 
on such matters as:  
 
(A) Operational plans, which would enable a potential enemy to deduce details of 
our intentions 
(B) Speculation about possible courses of action 
(C) State of readiness and detailed operational capability of individual units or 
formations 
(D) Location, employment and operational movements of individual units. 
(E) Particulars of current tactics and techniques 
(F) Operational capabilities of all types of equipments 
(G) Stocks of equipment and other details of logistics 
(H) Information about intelligence (especially communications intelligence) on 
Argentinian dispositions or capabilities 
(I) Communications 
(J) Equipment or other defects 
 
4. It is important that all correspondents on board should continue to feel free to file their 
stories and material. We rely on public opinion in UK being kept informed but it is also 
vital that nothing is published which puts at risk lives or success of operation. 
 
5. Position has been discussed informally with all editors, they have agreed that they 
should act responsibly in this matter, consulting MOD or D-Notice committee when in 
doubt. 
 
6. Commanding officers should ensure through information officers that all correspondents 
with the Task Force are reminded of the need for responsible reporting and in particular of 
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the diffecult [sic] areas itemised above. Speculation by correspondents aboard about 
operational plans (2 (A) above) is very dangerous since it will seem more authoritative. 
 
7. This reminder from information officers should be sufficient in all cases. If not, 
commanding officers will be able, in overriding interest of security, to stop transmission of 
a particular item: it is hoped however, this does not become necessary. 
 
8. TV and radio. By their very nature, may be more difficult to control but information 
officers should be instructed to do their best to ensure that guidelines set out above are met. 
 
9. The above guidelines apply equally to all service and civilian personnel, particularly 
those ashore in Ascension. 
 
10. Censorship of private mail and public communication channels (telephone calls, cables 
etc.) is not being implemented during current operation. But all personnel are to be 
reminded of vital importance of security in all matters pertaining to the operation and are 
to be instructed not to divulge the information outlined above or other classified 





Northwood and MoDPR 
 
 
Literature, as well as the Task Force journalists, has accused those running the war from 
Northwood of also running a private campaign against the journalists with the Fleet. 
Michael Nicholson, the ITN reporter in the South Atlantic wrote: 
 
From the moment we left Portsmouth there was a determined covert campaign to silence 
us. It was directed by Sir John from his comfortable war bunker at naval headquarters 
HMS WarriorKLGGHQDPRQJWKHPDQVLRQVRIWKHVWRFNEURNHUEHOWLQ/RQGRQ¶VVXEXUEDQ
Northwood, and it was enthusiastically obeyed by most officers aboard Hermes and her 
sister carrier Invincible.1 
 
Robert Fox also identified Northwood as controlling PR policy, along with MoD, the Task 
Force commander, Rear-$GPLUDO-RKQµ6DQG\¶:RRGZDUGDQGWKH6HQLRU1DYDO2IILFHU
of Canberra, Captain Christopher Burne.2 Northwood seemed, to many of the journalists 
who gave evidence to the HCDC, to be the main executors of PR policy and essentially, 
the one running the show. One reason Northwood was viewed as managing policy was 
because many signals originated from there. The sign for the Commander-in-Chief at 
Northwood, µCINCFLEET¶, was on many, if not the majority, of the signals transmitted to 
the Task Force containing instructions or guidance on public relations. In addition, all 
VLJQDOVZRXOGWUDYHOWKURXJK1RUWKZRRG¶V communications centre. Those signals were not 
always translated into copies for C-in-C to read. Fieldhouse maintained that signals 
µDFWXDOO\SDVVHGWKURXJKP\KHDGTXDUWHUVLIWKH\FDPHRQFHUWDLQFLUFXLWVEXWWKH\OLWHUDOO\
came through the wires. They nHYHUDFWXDOO\DSSHDUHGRQSDSHU«¶3 Major General Moore 
FODLPHGWKDWDOOLQVWUXFWLRQVRQ35µZHUHLVVXHGIURPWKH)OHHW+HDGTXDUWHUV«¶4 The 
origin of signals gave the overall impression that South Atlantic PR policy was developed 
and orchestrated by NorthwoRG+RZHYHULQUHDOLW\1RUWKZRRG¶VUROHZDVOLPLWHGZLWK
regard to policy.  
 
MoDPR was not the only part of the MoD able to influence policy in the South Atlantic. 
There were many ways in which MoDPR and Northwood clashed over policy regarding 
                                                 
1
 Nicholson, p.215. 
2
 Fox, pp.9-10. 
3
 Fieldhouse, HCDC, v.ii, p.350, q.1432. 
4
 Moore, HCDC, v.ii, p.281, q.1109. 
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public relations. There was, however, one reason why the two entities conflicted: 
µRSHUDWLRQDOVHFXULW\¶µ2SHUDWLRQDOVHFXULW\¶ZRXOGEHDWHUPZKLFKZRXOGSODJXHWKH
conduct of the Ministry during the Falklands. Many historians have commented on the 
phrase and poiQWHGWRWKHIDFWWKDWLWZDVUHDOO\DµFDWFK-DOO¶VD\LQJWRSUHYHQWLQIRUPDWLRQ
being released which might encourage a negative view of either the British Forces or the 
British Government.5 The HCDC judged that: 
 
,IXVHGWRRORRVHO\ZLWKSKUDVHVOLNH³WKDWLVDQRSHUDWLRQDOPDWWHU´EHLQJWDNHQDVDFDWFK-
all justification for not releasing inconvenient pieces of news, then the concept may be 
GHYDOXHGDQGSXEOLFDQGPHGLDFRQILGHQFHLQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VVSRNHVPHQZLOOVXIIHU6 
 
The academics commissioned by WKH0R'ZURWHLQWKHLUVWXG\WKDWµ«ZHGLIIHU
fundamentally with the Whitehall view of what qualifies as a security risk; to us, this 
means something which jeopardizes individual or operational security rather than 
everything which carries any form of internal WhitHKDOOVHFXULW\FODVVLILFDWLRQV¶7 Because 
the expression is discussed in depth in other works, here it is discussed only briefly.  
 
One of the most controversial aspects of the lack of definition was that the MoD was able 
to withhold, delay or altHULQIRUPDWLRQXQGHUWKHJXLVHWKDWLWPLJKWHQGDQJHUµRSHUDWLRQDO
VHFXULW\¶'LIIHULQJRSLQLRQVRYHUZKDWDFWXDOO\FRQVWLWXWHGLQIRUPDWLRQZKLFKPLJKW
MHRSDUGLVHµRSHUDWLRQDOVHFXULW\¶GLFWDWHGWKDWPHGLD-military relations soured as the term 
was increasingly used by the MoD. It also had an effect on the relationship between 
MoDPR and Northwood. Fieldhouse told the HCDC: 
 
7KHUHZDVDGHEDWHEHWZHHQ1RUWKZRRGDQGWKH0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFHEHFDXVH«ZH
considered the military considerations to be paramount. My business was to win, to put it 
bluntly, and there were occasions when I felt that information was being given which ran 
FRQWUDU\WRWKHPLOLWDU\LQWHUHVWDQGLQWKRVHFLUFXPVWDQFHV,VWDWHGP\YLHZ«8 
 
Indeed, the relationship between Northwood and the MoD would be of paramount 
importance, particularly when considered in the context of the PR chain of command. 
 
Fundamentally, there were two reasons why the relationship between MoDPR and 
Northwood became strained during the Falklands War. Firstly, there was a lack of 
                                                 
5
 'RGGVµ&RQWHVWLQJ:DU¶S; Mercer et al., p.ix.; Morrison and Tumber, p.189. 
6
 HCDC, v.i, p.xi, q.23. 
7
 Mercer et al., p.ix. 
8
 Fieldhouse, HCDC, v.ii, p.343, q.1395. 
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machinery in place to allow for smooth consultation and communication between the 
departments. Secondly, information on military events in the South Atlantic was not 
transmitted through Northwood to MoDPR in sufficient time or in enough detail. 
Northwood and MoDPR had not had much occasion for regular contact prior to the 
outbreak of the Falklands crisis. This meant there was no standard of co-operation between 
the two. This certainly affected their relationship in April 1982. There was no secure 
telephone line between MoDPR and the PR staff at Northwood. There was no consultation 
with Northwood when creating policy, bar the original advice on the number of journalists 
the Navy would accept on board during the first weekend of the crisis. The sole means of 
liaison between the two departments were the DPRs. The Falklands was very much a Navy 
affair: the Fleet was under the control of C-in-C Fleet and constituted the bulk of British 
Forces during the first phase of the campaign. The Chief of Defence Staff at the time, 
Admiral Sir Terence Lewin, was a naval man. Consequentially, McDonald requested that 
DPR(N) liaise closely with Northwood.9 This had limited effect, as DPR(N) was starved of 
information in the early stages of the campaign. Captain SutherlaQG¶VODFNRIWDQJLEOHGDWD
about the war prevented him from efficiently co-ordinating with Northwood. Neville 
7D\ORUWKHVXEVHTXHQW&35DW0R'35WROG0HUFHUHWDOLQDSULYDWHLQWHUYLHZWKDWµ«RQ
the PR side we need a link with the chaps who are poring over the charts in the bunkers in 
1RUWKZRRG¶10 The lack of machinery to connect the two departments had a significant 
implication ± a lack of supply to MoDPR of accurate and current military information.  
 
Northwood, on several occasions, failed to communicate military information to MoDPR. 
Taylor outlined the situation:  
 
The only arrangement we had was that essential operational information went from the 
Task Force to Northwood. Northwood may or may not then tell MoD. Nearly all the time 
we were trailing behind information available to correspondents and being transmitted by 
correspondents, but not known here in MoD.11 
 
MoDPR would, much of the time, learn of significant military events in the South Atlantic 
from reports transmitted by the Fleet, which would arrive via signal. The scarcity of 
information became so serious that McDonald addressed the Chiefs of Staff on the matter 
RQ0D\µ+H>0F'RQDOG@«UHPLQGHGWKH&RPPLWWHHRIWKHQHHGWRJLYHKLPWLPHO\
                                                 
9
 McDonald, HCDC, v.ii, p.257, q.954. 
10
 Taylor in Mercer et al., p.101. 
11
 Ibid., p.176. 
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information on events, for him to release before Argentine accounts JDLQHGFXUUHQF\¶12 
-RKQ1RWWREVHUYHGWKDWRQHRIWKHPDMRUµKHDGDFKHV¶RIWKHZDUZDVWKHµODFNRI
LQIRUPDWLRQFRPLQJEDFNIURPWKHIURQWOLQH¶+HVDLGWKDWµVRPHRIWKHLQIRUPDWLRQWKH\
[those at Northwood] felt, would be damaging to release, but it was not ultimately a pure 
military decision¶13 7KHUHLVVRPHHYLGHQFHWKDWWKHUHDVRQLQJEHKLQG1RUWKZRRG¶VUHIXVDO
to transmit information to MoDPR was a lack of trust ± not necessarily of MoDPR, but of 
London and Westminster in general. Northwood may have feared that sensitive 
information, once transmitted to the MoD, would be leaked.14 The prime example of why 
this might be the case is that of the release of the news that HMS Sheffield had been 
DWWDFNHG)UHHGPDQLGHQWLILHGWKDWµPDQ\LQ1RUWKZRRGDQGWKH6RXWK$WODQWLFZRXOGKDYH
OLNHGWKHQHZVGHOD\HG«¶15 The news of the loss of Sheffield was announced against Task 
Force wishes. There was one main reason why the Task Force and Northwood wished to 
keep the news of the Sheffield from being reported. The British wanted to bait the 
Argentines into the path of British attacks by encouraging them to return to the scene of the 
hit in order to discover how successful their attack had been. Without British reports of the 
event, the Argentines would have no way of knowing how effective their operation had 
been. In order to achieve this deceit, journalists with the Task Force were banned from 
reporting on the British loss. They were told that Northwood had imposed a complete news 
blackout.16 However, within an hour of Task Force journalists being told this, the BBC 
World Service reported a MoD press conference when the loss of Sheffield was announced. 
0F'RQDOG¶VYRLFHUHSRUWHGWRWKHZRUOGWKDW 
 
HMS Sheffield, a Type 42 Destroyer, was attacked and hit late this afternoon by an 
Argentine missile. The ship caught fire, which spread out of control. When there was no 
ORQJHUDQ\KRSHRIVDYLQJWKHVKLSWKHVKLS¶VFRPSDQ\DEDQGRQHGVKLS$OOZKR
abandoned her were picked up. It is feared there have been a number of casualties, but we 
have no details of them yet.17 
 
The announcement of the loss of the Sheffield ahead of time had two implications: relations 
with Task Force journalists were put in further jeopardy, and Northwood was encouraged 
to believe that the MoD could not be trusted with information. Task Force journalists were 
banned from filing reports two days before the damage to the Sheffield was inflicted, when 
                                                 
12
 CoS, 2 May, TNA, FCO7/4474 f.74. 
13
 Nott in Mercer et al., p.171. 
14
 See Mercer et al. pp.178-180. 
15
 Freedman, v.ii, p.413. 
16
 According to interviews in Morrison and Tumber, p.251. 
17




the Argentine cruiser, the ARA General Belgrano, was sunk by British Forces ± only to 
hear the news announced by the BBC World Service. The sinking of the Belgrano had its 
own significance in highlighting the problematic communication between Northwood and 
the MoD. John Nott made a statement in the House of Commons about the attack on the 
cruiser on 4 May. A fact not communicated to MoD was that the Belgrano had changed its 
FRXUVHDWWKHWLPHRIWKHDWWDFN1RWW¶VVXEVHTXHQWVWDWHPHQWLQWKH&RPPRQVFODLPHGWKDW
the surface group to which the Belgrano bHORQJHGZDVµFORVHWRWKHWRWDOH[FOXVLRQ]RQH
DQGZDVFORVLQJRQHOHPHQWVRIRXUWDVNIRUFH«¶18 The repercussion of inexact information 
flow from Northwood to the MoD was that the Secretary of State, and through him the 
Government, disseminated incorrect information on the campaign. 
 
Due to the experience of the Belgrano two days before, Task Force journalists became 
increasingly concerned at the restrictions being imposed upon them. Peter Archer of the 
3$ZDVWROGE\DPLQGHUWKDWµWKHUHDUHVRPHWKLQJV\RXZRQ¶WHYHQEHDOORZHGWRWHOO\RXU
grandchildren¶19 Alfred McIlroy, The Daily Telegraph reporter onboard HMS Invincible, 
ZDVGULYHQWRZULWHDQDUWLFOHRQWKHLVVXHHQWLWOHGµ&21&(51$71(:6'(/$<¶LQ
which he wrote that both the sinking of the Belgrano and the Sheffield were examples of 
gagging the journalists with the Fleet.20 The matter was even picked up in a Chiefs of Staff 
PHHWLQJRQ0D\ZKHQ0F'RQDOGHPSKDVLVHGWKDWµLWZDVHVVHQWLDOWKDWWKHJRRGZLOORI
the press, and in particular of our accredited defence correspondents, was retained¶ A 
measure McDonald suggested, to HQVXUHWKLVKDSSHQHGZDVµWKHDGRSWLRQRIDPRUH
SRVLWLYHDWWLWXGHWRWKHUDSLGUHOHDVHRIIDFWXDOLQIRUPDWLRQ¶IURP1RUWKZRRG21 However, 
WKHLQFLGHQWKDGDIILUPHG1RUWKZRRG¶VPLVJLYLQJVDERXWWKH0R'DQGWKHUHOHDVHRI
information the headquarters passeGWRµ/RQGRQ¶$VHQLRU5R\DO1DY\2IILFHUVDLGWKDWµLQ
the wider context there were times when there was a lack of trust on the Northwood side 
and they felt that if something went to Whitehall it would be leaked and that would be 
prejudicial to what Northwood was trying to do¶22 The Sheffield episode, therefore, had 
serious implications for the future release of information from Northwood to the MoD. 
 
Despite the two basic issues which precluded successful communication between 
Northwood and MoDPR, there is evidence that Northwood played a less significant role in 
                                                 
18
 Nott, HC Deb., 4 May, v.xxiii, c.30.  
19
 PA memorandum, HCDC, v.ii, p.312, q.11. 
20
 0F,OUR\µ&21&(51$71(:6'(/$<¶The Daily Telegraph, 11 May, p.28. 
21
 CoS, 7 May, N.A., FCO7/4474 f.82. 
22
 Mercer et al., p.179. 
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PR policy than has sometimes been assumed. The lack of communication between the two 
GHSDUWPHQWVLQVWHDGRIEHLQJDSURGXFWRI1RUWKZRRG¶VDWWHPSWVWRFRQWURODOODVSHFWVRI
the campaign, was actually merely a product of the chaotic nature of the crisis. Northwood 
and its inhabitants had had very little to do with the media. They were inexperienced and 
the majority of mistakes made were not committed maliciously. Northwood did have its 
own public relations department. It was a small body of, according to the Flag Lieutenant 
to C-in-C Fleet, three or four men, whose primary role was to keep the C-in-C updated on 
the media representation of the conflict.23 ,WZDVKHDGHGE\/DZUHQFHµ/DZULH¶3KLllips.24 
At no time during the conflict did the PR team at Northwood directly liaise with the PR 
department of the MoD. The MoD later admitted that, in fact, no written directives were 
given to Northwood PR staff throughout the campaign.25 Northwood PR played no 
tangible role in the formulation of policy. Its main responsibility was to keep the Fleet, as 
well as the command at Northwood, up to date on how the operation was being reported in 
the media.26 Despite having its own PR department, Northwood remained inexperienced 
when it came to the media ± especially when it came to conducting an operation when the 
media would be with the Forces. Even the PR department was relegated to cutting material 
from newspapers. This is not to underestimate the importance of keeping the Fleet 
appraised of the larger situation and of media content. Indeed, many prominent members 
RIWKH7DVN)RUFHZRXOGODWHUZULWHWR3KLOOLSVH[SUHVVLQJWKHLUJUDWLWXGHIRUKLVWHDP¶V
service during the war.27 
 
The role of Northwood was further limited by having nothing to do with the process of 
managing PR policy. Whenever Northwood was involved in PR, it was to voice concern or 
opinion in specific cases. For example, Northwood never had any role in censoring 
material from the Task Force, or in policy relating to censorship. Fieldhouse told the 
+'&'WKDWµLQWKHPDWHULDOEXVLQHVVRIFHQVRUVKLS«ZHKDGQRSDUW¶ 28 The final report of 
the HCDC confirmed that µDWQRSRLQWZDV+06Warrior, the headquarters of C-in-C 
Fleet, involved in the direct vetting of press reports¶29 Northwood would make its stance 
known to MoDPR if it thought that information should be delayed, censored or released 
TXLFNO\&RRSHUDGPLWWHGWKDWWKHUHµZHUHDUJXPHQWVRFFDVLRQDOO\EHWZHHQRXUVHOYHVDQG
                                                 
23
 Band, Interview. 
24
 L. Phillips, Interview, 15 Apr. 2014. 
25
 MoD letter in Mercer et al., p.42. 
26
 Phillips, Interview. 
27
 Personal letters provided by Phillips. 
28
 Fieldhouse, HCDC, v.ii, p.351, q.1435. 
29
 HCDC, v.i, p.xxix, q.65. 
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1RUWKZRRG«DVWRZKDWZHVKRXOGGRRQ a particular issue¶30 Chief examples of this 
system throughout the campaign can be seen in the events of the sinking of HMS Sheffield 
on 4 May, the sinking of HMS Coventry on 25 May and also the attacks on the landing 
craft RFA Sir Tristram and RFA Sir Galahad off Fitzroy on 8 June. The announcement of 
the sinking of HMS Coventry was delayed nearly 24 hours on the advice of the Chief of 
Defence Staff and the Chief of Naval Staff, Lewin and Leach respectively. Instead, Nott 
DQQRXQFHGWKDWµDVKLS¶KDGEHHQbadly damaged, without releasing the name of the vessel. 
On 8 June Argentine Skyhawks attacked landing craft which were unloading troops and 
equipment at Fitzroy Bay. The casualties sustained in the attack constituted the greatest 
loss of life in the conflict ± there were 43 fatalities and 46 men were wounded. Major 
General Moore on the Falklands and Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse in London both tried to 
have casualty figures withheld from the public:  
 
When I discussed the incident with the Commander-in-Chief that evening I asked, I 
thought entirely justifiably ± and he agreed ± that the extent of the casualties we had 
VXIIHUHGEHZLWKKHOGIURPSXEOLFDWLRQVIRUDFRXSOHRIGD\V«EHFDXVH,IHDUHGWKDWLIWKH
enemy realised the full extent of the damage he had managed to cause he might feel able to 
withdraw one or more battalions from their present, southward-facing deployments to 
UHLQIRUFHWKHPRXQWDLQV«31 
  
Despite Northwood intervening in specific cases, and even though the view of Northwood 
was consistently sought on the release of operational information, it should be emphasised 
that Northwood and C-in-&KDGµQRIRUPDOUROHLQLQIRUPDWLRQUHOHDVH¶32  
 
The PR Chain of Command 
The role of Northwood in PR policy has been emphasised because of its unique position in 
the chain of command. Few analyses of the role of the media in the Falklands pay specific 
notice to the importance of the chain of command within policy. Mostly the chain attracted 
a brief overview. 33 Among those histories which pay some attention to the topic there has 
been disagreement over the structure of the chain. Morrison and Tumber wrote that 
civilians at the MoD were forced to succumb to the military hierarchy: to communicate 
with the minders they had to report to the Task Force Commanders and work down 
through the various levels of command.34 Freedman places less emphasis on the position of 
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of command did not follow the operational chain of command¶.35 The study which devoted 
the most consideration to the subject was The Fog of War.36 Even with the material 
released from the National Archives, very little can be DGGHGWRWKHDXWKRUV¶HYDOXDWLRQ
The study is thorough in its treatment of signal material and benefits from privileged 
material supplied by the MoD. The main argument advanced by Mercer et al. was that the 
chain of command in the Falklands War failed to relay information both up and down the 
chain. Policy was relayed from the top down, but raw facts were not always successfully 
transmitted from the bottom, up.37 There was no specific PR chain of command during the 
war. Signals from MoDPR were not always treated by the military with the same 
importance as those from CINCFLEET. In addition, when the land campaign began, the 
Navy vessels found themselves increasingly out of touch with PR policy as signals 
bypassed them. Furthermore, signals bearing information from the Falklands went straight 
to CINCFLEET, and from there had to be relayed to MODUK.  
 
It is contended here that there were two PR-related problems which immediately resulted 
from the use of the military chain of command. First, information contained in signals 
often was not disseminated to the appropriate personnel on board naval vessels. After the 
Task Force reached Ascension, Woodward was left without a public relations adviser, 
since Robin Barrett (Deputy Head of Public Relations at Northwood) was forced to leave 
due to ill health. There were only five MoD PROs between the whole Fleet. The lack of 
352VGLFWDWHGWKDWWKHFKDLQµYLUWXDOO\FHDVHGWRH[LVW¶EHQHDWKWKHKHDGTXDUWHUVRIWKH
Task Force commanding officers.38 This meant that guidelines and instructions concerning 
PR were often not distributed further than a handful of personnel. The second problem was 
that the majority of information relayed from the Task Force was communicated directly 
with CINCFLEET. Information of major events or even situation reports had to be 
signalled from CINCFLEET to the Ministry. Not only did Northwood keep information 
from the MoD, but the chain of command ensured that often the MoD would be tardily 
notified of events.  
 
The gravity of the situation regarding the chain of command was recognised on 10 May, 
when John Nott met with Cooper and Taylor to discuss policy. Notes of the meeting 
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failure of the normal chain of command to keep those responsible in the MOD informed in 
as speedy and full a way as they required for effective PR action¶39 However, Nott 
FRQWUDGLFWHGWKLVODWHULQZKHQKHFODLPHGWKDWWKHFKDLQRIFRPPDQGZDVµDQ
H[WUHPHO\VLPSOHFKDLQ¶40 He claimed that the chain was simple: the Prime Minister, War 
Cabinet, Chief of Defence Staff or C-in-C would make a decision and formulate an order, 
and that would be relayed down the chain of command. In practice, however, the chain was 
far from simple and often excluded important organisations, groups or people from the 
knowledge or information necessary to administer successful PR policy. The MoD stood 
on the periphery of most Task Force communication which had serious consequences for 
public relations in the South Atlantic. 
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Extract from Signal of 11 May 
 
 
MoDUK to CTF 317, 11 May 19821 
 
The prescribed method of reporting an incident from the Task Force:  
 
 
A. TIME OF INCIDENT 
B. WHETHER WITHIN OR OUTSIDE TEZ 
C. LOCATION OF INCIDENT 
D. OWN UNIT(S) INVOLVED 
E. ENEMY UNIT(S) INVOLVED 
F. BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
G. NUMBER OF OWN CASUALTIES 
H. NUMBER OF ENEMY CASUALTIES  
 
 
                                                 
1









TO CTF 317 
INFO CTG 317.8 
C O N F I D E N T I A L 
 
1. FURTHER TO PARA 2 OD MODUK 19F/111030Z MAY AND IN VIEW OF 
GROWING CONCERN OVER MEDIA RELATIONS AND ALLEGED QUOTE 
UNNECESSARY CENSORSHIP UNQUOTE AFFECTING EMBARKED 
CORRESPONDENTS REQUEST FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AND 
PROCEDURE FOR TG AND EMBARKED MEDIA REPS 
 
A). TG UNIT CONCERNED MAKES FLASH INCIDENT REPORT, COPY TO 
MODUK 
 
B). AS SON [sic] AS PRACTICAL THEREAFTER, EMBARKED PRESS SHOULD BE 
BRIEFED ABOUT INCIDENT AND THE SECURITY AND CASUALTY 
IMPLICATIONS. 
 
C).     (A) IF FLASH INCIDENT REPORT CONCERNS ARGENTINE LOSSES 
THERE ARE TWO POSSIBILITIES: 
1. MODUK WILL INITIATE PRESS RELEASE AND INFORM CTG 
(THROUGH CTF) OF INTENDED RELEASE TIME. THIS WILL 
ENABLE CTG TO CLEAR COPY, WHICH SHOULD NOT BE 
RELEASED BEFORE MOD STATEMENT 
2. MODUK WILL SIGNAL FLASH QUOTE HOLD UNQUOTE MESSAGE 
TO CTG INFOR CTF AND UNIT CONCERNED 
(B) IF FLASH INCIDENT REPORT CONCERNS UK 
LOSS/DAMAGE/CASUALTY WHETHER BY ENEMY ACTION OR 
$&&,'(17µ+2/'¶:,//$8720$7,&$//<$3/<>VLF@/,)7,1*2)
µ+2/'¶,16758&7,21:28/'%($87+25,6('21/<%<02'8.
MODUK WILL INFORM CTG (THROUGH CTF) OF TIME WHEN MODUK 
WILL MAKE INITIAL PRESS RELEASE. EMBARKED PRESS WOULD BE 
FREE TO SEND COPY CLEARED BY CT FROM THAT TIME 
 
D) T. UNIT RELEASES IMMEDIATE AMPLIFYING SIGNALS 
 
E) 81/(66µ+2/'¶,6,1)25&(1235(665(675,&7,21627+(57+$172
PRESERVE OPERATIONAL SECURITY, APPLY 
 
F) ,)µ+2/'¶,0326('21/<02':,//$87+25,6(µ5(/($6(¶ 
GUIDANCE ON OBVIOUS SENSITIVE AREAS OF INFORMATION WAS GIVEN IN 









One area of censorship which the MoD did attempt to address in early May 1982 was the 
naming of individuals within Task Force copy. Most histories of the media and the 
Falklands mention the inconsistencies experienced by Task Force journalists regarding the 
naming of individuals with the Force. However, most accounts came directly from the 
testimony of the Task Force journalists at the HCDC, or from their subsequent interviews 
or publications. No historian has considered the policy disseminated by the MoD on this 
matter in any detail. The example serves well to demonstrate the one area in which the 
MoD attempted to project a more comprehensive censorship policy to the Task Force. That 
effort, however, instead of aiding the situation, caused confusion and led to greater 
inconsistencies in censorship. The HCDC found that the MoD pursued policies to exclude 
WKHQDPHVRILQGLYLGXDOVµUDWKHUHUUDWLFDOO\¶7KHQDPLQJRIXQLWVDOVRFDXVHGPLOG
controversy during the war. It was important for the media to receive stories which 
included this type of information. It was crucial, in fact, for the regional press, which relied 
RQµORFDOER\¶VWRULHVWRILOOWKHLUSDJHV%ULWDLQ¶VWKLUVWIRULQIRUPDWLRQIURPWKH)OHHWDQG
insatiable appetite for articles on local heroes dictated a demand for stories about people to 




During the HCDC inquiry, a host of journalists spoke on the inconsistencies which 
amounted as a result of the lack of policy on what units might be named, and when. At the 
very start of the conflict, journalists were not permitted to name the ships they were 
travelling on. Robert McGowan was forced to refer to the ship he was on, RFA Sir 
Lancelot DVµ&LQGHUHOOD¶± she knew she was going to the ball, but nobody else did.2 The 
ban on naming units was not as easy to cope with for journalists on the Falklands. Much of 
the time, the censoring of this information seemed absurd. For example, in a report by 
/HVOLH'RZGRI5HXWHUVDUHIHUHQFHWRWKHµSDUDFKXWHUHJLPHQW¶KDGEHHQFXWE\WKH
censor. However, the censor also deleted the name of an Army captain ± he replaced it 
ZLWKWKHSKUDVHµDSDUDWURRSFDSWDLQVDLG«¶3 Robert Fox had to interview Colonel Nick 
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 Alluich, p.18. 
2
 Hands and McGowan, p.22. 
3
 Daily Mail memorandum, HCDC, v.ii, p.124. 
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Vaux after the recapture of South Georgia without naming any Unit, Company or officer. 
7KHQH[WGD\DQDUUD\RI)OHHW6WUHHW¶VSXEOLFDWLRQVSURGXFHGVWRULHVRQWKH&RORQHO
himself, complete with pictures and details of his command.4  
 
Inconsistencies in naming individuals or units came about due to the lack of clear and 
coherent ± or current ± guidelines. The naming of individuals was particularly perilous, as 
it tended to have an effect on the family of the serviceman in the UK. The media often 
sought out the families of named sHUYLFHPHQLQWKH6RXWK$WODQWLFLQWKHSXUVXLWRIµORFDO
ER\¶VWRULHV0DMRU*HQHUDO0RRUHODWHUZURWHWKDWKHIHOWFRQFHUQRYHUKRZWKHPHGLD
might impinge on the morale of his troops by harassing their families, the stress about 
which could be transmitted to the men fighting in the Falklands.5 A current study on the 
effect of media reporting on the relatives of Task Force personnel is being conducted by 
Victoria Woodman of the University of Portsmouth.6 Mercer et al. also devoted the subject 
some analysis.7 7KHVXEMHFWRIµORFDOER\¶VWRULHVZDVEURXJKWXSLQWKHEGLWRUV¶Meeting 
of 20 April. When editors were invited to comment on how facilities provided for their 
organisations were working, there was a coPPRQFRPSODLQWWKDWµWKHUHZDVDQXQILOOHG
PDUNHWIRUµORFDOER\¶VWRULHV¶8  
 
Policy on the naming of servicemen in copy was decided on by the CoS on 21 April. It was 
agreed at their meeting that µµOocal boy¶stories could be used provided policy issues were 
QRWGLVFXVVHG¶9 Policy was considered by the MoD and then conveyed to the Task Force 
on 1 May. The MoD instructed that rank, first nDPHDQGVXUQDPHµ0$<%(*,9(1,)
,1',9,'8$/$*5((67238%/,&,7<¶,WZHQWRQWRUHFRPPHQGWKDWDGGUHVVHV
should be given in limited form ± without house numbers or names. Street names could be 
given.10 7KLVVHHPHGDYHU\SRVLWLYHDSSURDFKWRWKHXVHRILQGLYLGXDOV¶QDPHVLQFRS\
However, the Task Group transmitted a signal intended for Captain Sutherland, noting 
concern about this new policy. The signal stated that it was becoming apparent that 
messages passed on by the pUHVVZHUHµXQKHOSIXO¶,WVDLGWKDWµ35(66,18.5($&7%<
VISITING AND TELEPHONING HOMES DAY AND NIGHT SEEKING COMMENT 
)520:,9(62)7+26(1$0('¶11 By 9 May the situation remained unaltered, with 
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 Mercer et al., pp.90-95. 
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no further communication from MoD to the Task Force in order to remedy the situation. 
CINFLEET was forced to contact the MoD to relay the anxieties of the men in the South 
Atlantic. The signal read:  
 
THERE IS CONCERN PARTICULARLY AMONGST LANDING FORCES THAT 
POPULAR PRESS IS PUBLISHING PHOTOS AND PERSONAL DETAILS OF 




Much of the Task Force was concerned about what repercussions there might be from such 
details being publicised ± specifically what had been printed in the Press. If one of the 
servicemen who had been named in the media was captured on the Falklands and 
interrogated, the Argentines would have the advantage of knowing a variety of information 
about their prisoner. On 12 May censorship guidelines for the land campaign were 
constructed by the PRO of 3 Commando Brigade, Captain David Nicholls RM, in 
conjunction with the three civilian PROs onboard Canberra: Martin Helm, Allan George 
and Alan Percival.13 On 12 May the last policy update on the naming of individuals was 
transmitted to the rest of the Task Force. The instructions stated that individuals could be 
mentioned in copy, but that the names of the NoK and home towns or villages of the 
servicemen involved in the land campaign must not be revealed. The express permission of 
QDYDOIRUFHV¶GHWDLOVVKRXOGEHVRXJKWEHIRUHVXEPLVVLRQ14  
 
The last policy information transmitted from the MoD on the subject of naming individuals 
with the Task Force was sent on 1 May. Despite complaints and worries addressed by two 
signals (one from the Task Group and one from CINCFLEET) to MODUK, there was no 
attempt to address the weaknesses of the policy. Even as far into the conflict as 1 June, the 
CoS KHDUGWKDWGLVFORVXUHRIXQLWDQGLQGLYLGXDOQDPHVZDVµFDXVLQJVWURQJUHDFWLRQV
DPRQJWKH7DVN)RUFH¶15 At the end of the war the MoD position towards naming 
individuals was relaxed. It was agreed on 14 June that µin the light of the changed 
operational situation, they [the CoS] would in future allow the names of individuals 
VHOHFWLYHO\WREHUHOHDVHGWRWKHSUHVVDQGLQSDUWLFXODUDOORZµORFDOER\¶VWRULHVto be 
UHOHDVHG¶16 Additionally, on the return journey of the Canberra, journalists from the 
                                                 
12
 CINCFLEET to MODUK and MODUK NAVY, 9 May, HCDC, v.ii, p.479. 
13
 See Chapter Three. 
14
 CTG 317.8 to CTF 317, MODUK Navy and CTG 317.1, MoD, DEFE24/2266 f.E28. 
15
 CoS, 1 Jun., TNA, FCO7/4475 f.108. 
16
 CoS, 14 Jun., TNA, FCO7/4475 f.119. 
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regional press were permitted access to the ship in order for them to speak to the troops.17 
However, this did not rectify the errors committed by the MoD in dealing with the issue. 
Only one policy update was sent to the Task Force. The only other attempt to readdress the 
situation was made from the South Atlantic on 12 May. What is apparent from the lack of 
guidelines on the subject, and the lack of effort exerted to remedy the situation, or to allay 
the concerns of both the Task Group and Northwood, is that the MoD failed to provide 
DGHTXDWHSROLF\RQWKHFHQVRUVKLSRI7DVN)RUFHMRXUQDOLVWV¶FRS\FRQFHUQLQJWKHQDPLQJ
of units and names of individuals.
                                                 
17









spokesman. He told the HCDC that µLWZDVSROLF\WKDWWKHUHVKRXOGEHRQHPDLQVSRNHVPDQ
because in the on-the-record question and answer sessions it was very important indeed 
that there was a complete consistency of view¶1 McDonald attracted vast amounts of 
attention in his new-IRXQGUROH(YHQWRGD\WKHPHPRU\RIWKH0LQLVWU\¶VPRXWKSLHFH
remains strong in the minds of those who lived through the conflict. The Sunday Times 
Insight Team felt that µit was McDonald who became the most public expression of 
&RRSHU¶VSROLF\¶2 His approach to reading the news - careful and sombre - was heavily 
criticised and even ridiculed during the war. The literature of the Falklands and the media 
has provided comment on the tone adopted by McDonald - assessments are mostly limited 
to regurgitations of the criticism that he was too grave.3 This section provides an 
DVVHVVPHQWRI0F'RQDOG¶VSXEOLFLPDJHduring the war. 
 
7ZRRI0F'RQDOG¶VQLFNQDPHVLQZHUHµ0F'DOHN¶DQGWKHµVSHDN-your-weight-
PDFKLQH¶ 4 Keith Waterhouse, in his column for the Daily Mirror, accused McDonald of 
EHLQJµWKHRQO\PDQLQWKHZRUOGWRVSHDNLQ%UDLOOH¶5 The public was in no way neutral 
towards McDonald, who became a regular on television. During the war there was a 
multitude of articles authored on him&ULWLFDODUWLFOHVLQFOXGHGWLWOHVVXFKDVµ6RIWHQ\RXU
image MaF¶DQGµ6PLOHIRUWKHFDPHUD³0U1HZV´ LVWROG¶6  Frank Johnson of The Times 
even declared McDonald WREHWKHµPHVVHQJHURIGHDWK¶+HFODLPHG µQRQHLVEHWWHU
qualified for the role¶7 Letters from the public questioned his talent as a news reader. One 
such letter appeared in The Times on 14 May and read: µ«,GRIHHOWKDWWKHQHZVZRXOG
seem less depressing if the Defence Ministry could find a spokesman with an animate face 
and voice¶8 The British Ambassador to the US, Henderson, even signalled the MOD on 11 
                                                 
1
 McDonald, HCDC, v.ii, p.398, q.1766. 
2
 Eds. Eddy et al., p.210. 
3
 See: Eds. Eddy et al., p210.; Ingham, p.289.; Harris, p.103.; Nott, p.263.; Hastings and Jenkins, p.209.; 
Harris, p.418.; Hart Dyke, p.230. 
4
 µ0F'DOHN¶LQ(GV(GG\HWDOS; µVSHDN-your-weight-PDFKLQH¶LQ+DUULVS 
5
 :DWHUKRXVHµ$GLHWRIULFKGDPSFDNH¶Daily Mirror, 31 May, p.10. 
6
 µ6RIWHQ\RXULPDJH0DF¶Daily Mirror, 14 May, p.3.; µ6PLOHIRUFDPHUDµ0U1HZV¶LVWROG¶Daily 
Express, 14 May, p.2. 
7
 )-RKQVRQµ7KHKDUGVKLSVRIZDULQWKH&RPPRQVWUHQFKHV¶The Times, 27 May, p.28. 
8
 C. Bermant, Letter to The Times, 14 May, p.11. 
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0D\WRLQIRUPLWWKDWµ02'632.(60$1'2(6127&2ME OVER WELL TO US 
VIEWERS TALKING SEPULCHRALLY AT DICTATION SPEED. WHERE IS DPR 
1$9<48(6¶9 One of the main criticisms of McDonald was that he appeared to be 
completely subservient to the MoD. For many, the key issue was that McDonald was a 
civil servant, and his primary duty was to his superior Ministers. David Cross wrote an 
DUWLFOHHQWLWOHGµ1HZVSUHVHQWZLWKDVWULFWEULHI¶DQG0F'RQDOGZDVPDGHWKHVXEMHFWRI
humorous cartoons (see Figure 1).10 However, McDonald defended himself, and his style, 
duULQJDQGDIWHUWKHZDU2Q0D\0F'RQDOGZDVUHSRUWHGDVVD\LQJµ,NQRZWKHUHKDYH
been criticisms ± perhaps they are right to say I am a bit funereal. But I speak slowly 
EHFDXVHORWVRISHRSOHGRQ¶WVSHDNDVIDVWDVLVFRPPRQSUDFWLFHLQ/RQGRQ¶11 In a radio 
LQWHUYLHZRQ-XQHKHPDLQWDLQHGWKDWµ,GRWKLQNWKDWWKHIDFWXDOQHZVWKDW,JLYHLV
important and serious news and therefore deserves to be read as such. I think it would be 
quite wrong to attempt to be superficial or to laugh or giggle. The news is important and 
serious, you know it's about people's lives - SHRSOH
VIDPLOLHVDUHOLVWHQLQJ¶12 Even some 
newspapers called for the teasing and condemnation to cease. The Daily Telegraph 
GHYRWHGDQHGLWRULDOWLWOHGµ6+227,1*7+(0(66(1*(5¶WR0F'RQDOG¶VGHIHQFH7KH
SLHFHGHPDQGHGWKDWµ«DWWDFNVRQ0U0F'RQDOGLWQHHGVWREHVDLGDUHJURVVO\XQIDLU¶13 
The Sunday Telegraph IROORZHGLWVVLVWHUSXEOLFDWLRQ¶VOHDGDQGLQVLVWHGWKDWµLWLVUight and 
proper that news about battles, often involving tragic death tolls, should be announced in a 
special tone of voice intended to emphasise the gravity of the occasion¶14 
 
 
Figure 1: &DUWRRQLVW3%URRNHV$UWLFOH6-HQNLQVµ:KHQVROGLHUVSOD\Mournalists and 
MRXUQDOLVWVSOD\DWVROGLHUV¶µThe Times¶, 10 May 1982, p.8. 
 
                                                 
9
 Henderson to MoDUK, 11 May, MoD, DEFE24/2266 f.E14. 
10
 '&URVVµ/RQGRQ1HZVSUHVHQWHUZLWKDVWULFWEULHI¶The Times, 6 May, p.2. 
11
 µ1RZ,DQVSHDNVIRUKLPVHOI¶Daily Mirror, 24 May, p.13. 
12
 0F'RQDOGµ,DQ0F'RQDOGRQKLV-REDV0R'6SRNHVPDQ¶BBC Radio News, 2 Jun. 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0010500481005>. 
13
 (GLWRULDOµ6+227,1*7+(0(66(1*(5¶The Daily Telegraph, 14 May, p.14. 
14
 (GLWRULDOµ)LUVWWKLQJVILUVW¶The Sunday Telegraph, 6 Jun., p.16. 
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McDonald was not universally disliked or joked about ± he managed to gain a brigade of 
loyal fans throughout the course of the conflict. Later, McDonald was to tell IRN that he 
did not have time to realise he had become a national figure.15 McDonald, it emerged, was 
very popular with the ladies. The Mirror GXEEHGKLPµRXUODWHVWDQGPost unlikely sex 
V\PERO¶µ7KHKHDUWWKURERIWKH0R'¶16 There was a clamour to interview friends of the 
QHZFHOHEULW\DQGZKHQ0F'RQDOG¶VPRWKHUZDVSUHSDUHGWRJLYHLQWHUYLHZVDQXPEHURI
newspapers sent reporters to Scotland to ask the lady for more details about her son. The 
Daily Express boasted that his mother, Annie McDonald, had given them precious pictures 
of him as a baby.17 The Sun went one step further and plastered a whole page with a 
photograph of McDonald as an infant, lying half-naked, face down on the floor, along with 
the line that: µ7KHFKXEE\-bottomed baby boy is none other than pokerfaced Ian 
McDonald, the best known civil servant in the world¶ 18 0F'RQDOG¶VHGXFDWLRQDQGOHYHO
of intelligence also caught headlines during the war. Ian Mather, one of three journalists 
imprisoned during the conflict in Argentina, wrote later that Ian McDonald was well-
NQRZQIRUKLVµLGLRV\QFUDWLFKDELW¶RITXRWLQJ6KDNHVSHDUH19 This was problematic for 
some journalists, according to reports, particularly those from the US. The Daily 
Telegraph¶VFRUUHVSRQGHQWVIRund this particularly humorous, and included articles such 
DVµ865(3257(572/'7+$7+$0/(7+$'$:25')25,7¶DQGµ86
µ%$))/('%<%5,7,6+5(7,&(1&($1'-817$/,(6¶¶20 Ian Ball of the Telegraph 
HYHQUHODWHGWKDWµZKDW%ULWDLQ¶V0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFHVSokesman, borrowing from 
6KDNHVSHDUHOLNHQHGWR³WKHFRXQWHUIHLWSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWZREURWKHUV´KDVEHFRPHDPDMRU
theme in American coverage of the Falklands conflict¶21 0F'RQDOG¶VVKDUSZLWDOVRNHSW
reporters on their toes when the cameras stopped rolling. When McDonald was asked by 
RQHUHSRUWHUKRZWKHIHURFLW\RIWKH6$6ZDVDQHZVVWRU\KHUHSOLHGµ:HOO«LIWKH
$UJHQWLQHVGLGQ¶WNQRZDERXWLWEHIRUHWKHQSUHVXPDEO\LWZDVQHZVWRWKHP¶22 
Commentary on McDonald, and the demand for background on him - of the depth denied 
                                                 
15
 ,QJKDPDQG0F'RQDOGµ*RYHUQPHQW6SOLWRQ)DONODQGV0HGLD&RYHUDJH¶IRN (Unknown date in 1982) 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0023300059024>. 
16
 µ7KHKHDUWWKURERIWKH0R'¶Daily Mirror, 12 May, p.13. 
17
 µ1RZ,DQVSHDNVIRUKLPVHOI¶Daily Mirror, 24 May, p.13. 
18
 3.HQQHG\µ2KEDE\-XVWORRNDW79¶VODWHVWVWDUQRZ¶The Sun, 25 May, p.7. 
19
 0DWKHUµ,ZHQWDVD5HSRUWHUEXWHQGHGXSD3ULVRQHURI:DU¶Observer, 1 Apr. 2007 
<www.theguardian.com/media/2007/apr/01/pressandpublishing.business>. 
20
 7&RQ\HUVµ865(3257(572/'7+$7+$0/(7+$'$:25')25,7¶The Daily Telegraph, 3 
May, p.4.; ,%DOOµ86µ%$))/('%<%5,7,6+5(7,&(1&($1'-817$/,(6¶¶The Daily 
Telegraph, 5 May, p.5. 
21
 %DOOµ86µ%$))/('%<%5,7,6+5(7,&(1&($1'-817$/,(6¶¶The Daily Telegraph, 5 May, 
p.5. 
22
 µ7DFWLFDOHYDVLRQV¶The Daily Telegraph, 21 May, p.22. 
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to the media about the war - was indicative of the emotive reactions his style of briefing 
provoked in the general public ± and in the media. 
 
Ian McDonald suffered one further criticism. He lacked experience as a spokesman, and 
experience appearing on television. McDonald told the HCDC, when asked if he had any 
experience: µAVDVSRNHVPDQQR«WHOHYLVLRQFDPHUDWHFKQLTXHDQGVRIRUWKQR¶23 He also 
admitted this fact during the war: µ%HIRUH,VWDUWHGWRVSHDNRQWHOHYLVLRQGXULQJWKLVtime, 
I'd never done so before¶24 However, Mercer et al. pointed out that there was precedent for 
the Chief of PR to be a Government spokesman. Nicholas Fenn had been the spokesman 
during the Zimbabwe peace talks at Lancaster House in 1979.25 The criticism that 
McDonald was a civil servant was furthered by Bernard Ingham in his own account of the 
ZDUZKHQKHDUJXHGµ+HVKRXOGQHYHUKDYHEHHQSXWLQWKLVSRVLWLRQ,QRXUNLQGRI
'HPRFUDF\WKHRQO\DFFHSWDEOHVSRNHVPHQ«LVD0LQLVWHU,DQ0F'RQDOG¶VXS-front job 
was for a Minister of the Crown and no one else¶26 Yet the main thrust of criticism 
concerned his delivery, and not his experience. In fact, McDonald was perhaps more 
reliable as a source of accurate information than many others would have been in his 
pRVLWLRQ'XULQJWKHZDUWKH0R'REVHUYHGDSROLF\RIRQO\WHOOLQJWKHµWUXWK¶LQLWVSXEOLF
statements ± even if this meant it could report the bare minimum as a result. The MoD 
VXEPLWWHGWRWKH+&'&WKDWµ'XULQJWKHPLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVWRUHFRYHUWKH)DOkland 
Islands, our policy was to tell the truth as quickly and accurately as we could, consistent 
with the safety and security of our forces¶27 According to one PRO interviewed by Mercer 
et al., DQRWLFHERDUGLQWKH0R'GHPDQGHGµ<RXZLOOQRWWHOODQ\OLHs; you will not say 
anything that will jeopardize the Task Force or the lives or members of the Task Force¶28 
$PHHWLQJRI,QIRUPDWLRQ2IILFHUVRQ0D\DJUHHGWKDWµSUHVVFULWLFLVPZDVGLUHFWHG
more at the speed and amount of information available rather than the truth¶29 McDonald 
HPERGLHGWKHSROLF\WRWHOOQRWKLQJEXWWKHWUXWK1RWWODWHUFRQILUPHGWKDWµLWZDVSDLQIXOO\
obvious to the whole world that Ian could only speak the truth¶30 However, adherence to 
this policy meant that, often, McDonald had to resort to the phrase µQRFRPPHQW¶ZKHQ
answering questions. The fact that Q&A sessions were also on-the-record meant that 
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 McDonald, HCDC, v.ii p.398, q.1762. 
24
 0F'RQDOGµ,DQ0F'RQDOGRQKLV-REDV0R'6SRNHVPDQ¶BBC Radio, 2 Jun. 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0010500481005>. 
25
 Mercer et al., p.182. 
26
 Ingham, p.289. 
27
 MoD memorandum, HCDC, v.ii, p.1, q.2. 
28
 Mercer et al., p.46. 
29
 MIO, 10 May, TNA, CAB134/4636 f.17. 
30
 Nott, p.263. 
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McDonald was left unable to counter much rumour or disinformation beyond this 
expression.31 )URPWKHMRXUQDOLVWV¶SRLQWRIYLHZWKLs furthered the effect of the on-the-
record briefings in limiting accessible information. At a meeting with editors on 6 May, 
RQHRIWKHPDLQFRPSODLQWVZDVWKDWWKH0R'ZDVXQDEOHWRµFRQILUPRUGHQ\VWories 
RULJLQDWLQJIURPRYHUVHDV«¶32 The BBC testified WKDWµ7KHGHFLVLRQWKDWWKHUHVKRXOGEH
RQHRIILFLDO0R'VSRNHVPDQZKRZRXOGVD\DVOLWWOHDVSRVVLEOHWRWKHSUHVVµRIIWKH
UHFRUG¶HYHQWRDFFUHGLWHG'HIHQFH&RUUHVSRQGHQWVKDGWKHHIIHFWRIPD[LPLVLQJWKH
suspicion of journalists¶33 
 
McDonald was a public figure throughout the Falklands War. His appearances on 
television as the official spokesman of MoD policy were widely controversial. He was 
ridiculed and heavily criticised for his deliverance, tone and style. Yet he always received a 
large fan base and became a celebrity as a result of his new position. Despite his lack of 
experience in presenting the news or in television, McDonald performed the role of 
spokesman to the very best of his ability. His inexperience in the media spotlight was 
perhaps the reason for his unfaltering sombre technique when reporting both positive and 
tragic news. Quite rightly, those who defended his position reminded the public that the 
tone of his performance was directly linked to the gravity of the situation. However, the 
effect of the lack of unattributable briefings in the ministry throughout the majority of the 
ZDUZDVH[DFHUEDWHGE\0F'RQDOG¶VVWULFWDGKHUHQFHWRWKHWUXWK. In principal the policy 
was laudable, but it dictated that McDonald was in the unfortunate position of being unable 
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 6HH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7 April 1982, 1750 for 1800 
Organisation Representative Position 
BBC Radio 
News 
Larry Hodgson Editor 
BBC Television Alan Protheroe Assistant Director-General 
Daily Express Christopher Ward Editor 
Daily Mail David English Editor 
Daily Mirror Peter Thompson Deputy Editor 
Daily Star Brian Steel Editor 
The Daily 
Telegraph 
William Deedes Editor 
Financial Times Geoffrey Owen Editor 
The Guardian Peter Preston Editor 
IRN Peter Thornton News Editor 
ITN David Nicholas Editor 
Mail on Sunday Iain Walker News Editor 
News of the 
World 
Philip Wrack Deputy Editor 
Newspaper 
Conference 
Alex MacDonald Chairman 
The Observer Donald Trelford Editor 
PA David Chipp Editor-in-Chief 
Sunday Express Robert McWilliams Deputy Editor 
Sunday Mirror Vic Birkin Deputy Editor 
The Sunday 
People 
Nick Lloyd Editor 
The Sunday 
Telegraph 
John Thompson Editor 
The Sunday 
Times 
Frank Giles Editor 
The Sun Kelvin McKenzie Editor 
The Times John Grant Deputy Editor 
 
Editors' Meeting  
20 April 1982, 1750 for 1800  
Organisation Representative Position 
BBC External Services Ken Brazier Editor 
BBC Radio John Wilson Editor 
BBC Radio Larry Hodgson Deputy Editor 
BBC Television Alan Protheroe Assistant Director-General 
BBC TV News Peter Woon Editor 
Daily Express Christopher Ward Editor 
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Daily Mail David Tytler Assistant Editor  
Daily Mirror Richard Scott Assistant Editor  
Daily Star Brian Hitchens Editor 
The Daily Telegraph William Deedes Editor 
Economist Dudley Fishburn Executive Editor 
Financial Times G. D. Owen Editor 
The Guardian Peter Preston Editor 
IRN Peter Thornton Editor 
ITN David Nicholas Editor 
Mail on Sunday Anthony Shrimsley Associate Editor 
News of the World Derek Jameson Editor 
Newspaper Conference M. Barrington-Ward Vice-Chairman 
The Observer Donald Trelford Editor 
PA David Chipp Editor-in-Chief 
Reuters Graham Stewart Chief Correspondent 
Sunday Express Michael Toner Political Editor 
Sunday Mirror Bill Hagerty Assistant Editor  
The Sunday People Ernest Burrington Associate Editor 
The Sunday Times Frank Giles Editor 
The Sun David Shapland Deputy Editor 
The Times Fred Emery Executive Editor 
 
Editors' Meeting  
6 May 1982, 1750 for 1800 
Organisation Representative Position 
BBC Peter Woon News Editor 
BBC External 
Services 
Ken Brazier Editor 




BBC TV Alan Protheroe Assistant Director-
General 
Daily Express Christopher Ward Editor 
Daily Mail David Tytler Deputy Editor 
Daily Mirror Peter Thompson Deputy Editor 
Daily Star Brian Hitchens Editor 
The Daily Telegraph William Deedes Editor 
Economist Andrew Knight Editor 
Financial Times G. D. Owen Editor 
The Guardian Peter Preston Editor 
IRN Peter Thornton Editor 
ITN David Nicholas Editor 
Mail on Sunday Anthony Shrimsley Associate Editor 
News of the World Derek Jameson Editor 
Newspaper 
Conference 
Alexander McDonald Chief Correspondent 
The Observer Ian Lindsey-Smith Associate Editor 
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PA David Chipp Editor-in-Chief 
Reuters Graham Stewart Associate Editor 
Sunday Express Mike Toner Political Editor 
Sunday Mirror Bill Hagerty Assistant Editor 
The Sunday People Nick Lloyd Editor 
The Sunday Telegraph John Thompson Editor 
The Sunday Times Frank Giles Editor 
The Sun David Shapland Deputy Editor 
The Times Fred Emery Executive Editor 
 
Editors' Meeting  
12 May 1982, 1750 for 1800 
Organisation Representative Position 
BBC External 
Services 
Terry Heran Deputy Editor 
BBC External 
Services 
Alan Protheroe Assistant Director-
General 
BBC Radio Larry Hodgson Editor 
BBC TV Peter Woon Editor 
Daily Express Christopher Ward Editor 
Daily Mail David Tytler Associate Editor 
Daily Mirror Peter Thompson Deputy Editor 
Daily Star Brian Hitchens Editor 
The Daily Telegraph William Deedes Editor 
Financial Times Geoffrey Owen Editor 
The Guardian Peter Preston Editor 
ITN David Nicholas Editor 






The Observer Ian Lindsay-Smith Executive Editor 
PA David Chipp Editor 
Reuters Graham Stewart Chief Correspondent 
Sunday Express Henry Macory Chief Leader Writer 
The Sunday People Ernie Barrington Associate Editor 
Sunday Telegraph John Thompson Editor 
The Sunday Times Magnus Linklater Features Editor 
The Mail on Sunday Anthony Shrimsley Editor 
The Sun Ken Donlan Managing Editor 






Editors' Meeting  
20 May 1982, 1150 for 1200 
Organisation Representative Position 
BBC  Alan Protheroe Assistant Director-General 
BBC External 
Services 
Terry Heran Deputy Editor 
BBC Radio John Wilson Editor - News and  
Current Affairs 
BBC TV Peter Woon Editor 
Daily Mail David Tytler Assistant Editor 
Daily Mirror Richard Stott Deputy Editor 
Daily Star Brian Hitchens Editor  
The Daily Telegraph William Deedes Editor 
Financial Times Geoffrey Owen Editor 
The Guardian Peter Preston Editor 
IRN Peter Thornton Deputy Editor 
ITN John Horrabin Editor 
Mail on Sunday Anthony Shrimsley Editor 
News of the World Derek Jameson Editor 
The Observer Donald Trelford Editor 
PA David Chipp Editor-in-Chief 
Reuters Graham Stewart Chief Correspondent 
Sunday Express Mike Toner Executive Editor 
Sunday Mirror Robert Edwards Editor 
The Sunday People Nick Lloyd Editor 
The Sunday 
Telegraph 
John Thompson Editor 
The Sunday Times Frank Giles Editor 
The Sun Kelvin McKenzie Editor 




Editors' Meeting  
9 June 1982, 1750 for 1800 
Organisation Representative Position 
BBC Alan Protheroe Assistant Director-
General 
BBC External Services Ken Brazier Editor 
BBC Radio  John Wilson Editor - News and  
Current Affairs 
BBC Radio  Larry Hodgson Editor 
BBC TV Peter Woon Editor 
Daily Express Edward Dickinson Deputy Editor 
Daily Mail David Tytler Assistant Editor 
Daily Mirror Richard Stott Deputy Editor 
Daily Star Philip Kellor Deputy News Editor 
The Daily Telegraph William Deedes Editor 
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Evening Standard Roy Wright Deputy Editor 
Financial Times Geoffrey Owen Editor 
The Guardian Peter Preston Editor 
IRN Peter Thornton Deputy Editor 
ITN David Nicholas Editor 
Mail on Sunday Anthony Shrimsley Editor 
News of the World Derek Jameson Editor 
Newspaper Conference Alex McDonald Chairman 
Newspaper Conference Mark Barrington-
Ward 
Vice-Chairman 
Newspaper Proprietors  
Association 
John Le Page Director 
Newspaper Society  Gordon Page Secretary 
The Observer  Donald Trelford Editor 
PA David Chipp Editor-in-Chief 
Reuters Graham Stewart Chief Correspondent 
Sunday Express Mike Toner Executive Editor 
Sunday Mirror Peter Wilson News Editor 
The Sunday Telegraph Peregrine 
Worsthorne 
Associate Editor 
The Sun Ken Donlan Assistant Editor 
The Times Fred Emery Executive Editor 
 
Editors' Meeting  
16 June 1982, 1750 for 1800 
Organisation Representative Position 
BBC Alan Protheroe Assistant Director-
General 
BBC External Services Ken Brazier Editor 
BBC News and  
Current Affairs 
John Wilson Editor 
BBC Radio  Larry Hodgson Editor 
BBC TV Peter Woon Editor 
Daily Express Christopher Ward Editor 
Daily Mail David Tytler Associate Editor 
Daily Mirror Peter Thompson Deputy Editor 
Daily Star Brian Hitchens Editor 
The Daily Telegraph Morrison Holcrow  
Economist Andrew Knight 
or Dudley Fishburn 
Editor 
Executive Editor 
Evening Standard Louis Kirby Editor 
Financial Times Geoffrey Owen Editor 
The Guardian Peter Preston Editor 
IRN Peter Thornton Deputy Editor 
ITN John Horrabin Editor 
Mail on Sunday Anthony Shrimsley Editor 
News of the World Derek Jameson Editor 
Newspaper Conference Alex McDonald Chairman 
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Newspaper Society Gordon Page Secretary 
NPA Arthur Gawen Chairman 
The Observer Robin Lustig Assistant Editor 
PA David Chipp Editor-in-Chief 
Reuters Graham Stewart Chief Correspondent 
Sunday Express Mike Toner Political Editor 
Sunday Mirror Cyril Kersh Editor 
The Sunday People Nick Lloyd Editor 
The Sunday Telegraph Peregrine Worsthorne Associate Editor 




The Sun Kelvin McKenzie  
and David Shapland 
Editor 
Deputy Editor 






Attendance at Meetings of Information Officers throughout the Falklands War 
 
 
Meeting of Information Officers 
Monday 19 April 1982 
B. Ingham  Chair (No.10) 
N. Taylor MoD 
R. Westbrook FCO 
J. Groves CoI 
Jeffries CoI 
J. P. O. Lewis Board of Inland Revenue 
R. Davy Central Statistical Office 
T. Perks Department of Education and Science 
I. Gillis Department of Energy 
D. Fawell Department of Health and Social Security 
J. Woodrow Department of Industry 
J. Hewlett-Davies Department of the Environment 
M. Garrod Department of Trade 
Rowe Department of Transport 
A. Wood Home Office 
H. Jarmany Management and Personnel Office 
J. A. Colmer Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
R. C. A. Christopherson Northern Ireland Office 
P. Broderick Overseas Development Administration 
J. Monaghan Treasury  
Roberts Welsh Office 
 
Meeting of Information Officers 
Monday 10 May 1982 
B. Ingham  Chair (No.10) 
R. Westbrook FCO 
J. Dobble FCO 
Jeffries CoI 
J. P. O. Lewis Board of Inland Revenue 
R. Davy Central Statistical Office 
N. Gaffin Department of Education and Science 
I. Gillis Department of Energy 
F. Birtles Department of the Environment 
J. Bolitho Department of Health and Social Security 
J. Woodrow Department of Industry 
M. Butcher Department of Employment 
M. Garrod Department of Trade 
R. Rowe Department of Transport 
A. Wood Home Office 
H. Jarmany Management and Personnel Office 
J. A. Colmer Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
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J. Murphy Overseas Development Administration 
F. Corbett Scottish Office 
S. Wallace Secretary  
J. Monaghan Treasury  
Roberts Welsh Office 
 
Meeting of Information Officers 
Monday 17 May 1982 
B. Ingham  Chair (No.10) 
C. Wilton FCO 
J. Groves COI 
S. Jeffries COI 
N. Taylor MoD 
R. Davy Central Statistical Office 
I. Gillis Department of Energy 
F. Birtles Department of the Environment 
J. Hewlett-Davies Department of the Environment 
D. Silvan-Evans Department of Industry 
A. Moorey Department of Employment 
L. A. R. Crump Department of Transport 
J A L Dahn HM Customs and Excise 
A. Wood Home Office 
R. Stiles Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
R. C. A. Christopherson Northern Ireland Office 
P. Broderick Overseas Development Administration 
S. Sutherland Scottish Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
A. Thomas Welsh Office 
 
Meeting of Information Officers 
Monday 24 May 1982 
B. Ingham  Chair (No.10) 
A. A. Joy FCO 
J. Doble FCO 
J. Groves CoI 
S. Jeffries CoI 
H. Colver Cabinet Office 
R. Davy Central Statistical Office 
N. Gaffin Department of Education and Science 
G. Meredith Department of Energy 
J. Bolitho Department of Health and Social Security 
D. Silvan-Evans Department of Industry 
A. Moorey Department of Employment  
F. Birtles Department of the Environment 
R. F. Mayes Department of Trade 
R. Rowe Department of Transport 
D. Grant Home Office 
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J. A. L. Dahn HM Customs and Excise  
H. Jarmany Management and Personnel Office 
J. A. Colmer Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
R. C. A. Christopherson Northern Ireland Office 
J. Murphy Overseas Development Administration 
S. Sutherland Scottish Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
J. Monaghan Treasury  
G. Roberts Welsh Office 
 
Meeting of Information Officers 
Monday 7 June 1982 
B. Ingham  Chair (No.10) 
R. Westbrook FCO 
C. Wilton FCO 
J. Groves CoI 
H. Lumsden Central Statistical Office 
T. Perks Department of Education and Science 
G. Meredith Department of Energy 
J. Bolitho Department of Health and Social Security 
J. Woodrow Department of Industry 
A. Moorey Department of Employment  
M. Devereau Department of the Environment 
R. F. Mayes Department of Trade 
J. Robson Department of Transport 
A. Wood Home Office 
J. A. L. Dahn HM Customs and Excise  
H. Jarmany Management and Personnel Office 
J. A. Colmer Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
L. Drummond Northern Ireland Office 
J. Murphy Overseas Development Administration 
F. Corbett Scottish Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
S. Wallace Secretary (No.10) 
M. Hall Treasury  
G. Roberts Welsh Office 
 
Meeting of Information Officers 
Monday 14 June 1982 
B. Ingham  Chair (No.10) 
R. Westbrook FCO 
S. Jeffries CoI 
N. Taylor MoD 
M. Pentreath MoD 
H. Lumsden Central Statistical Office 
T. Perks Department of Education and Science 
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I. Gillis Department of Energy 
M. Butcher Department of Employment  
J. Hewlett-Davies Department of the Environment 
M. Devereau Department of the Environment 
R. F. Mayes Department of Trade 
L. A. R. Crump Department of Transport 
A. Wood Home Office 
J. A. L. Dahn HM Customs and Excise  
R. Stiles Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
L. Drummond Northern Ireland Office 
P. Broderick Overseas Development Administration 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
S. Wallace Secretary (No.10) 
J. Monaghan Treasury  










Attendance at the Information Group throughout the Falklands War 
 
 
Meeting of the Information Group 
8 April 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
N. Fenn FCO 
I. McDonald MoD 
S. Jeffries COI 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
14 April 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
N. Fenn FCO 
N. Kelly COI 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
16 April 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
N. Fenn FCO 
J. Groves COI 
J. Gee MoD 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
Meeting of the Information Group 
21 April 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Gee MoD 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
22 April 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
I. McDonald MoD 
R. Westbrook FCO 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
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Meeting of the Information Group 
23 April 1982 
B. Mower Chair (No.10) 
N. Kelly COI 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
R. Westbrook FCO 
J. Gee MoD 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
Meeting of the Information Group 
26 April 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
27 April 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
I. McDonald MoD 
R. Westbrook FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
28 April 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
J. Gee MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
29 April 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
D. Wright MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
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Meeting of the Information Group 
30 April 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
N. Kelly COI 
J. Gee MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
2 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
N. Kelly COI 
J. Whiting FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
H. Colver Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
3 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
P. Brazier COI 
I. McDonald MoD 
R. Westbrook FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
H. Colver Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
4 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
J. Gee MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
5 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
I. McDonald MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
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R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
6 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
P. Brazier COI 
J. Gee MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
7 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
I. McDonald MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
9 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
R. Westbrook FCO 
C. Worrall MoD 
H. Colver Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
10 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
P. Brazier COI 
I. McDonald MoD 
R. Westbrook FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
11 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
P. Brazier COI 
I. McDonald MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
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S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
12 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
P. Brazier COI 
C. Worrall MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
13 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
P. Brazier COI 
J. Gee MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
16 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
P. Brazier COI 
N. Taylor MoD 
R. Westbrook FCO 
Meeting of the Information Group 
17 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
J. Gee MoD 
R. Westbrook FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
18 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
J. Gee MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
 332 
 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
K. Long Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
19 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
J. Gee MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
H. Mills Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
20 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
J. Gee MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
K. Long Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
21 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
N. Kelly COI 
J. Gee MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
H. Mills Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
23 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
N. Kelly COI 
j. gee MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
H. Mills Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
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Meeting of the Information Group 
24 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
M. Pentreath MoD 
P. Brazier COI 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
I. Kydd Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
25 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
P. Brazier COI 
F. Dodman MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
H. Mills Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
26 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
N. Kelly COI 
J. Gee MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
H. Mills Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
27 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
P. Brazier COI 
M. Pentreath MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
H. Mills Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
28 May 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
P. Brazier COI 
j. gee MoD 
N. Fenn FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
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S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
H. Mills Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
1 June 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
J. Gee MoD 
R. Westbrook FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
K. Long Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
I. Kydd Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
2 June 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
R. Moore MoD 
R. Westbrook FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
K. Long Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
3 June 1982 
B. Mower Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
N. Fenn FCO 
F. Dodman MoD 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
K. Long Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
I. Kydd Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
4 June 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
A. Leys COI 
M. Pentreath MoD 
R. Westbrook FCO 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
K. Long Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
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Meeting of the Information Group 
7 June 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
R. Westbrook FCO 
M. Pentreath MoD 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
H. Mills Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
8 June 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
J. Groves COI 
N. Fenn FCO 
R. Moore MoD 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
H. Mills Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
B. Mower Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
9 June 1982 
B. Mower Chair (No.10) 
P. Brazier COI 
N. Fenn FCO 
J. Gee MoD 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
H. Mills Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
Meeting of the Information Group 
10 June 1982 
B. Mower Chair (No.10) 
N. Kelly COI 
R. Westbrook FCO 
F. Dodman MoD 
D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
H. Mills Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 
I. Kydd Secretary (No.10) 
Meeting of the Information Group 
14 June 1982 
B. Ingham Chair (No.10) 
N. Kelly COI 
P. Marshall FCO 
M. Pentreath MoD 
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D. Colvin Cabinet Office and Presentation Unit 
S. Fuller Presentation Unit 
R. Hatfield Presentation Unit 
K. Long Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster's Office 





List of Themes used in Content Analysis 
 
 
*N ± Negative reporting of 
*P ± Positive reporting of 
 
Original wording used in Morrison and 
Tumber  Wording used in this thesis  
Themes contributed by 
this thesis 
Aggression - the need to combat Aggression - need to combat  
Aggression as a way of not solving 
problem Aggression - not the way  
Aggression as a way of solving problem Aggression - the way  
Argentine claim to Falklands Claim to the Falklands - Argentine  
Argentine political system, history etc.  Argentine history  
Argentine treatment of the Falklands ± 
negative 
Argentine treatment of the Falklands ± 
N  
Argentine treatment of the Falklands ± 
positive 
Argentine treatment of the Falklands ± 
P  
    Argentines in Britain - N 
    Argentines in Britain - P 
Arms trade - supplies, trade with Argentina Arms trade ± Argentina  
Arms trade - supplies, trade with Britain Arms trade ± Britain  
Arms trade - world, general Arms trade ± general  
    Belgrano - N 
    Belgrano - neutral 
    Belgrano - P 
Belief of British reinvasion of Falklands British confidence  
Bravery of troops ± Argentina Bravery ± Argentine  
Bravery of troops ± British Bravery ± British  
Britain's international standing viz other 
colonies, i.e. Hong Kong    
British in Argentina - lack of support for 
British case British in Argentina - lack of support  
British in Argentina - links, history British in Argentina - links  
British in Argentina - support for British 
case ± positive British in Argentina - support  
    
British in Argentina - 
treatment of - N 
    
British in Argentina - 
treatment of - P 
British links with South America - 
economic and political South America - links with Britain  
British treatment of Falklanders - positive British treatment of the Falklanders - P  
British treatment of Falklanders - negative British treatment of the Falklanders - N  
British-Argentine relationship after war British-Argentine relationship after war  
    Causalities - British - heavy 
    Causalities - British - light 
    
Casualties - Argentine - 
heavy 
    
Casualties - Argentine - 
light  
Censorship - Argentine lack of freedom Censorship - Argentine  
Censorship - British references to reporting 
restrictions Censorship ± British  
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Civilians with the Task 
Force 
Colonialism - Britain's responsibility Colonialism   
Colonialism - relic of the past    
Communications difficulties Communication difficulties  
    
Commitment to force ± 
Argentine 
    
Commitment to force ± 
British 
Condition of Argentine prisoners - negative Condition of prisoners - Argentine - N  
Condition of Argentine prisoners - positive Condition of prisoners - Argentine - P  
Condition of British prisoners - positive Condition of prisoners - British - P  
Conditions of British prisoners - negative Condition of prisoners - British - N  
Conditions of conflict - weather, terrain Conditions of conflict  
Conflict over name - Malvinas or Falklands Conflict over name  
Criticism of British Gov. for not realizing 
invasion 
Criticism of British Government - late 
response  
Democracy    
Details of operations, battles    
Diplomacy - as a way of not solving 
problem Diplomacy - not the way  
Diplomacy as a way of solving problem Diplomacy - the way  
Disbelief of British invasion of Falklands    
Discipline of troops, looting etc. ± 
Argentine Discipline - Argentine  
Discipline of troops, looting etc. - British Discipline ± British  
East-West conflict East-West conflict  
    
Economic implications of 
crisis 
    Education on Falklands 
    Education on war 
    Effect in Britain - N 
    Effect in Britain - P 
Falklanders' reaction to invasion Falklanders' reaction to invasion  
Falklands - Englishness, love for Britain Falklands - Britishness  
Falklands - links with Argentina, trade, 
medical,  
tourism, education Falklands - links with Argentina  
Falklands - they are Argentina's     
Falklands reaction to invasion    
    
Families of the Task Force - 
N 
    
Families of the Task Force ± 
P 
Fascism     
Funerals - Argentina Funerals ± Argentine  
Funerals - British Funerals ± British  
Future of Falklands after war - economic Future of Falklands - economic  
Future of Falklands after war - political Future of Falklands - political  
    Future of Falklands - natural 
    
Government criticism of the 
media 
History of Falklands History of Falklands  
Importance of media in context of 
communications war Importance of the media  
Invasion - reasons for Argentina - 
economic problems Invasion - economic reasons  
Invasion - reasons for Argentina - Galtieri's 
personal position Invasion - Galtieri's agenda  
Invasion - reasons for Argentina - social 
and political  Invasion - social and political reasons  
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Invasion - reasons for Argentina, 
geographical Invasion - geographical reasons  
Invasion - reasons for Argentina, legal 
entitlement Invasion - legal entitlement  
    Jingoism - discussion of 
    Jingoism - the use of 
Lack of equipment - i.e. flash masks 
(Argentina) Lack of equipment - Argentina  
Lack of equipment - i.e. flash masks 
British Lack of equipment - British  
Lack of support for Argentine position, 
UN, EEC, world (except USA) 
Lack of support for Argentina - UN, 
EEC, World  
Lack of support for British position - UN, 
EEC, world (except USA) 
Lack of support for Britain - UN, EEC, 
World  
Lack of support for invasion within 
Argentina 
Lack of support for invasion ± 
Argentina  
Lack of support for war within Argentina Lack of support for war - Argentina   
Lack of support in Britain - opinion polls, 
public 
Lack of support for war - Britain ± 
public  
    
Lack of support for war - 
Britain - parliamentary 
    Media - Argentine 
    
Media - criticism of British 
journalism 
    
Media - criticism of 
journalism from Task Force 
    
Media - praise of British 
journalism 
    
Media - praise of journalism 
from Task Force 
Legal position - status of Falklands Legal arguments  
Military equipment - capacity, ships, 
planes (Argentina) Military equipment - Argentine  
Military equipment - capacity, ships, 
planes (British) Military equipment - British  
Military equipment during war - e.g. 
Exocet 
Military equipment used in Falklands 
conflict  
    Military figures - Argentine 
    Military figures - British 
Military mistakes - Argentina - unexploded 
bombs Military mistakes - Argentine  
Military mistakes ± British Military mistakes - British  
    
MoD - media-related 
criticism 
    MoD - media-related praise 
Moral arguments against conflict    
Morale of troops - Argentine - negative Morale - Argentine - N  
Morale of troops - Argentine, positive Morale - Argentine - P  
Morale of troops - British - negative Morale - British ± N  
Morale of troops - British - positive Morale - British ± P  
Neutral position - Ireland, Italy Neutral countries  
    Officers - N 
    Officers - P 
Opposition in Britain to sending of Task 
Force -  
public display, opinion polls Opposition in Britain - public  
Opposition in Britain to sending of Task 
Force ± Parliamentary Opposition in Britain - parliamentary  
Opposition within Argentina to 
Government Opposition movement in Argentina  
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Organisation of British 
forces 
    Parliamentary events 
Patriotism - British honour at stake Patriotism  
Peace plans - Haig - likelihood of failure Peace plan - Haig - failure  
Peace plans - Haig - likelihood of success Peace plan - Haig - success  
    Peace plan - Haig - neutral  
Peace plans - Peru - likelihood of failure Peace plan - Peru - failure  
Peace plans - Peru - likelihood of success Peace plan - Peru - success  
Peace plans - UN - likelihood of failure Peace plan - UN - failure  
Peace plans ± UN - likelihood of success Peace plan - UN - success  
Political capital being made by Thatcher 
and Gov. Political capital  
Political control of Argentine mass media Media - Argentine - political control  
Political control of British mass media Media - British - political control  
    
Political figures - Argentine 
- N 
    
Political figures - Argentine 
- P 
    Political figures - British - N 
    Political figures - British - P 
Political system - Argentinian , fascist, 
Junta - unrepresentative ± descriptive 
Political system - Argentine ± 
descriptive  
Political system - Argentinian fascist,  
Junta unrepresentative, critical Political system - Argentine - critical  
Political system - British parliamentary  
democracy ± representativeness Political system - British   
Political/military comparison without the 
conflicts - Hitler/Ruhr, Cuba, Berlin    
Pope's visit - decision to visit Britain - 
should not come Pope's visit - should not come  
Pope's visit - decision to visit Britain, 
should come Pope's visit - should come  
Pope's visit in Argentina Pope's visit - Argentina  
Pope's visit to Britain Pope's visit ± Britain  
Possibility of casualties - Argentina - light 
Possibility of casualties - Argentina ± 
light  
Possibility of casualties - British - light Possibility of casualties - British - light  
Possibility of casualties - Falklands, light 
Possibility of casualties - Falklands ± 
light  
Possibility of causalities - Argentine, heavy 
Possibility of casualties - Argentine ± 
heavy  
Possibility of causalities - British, heavy 
Possibility of casualties - British ± 
heavy  
Possibility of causalities - Falklanders ± 
heavy 
Possibility of casualties - Falklanders ± 
heavy  
Possibility of fighting Possibility of armed conflict or war  
Previous Argentine conflicts - external 
Previous conflicts - Argentine ± 
external  
Previous Argentine conflicts - internal Previous conflicts - Argentine - internal  
Previous British conflicts - Suez, World 
War II, Cyprus Previous conflicts - British   
Prince Andrew Prince Andrew  
    Propaganda - Argentine 
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    Propaganda - British 
    Regulars - N 
    Regulars - P 
Recall of Task Force - calls for    
Recall of Task Force - impractical, 
present/future    
Recall of Task Force - impractical, 
present/future    
Religious reactions - Argentine position, 
lack of support for 
Religious reaction - lack of support ± 
Argentina  
Religious reactions - Argentine position, 
support for Religious reaction - support - Argentina  
Religious reactions - British position - lack 
of support for 
Religious reaction - lack of support ± 
Britain  
Religious reactions - British position - 
support for Religious reaction - support - Britain  
Repatriation of bodies Repatriation of bodies  
    Reporting on UN events 
    Reports on armed conflict 
Ridicule/comment of Argentine figures in 
British media     
Ridicule/comment of British figures in 
Argentine media display    
S. American criticism of Argentina (lack of 
support)    
Self-determination for Falklanders (refs. 
To) Self determination  
Skill of troops - Argentine Skill ± Argentine  
Skill of troops - British Skill ± British  
South American disputes with Argentina South America - disputes - Argentina  
South American support for Argentina South America - support - Argentina  
South American support for Britain South America - support - Britain  
    
South America - lack of 
support - Argentina 
Sovereignty - Argentinian Sovereignty ± Argentine  
Sovereignty - British Sovereignty ± British  
Special terms during Conflict - i.e. 
yomping Special terms  
    
Speculation - Argentine 
action 
    Speculation - British action 
State of Argentine armed forces State of Argentine armed forces   
State of Argentine armed forces - negative   
State of British armed forces - cuts ± 
negative State of British forces - N  
State of British armed forces - ready ± 
positive State of British forces - P  
State of war - Argentina might lose State of war - Argentina - lose  
State of war - Argentine winning State of war - Argentina - win  
State of war - British might lose State of war - British - lose  
State of war - British winning State of War - British - win  
    Stories - N 
    Stories - P 
Support for Argentine position - UN, EEC, 
world (except USA) 
Support for Argentina - UN, EEC, 
World  
Support for British position - UN, EEC, 
world (except USA) Support for Britain - UN, EEC, World  
Support for invasion within Argentina Invasion - support - Argentine  
Support for sending Task Force ± 
Parliamentary Support in Britain - parliamentary  
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Support for sending Task Force - public 
display -  
opinion polls Support in Britain - public  
Support for war within Argentina Support for war - Argentine  
    Support for war - British 
Symbols of Argentine nationalism - self-
sacrifice     
Symbols of British nationalism    
Tactical discussions - military, battle plans    
Tactical discussions during war    
Task Force preparations, training, 
equipment Task Force - preparations  
    
Task Force journalists - 
armed conflict 
    Task Force journalists - N 
    
Task Force journalists - 
non-battle 
    Task Force journalists - P 
Terrorism    
Trade British-Argentine - arms, training Trade - Argentine-British - arms  
Trade, British-Argentine - economic Trade - Argentine-British - economic  
    Trade - Argentine-Russian 
Treatment of Argentine prisoners ± 
negative Treatment of prisoners - Argentine - N  
Treatment of Argentine prisoners - positive Treatment of prisoners - Argentine - P  
Treatment of British prisoners - negative Treatment of prisoners - British - N  
Treatment of British prisoners - positive Treatment of prisoners - British - P  
Unfair fighting tactics - napalm (British) Unfair tactics - British  
Unfair fighting tactics - napalm, white 
flags (Argentina) Unfair tactics - Argentine  
US aid to Argentina US - aid to Argentina  
US aid to Britain - military, 
communication, intelligence US - aid to Britain  
    US - criticism of 
US links with South America - economic US-South America - economic  
US links with South America - political US-South America - political  
US neutral US - neutral position  
    
US - public opinion - pro-
Argentine 
    
US - public opinion - pro-
British 
US support for Argentine position US - support - Argentina  
US support for British position US - support - Britain  
Whole escapade is madness Crisis is madness  
    
World Cup -  Argentina's 
participation 
World Cup - British should not participate World Cup - Britain - N  
World Cup - British should participate World Cup - Britain - P  









Themes used in Content Analysis and their Descriptions 
 
 
Wording used in thesis  Description of Theme 
Aggression - need to combat The need to combat the Argentine aggression displayed through the 
invasion of the Falkland Islands  
Aggression - not the way Aggression is not a suitable way of resolving the dispute over the 
Falklands 
Aggression - the way Aggression is a suitable response in order to resolve the Falklands 
crisis 
Claim to the Falklands ± Argentine Discussion of the Argentine claim to the Falklands - to include 
history and arguments for 
Argentine history Argentine history - political, social and economic 
Argentine treatment of the Falklands ± N Argentine treatment of the Falklands and the persons of the Falklands 
± negative 
Argentine treatment of the Falklands ± P Argentine treatment of the Falklands and the persons of the Falklands 
± positive 
Argentines in Britain ± N The treatment of peoples of Argentine descent, Argentine tourists or 
Argentines in permanent residency in Britain - negative+C28 
Argentines in Britain ± P The treatment of peoples of Argentine descent, Argentine tourists or 
Argentines in permanent residency in Britain - positive 
Arms trade ± Argentina Arms trade - supplies to Argentina from the EU, US and World 
Arms trade ± Britain Arms trade - supplies to Britain from the EU, US and World 
Arms trade ± general Arms trade - general and world-wide 
Belgrano ± N The sinking of the Belgrano - comment on British action - negative 
Belgrano neutral The sinking of the Belgrano - comment on British action - neutral 
Belgrano ± P The sinking of the Belgrano - comment on British action - positive 
British confidence British confidence in her eventual victory - diplomatic or military 
Bravery ± Argentine Accounts of the bravery of Argentine troops 
Bravery ± British Accounts of the bravery of British troops 
British in Argentina - lack of support Lack of support for Britain by peoples of British descent in, British 
tourists in, or British in permanent residency in Argentina 
British in Argentina ± links The history and links between the British in Argentina - peoples of 
British descent or in permanent residency 
British in Argentina ± support Support for Britain by peoples of British descent in, British tourists 
in, or British in permanent residency in Argentina 
British in Argentina - treatment of ± N Treatment of peoples of British descent, British tourists, or British in 
permanent residency, in Argentina - negative 
British in Argentina - treatment of ± P Treatment of peoples of British descent, British tourists, or British in 
permanent residency, in Argentina - positive 
South America - links with Britain South American links with Britain - economic, political and social 
British treatment of the Falklanders ± P Treatment of the Falklanders by the British - before or during the 
course of the conflict - positive  
British treatment of the Falklanders ± N Treatment of the Falklanders by the British - before or during the 
course of the conflict - negative 
British-Argentine relationship after war Speculation as to the nature of the British-Argentine relationship after 
war - economic, political and social 
Causalities - British ± heavy British casualties - heavy - i.e. over 10 people wounded or killed 
Causalities - British ± light British casualties - light - i.e. under 10 people wounded or killed 
Casualties - Argentine ± heavy Argentine casualties - heavy - i.e. over 10 people wounded or killed 
Casualties - Argentine - light  Argentine casualties - light - i.e. under 10 people wounded or killed 
Censorship ± Argentine References or description of censorship of the mass media in 
Argentina 
Censorship ± British References or description of censorship of the mass media in Britain 
Civilians with the Task Force Stories, accounts or mention of civilians travelling with, or involved 
with the Task Force 
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Colonialism  Mention, or comment on, Britain's colonial possessions, 
responsibilities, or colonial past 
Communication difficulties Communication difficulties - to include technical problems with 
satellites, delays in copy or despatches, conditions affecting 
transmissions, delayed or lost correspondence with the Task Force 
Commitment to force - Argentine Signs of, mention of or discussion on the Argentine commitment to 
the use of force in the Falklands crisis 
Commitment to force - British Signs of, mention of or discussion on the British commitment to the 
use of force in the Falklands crisis 
Condition of prisoners - Argentine - N Condition of Argentine prisoners or hostages - negative 
Condition of prisoners - Argentine - P Condition of Argentine prisoners or hostages - positive 
Condition of prisoners - British - P Condition of British prisoners or hostages - positive 
Condition of prisoners - British - N Condition of British prisoners or hostages - negative 
Conditions of conflict Conditions of conflict - to include weather conditions and conditions 
of terrain  
Conflict over name Conflict over whether the Falklands Islands should be named the 
Falklands or Islas Malvinas 
Criticism of British Government - late 
response 
Criticism of the British Government for not having anticipated the 
Argentine invasion of the Falklands or responding late to information 
and intelligence 
Diplomacy - not the way The use of diplomacy in the Falklands crisis is not a suitable way of 
resolving the situation - to include argument of the text or reference 
to that argument by a third party 
Diplomacy - the way The use of diplomacy in the Falklands crisis is a suitable way of 
resolving the situation - to include argument of the text or reference 
to that argument by a third party 
Discipline - Argentine Poor discipline of Argentine troops - to include actions of looting, 
criminal damage and poor behaviour 
Discipline - British Poor discipline of British troops - to include actions of looting, 
criminal damage and poor behaviour 
East-West conflict East-West conflict or tension between Russia and Western Europe or 
the United States 
Economic implications of crisis Economic implications of the crisis, or of fighting a war, for both 
Argentina and Britain 
Education on Falklands Reports, accounts, articles or descriptions specifically aimed at 
educating the public on the Falkland Islands 
Education on war Reports, accounts, articles or descriptions specifically aimed at 
educating the public on the art, operation or considerations of war/ 
armed conflict 
Effect in Britain - N Effect of the Falklands crisis on the greater population of Britain - 
economically, socially or politically - negative 
Effect in Britain - P Effect of the Falklands crisis on the greater population of Britain - 
economically, socially or politically - positive 
Falklanders' reaction to invasion The reaction to the invasion of the Falklands by their inhabitants - 
negative or positive  
Falklands - Britishness The British nature of the Falkland Islands or Falkland Islanders. 
Includes accounts, articles, or descriptions of how much the 
Falklanders feel they belong to Britain 
Falklands - links with Argentina Links between Argentina and the Falkland Islands. To include trade, 
medical, tourism, education and general resources 
Families of the Task Force - N Mention of, discussion of the effect on, or accounts relating to, the 
families of servicemen in the Task Force - negative 
Families of the Task Force - P Mention of, discussion of the effect on, or accounts relating to, the 
families of servicemen in the Task Force - positive 
Funerals - Argentine Funerals of Argentine servicemen - on the Falkland Islands or in 
Argentina 
Funerals - British Funerals of British servicemen - on the Falkland Islands or in Britain  
Future of Falklands - economic The future of the Falkland Islands - to include economics or 
monetary advantages of reclaiming the islands/ hindrances 
Future of Falklands - political The future of the Falkland Islands - to include the political outcomes 
possible - administration of the islands etc. 
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Future of Falklands - natural The future of the Falkland Islands - natural - to include conservation 
measures and future natural status of the Islands 
Government criticism of the media Government-led criticism of the media in Britain and British 
journalism 
History of Falklands History of the Falklands - to include discovery of, exploration of, 
economic, social and political history 
Importance of the media The importance of the media in the context of a communications war 
Invasion - economic reasons Reasons for the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands - 
economic advantages  
Invasion - Galtieri's agenda Reasons for the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands - to fulfil 
Galtieri's own political position or political agenda 
Invasion - social and political reasons Reasons for the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands - social 
and political 
Invasion - geographical reasons Reasons for the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands - 
geographical position 
Invasion - legal entitlement Reasons for the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands - legal 
entitlement 
Jingoism - discussion of Jingoism in the British press - discussion of 
Jingoism - the use of Jingoism in the British press - use of 
Lack of equipment - Argentina Reference to, or judgement on, Argentina's lack of military 
equipment or equipment which would be beneficial to the Argentine 
army 
Lack of equipment - British Reference to, or judgement on, Britain's lack of military equipment or 
equipment which would be beneficial to the Task Force 
Lack of support for Argentina - UN, 
EEC, World 
Lack of support for Argentina within the UN, EEC and wider-world - 
includes accounts, articles or descriptions of groups who do not 
support Argentina within countries which might otherwise support 
her 
Lack of support for Britain - UN, EEC, 
World 
Lack of support for Britain within the UN, EEC and wider-world - 
includes accounts, articles or descriptions of groups who do not 
support Britain within countries which might otherwise support her 
Lack of support for invasion - Argentina Lack of support for the Argentine invasion of the Falklands within 
Argentina 
Lack of support for war - Argentina  Lack of support for war within Argentina 
Lack of support for war - Britain - public Lack of support for war within Britain - referring to the British public 
Lack of support for war - Britain - 
parliamentary 
Lack of support for war within Britain - referring to the British 
parliament 
Media - Argentine Discussion of the processes of and ethics of the Argentine media 
Media - criticism of British journalism Criticism of the conduct of the British media (in Britain) 
Media - criticism of journalism from 
Task Force 
Criticism of the conduct of journalists accompanying the Task Force 
Media - praise of British journalism Praise of the conduct of the British media (in Britain) 
Media - praise of journalism from Task 
Force 
Praise of the conduct of journalists accompanying the Task Force 
Legal arguments Legal arguments - concerning the status of the Falklands, Britain's 
right to self-defence, UN resolution 502 
Military equipment - Argentine Argentine military equipment - to include military capacity, troop 
movements, requisitioned ships and general equipment 
Military equipment - British British military equipment - to include military capacity, troop 
movements, requisitioned ships and general equipment 
Military equipment used in Falklands 
conflict 
Military equipment used in the Falklands conflict - to include 
discussion on the Exocet missile etc. 
Military figures - Argentine Presentation of Argentine military figures in the British press 
Military figures - British Presentation of British military figures in the British press 
Military mistakes - Argentine Argentine Military mistakes - to include unexploded bombs, crash-
landings, or operational mistakes 
Military mistakes - British British Military mistakes - to include unexploded bombs, crash-
landings, or operational mistakes 
MoD - media-related criticism Media-related criticism of the Ministry of Defence - to include 
communication difficulties, the release of news, organisation of Task 
Force attributed journalists and criticism of Ian McDonald 
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MoD - media-related praise Media-related praise of the Ministry of Defence - to include the 
release of news, communication with Task Force personnel's families 
and praise of Ian McDonald 
Morale - Argentine - N Morale of servicemen - Argentine - negative 
Morale - Argentine - P Morale of servicemen - Argentine - positive 
Morale - British - N Morale of servicemen - British - negative 
Morale - British - P Morale of servicemen - British - positive 
Neutral countries Countries which adopt neutral status in the conflict - specifically 
relating to Italy and Ireland 
Officers - N Presentation of British officers - negative 
Officers - P Presentation of British officers - positive 
Opposition in Britain - public Opposition to the  Government's line on the Falklands or British 
military action within Britain and specific to the British public - to 
include discussion on public displays or opinion polls  
Opposition in Britain - parliamentary Opposition to the  Government's line on the Falklands or British 
military action within Britain and specific to parliament 
Opposition movement in Argentina Opposition to the Junta's line on the Falklands or Argentine military 
action within Argentina 
Organisation of British forces Organisation of British forces - to include discussion on protocol and 
red tape 
Parliamentary events Discussion on events within parliament or specifically to do with 
politics within Britain 
Patriotism Patriotism - displays of nationalism, or love of one's country - 
Argentine or British 
Peace plan - Haig - failure Haig peace plan - references to, or discussion on, the likelihood of the 
plan's failure 
Peace plan - Haig - success Haig peace plan - references to, or discussion on, the likelihood of the 
plan's success 
Peace plan - Haig - neutral  Haig peace plan - neutral discussion of  
Peace plan - Peru - failure Peru's peace plan - references to, or discussion on, the likelihood of 
the plan's failure 
Peace plan - Peru - success Peru's peace plan - references to, or discussion on, the likelihood of 
the plan's success 
Peace plan - UN - failure UN peace plan -  references to, or discussion on, the likelihood of the 
plan's failure 
Peace plan - UN - success UN peace plan - references to, or discussion on, the likelihood of the 
plan's success 
Political capital Political capital made by the Thatcher Government as a result of the 
Falklands crisis 
Media - Argentine - political control References to, or discussion of, Argentine political control of the 
mass media 
Media - British - political control References to, or discussion of, British political control of the mass 
media 
Political figures - Argentine - N Presentation of Argentine political figures - negative 
Political figures - Argentine - P Presentation of Argentine political figures - positive 
Political figures - British - N Presentation of British political figures - negative 
Political figures - British - P Presentation of British political figures - positive  
Political system - Argentine - descriptive Argentine political system - descriptive discussion of, or references 
to, the fascist Junta or the unrepresentative nature of the system 
Political system - Argentine - critical Argentine political system - critical discussion of, or references to, 
the fascist Junta or the unrepresentative nature of the system 
Political system - British  British political system - descriptive discussion of, or reference to, 
parliamentary system 
Pope's visit - should not come Pope's visit to Britain - comment on or speculation on the fact that he 
should no longer continue with his scheduled visit 
Pope's visit - should come Pope's visit to Britain - comment on or speculation on the fact that he 
should continue with his scheduled visit 
Pope's visit - Argentina Pope's visit to Argentina  
Pope's visit - Britain Pope's visit to Britain 
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Possibility of casualties - Argentina - 
light 
The possibility of Argentine casualties - light - i.e. under 10 people 
predicted to be wounded or killed 
Possibility of casualties - British - light The possibility of British casualties - light - i.e. under 10 people 
predicted to be wounded or killed 
Possibility of casualties - Falklands - 
light 
The possibility of Falkland casualties - light - i.e. under 10 people 
predicted to be wounded or killed 
Possibility of casualties - Argentine - 
heavy 
The possibility of Argentine casualties - heavy - i.e. over 10 people 
predicted to be wounded or killed 
Possibility of casualties - British - heavy The possibility of British casualties - heavy - i.e. over 10 people 
predicted to be wounded or killed 
Possibility of casualties - Falklanders - 
heavy 
The possibility of Falkland casualties - heavy - i.e. over 10 people 
predicted to be wounded or killed 
Possibility of armed conflict or war The possibility of crisis resulting in armed conflict or a war 
Previous conflicts - Argentine - external Discussion of, links or reference to previous Argentine conflicts - 
specifically with other countries 
Previous conflicts - Argentine - internal Discussion of, links or reference to previous Argentine conflicts - 
specifically those fought internally, to include the 'Dirty War' and 
illegal action in Argentina in the 1970s 
Previous conflicts - British  Discussion of, links or reference to previous British conflicts - 
specifically those with other countries 
Prince Andrew Articles on, discussion of or reference to, the role of Prince Andrew 
as a member of the Task Force in the Falklands conflict 
Propaganda - Argentine Argentine use of propaganda - both internal and external use 
Propaganda ± British British use of propaganda - both internal and external use 
Regulars ± N Presentation of regular British servicemen - negative 
Regulars ± P Presentation of regular British servicemen - positive 
Religious reaction - lack of support - 
Argentina 
Religious reactions demonstrating a lack of support for Argentina 
Religious reaction - support - Argentina Religious reactions demonstrating support for Argentina 
Religious reaction - lack of support - 
Britain 
Religious reactions demonstrating a lack of support for Britain 
Religious reaction - support - Britain Religious reactions demonstrating support for Britain 
Repatriation of bodies Stories or discussion relating to the repatriation of British 
servicemen's bodies 
Reporting on UN events Discussion on events within the United Nations 
Reports on armed conflict Reports, descriptions of, or discussion on armed conflict between 
Argentina and Britain 
Self-determination The Falkland Islanders' right to self-determination - either argued in 
text or where references are made to arguments for self determination 
Skill ± Argentine Skill of Argentine troops 
Skill ± British Skill of British troops 
South America - disputes - Argentina South American disputes with Argentina - territorial, economic, 
political or social - to include historical disputes or present-day 
disputes 
South America - support - Argentina South American support for Argentina 
South America - support - Britain South American support for Britain 
South America - lack of support - 
Argentina 
South American criticism of,  or lack of support for, Argentina 
Sovereignty ± Argentine Sovereignty of the Falklands belongs to Argentina - either argued in 
text or where references are made to arguments for Argentine 
Sovereignty   
Sovereignty ± British Sovereignty of the Falklands belongs to Britain - either argued in text 
or where references are made to arguments for British Sovereignty   
Special terms Special terms used during the conflict or which are specific to the 
conflict - to include 'yomping' and other informal terms 
Speculation - Argentine action Speculation or rumour about intended Argentine action 
Speculation - British action Speculation or rumour about intended British action 
State of Argentine Armed Forces  The state of the Argentine armed forces - preparedness, training, 
economic state 




State of British forces ± P The state of the British forces - prepared, able to fight a war against 
Argentina 
State of war - Argentina - lose Comment on the state or progress of the war - Argentina may lose 
State of war - Argentina - win Comment on the state or progress of the war - Argentina may win 
State of war - British - lose Comment on the state or progress of the war - Britain may lose 
State of War - British - win Comment on the state or progress of the war - Britain may win 
Stories ± N Stories relating to the Falkland Islands or the conflict from people in 
Britain ± negative 
Stories ± P Stories relating to the Falkland Islands or the conflict from people in 
Britain ± positive 
Support for Argentina - UN, EEC, World Support for Argentina within the UN, EEC and wider-world - 
includes accounts, articles or descriptions of groups who support 
Argentina within countries which might otherwise oppose her 
Support for Britain - UN, EEC, World Support for Britain within the UN, EEC and wider-world - includes 
accounts, articles or descriptions of groups who support Britain 
within countries which might otherwise oppose her 
Invasion - support - Argentine Argentine support for the initial invasion of the Falkland Islands  
Support in Britain - parliamentary Support for the Government's line on the Falklands or British military 
action within Britain and specific to parliament 
Support in Britain - public Support for the Government's line on the Falklands or British military 
action within Britain and specific to the British public - to include 
discussion on public displays or opinion polls  
Support for war - Argentine Support for an Argentine-British war within Argentina 
Support for war ± British Support for an Argentine-British war within Britain 
Task Force - preparations Preparations for the Task Force - to include requisitioning of ships, 
training, preparation of equipment and economic provision 
Task Force journalists - armed conflict Stories originating from journalists accredited to the Task Force - 
accounts of armed conflict 
Task Force journalists - N Stories originating from journalists accredited to the Task Force - 
negative accounts 
Task Force journalists - non-battle Stories originating from journalists accredited to the Task Force - 
non-battle stories 
Task Force journalists - P Stories originating from journalists accredited to the Task Force - 
positive accounts 
Trade - Argentine-British - arms Trade between Argentina and Britain - to include arms sales and 
military training 
Trade - Argentine-British - economic Trade between Argentina and Britain - to include only economic 
trade 
Trade - Argentine-Russian Trade between Argentina and Russia - to include arms sales where 
appropriate 
Treatment of prisoners - Argentine - N Treatment of Argentine prisoners or hostages - negative 
Treatment of prisoners - Argentine - P Treatment of Argentine prisoners or hostages - positive 
Treatment of prisoners - British - N Treatment of British prisoners or hostages - negative 
Treatment of prisoners - British - P Treatment of British prisoners or hostages - positive 
Unfair tactics ± British Reports of or speculation on the use of unfair fighting tactics by 
Britain - to include the use of napalm, using prisoners to clear 
minefields, the use of white flags etc. 
Unfair tactics - Argentine Reports of or speculation on the use of unfair fighting tactics by 
Argentina - to include the use of napalm, using prisoners to clear 
minefields, the use of white flags etc. 
US - aid to Argentina United States aid to Argentina throughout the course of the crisis/ 
conflict 
US - aid to Britain United States aid to Britain throughout the course of the crisis/ 
conflict 
US - criticism of Criticism of the United States Government for not aligning with 
Britain, or not aligning sooner 
US-South America - economic United States- South American links - economic 
US-South America - political United States- South American links - political 
US - neutral position Comment on, reference to, or discussion of, the neutral status of the 
United States 
US - public opinion - pro-Argentine Pro-Argentine public opinion within the United States 
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US - public opinion - pro-British Pro-British public opinion within the United States 
US - support ± Argentina Support of the United States for Argentina 
US - support ± Britain Support of the United States for Britain 
Crisis is madness The departure of a British Task Force and a potential conflict or the 
actual war is madness  
World Cup -  Argentina's participation The World Cup competition - articles relating to whether or not 
Argentina should be allowed to participate 
World Cup - Britain ± N The World Cup competition - the argument that Britain should not 
participate - either argued in text or where references are made to 
arguments against Britain's participation   
World Cup - Britain ± P The World Cup competition - the argument that Britain should 
participate - either argued in text or where references are made to 
arguments for Britain's participation   
World Cup ± neutral The World Cup competition - neutral reporting of preparations for 









N.B. This is not the actual analysis of The Times on 19 April 1982 ± it is merely a 





Definition of Time Periods Employed in Content Analysis 
 
 
In order to make the sample included in this analysis comparable with that of analysis of 
television news, the same method concerning dates was followed. In Journalists at War the 
duration of the conflict was divided into five distinct time periods.  These date brackets are 
observed in this content analysis.1 Each period covers various events which occurred in the 
campaign, making thematic analysis more effective. The first period, from 2 April to 4 
April, covers the invasion of the islands, the first House of Commons debate on the 
invasion and the extensive, but brief, preparation of the Task Force. The second period 
spans from 5 to 24 April. This period comprises the sailing of the Task Force, Alexander 
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with Britain are included in the third period considered - 25 to 30 April. May 1 to 20, the 
fourth period studied, covered the first signs of action on the Falkland Islands since the 
Argentine invasion - the bombing of the Port Stanley runway, the sinking of the General 
Belgrano and HMS Sheffield and the shooting down of Argentine planes. The period ended 
with the failure of Britain and Argentina to reach a peaceful solution to the crisis. The final 
period examined fell between 21 May and 15 June. This stage involved the destruction of 
British naval and merchant ships, the successful British campaign at Goose Green, the 
Bluff Cove disaster and the advance of British troops with the ceasefire and surrender of 
Argentine troops.  
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Original Locations and how they were defined in this Thesis 
 
 
Original Location and Report Type as listed in Journalists at War Origin Allocated  
British film from Argentina - interviews with Argentinians and British, 
parades, funerals, general film 
Argentina 
Other film, i.e. NBC from Argentina Argentina 
Argentinian film - invasion film plus entry into Stanley and all Falklands 
film 
Argentine source 
Argentine film from Argentina Argentine source 
Argentinian film - official Government information film, propaganda film Argentine source 
Studio, e.g. newsreader, expert witness, studio discussion, drawings, 
graphs, maps, photographs and models  
Britain 
Home film - interviews with politicians, wives, parliamentary reports, 
statements, vox pop, home film abroad 
Britain 
Diplomatic film, i.e. Haig shuttle, EEC reports, UN etc. Britain 
Pre-sailing Task Force film, i.e. embarkation, training preparation Britain 
Home film - official war statements only - i.e. Ian McDonald and John 
Nott or anyone making official war statements, but not at Parliament 
Britain 
MoD and COI film, i.e. simulated, training and official Falklands film 
(historical film of Falklands kelpers). Only if stated as caption or 
announcement 
Britain 
BBC, ITN film - i.e. simulated training and official Falklands film 
(historical film of Falklands kelpers) 
Britain 
Other film, i.e. NBC from rest of the world Other 
British film from South America excluding Falklands and Argentina South America 
Other film, i.e. NBC from South America South America 
Task Force film on board ships and on Falklands - radio report with or 
without still picture 
Task Force 
Task Force film on board ships and on Falklands - commentary plus film - 












Government Papers and Reports 
 
House of Commons Defence Committee, The Handling of Press and Public Information 
During the Falklands Conflict: Observations presented by Secretary of State for Defence, 
House of Commons Papers 17-I-II 1982-83 (London: HMSO, 1983) 
 
House of Commons Defence Committee, The Handling of Press and Public Information 
During the Falklands Conflict, Volume I: Report and Minutes of Proceedings (London: 
HMSO, 1982) 
 
House of Commons Defence Committee, The Handling of Press and Public Information 
During the Falklands Conflict, Volume II: Minutes of Evidence (London: HMSO, 1982)  
 
Ministry of Defence, History of the Ministry of Defence, Dec. 2012 
<www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/49053/history_of
_mod.pdf> [Accessed 11 Aug. 2014] 
 
Ministry of Defence, License for an Accredited Correspondent Accompanying an 
Operational Force (London: MoD, 1956) 
 
Ministry of Defence, Regulations for Correspondents Accompanying an Operational 
Force (London: MoD, 1958) 
 
Nott, J., Statement on the Defence Estimates 1982, Cmnd.8529. (London: HMSO, 1981) 
 
Study Group on Censorship, The Protection of Military Information: Report of the Study 
Group on Censorship (London: HMSO, 1983) 
 
The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State 
for Defence by Command of Her Majesty, Cmnd.8758. (London: HMSO, 1982) 
 
The Falklands Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, Cmnd.8787. 




The Falklands Campaign: A Digest of Debates in the House of Commons, 2 April to 15 








Hansard, HC Deb., 14 Dec. 1964, v.dcciv, cc.20-22. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 2 Apr. 1982, v.xxi, cc.571-577. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 7 Apr. 1982, v.xxi, cc.959-1052. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 8 Apr. 1982, v.xxi, cc.416-417. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 14 Apr. 1982, v.xxi, cc.1146-1208. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 21 Apr. 1982, v.xxii, cc.271-281. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 26 Apr. 1982, v.xxii, cc.609-617. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 4 May 1982, v.xxiii, cc.19-37. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 6 May 1982, v.xxiii, c.112.  
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 7 May 1982, v.xxiii, cc.395-403. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 11 May 1982, v.xxiii, cc.603-604. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 13 May 1982, v.xxiii, cc.952-1034. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 20 May 1982, v.xxiv, cc.477-561. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 24 May 1982, v.xxiv, cc.647-655. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 26 May 1982, v.xxiv, cc.921-931. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 10 Jun. 1982, v.xxv, cc.399-405. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 14 Jun. 1982, v.xxv, c.618. 
 
Hansard, HC Deb., 15 Jun. 1982, v.xxv, cc.729-741. 
 
House of Lords 
 
Hansard, HL Deb., 14 Apr. 1982, v.cdxxix, cc.289-374. 
 
Hansard, HL Deb., 29 Apr. 1982, v.cdxxix, cc.958-1036. 
 
Hansard, HL Deb., 4 May 1982, v.cdxxix, cc.1064-1080. 
 
Hansard, HL Deb., 14 May 1982, v.cdxxx, cc.413-415. 
 




Hansard, HL Deb., 24 May 1982, V.cdxxx, cc.967-74. 
 
Hansard, HL Deb., 10 Jun. 1982, v.cdxxxi, cc.307-314. 
 
The National Archives, Kew 
 
BA 19 - Treasury, and Civil Service Department: Management (Personnel) Division:  
  Personnel Management (MP and PM series) Files 
 
BA 19/672 -   Proposed Head of the Information Officer Group 
 
CAB 128 - Cabinet: Minutes (CM and CC Series) 
 
 CAB 128/73 -  Conclusions of Cabinet Meetings 1-30 (1982) 
 CAB 128/74 -  Conclusions of Cabinet Meetings 31-53 (1982) 
 
CAB 134 - Cabinet: Miscellaneous Committees: Minutes and Papers (General Series) 
 
 CAB 134/4636 -  Meeting of Chief Information Officers: papers 1-8 
 CAB 134/4637 -  Meeting of Chief Information Officers: papers 9-20 
 CAB 134/4638 -  Meeting of Chief Information Officers: papers 21-33 
 
CAB 148 - Cabinet Office: Defence and Oversea Policy Committees and Sub-Committees:  
       Minutes and Papers 
 
CAB 148/211 -  Defence and Oversea Policy Committee: Sub-Committee on 
the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands: papers 1-23 
CAB 148/212 - Defence and Oversea Policy Committee: Sub-Committee on 
the South Atlantic and the Falkland Islands: papers 24-71 
 
CAB 164 - Cabinet Office: Subject (Theme Series) Files 
 
CAB 164/1611 -  Falklands Presentation Unit: South Atlantic Presentation 
Unit  
CAB 164/1622 -  Anglo-Argentine dispute over the sovereignty of the 
Falkland Islands: meetings of Information Group 
 
FCO 7 - Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: American and Latin  
   American Departments: Registered Files 
 
FCO 7/4372 -  Falkland Islands: liaison between the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence 
FCO 7/4460 - Leaflets prepared for dropping on the Falkland Islands 
during the conflict 
FCO 7/4461 -  Falkland Islands conflict: press and media coverage 
FCO 7/4472 - Falklands Islands conflict: minutes of Chiefs of Staff 
meetings 




FCO 7/4474 -  Falklands Islands conflict: minutes of Chiefs of Staff 
meetings 
FCO 7/4475 -  Falklands Islands conflict: minutes of Chiefs of Staff 
meetings 
FCO 7/4476 -  Reactions of the British public to the Argentine presence on 
the Falkland Islands 
FCO 7/4477 - Reactions of the British public to the Argentine presence on 
the Falkland Islands 
FCO 7/4478 -  Reactions of the British public to the Argentine presence on 
the Falkland Islands 
FCO 7/4479 -  Reactions of the British public to the Argentine presence on 
the Falkland Islands 
FCO 7/4480 -  Reactions of the British public to the Argentine presence on 
the Falkland Islands 
FCO 7/4481 -  Reactions of the British public to the Argentine presence on 
the Falkland Islands 
FCO 7/4487 -   Falkland Islands crisis: United Nations involvement 
FCO 7/4490 -   Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands 
FCO 7/4494 -  Falkland Islands crisis: Ministerial statements to the press 
and Parliament 
FCO 7/4495 -  Falkland Islands crisis: Ministerial statements to the press 
and Parliament 
FCO 7/4496 -  Falkland Islands crisis: Ministerial statements to the press 
and Parliament 
FCO 7/4497 -  Falkland Islands crisis: Ministerial statements to the press 
and Parliament 
FCO 7/4498 -  Falkland Islands crisis: Ministerial statements to the press 
and Parliament 
FCO 7/4499 -  Recapture of the Falkland Islands by British forces: military 
options 
FCO 7/4502 -  Falkland Islands crisis: implications of a declaration of war 
against Argentina 
FCO 7/4522 -  Falkland Islands conflict: he sinking of the Argentine cruiser 
General Belgrano 
FCO 7/4529 -  Falkland Islands crisis: non-military co-operation between 
the UK and USA 
FCO 7/4530 -  Falkland Islands crisis: non-military co-operation between 
the UK and USA 
FCO 7/4531 -  Falkland Islands crisis: non-military co-operation between 
the UK and USA 
FCO 7/4532 -  Falkland Islands crisis: non-military co-operation between 
the UK and USA 
FCO 7/4533 -  Falkland Islands crisis: non-military co-operation between 
the UK and USA 
FCO 7/4534 -  Falkland Islands crisis: military co-operation between the 
UK and USA 
FCO 7/4635 -  Radio, telephone and telex communications with the 
Falkland Islands 
FCO 7/4636 -   BBC transmission to the Falkland Islands 
 357 
 
FCO 7/4610 -  Falkland Islands conflict: UK Task Force; military 
operations 
FCO 7/4644 -  Falkland Islands crisis: press reports, Parliamentary debates, 
Ministerial interviews 
FCO 7/4645 -  Falkland Islands crisis: press reports, Parliamentary debates, 
Ministerial interviews 
FCO 7/4646 -  Falkland Islands crisis: reports from the media with the UK 
Task Force 
 FCO 7/4647 -   Press requests to visit the Falkland Islands 
FCO 7/4765 -  %URDGFDVWLQJWRWKH)DONODQG,VODQGV%%&µ&DOOLQJWKH
)DONODQGV¶SURJUDPPH 
FCO 7/4910 -  Falkland Islands dispute between Argentina and the UK: 
media interest; television and newspapers 
 
INF 6 - Central Office of Information and Predecessors: Film Production Documents 
 
INF 6/2158 -   Pym interview, Negotiations, Falkland Island One, Islanders 
INF 12/1433 -  Enquiry by Sir Derek Rayner from the Cabinet Office on the 
effectiveness of government information work: Publications 
Division response 
 
PREM 19 - 5HFRUGVRIWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V2IILFH&RUUHVSRQGHQFHDQG3DSHUV- 
        1997 
 
PREM 19/617 -  ARGENTINA. The Falklands crisis: further diplomatic 
activity including the second visit of the United States 
Secretary of State to London; part 6 
PREM 19/624 -  ARGENTINA. The Falklands crisis: visit of the Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to New York; 
the Peruvian peace initiative; sinking of HMS Sheffield; 
continuing dialogue with the United States Secretary of 
State; part 13 
PREM 19/643 -  ARGENTINA. The handling of the Falklands crisis: briefs 
for the Prime Minister, intelligence summaries and general 
correspondence; part 1 
PREM 19/648 -  ARGENTINA. The handling of the Falklands crisis: briefs 
for the Prime Minister, intelligence summaries and general 
correspondence; part 6 
PREM 19/649 -  ARGENTINA. The handling of the Falklands crisis: briefs 
for the Prime Minister, intelligence summaries and general 
correspondence; part 7 
PREM 19/650 -  ARGENTINA. The handling of the Falklands crisis: briefs 
for the Prime Minister, intelligence summaries and general 
correspondence; part 8 
PREM 19/651 -  ARGENTINA. The handling of the Falklands crisis: briefs 
for the Prime Minister, intelligence summaries and general 
correspondence; part 9 
PREM 19/657 -  ARGENTINA. Falkland Islands Review Committee (chaired 




copied to the Committee; part 2 
PREM 19/663 -  BROADCASTING. BBC TV programme about handling of    
information by the Ministry of Defence and media during the 
)DONODQGVFULVLV3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶VGLUective that no Ministers 
or officials should take part 
PREM 19/664 -  BROADCASTING. Direct broadcasting by satellite; cable 
systems and broadcasting policy; part 1 
PREM 19/665 -  BROADCASTING. Direct broadcasting by satellite; cable 
systems and broadcasting policy; part 2 
 
Ministry of Defence 
 
DEFE 24 - Ministry of Defence: Defence Secretariat Branches and their Predecessors:  
Registered Files 
 
DEFE 24/2196 -  Falkland Islands ± Policy on PR and release of Information 
DEFE 24/2266 - The Future of the Royal United Service Institute 
 DEFE 24/2355 - Falkland Islands ± Operation Corporate 
 
DEFE 31 - Ministry of Defence ± Defence Intelligence Staff: Director General of  
Intelligence, later Chief of Defence Intelligence; Deputy Chief of Defence Staff 
(Intelligence); Directorate of Management and Support of Intelligence; and 
Defence Intelligence Staff Secretariat: Registered Files 
 
 DEFE 31/220 -  Falklands Crisis: the media and the public 
DEFE 31/221 -  Ministry of Defence notes on the House of Commons 
Defence Committee Inquiry 
 
Cambridge University, Churchill Archives  
 
The Thatcher Papers 
 
THCR 1 - 0DUJDUHW7KDWFKHU¶VSHUVRQDOILOLQJ 
 
THCR 1/20/3/2 -  Papers on the Falklands collected by Margaret Thatcher. 
1971-28 March 1982 
THCR 1/20/3/5 -  Papers on the Falklands collected by Margaret Thatcher, 6-
10 April 
THCR 1/20/3/6 -  Papers on the Falklands collected by Margaret Thatcher, 11-
12 April 
THCR 1/20/3/7 -  Papers on the Falklands collected by Margaret Thatcher, 13 ± 
17 April 
THCR 1/20/3/8 -  Papers on the Falklands collected by Margaret Thatcher, 17-
25 April 
THCR 1/20/3/9 -  Papers on the Falklands collected by Margaret Thatcher, 26 -
27 April 
THCR 1/20/3/13 -  Papers on the Falklands collected by Margaret Thatcher, 5-
19 May 1982 
 359 
 
THCR 1/20/3/15 -  Papers on the Falklands collected by Margaret Thatcher, 21-
24 May 1982 
THCR 1/20/3/17 -  Papers on the Falklands collected by Margaret Thatcher, 28 
May ± 2 June 1982 
THCR 1/20/3/18 -  Papers on the Falklands collected by Margaret Thatcher, 2-
13 June 
THCR 1/20/3/45 -  Original press digests etc., 15 January - 19 July 1982 
THCR 1/20/3/25 -  Papers on the Falklands collected by Margaret Thatcher, 25-
26 July and 4 & 25 August 1982 
THCR 1/20/3/52 -  Miscellaneous photographs relating to the Falklands War and 
subsequent campaign dinner in October 1982 
 
THCR 2 - Public and political correspondence and papers 
 
THCR 2/6/2/123 -  0DUJDUHW7KDWFKHU¶V2IILFHUPLVFHOODQHRXVSDSHUV0D\
1979-May 1983 
THCR 2/6/2/135 -  Papers relating to press, publicity and broadcasting (3), May 
1982 - May 1982 
 
THCR 3 - Prime Ministerial papers 
 
 THCR 3/5/14 -  Press Digests, March ± June 1982 
 
THCR 5 - Speeches and public statements 
 
THCR 5/2/83 -  3DSHUVUHODWLQJWR0DUJDUHW7KDWFKHU¶VWHOHYLVLRQDQGUDGLR
interviews on the occasion of the resignation of Lord Peter 
Carrington as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 5 April 
1982 
THCR 5/2/84 -  3DSHUVUHODWLQJWR0DUJDUHW7KDWFKHU¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWK5REHUW
.HHDQG5LFKDUG/LQGOH\IRU%%&7HOHYLVLRQ¶Vµ3DQRUDPD¶
26 April 1982  
 
THCR 6 - Engagements and visits 
 
THCR 6/2/2/43 -  Briefing files for domestic official visits and engagements as 
Prime Minister, April 1982 
 
The Ingham Papers 
 
INGH 2 - 3DSHUVUHODWLQJWR,QJKDP¶VUROHDV&KLHI3UHVV6HFUHWDU\WRWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU
1979-1990 
 
 INGH 2/1/2 -   The personal papers of Bernard Ingham 
 INGH 2/1/8 -   The personal papers of Bernard Ingham 
INGH 2/2/1 -   The personal papers of Bernard Ingham 
 INGH 2/2/10 -  The personal papers of Bernard Ingham 




INGH 3 - Correspondence, mostly maintained by Ingham from the time he was Chief 
Press Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1980-1994 
 
The Nott Papers 
 
NOTT 1 - Public and political papers 
 
 NOTT 1/2/1 -   Press cuttings about the Falklands 
 NOTT 1/2/6 -   Falklands articles 
 NOTT 1/2/7 -   Diary extracts with associated press cuttings 
 
NOTT 4 - Literary papers of Sir John Nott   
 
NOTT 4/6 -  Annotated typescript drafts and recollections on Defence and 
the Falklands 
 
&KXUFKLOO$UFKLYHV¶%ULWLVh Oral History Project 
 
Coles, J., Interview for the British Diplomatic Oral History Project, 2000, Churchill 
Archives, DOHP f.46/1. <www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Coles.pdf> 
 
Fearn, R., Interview for the British Diplomatic Oral History Project, 2002, Churchill 
Archives, DOHP f.75/1. <www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Fearn.pdf> 
 
Fenn, N., Interview for the British Diplomatic Oral History Project, 2010, Churchill 
Archives, DOHP f.126/1. <www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Fenn.pdf> 
 
Palliser, M., Interview for the British Diplomatic Oral History Project, 1999, Churchill 
Archives, DOHP f.37/1. <www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads /files/Palliser.pdf> 
 
Wade-Gery, R., Interview for the British Diplomatic Oral History Project, 2000, Churchill 
Archives, DOHP f.47/1. <www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Wade-Gery.pdf> 
 
Imperial War Museum  
 
Fleet Photographic Unit, HMS Excellent Collection, Imperial War Museum, Photograph 
Collection. 
 
Duffin, M., Private Papers Collection, Imperial War Museum, Documents f.5595.  
 
Russ, D., Private Papers Collection, Imperial War Museum, Documents f.23817. 
 
Imperial War Museum Interview Series 
 
Balfour, H., Interview for the IWM Collection, 5 Oct. 1994, Sound f.14596.  
 
Black, J., Interview for the IWM Collection, 13 Oct. 1993, Sound f.13445. 
 




Crosland, J., Interview for the IWM Collection, 7 Sep. 1995, Sound f.15742. 
 
Fox, R., Interview for the IWM Collection, 16 Feb. 1992, Sound f.12427. 
 
Larken, J., Interview for the IWM Collection, 17 Aug. 1993, Sound f.13304. 
 
Moore, J., Interview for IWM Collections, 14 Nov. 1988, Sound f.10482. 
 
Southby-Tailyour, E., Interview for IWM Collection, 13 Oct. 1992, Sound f.12787. 
 
.LQJV¶&ROOHJH/RQGRQLiddell Hart Centre for Military Archives 
 
The Cooper Collection 
 
Cooper 2 - 1980-UHODWLQJWR&RRSHU¶VVHUYLFHDV3HUPDQHQW8QGHU-Secretary of 
State, Ministry of Defence, 1976-1982, 1980-1992 
 
 Cooper 2/2/1-9 - Reports 1980-1984 
 Cooper 2/2/3 -  Review of Operational Requirements Procedures 
 
Cooper 3 - Correspondence 
 Cooper 3/1-3/5 -  Correspondence, 1976-1989 
 
Cooper 4 - Interview Transcripts, 1982-1998 
 
 Cooper 4/1/4 -  1998 Jun.- Aug.  
 
Audio and Visual Material 
 
Carr, R., Huddart, A. and Webb, J., Up the Falklands! Cartoons from the Royal Marines 
(Poole: Bladford Press, 1982) 
 
Ed. MacCreedy, D., Pictures from Far Away: A Photographic Record of the Falklands 
War, Taken by Members of the Task Force (London: Recycler Publishing & Events Ltd., 
2007) 
 
Kitson, L. The Falklands War: A Visual Diary (London: Imperial War Museum, 1982) 
 
µ&DQZH$YRLG:DU"¶µ3DQRUDPD¶BBC Television, 10 May 1982 
 
6QRZ3µ1HZVQLJKW¶BBC Television, 2 May 1982  
 
0DF*UHJRU6µ7KH5HXQLRQ3URJUDPPH+06Sheffield¶BBC Radio, BBC Four, 20 
Apr. 2012 
 




0F'RQDOGµ,DQ0F'RQDOGRQKLV-REDV0R'6SRNHVPDQ¶BBC Radio News, 2 Jun. 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0010500481005> 
 
µ$UJHQWLQHPHGLDFRYHUDJHRI)DONODQGVFRQIOLFW¶IRN, unknown date in 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0107a00011013> 
 
%UDFNOH\6µ6XH%UDFNOH\RQ)DONODQGVFDVXDOW\ UHSRUWLQJ¶IRN, 10 Jun. 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0011400033010> 
 
µ%ULWLVK&DSWXUHSI3RUW6WDQOH\± )LUVW-RXUQDOLVWLQ7RZQ¶IRN, 17 Jun. 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0011700016006> 
 
µ)DONODQGV:Dr ± %%&:RUOG6HUYLFH3URJUDPPH¶IRN, 7 Apr. 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0006400362001> 
 
µ)DONODQGV:DU± %ULWLVK)RUFHV%URDGFDVWLQJ6HUYLFH¶IRN, 24 Apr. 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0007700092015> 
 






µ)alklands War ± 5HDU$GPLUDOVSHDNV¶IRN, 5 Jul. 1982  
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvand radio/lbc/index.php/segment/0014000111005> 
 
µ*RYHUQPHQW6SOLWRQ)DONODQGV0HGLD&RYHUDJH¶IRN, unknown date in 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/ segment/0023300059024> 
 
µ/HRSROGR*DOWLHULRQ3UHVV&RYHUDJHRI)DONODQGV&RQIOLFW¶IRN, 13 May 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0009300025009> 
 
0F'RQDOG,µ,DQ0F'RQDOGRQDLU-VHDFODVKHVLQ)DONODQGV¶IRN, 8 Jun. 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0107a00011011> 
 
0F'RQDOG,µ,DQ0F'RQDOGRQ)DONODQGV&RQIOLFW¶IRN, 3 May 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0090a00106001> 
 
0F'RQDOG,µ,DQ0F'RQDOGRQKLV-REDV0R'6SRNHVPDQIRN, 2 Jun. 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0010500481005> 
 
0RRUH-µ)DONODQGV:DU(QGV± -HUHP\0RRUH3UHVV&RQIHUHQFH¶IRN, 16 Jun. 1982, 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0012800171006> 
 





1LFKROVRQ0µ0LFKDHO1LFKROVRQRQUHFDSWXUHLQ*RRVH*UHHQ¶IRN, 2 Jun. 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0010500481004> 
 
3DUNLQVRQµ&HFLO3DUNLQVRQRQ)DONODQGVSHDFHWDONV¶IRN, 18 May 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0009700108001>  
 
3DUNLQVRQ&µ&HFLO3DUNLQVRQRQ0DUJDUHW7KDWFKHU± )DONODQGVFULVLV¶IRN, 16 Jun. 
1982 <www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0011700016012>  
 
3DUNLQVRQ&µ&HFLO3DUNLQVRQRQ)DONODQGVSHDFHWDONV¶IRN, 18 May 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0009700108001> 
 
µ3ULQFH&KDUOHVRQ%%& coverage of Falklands confliFW¶, IRN, 15 May 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0009600065002> 
 
5RGJHUV%µ%LOO5RGJHUVRQ*RYHUQPHQW&ULWLFLVPRI%%&¶IRN, 12 May 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0009300025006> 
 
6DELGR.µ)DONODQGV:Dr ± 6DELGRLQEDWWOH¶IRN, unknown date in 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0119a00135008> 
 
6DELGR.µ)DONODQGV:DU± 6DELGRRQZDUH[SHULHQFH¶IRN, 23 Jun. 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0013900113008> 
 
6DELGR.µ)DONODQGV:DU± .LP6DELGRRQFULWLFLVPV¶IRN, 23 Jun. 1982 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0013900113009> 
 
6DELGR.µ.LP6DELGRRQUHSRUWLQJIURPWKH)DONODQGV¶IRN, 30 May 1982, 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0010700014015> 
 
6DELGR.µ.LP6DELGRRQUHSRUWLQJIURPWKH)DONODQGV¶IRN, 9 Jun. 1982, 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0010700014015> 
 
7KDWFKHU0µ)DONODQGV:DU± Thatcher on CasualWLHV¶IRN, 11 Jun. 1982, 
<www.bufvc.ac.uk/tvandradio/lbc/index.php/segment/0012800171008> 
 
Joint Information Systems Committee Media Hub 
 
µ)DONODQGV%OXII&RYH¶µ1HZVDW7HQ¶ITN, 24 Jun. 1982  
<www.jiscmediahub .ac.uk/record/display/039-00010280> 
 
µ)DONODQGV0HGLD&RYHUDJH¶µ1HZVDW7HQ¶ITN, 13 May 1982  
<www.jiscmedia hub.ac.uk/record/display/039-00010218> 
 
µ)DONODQGV1LFKROVRQ+RPH¶µ1HZVDW7HQ¶ITN, 26 Jun. 1982 
<www.jiscmediahub.ac.uk/record/display/03900010282> 
  





+DQGV-µ)DONODQGV&DQEHUUD¶µ1HZVDW7HQ¶ITN, 26 Apr. 1982  
<www.iscmedia hub.ac.uk/record/display/039-00010193> 
 
0F'RQDOG,µ)DONODQGV02'6WDWHPHQW¶µ1HZVDW7HQ¶ITN, 29 May 1982 
<www.jiscmediahub.ac.uk/record/display/039-00010233>  
 
0LOQH$µ)DONODQGV0LOQH¶µ1HZVDW7HQ¶ITN, 12 May 1982 
<www.jiscmediahub.ac.uk/record/display/039-00010216> 
 
1LFKROVRQ0µ)DONODQGV$LU$WWDFN¶µ1HZVDW7HQ¶ITN, 9 Jun. 1982  
<www.jisc mediahub.ac.uk/record/display/039-00010251> 
 









µ)DONODQGV0DULQHV*RYHUQRUKRPH¶µ1HZVDW7HQ¶ITN, 5 Apr. 1982, f.AS050482008. 
<www.itn source.com/shotlist/ITN/1982/04/05/AS050482008/?v=0> 
 
µ)DONODQGV0HGLD¶µ1HZVDW7HQ¶ITN, 16 Dec. 1982, f.AS161282006.  
<www.itn source.com/en/shotlist/ITN/1982/12/16/AS161282006/?s=Falklands%20media> 
 
µ)DONODQGV0HGLD&RYHUDJH¶µ1HZVDW7HQ¶ITN, 10 May 1982, f.AS100582007. 
<www.itnsource.com/en/shotlist/ITN/1982/05/10/AS100582007/?s=Falklands%20media> 
 
µ)DONODQGV0HGLD&RYHUDJH¶µ1HZVDW7HQ¶ITN, 13 May 1982, f.AS130582005. 
<www. itnsource.com/en/shotlist/ITN/1982/05/13/AS130582005/?s=Falklands%20media> 
 




ITN, 22 Apr. 1982, f.AS220482014. 
<www.itnsource.com/en/shotlist/ITN/1982/04/22/AS220482014/?s=Falklands%20media> 
 
5HHFH1µ)DONODQGV$UJHQWLQH7URRSV¶µ/DWH(YHQLQJ1HZV¶ITN, 6 Jun. 1982 
<www.itnsource.com/en/shotlist/ITN/1982/06/06/AS060682002/?s=Falklands> 
 













Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) 
 
Voting Intentions 1979 ± 1983 <www.ukpollingreport.co.uk/voting-intention-1979-1983> 
 









News of the World 
Sunday Express 
Sunday Mirror 




The Sunday Telegraph 











(OOLVRQ-µ2YHUNLOOLQWKHZDURIZDUGV¶Daily Express, 3 May 1982, p.6. 
 
(YDQV0µ75$*('<2)6,5*$/$+$'¶Daily Express, 10 Jun. 1982, p.1.  
 
Evans, M., µ:KRVHILQJHURQWKHWULJJHU"¶ Daily Express, 24 Apr. 1982, p.2. 
 
*DWHV-µ$QDUPFKDLUJXLGHWRDUPFKDLUVWUDWHJLVWV¶Daily Express, 10 May 1982, pp.6-7. 
 
+DVWLQJV0µ,JRLQZLWKWKH%ULWLVKGDUHGHYLOV¶Daily Express, 3 Jun. 1982, p.3. 
 
+DVWLQJV0µ7KHGHIHDWHGKDYHWLPHIRUUHJUHW¶Daily Express, 17 Jun. 1982, pp.2-3. 
 
Hastings, M., µ7KHVZRUGDQGWKHSHQ¶Daily Express, 22 May 1982, p.4. 
 
+DVWLQJV0µ:K\QRQHRIXVFDQEHQHXWUDOLQWKLVZDU¶Daily Express, 8 Jun. 1982, p.1. 
 
7D\ORU$µ0DJJLHKLWVDW%%&¶VFULVLVFRYHUDJH¶Daily Express, 7 May 1982, p.3. 
 




Bond, :µ:HGRQ¶WEHDWMLQJRGUXP¶, Daily Mail, 12 May 1982, p.4. 
 
µ'HDWKRIWKH%HOJUDQR¶Daily Mail, 15 May 1982, p.1. 
 
(GLWRULDOµ5HPHPEHUWKH6LOHQW6HUYLFH¶Daily Mail, 30 Apr. 1982, p.6. 
 
(OOLRWW+µ',6$67(5$7%/8))&29(¶Daily Mail, 10 Jun. 1982, p.1. 
 




µ$-VXEVJRRQDOHUWWRSURWHFW)DONODQGV¶Daily Mirror, 31 Mar. 1982, p.2. 
 
µ&KDLUPDQ*HRUJHGHILHV%%&FULWLFV¶Daily Mirror, 14 May 1982, p.13. 
 
&RQQHZ3µ%,**(67/,(2)7+(:$5¶Daily Mirror, 1 Jun. 1982, p.3. 
 
'RZGQH\0µ%%&&KLHIIDFHV03¶VEODVW¶Daily Mirror, 13 May 1982, p.2. 
 
'RZGQH\0µ3<0$77$&.6%%&¶Daily Mirror, 11 May 1982, p.1. 
 










families ZDLWLQJIRUQHZV¶Daily Mirror, 6 May 1982, p.1. 
 
+DVWLQJV0µ0DUYHOORXV7KHZHOFRPHIURPDMXELODQWSULHVW¶Daily Mirror, 16 Jun. 
1982, p.2. 
 
+DVWLQJV0µ0DVVRIPHQDQGZHDSRQV¶Daily Mirror, 3 Jun. 1982, p.2. 
 
.LQJVOH\+µ0HQIURPWKH0LQLVWU\DUHEDGQHZV¶Daily Mirror, 29 May 1982, p.13. 
 
0F4XHHQ$µ7KHVWRULHVZHFDQQRWWHOO¶Daily Mirror, 14 May 1982, p.2. 
 
µ1DY\SD\FXWURZKRWVXS¶Daily Mirror, 20 Apr. 1982, p.2. 
 
µ1RZ,DQVSHDNVIRUKLPVHOI¶Daily Mirror, 24 May 1982, p.13. 
 
3ODLFH(µµ:HZLOOPLVOHDG\RXZKHQQHFHVVDU\¶¶Daily Mirror, 19 May 1982, p.2. 
 
µ6PLOHIRUFDPHUDµ0U1HZV¶LVWROG¶Daily Express, 14 May 1982, p.2. 
 
µ6RIWHQ\RXULPDJH0DF¶Daily Mirror, 14 May 1982, p.3. 
 
µ7KDWFKHUVODPV%%&¶Daily Mirror, 12 May 1982, p.3. 
 
µ7+(+$5/272))/((767¶Daily Mirror, 8 May 1982, p.2. 
 
µ7KH+HDUWWKURERIWKH0R'¶Daily Mirror, 12 May 1982, p.13. 
 
µ7KHNLOOLQJKDVWRVWRS¶Daily Mirror, 6 May 1982, p.3. 
 
7RU\3µ79¶V1DY\PDQLVDOODWVHD¶Daily Mirror, 13 May 1982, p.13. 
 
:DUGHQ:µ)DONODQG)LDVFR¶Daily Mirror, 31 Mar. 1982, p.1.  
 
:DWHUKRXVH.µ$GLHWRIULFKGDPSFDNH¶Daily Mirror, 31 May 1982, p.10. 
 
:DWHUKRXVH.µ.LFNLQJWKH0HVVHQJHU¶Daily Mirror, 13 May 1982, p.10. 
 





Daily Star, 28 Apr. 1982, p.11. 
 








+DVWLQJV0µ),5670$1,167$1/(<¶Evening Standard, 15 Jun. 1982, p.1. 
 
News of the World 
 




+DVWLQJV0µ+2:7+(6$60$'(,7¶Sunday Express, 6 Jun. 1982, p.2. 
 
µ2XUWURRSVJRVZHHSLQJRQ¶Sunday Express, 23 May 1982, p.1. 
 




µ'HDU0XP¶Sunday Mirror, 16 May 1982, p.1. 
 
%DUNHUµ6:$/.¶Sunday Mirror, 2 May 1982, p.5. 
 
The Daily Telegraph 
 
%DOO,µ86µ%$))/('%<%5,7,6+5(7,&(1&($1'-817$/,(6¶¶The Daily 
Telegraph, 5 May 1982, p.5. 
 
µ%%&$&&86('µ)LIWKFROXPQ¶The Daily Telegraph, 10 May 1982, p.4. 
 
%%&&+,()72)$&(725<03V¶The Daily Telegraph, 12 May 1982, p.1. 
 
µ&$%,1(75(%8.()25$'0,5$/¶The Daily Telegraph, 30 Apr. 1982, p.11. 
 
&ODUNH.µ+(,*+762))$17$6<¶The Daily Telegraph, 15 May 1982, p.34. 
 
&RPIRUW1µ7RU\DQJHUDW%%&¶The Daily Telegraph, 13 May 1982, p.1. 
 
&RQ\HUV7µ865(3257(572/'7+$7+$0/(7+$'$:25')25,7¶The 
Daily Telegraph, 3 May 1982, p.4. 
 
Day-/HZLV6µ3,&785(6:,//%(63(('('¶The Daily Telegraph, 14 May 1982, 
p.4.  
 
Day-/HZLV6µ7KDWFKHUFULWLFRI79DQGUDGLRFRYHUDJH¶The Daily Telegraph, 7 May 
1982, p.4. 
 




)XUVGRQ(µ:+,7(+$//:$,76,16,/(1&(¶The Daily Telegraph, 28 Apr. 1982, 
p.1. 
 
*HG\H5µ',67257('1(:6,1$5*(17,1$¶The Daily Telegraph, 12 May 1982, 
p.4. 
 
µ,19,1&,%/(3$<&87µ$77$&.('¶¶The Daily Telegraph, 19 Apr. 1982, p.4. 
 
0F,OUR\$µ&21&(51$71(:6'(/$<¶The Daily Telegraph, 11 May 1982, p.28. 
 
1XUVH.µ%%&µ1($57275($621¶6$<603¶The Daily Telegraph , 4 May 1982, 
p.1. 
 
µ3$5/,$0(17$1':$5¶The Daily Telegraph, 19 May 1982, p.16. 
 
µ35,621(5',(6,1µ,1&,'(17¶¶The Daily Telegraph, 29 Apr. 1982, p.1. 
 
µ7DFWLFDOHYDVLRQV¶The Daily Telegraph, 21 May 1982, p.22. 
 




Black, ,µ,QTXLU\LQWR$UJHQWLQH¶VGHDWK¶The Guardian, 29 Apr. 1982, p.26. 
 
%URZQ&µ%%&)DONODQGVFRYHUDJHDWWDFNHGE\7RU\03V¶The Guardian, 11 May 
1982, p.1. 
 
)DLUKDOO'µ7KHQH[WURXQGZRQ¶WEHSODLQVDLOLQJ¶The Guardian, 28 Apr. 1982, p.13. 
 
+DVWLQJV0µ/HDUQLQJWKHOHWKDOOHVVRQVRIPRGHUQZDU¶The Guardian, 2 Jun. 1982, p.3. 
 
+DVWLQJV0µ3ULGHUHVWRUHGDWDKLJKSULFH¶The Guardian, 16 Jun. 1982, p.3. 
 
+DVWLQJV0µ7DFWLFVDQGOXFNSD\RII¶The Guardian, 15 Jun. 1982, p.2. 
 
LangdoQ-µ7RU\ZDUDQJHUILQGVDWDUJHW¶The Guardian, 13 May 1982, p.4. 
 
:KLWH0µ$VHFRQGELWHDQGFHUWDLQFDOPQHVV¶The Guardian, 6 May 1982, p.2. 
 





:LOVRQ$µ+RZWRXVHWKHQHZV¶The Observer, 30 May 1982, p.5. 
 






$NDVV-µ*/$5,1*(55256¶The Sun, 5 May 1982, p.6. 
 
$NDVV-µ:+<7+(0<67(5<"¶The Sun, 26 Apr. 1982, p.6. 
 
µ'($'25$/,9(¶The Sun, 6 May 1982, p.5. 
 
(GLWRULDOµ'DUHFDOOLWWUHDVRQ¶The Sun, 7 May 1982, p.6. 
 
(GLWRULDOµ6DFNWKH*XLOW\0HQ¶The Sun, 3 Apr. 1982, p.6. 
 
(YDQV&µ790(1µ75($7,1*$5*,(6$6(48$/6¶¶The Sun, 7 May 1982, p.4. 
 
µ)RUFHV/RYHOLQHV¶The Sun, 1 Jun. 1982, p.20. 
 
µ*RWFKD¶The Sun, 3 May 1982, p.1. 
 
.HQQHG\3µ2KEDE\-XVWORRNDW79¶VODWHVWVWDUQRZ¶The Sun, 25 May 1982, p.7. 
 
Snow, T.µ,+8177+((1(0<:,7+$1'<¶7KHSun, 10 Apr. 1982, p.2. 
 
µ67,&.,783<285-817$¶The Sun, 20 Apr. 1982, p.1. 
 
µ7UHDVRQ03ODVKHV79PDQ¶The Sun, 4 May 1982, p.14. 
 
µ'($'¶The Sun, 11 Jun. 1982, p.1. 
 
The Sunday Telegraph 
 
(GLWRULDOµ)LUVWWKLQJVILUVW¶The Sunday Telegraph, 6 Jun. 1982, p.16. 
 
:DOOHU,µ7KHGD\WKDWWKH%%&FDPHXQGHUILUH¶The Sunday Telegraph, 16 May 1982, 
p.4. 
 
The Sunday Times 
 
Connell, J., µ)LIWHHQPLVVLOHVVLQNWKHIULJDWH$UGHQW± WZHQW\IHDUHGGHDG¶The Sunday 
Times, 23 May 1982, p.1. 
 
'DYLHV5µ,GHQWLW\FULVLV¶The Sunday Times, 2 May 1982, p.3. 
 
(GLWRULDOµ)DONODQGV&DQZHKROGEDFN"¶The Sunday Times, 16 May 1982, p.14. 
 
)UHHPDQ6DQG.QLJKWOH\3µ0DMRULW\EDFNWKH%%&OLQH¶The Sunday Times, 16 May 
1982, p.1. 
 




µ6WRSNQRFNLQJWKH%%&¶The Sunday Times, 6 May 1982, p.16. 
 




µ$UJHQWLQHSULVRQHUGLHVLQµLQFLGHQW¶¶The Times, 29 Apr. 1982, p.1. 
 
Bermant, C., Letter, The Times, 14 May 1982, p.11. 
 
%HYLQV$µ%%&PHQJULOOHGE\7RU\03V¶The Times, 13 May 1982, p.1. 
 




QHZVSDSHUVDQGILOP¶The Times, 30 Sep. 1975, p.12. 
 
%LUW-DQG-D\3µ7KHUDGLFDOFKDQJHVQHHGHGWRUHPHG\79¶VELDVDJDLQVW
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶The Times, 1 Oct. 1975, p.14. 
 
%LVKRS3DQG:LWKHURZ-µ<RPSLQJKDFNLQJSURIILQJ¶The Times, 4 Sep. 1982, p.8. 
 
µ%ULWLVKVXERQWKHPRYH¶The Times, 31 Mar. 1982, p.1. 
 
%XWW5µ3HDFHPRQJHUVDWDQ\SULFH¶The Times, 13 May 1982, p.12. 
 
µ&RPPRQVDWWDFNRQ%%&¶The Times, 11 May 1982, p.6. 
 
&URVV'µ/RQGRQ1HZVSUHVHQWHUZLWKDVWULFWEULHI¶The Times, 6 May 1982, p.2. 
 
Downie, N., Letter, The Times, 11 May 1982, p.13. 
 
(GLWRULDOµ$'87<72,1)250¶The Times, 13 May 1982, p.13. 
 
EdLWRULDOµ1$.('$**5(66,21¶The Times, 3 Apr. 1982, p.7. 
 
(GLWRULDOµ3$125$0$¶6%/,1'6327¶The Times, 15 May 1982, p.11. 
 
(GLWRULDOµ:($5($//)$/./$1'(5612:¶The Times, 5 Apr. 1982, p.9. 
 
(PHU\)µµ.LW¶DQGµPLQGHUV¶GLFWDWHIORZRIQHZVIURPWKHIURQW¶The Times, 10 Jun. 
1982, p.6. 
 
µ)LUVWIRRWDJHRIODQGLQJVKRZQ¶The Times, 9 Jun. 1982, p.6. 
 




*RVOLQJ.µ0LQLVWU\DFFXVHGRIVHULRXVIDLOXUH¶The Times, 27 May 1982, p.3. 
 
Greenhill, D., Letter, The Times, 14 May 1982, p.11. 
 
+DVWLQJV0µ:K\,¶PSURXGWRWDNH%ULWDLQ¶VVLGH¶The Times, 9 Jun. 1982, p.10. 
 
+RUVQHOO0µ3DQRUDPDDWWDFNHGE\RZQSUHVHQWHU¶The Times, 14 May 1982, p.1. 
 
Jenkins, S., Letter, The Times, 15 May 1982, p.11. 
 
-HQNLQV6µ:KHQVROGLHUVSOD\MRXUQDOLVWVDQGMRXUQDOLVWVSOD\DWVROGLHUV¶The Times, 10 
May 1982, p.8. 
 
-RKQVRQ)µ7KHKDUGVKLSVRIZDULQWKH&RPPRQVWUHQFKHV¶The Times, 27 May 1982, 
p.28. 
 
Kee, R.µµ3DQRUDPD¶DQGWKH)DONODQGVZDVWKHEDODQFHULJKW¶ The Times, 14 May 1982, 
p.11. 
 
0F&XOOLQ'µ:DUFRYHUDJH¶The Times, 17 Jun. 1982, p.13. 
 
Mott-Radclyffe, C., Letter, The Times, 15 May 1982, p.11. 
 
Nicholson-LoUG'µ0LQLVWU\ZDNHVXSWRSURSDJDQGDZDU¶The Times, 14 May 1982, 
p.7. 
 
1R\HV+µ1RWWKLQWVDWSDXVHLQDFWLRQ¶The Times, 6 May 1982, p.1. 
 
1R\HV+DQG:HEVWHU3µ&DVXDOWLHVFRXOGEHDVKLJKDV¶The Times, 5 May 1982, 
p.1. 
 
Page, J., Letter, The Times, 11 May 1982, p.13. 
 
µ3$5/,$0(17¶65(63216,%,/,7<¶The Times, 30 Apr. 1982, p.11. 
 
Snow, P., Letter, The Times, 8 May 1982, p.9. 
 
6WDQKRSH+µ'HIHQFHVWDWLRQVDOHUWIRUIOHHW¶The Times, 24 Apr. 1982, p.1. 
 
7D\ORU'µ%%&EURDGFDVWVMDPPHG¶7KHTimes, 4 May 1982, p.2. 
 
Timms, E., Letter, The Times, 14 May 1982, p.11. 
 
µ7ULEXWHWRSUHVV¶The Times, 27 May 1982, p.3.  
 
:LWKHURZ-µ&XWLQDOORZDQFHOHDYHVVRXUWDVWHDPRQJVHDPHQ¶The Times, 19 Apr. 
1982, p.4. 
 




:LWKHURZ-µ,QYLQFLEOHFOHDUVGHFNVIRUEDWWOH¶The Times, 23 Apr. 1982, p.8. 
 











New York Times 
 
Rattner, S., µ86+DQGOLQJRI)DONODQG&ULVLV6WLUV'HHS5HVHQWPHQWLQ%ULWDLQ¶New York 




'RZQLH/µ+RZ%ULWDLQ0DQDJHGWKH1HZV7KH1HZV%XVLQHVV¶Washington Post, 20 
Aug. 1982, p.6. 
 
Washington Post )RUHLJQ6HUYLFHµIf it Ever Comes to Shooting, Britain sees U.S. as its 
$OO\¶Washington Post, 17 Apr. 1982, p.15. 
 
Interviews Conducted by the Author 
 
Band, J., Interview with the author, Portsmouth, 20 Feb. 2014 
 
Bennett, A., Interview with the author, Dorset, 11 Feb. 2014 
 
Benest, D., Interview with the author, Wiltshire, 3 Jun. 2014 
 
Bryant, B., Interview with the author, Tunbridge Wells, 24 Jan. 2014 
 
Butler, N., Interview with the author, Tunbridge Wells, 24 Jan. 2014 
 
Clapp, M., Interview with the author, Broadhempston, 20 Mar. 2014 
 
Devonshire, R., Interview with the author, Portsmouth, 22 Aug. 2013 
 
Dunt, P., Interview with the author, Guildford, 5 Mar. 2014 
 
Hall, N. Interview with the author, Worthing, 6 Oct. 2013 
 




Parkinson, C., Interview with the author, Potters Bar, 1 Dec. 2014 
 
Phillips, L. Interview with the author, Northwood, 15 Apr. 2014 
 
Reed, M., Interview with the author, Thornton [telephone] 1 Apr. 2014 
 
Sanders, J., Interview with the author, Okehampton, 10 Feb. 2014 
 
Shickle, I., Interview with the author, [telephone] 26 Aug. 2013 
 
Stanhope, H., Interview with the author, Swansea, 21 Aug. 2013 
 
Thompson, J., Interview with the author, Putney, 14 Mar. 2014 
 
Walhen, T., Interview with the author, [telephone] 26 Aug. 2013 
 




Arthur, M., Above all Courage: The Falklands Front Line: First Hand Accounts (London: 
Sidgwick & Jackson, 1985)  
 
Barker, N., Beyond Endurance: An Epic of Whitehall and the South Atlantic (London: Leo 
Cooper, 1997) 
 
%LVKRS3µ5HSRUWLQJWKH)DONODQGV¶Index on Censorship, 11, 6 (1982) pp.6-8. 
 
%UXFH,µ)URQWOLQH0HPRULHV<HDUVDIWHUWKH)DONODQGV¶The Herald, 3 Apr. 2007 
<www.heraldscotland.com/frontline-memories-25-years-after-the-falklands-1.839798> 
[Accessed 11 Dec. 2011] 
 
Bruce, I., µIan Bruce recalls his yomp across the Falklands while reporting on the war 20 
years ago A damned close-UXQVNLUPLVK¶The Herald, 3 Apr. 2002 
<www.heraldscotland.com/SPORT/SPL/ABERDEEN/IAN-BRUCE-RECALLS-HIS-
YOMP-ACROSS-THE-FALKLANDS-WHILE-REPORTING-ON-THE-WAR-20-
YEARS-AGO-A-DAMNED-CLOSE-RUN-SKIRMISH-1.154200> [Accessed 11 Dec. 
2011] 
 
Carrington, P., Reflect on Things Past: The Memoirs of Lord Carrington (London: Colins, 
1988) 
 
Clapp, M. and Southerby-Tailyour, E., Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle over San 
Carlos Water (London: Orion, 1997) 
 
Dalyell, T., 2QH0DQ
V)DONODQGV« (London: Cecil Woolf, 1982) 
 





)R[5DQG+DQUDKDQ%µI Counted them all out and I Counted them all Back': The 
Battle for the Falklands (London: BBC Books, 1982) 
 
Hart Dyke, D., Four Weeks in May: A Captain's Story of War at Sea (London: Atlantic 
Books, 2008) 
 
Hastings, M., Going to the Wars (London: Macmillan, 2000) 
 
Hastings, M. and Jenkins, S., The Battle for the Falklands (London: Joseph, 1983) 
 
+XGVRQ'µ0\9R\DJHWR:DU«IURP&DELQ$RQWKH&DQEHUUDWR'-Day in the 
)DONODQGV¶Yorkshire Post, 9 Apr. 2007, 
<www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/news/features/my_voyage_to_war_from_cabin_a86_on_the_ca
nberra_to_d_day_in_the_falklands_1_2451734> [Accessed 11 Dec. 2011] 
 
Hunt, R., My Falkland Days (London: David & Charles, 1992) 
 
Ingham, B., Kill the Messenger (London: Fontana, 1991) 
 
,QJKDP%µ0\OLIHZLWKWKHOLRQHVV0DUJDUHW7KDWFKHU¶The Daily Telegraph, 9 Apr. 
2013 < www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/margaret-thatcher/9982167/My-life-with-the-
lioness-Margaret-Thatcher.html> [Accessed 9 Apr. 2013] 
 
Jolly, R., The Red and Green Life Machine: A Diary of the Falklands Field Hospital and 
Aftermath of the 1982 South Atlantic Conflict with Argentina (Cornwall: Red & Green 
Books, 2007) 
 
Lawrence, J., Lawrence, R. and Price, C., When the Fighting is Over: A Personal Story of 
the Battle for Tumbledown Mountain and its Aftermath (London: Bloomsbury, 1988) 
 
Lukowiak, K., A Soldier's Song: True Stories from the Falklands (London: Secker & 
Warburg, 1993) 
 
0DWKHU,µ,ZHQWDVD5HSRUWHUEXWHQGHGXSD3ULVRQHURI:DU¶The Observer, 1 Apr. 
2007 <www.theguardian.com/media/2007/apr/01/pressandpublishing.business> [Accessed 
12 Dec. 2011] 
 
McGowan, R. and Hands, J., 'RQ¶W&U\IRU0H6HUJHDQW0DMRU$8QLTXHPortrait of the 
Falklands War ± from the Sharp End (London: Futura, 1983) 
 
0RRUH-µ7KH)DONODQGV:DU$&RPPDQGHU¶V9LHZRIWKH'HIHQFH0HGLD,QWHUIDFH¶LQ
Ed. Young, P., Defence and the Media in Time of Limited War (London: Routledge, 1992) 
 
NicholsoQ0µ$'D\RI([WUDRUGLQDU\+HURLVP¶The Daily Telegraph, 13 Apr. 2007 
<www.telegraph.co.uk/news/features/3632095/A-day-of-extraordinary-heroism.html> 








Connection (London: Discovered Authors Diamonds, 2007) 
 
Nott, J., Here Today, Gone Tomorrow: Recollections of an Errant Politician (London: 
Politicos, 2002) 
 
Parkinson, C. Right at the Centre (London: George Weidenfeld & Nicholson Ltd., 1992) 
 
3DUVRQV$µ7KH)DONODQGV&ULVLVLQWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV0DUFK--XQH¶
International Affairs, 59, 2 (1983) pp.169-178. 
 
Pym, F., The Politics of Consent (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1984) 
 
Southerby-Tailyour, E., Reasons in Writing: A Commando's View of the Falklands War 
(Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 1993) 
 
Thatcher, M., The Downing Street Years (London: HarperCollins, 1993) 
 
Thompson, J., 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands: No Picnic (London: Pen & Sword, 
2007) 
 
Tinker, D., A Message from the Falklands: The Life and Gallant Death of David Tinker, 
RN, from his Letters and Poems (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982) 
 
Woodward, J., One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group 




Adams, V., The Media and the Falklands Campaign (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986) 
 
Eds. Allan, S. and Zelizer, B., Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime (London: Routledge, 
2004) 
 
Eds. Allen, T. and Seaton, J., The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations 
of Ethnic Violence (London: Zed Books, 1999) 
 
$QGHUVRQ.DQG-DFN'µ/HDUQLQJWR/LVWHQ,QWHUYLHZ7HFKQLTXHVDQG$QDO\VHV¶LQ
Eds. Perks, R. and Thomson, A., The Oral History Reader (Oxford: Routledge, 1998) 
 
Aullich, J., Framing the Falklands War: Nationhood, Culture and Identity (Buckingham: 
Open University Press, 1992) 
 





The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years on: Lessons for the Future (Oxford: Frank Cass, 
2005) 
 
Eds. Bates, M., Lichty, L., Miles, P., Spector, R. and Young, M., Reporting Vietnam: 
American Journalism 1959-1969 (New York: The Library of America, 1998) 
 
Berelson, B., Content Analysis in Communications Research (New York: Hafner, 1954) 
 
Bicheno, H., Razor's Edge: The Unofficial History of the Falklands War (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006) 
 
Bishop, P. and Witherow, J., The Winter War: The Falklands (London: Quartet, 1982) 
 
Black, J. and MacRaild, D. D., Studying History (London: Palgrave, 2000) 
 
Blakeway, D., The Falklands War (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1992) 
 
Boyce, D. G., The Falklands War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 
 
Eds. Boyce, G., Curran, J. and Wingate, P., Newspaper History from the Seventeenth 
Century to the Present Day (London: Constable, 1978) 
 
Boyd, A., Stewart, P. and Alexander, R., Broadcast Journalism: Techniques of Radio and 
Television News (London: Taylor & Francis, 2012) 
 
Bullen, R., The Foreign Office 1782-1982 (Maryland: Fredrick University Publications of 
America, 1984) 
 
Burch, M. and Holliday, I., The British Cabinet System (Hertfordshire: Prentice Hall, 1996) 
 
Carruthers, S., The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) 
 
Cawkell, M., The History of the Falkland Islands (Oswestry: Anthony Nelson, 2001) 
 
Chantler, P. and Stewart, P., Essential Radio Journalism: How to Produce and Present 
Radio News (London: Methuen Drama, 2009) 
 
Charlton, M., The Little Platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands Dispute (London: 
Blackwell, 1989) 
 
Charlton, T., Myers, L. and Sharpless, R., History of Oral History: Foundations and 
Methodology (Plymouth: AltaMira Press, 2007) 
 
Cockerell, M., Live from Number 10: The Inside Story of Prime Ministers and Television 




Cockerell, M., Hennessy, P. and Walker, D., Sources Close to the Prime Minister: Inside 
the Hidden World of the News Manipulators (London: Macmillan, 1985) 
 
Cohen, Y., Media Diplomacy: The Foreign Office in the Mass Communications Age 
(Oxford: Frank Cass, 1986)  
 
Colbeck, G., With 3 Para to the Falklands (London: Greenhill Books, 2002) 
 
Conboy, M., Tabloid Britain: Constructing a Community through Language (London: 
Routledge, 2006) 
 
Conboy, M., The Language of the News (London: Routledge, 2007) 
 
Eds. Connelly, M. and Welch, D., War and the Media: Reportage and Propaganda, 1900-
2003 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005) 
 
Cultice, W. W., Thatcher Government Censorship of British News Media in the Falkland 
Islands Campaign: A Model for Future United States Military Employments?, Air War 
College Research Report (Alabama: Maxwell Air Force Base, May 1990)  
 
Curran, J. and Seaton, J., Power without Responsibility: The Press, Broadcasting and New 
Media in Britain (London: Routledge, 1988) 
 
Curtis, L., Ireland: The Propaganda :DU7KH%ULWLVK0HGLDDQGWKHµ%DWWOHIRU+HDUWV
DQG0LQGV¶ (London: Pluto, 1984) 
 
Ed. Dale, I., Memories of the Falklands /RQGRQ3ROLWLFR¶V 
 
Eds. Dale, I. and Tucker, G., The Margaret Thatcher Book of Quotations (London: 
Biteback, 2012) 
 
Darling, K., RAF Strike Command 1968-2007: Aircraft, Men and Action (Barnsley: Pen & 
Sword Aviation, 2012) 
 
de la Billiere, Call for Fire: Sea Combat in the Falklands and the Gulf War  (London: John 
Murray Publishers, 1995) 
 
Eds. Dennis, P. and Grey, J., The Military, the Media and Information Warfare (Canberra: 
Army History Unit, 2009)  
 
Dickie, J., Inside the Foreign Office /RQGRQ&KDSPDQ¶V 
 
Eds. Dobson, M. and Ziemann, B., Reading Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Texts 
from Nineteenth and Twentieth Century History (Oxon: Routledge, 2009) 
 
'RGGV.µ&RQWHVWLQJ:DU%ULWLVK0HGLD5HSRUWLQJDQGWKH6RXWK$WODQWLF:DU¶LQ
Eds. Connelly, M. and Welch, D., War and the Media: Reportage and Propaganda, 1900-




Dodds, K., Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002) 
 
Dollar, C. M. and Jensen, R. J., +LVWRULDQ¶V*XLGHWR6WDWLVWLFV4XDQWLWDWLYH$QDO\VLVDQG
Historical Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971) 
 
Eds. Eddy, P., Linklater, M. and Gillman, P., 7KH)DONODQGV:DU7KH)XOO6WRU\E\µ7KH
6XQGD\7LPHV¶,QVLJKW7HDP (London: Andre Deutsch, 1982)  
 
Evans, R., In Defence of History (London: Granta Books, 1997) 
 
Ferns, H. S., Britain and Argentina in the 19th Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960) 
 
Ed. Finberg, H., Approaches to History: A Symposium (London: Routledge, 1965) 
 
Finlan, A., The Royal Navy in the Falklands Conflict and the Gulf War: Culture and 
Strategy (London: Routledge, 2004) 
 
)RVWHU.µ7KH)DONODQGV:DU$&ULWLFDO9LHZRI,QIRUPDWLRQ3ROLF\¶LQ(G<RXQJ3
Defence and the Media in Time of Limited War (London: Routledge, 1992) 
 
Fox, J. and Welch, D., 'Justifying War: Propaganda, Politics and the Modern Age', in Eds. 
Welch, D and Fox, J., Justifying War: Propaganda, Politics and the Modern Age 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.1-20. 
 
Franck, T. and Weisband, E., Secrecy and Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1954) 
 
Freedman, L., Britain and the Falklands War (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988) 
 
Freedman, L., The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: The Origins of the 
Falklands War, v.i. (London: Taylor & Francis, 2005) 
 
Freedman, L., The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: War and Diplomacy, v.ii. 
(London: Taylor & Francis, 2005) 
 
Freedman, L. and Gamba-Stonehouse, V., Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982 
(London: Faber, 1990) 
 
Geller, V., Creating Powerful Radio: Getting, Keeping and Growing Audiences News, 
Talk, Information and Personality Broadcast (London: Taylor & Francis, 2009) 
 
Eds. Gillespie, M. and Toynbee, J., Analysing Media Texts (Berkshire: Open University 
Press, 2006) 
 
Glasgow University Media Group: Broadbent, L., Eldridge, J., Kimmett, G., Philo, G., 





Glasgow University Media Group: Eds. Eldridge, J. and Philo, G., Glasgow Media Group 
Reader Volume I: News Content, Language and Visuals (London: Routledge, 1995) 
 
Ed. Glover, S., The Penguin Book of Journalism: Secrets of the Press (London: Penguin, 
2000) 
 
Gorst, A. and Johnman, L., The Suez Crisis (London: Routledge, 1997) 
 
Green, A. and Troup, K., The Houses of History: A Critical Reader in Twentieth-Century 
History and Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999) 
 
*UHHQEHUJ6DQG6PLWK*µ5HMRLFH¶0HGLD)UHHGRPDQGWKH)DONODQGV (London: 
Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, 1983) 
 
Halliday, J. and Cummings, B., Korea: The Unknown War (London: Viking, 1988) 
 
Hallin, D., 7KHµ8QFHQVRUHG:DU¶7KH0HGLDDQG9LHWQDP (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986) 
 
Eds. Hampl, P. and Tyler May, E., Tell Me True: Memoir, History, and Writing a Life 
(Minnesota: Borealis Books, 2008) 
 
Hanusch, F., Representing Death in the News: Journalism, Media and Mortality 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 
 
Harris, R., Good and Faithful Servant: The Unauthorized Biography of Bernard Ingham 





Hartley, J., Understanding News (London: Methuen, 2001) 
 
Hastings, M., The Korean War (London: Pan, 1987) 
 
Ed. Hawker, S., Little Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus (London: Oxford University Press, 
2003) 
 
Ed. Hendy, D., Life on Air: A History of Radio Four (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007) 
 
Hennessy, P., Cabinet (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) 
 
Hennessy, P., The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders Since 1945 (London: Allen 
Lane, 2000) 
 
+HQQHVV\3µµ:DU&DELQHWU\¶7KH Political DirectiRQRIWKH)DONODQGV&RQIOLFW¶ in Eds. 
Havers, R. and Grove, M., The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years on: Lessons for the Future 




Hennessy, P., Whitehall (London: Secker & Warburg, 1989)  
 
Hess, S., International News and Foreign Correspondents (Washington: Brookings 
Institution, 1996) 
 
Hetherington, A., News, Newspapers and Television (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985) 
 
Holsti, O. R., Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (London: Addison-
Wesley Pub. Co, 1969) 
 
Hooper, A., The Military and the Media (Hampshire: Dartmouth, 1982) 
 
+RVNLQV$DQG2¶/RXJKOLQ%War and Media: The Emergence of Diffused War 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2010) 
 
Howarth, K., Oral History (Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1999) 
 
Hudson, M. and Stanier, J., War and the Media: A Random Searchlight (Gloucestershire: 
Sutton, 1997) 
 
Jordanova, L., History in Practice (London: Hodder Education, 2006) 
 
Knightley, P., The First Casualty: From the Crimea to the Falklands: The War 
Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth Maker (London: Pan Books, 1989) 
 
Koss, S., The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain: The Twentieth Century, VII 
(London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1984) 
 
Kuhn, R., Politics and the Media in Britain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 
 
Linton, D., The Twentieth Century Newspaper Press in Britain: An Annotated 
Bibliography (London: Mansell, 1994) 
 
MacDonald, C., Britain and the Korean War (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) 
 
MacGill Hughes, H., News and the Human Interest Story (Chicago: University of Chicago, 
1940) 
 
Eds. Maltby, S. and Keeble, R., Communicating War: Memory, Media and Military 
(Suffolk: Arima Publishing, 2007) 
 
Marr, A., My Trade: A Short History of British Journalism (London: Pan Books, 2005) 
 
Eds. May, A. and Rowan, K., Inside Information: British Government and the Media 
(London: Constable, 1982)  
 
McCann. E., The British Press and Northern Ireland (London: Northern Ireland Socialist 




McCarthy, M., Vietnam (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969) 
 
0F/DFKODQ6DQG*ROGLQJ3µ7DEORLGL]DWLRQLQWKH%ULWLVK3UHVV$4XDQWLWDWLYH
Investigation into Changes in British Newspapers, 1952 ± ¶LQ(GV6SDUNV&DQG
Tulloch, J., Tabloid Tales: Global Debates over Media Standards (London: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2000) 
 
McNair, B., The Sociology of Journalism (London: Arnold, 1998) 
 
Mercer, D., Mungham, G. and Williams, K., The Fog of War: The Media on the Battlefield 
(London: Heinmann, 1987) 
 
Middlebrook, M., Operation Corporate: The Story of the Falklands War, 1982 (London: 
Viking, 1985) 
 
Middlebrook, M., 7KH)LJKWIRUWKHµ0DOYLQDV¶7KH$UJHQWLQH)RUFHVLQWKH)DONODQGV 
War (London: Viking, 1989) 
 
Miller, D., 'RQ¶W0HQWLRQWKH:DU1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGPropaganda and the Media 
(London: Pluto Press, 1994) 
 
Moore, C., Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography (London: Penguin, 2013) 
 
Moro, R., The History of the South Atlantic Conflict: The War for the Malvinas (London: 
Praeger, 1989) 
 
Morrison, D. and Tumber, H., Journalists at War: The Dynamics of News Reporting 
During the Falklands Conflict (London: Sage, 1988) 
 
Murray, D., Schwartz, J. and Lichter, S. R., It Ain't Necessarily So: How the Media 
Remake our Picture of Reality (New York: Penguin Books, 2002) 
 
Noakes, L., Women and the British Army: War and the Gentle Sex 1907-1948 (London: 
Routledge, 2006) 
 
Eds. Odasuo, A. and Eke, K., Media Coverage of Terrorism: Methods of Diffusion 
(London: Sage, 1991) 
 
O'Donovan, O., The Just War Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 
  
Page, C., U.S. Official Propaganda during the Vietnam War, 1965-1973: The Limits of 
Persuasion (London: Leicester University Press, 1996) 
 
Pedelty, M., War Stories: The Culture of Foreign Correspondents (New York: Routledge, 
1995) 
 




Perkins, R., Operation Paraquet: The Battle for South Georgia (Chippenham: Picton Print, 
1986) 
 
Pile, J., &KXUFKLOO¶V6HFUHW(QHP\0,DQGWKH3ORW to Stop Winston Churchill (London: 
CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012) 
 
Pimlott, J., British Military Operations 1945-1984 (London: Bison Books, 1984) 
 
Ponting, C., The Right to Know: The Inside Story of the Belgrano Affair (London: Sphere, 
1985) 
 
Pook, J., RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands (London: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2007) 
 
Prebble, S., 6HFUHWVRIWKH&RQTXHURU7KH8QWROG6WRU\RI%ULWDLQ¶V0RVW)DPRXV
Submarine (London: Faber & Faber, 2013) 
 
Price, L., Where Power Lies: Prime Ministers v the Media (London: Simon & Schuster 
Ltd., 2010) 
 
Rice, D. and Gavshon, A., The Sinking of the Belgrano (London: Secker and Warburg, 
1984) 
 
Ritchie, D., Doing Oral History: A Practical Guide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003) 
 
Riddell, P., The Thatcher Government (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985)  
 
Rossiter, M., Sink the Belgrano (London: Corgi, 2007) 
 
Royle, T., :DU5HSRUW7KH:DU&RUUHVSRQGHQW¶V9LHZRI%DWWOHIURPWKH&ULPHDWRWKH
Falklands (Worcester: Mainstream, 1987) 
 
Seaton, J. and Pimlott, B., The Media in British Politics (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1987)  
 
Seldon, A. and Pappworth, J., %\:RUGRI0RXWKµeOLWH¶2UDO+LVWRU\ (London: Methuen 
& Co., 1983) 
 
Sergeant, J., Maggie: Her Fatal Legacy (London: Pan, 2005) 
 
Seymour-Ure, C., Prime Ministers and the Media: Issues of Power and Control (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2003) 
 
Shaw, T., Eden, Suez, and the Mass Media: Propaganda and Persuasion during the Suez 
Crisis (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996) 
 
Singer, E. and Endreny, P., Reporting on Risk: How the Mass Media Portray Accidents, 




Ed. Smith, P., Government and the Armed Forces in Britain 1956-1990 (London: 
Hambledon Continuum, 2010)  
 
Sterling, C., Encyclopaedia of Radio (London: Routledge, 2004) 
 
Sunday Express Magazine Team, War in the Falklands: Campaign in Pictures (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982) 
 
Taylor, P., Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945 
(London: Routledge, 1997) 
 
Taylor, P., The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda 1919-
1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 
 
Thomas, H., The Suez Affair (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966) 
 
Thompson, P., The Voice of the Past: Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1978) 
 
Eds. Thussu, D. K. and Freedman, D., War and the Media (London: Sage, 2003) 
 
Tumber, H. and Webster, F., Journalists under Fire: Information War and Journalistic 
Practices (London: Sage, 2006) 
 
Tunstall, J., Newspaper Power: The New National Press in Britain (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996) 
 
Tunstall, J., The Media in Britain (London: Constable, 1985) 
 
Van der Bijl, N. and Aldea, D., 5th Infantry Brigade in the Falklands, 1982 (Yorkshire: Pen 
& Sword, 2003) 
 
Vansina, J., Translation by Wright, H. M., Oral Tradition: A Study in Historical 
Methodology (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2009)  
 
Walker, M., 3RZHUVRIWKH3UHVV7KH:RUOG¶V*UHDW1HZVSDSHUV (London: Quartet Books, 
1982)  
 
Walzer, M., Arguing about War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) 
 
Welch, D., Justice and the Genesis of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995) 
 
Wells, T., 7KH:DU:LWKLQ$PHULFD¶V%DWWOHRYHU9LHWQDP (London: University of 
California, 1994) 
 





Willcox, D., Propaganda, the Press and Conflict: The Gulf War and Kosovo (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2005) 
 
Wilson, J., Understanding Journalism: A Guide to Issues (London: Routledge, 2006) 
 





:DU¶National Identities, 13, 2 (Jun. 2011) pp.189-204. 
 
$UTXLOOD-DQG0R\DQR5DVPXVVHQ0µ7KH2ULJLQVRIWKH6RXWK$WODQWLF:DU¶Journal 
of Latin American Studies, 33, 4 (Nov. 2001) pp.739-775. 
 




Administration, 42, 4 (Dec. 1964) pp.415-419. 
 








)HDVLELOLW\6WXG\¶The Public Opinion Quarterly, 40, 1 (Spring, 1976) pp.92-100. 
 
&ODUNH+'0LVKOHU:DQG:KLWHOH\3µ5HFDSWXULQg the Falklands: Models of 




+LVWRU\¶The Journal of American History, 87, 2 (Sep. 2000) pp.582-592. 
 
&RKHQ<µ1HZV0HGLDDQGWKH1HZV'HSDUWPHQWRIWKH)RUHLJQDQG&RPPRQZHDOWK
2IILFH¶Review of International Studies, 14, 2 (Apr. 1988) pp.117-131. 
 
'RGGV.µ&RQVROLGDWH%ULWDLQWKH)DONODQG,VODQGVDQG:LGHUWKH6RXWK 
$WODQWLF$QWDUFWLF¶Global Discourse, 3, 1 (Jul. 2013) pp.166-172. 
 
'RGGV.µ7KH)DONODQG,VODQGVDVDµ6WUDWHJLF*DWHZD\¶%ULWDLQDQGWKH6RXWK$WODQWLF




'RGGV.DQG%HQZHOO0µ$rgentine Territorial Nationalism Revisited: The 
0DOYLQDV)DONODQGV'LVSXWHDQG*HRJUDSKLHVRI(YHU\GD\1DWLRQDOLVP¶Political 
Geography, 30, 8 (Nov. 2011) pp.441-449 
 
'RGGV.DQG%HQZHOO0µ0RUH8QILQLVKHG%XVLQHVVWKH)DONODQGV0DOYLQDV0DULWLPH
&ODLPVDQGWKH6SHFWUHRI2LOLQWKH6RXWK$WODQWLF¶Environment and Planning: Society 
and Space, 28, 4 (Dec. 2010) pp.571-580. 
 
(GJHUWRQ*µ4XHOOLQJWKH2[\JHQRIPublicity": British Broadcasting and "the 
7URXEOHVGXULQJWKH7KDWFKHU<HDUV¶Journal of Popular Culture, 30, 1 (1996) pp.115-
131. 
 
)HOGVWHLQ0µ.LVVLQJ&RXVLQV-RXUQDOLVPDQG2UDO+LVWRU\¶The Oral History Review, 
31, 1 (Winter 2004) pp.1-22. 
 




)DONODQGV:DU¶The American Journal of International Law, 77, 1 (Jan. 1983) pp.109-124. 
 
)UHHGPDQ/µ%ULGJHKHDG5HYLVLWHG7KH/LWHUDWXUHRIWKH)DONODQGV¶International 
Affairs, 59, 3 (1983) pp.445-452. 
 
)UHHGPDQ/µ7KH$WODQWLF&ULVLV¶International Affairs, 58, 3 (Summer, 1982) pp.395-
412. 
 
*DUODQG-µ7KH6DPH2ld Story? Englishness, the Tabloid Press, and the 2002 World 
&XS¶Leisure Studies, 23, 1 (2004) pp.79-92. 
 
*DUODQG-DQG5RZH0µ:DU0LQXVWKH6KRRWLQJ"-LQJRLVPWKH(QJOLVK3UHVVDQG
(XURµ¶Journal of Sport and Social Issues, 23, 1 (Feb. 1999) pp.80-95. 
 
+DUULVRQ%µ2UDO+LVWRU\DQG5HFHQW3ROLWLFDO+LVWRU\¶Oral History, 1, 3 (1972) pp.30-
48. 
 
+HDGULFN%DQG/DQRXH'-µ6KRUW-Term Political Events and British Government 
3RSXODULW\'LUHFWDQG,QGLUHFW(IIHFWV¶Polity, 30, 3 (Spring, 1998) pp.417-433. 
 
+HU]RQ)'.LQFDLG-DQG'DOWRQ9µ3HUVRQDOLW\	3XEOLF2SLQLRQ7KH&DVHRI
$XWKRULWDULDQLVP3UHMXGLFHDQG6XSSRUWIRUWKH.RUHDQ	9LHWQDP:DUV¶Polity, 11, 1 
(Autumn, 1978) pp.92-113. 
 
+RIIPDQ$µ2UDO+LVWRU\¶History News, 30, 1 (Jan. 1975) p.21. 
 
+RSSOH*µ,QWHOOLJHQFHDQG:DUQLQJ,PSOLFDWLRQVDQG/HVVRQVRIWKH)DONODQGV:DU¶




+RZDUG0µThe Official History of the Falklands Campaign E\/DZUHQFH)UHHGPDQ¶
The English Historical Review, 121, 490 (Feb. 2006) pp.260-264.  
 
+XOEHUW-µ5LJKW-Wing Propaganda or Reporting History? The Newsreels and the Suez 
&ULVLVRI¶Film History, 14, 3 (2002) pp.261-281. 
 
+XPSKULHV$$µ7ZR5RXWHVWRWKH:URQJ'HVWLQDWLon: Public Affairs in the South 
$WODQWLF:DU¶Naval War College Review (May, 1983) pp.56-71. 
 
+XVWRQ-$µ&ODVVLI\LQJ³6RXUFHV´IRU&ODULW\LQ7HDFKLQJ¶The History Teacher, 22, 2 
(Feb. 1989) pp.139-144. 
 
Janis, I. L., Fadner, R. H. and Janowitz, M., µ7KH5HOLDELOLW\RID&RQWHQW$QDO\VLV
7HFKQLTXH¶The Public Opinion Quarterly, 7, 2 (1943) pp.293-296. 
 
.DUO3DWULFLD$µ0HGLD'LSORPDF\¶Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 
34, 4 (1982) pp.143-152. 
 
.HHEOH5/µ5HIOHFW5HIOHFW7KH,PSRUWDQFHRIWKH)DONODQGV0DOYLQDV3UHFHGHQW¶
Media Lens, Mar. 2012 <www.medialens.org/forum/viewtopic.php?=11595> [Accessed 3 
Apr. 2013] 
 
.LQJVWRQ6µ7HUURULVPWKH0HGLDDQGWKH1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG&RQIOLFW¶Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism, 18, 3 (1995) pp.203-231. 
 
.QLJKWOH\3µ7KH)DONODQGV+RZ%ULWDQQLDUXOHGWKHQHZV¶ Columbia Journalism 
Review, 21, 3 (Sep-Oct. 1982) pp.51-53.  
 
.UDFDXHU6µ7KH&KDOOHQJHRI4XDOLWDWLYH&RQWHQW$QDO\VLV¶The Public opinion 
Quarterly, 16, 4 (Winter, 1952-53) pp.631-642. 
 
Krippendorff, K., Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology (California: 




in the United Kingdom, 1948-¶International Studies Quarterly, 49, 2 (Jun. 2005) 
pp.255-272. 
 
/DQFH'µ2UDO+LVWRU\$UFKLYHV3HUFHSWLRQVDQG3UDFWLFHV¶Oral History, 8, 2 (Autumn 
1980) pp.59-63.  
 
/DXUHQFH-µ$)DLOHG7UXWK¶History Today, 51, 10 (2001) 
<www.historytoday.com/john-laurence/failed-truth> [Accessed 16 Feb. 2012] 
 
/RIJUHQ6-µ7KH6WDWXVRI2UDO+LVWRU\LQWKH$UP\([SDQGLQJD7UDGLWLRQ¶The Oral 





Institute Paper from the Media Management Centre at Northwestern University (2002) 
<www.readership.org/content/content_analysis/data/how-to.pdf> [Accessed 11 Jul. 2012] 
 
MakiQ*$µ$UJHQWLQH$SSURDFKHVWRWKH)DONODQGV0DOYLQDV:DVWKH5HVRUWWR
9LROHQFH)RUHVHHDEOH"¶International Affairs, 59, 3 (Summer, 1983) pp.391-403. 
 
0DUWLQ//µ,QVWLWXWLRQVDQG&RRSHUDWLRQ6DQFWLRQVGXULQJWKH)DONODQG,VODQGV
&RQIOLFW¶International Security, 16, 4 (Spring, 1992) pp.143-178. 
 
1HJULQH5µ7KH3UHVVDQGWKH6XH]&ULVLV$0\WK5H-([DPLQHG¶The Historical 
Journal, 25, 4 (Dec. 1982) pp.975-983. 
 
1RUWRQ0RRUH-µ7KH,QWHU-$PHULFDQ6\VWHP6QDUOVLQ)DONODQGV:DU¶The American 
Journal of International Law, 76, 4 (Oct. 1982) pp.830-831. 
 
3DUPHQWLHU*µ7KH%ULWLVK3UHVVLQWKH6XH]&ULVLV¶The Historical Journal, 23, 2 (Jun. 
1980) pp.435-448. 
 
3DUVRQV$µ7KH)DONODQGV&ULVLVLQWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQV0DUFK± 14 June 198¶
International Affairs, 59, 2 (Spring, 1983) pp.169-178. 
 
3LQNHUWRQ$µµ6WUDQJHUVLQWKH1LJKW¶7KH)DONODQGV&RQIOLFWDVD5DGLR:DU¶Twentieth 
Century British History, 19, 3 (2008) pp.344-375. 
 
3RWWV$µ(\H:LWQHVVHVRIWKH)DONODQGV:DU¶History Workshop, 15 (Spring, 1983) 
pp.192-195. 
 
3\P)µ%ULWLVK)RUHLJQ3ROLF\&RQVWUDLQWVDQG2SSRUWXQLWLHV¶International Affairs, 59, 
1 (Winter, 1982-83) pp.1-6. 
 
Roper, C., 'Iron Britannia by Anthony Barnett; One Man's Falklands by Tam Dalyell; The 
)DONODQGV:DUE\7KH6XQGD\7LPHV,QVLJKW7HDP¶History Workshop, 15 (Spring, 1983) 
pp.180-182. 
 
6DQGHUV':DUG+0DUVK'DQG)OHWFKHU7µ*RYHUQPHQW3RSXODULty and the 
)DONODQGV:DU$5HDVVHVVPHQW¶British Journal of Political Science, 17, 3 (Jul. 1987) 
pp.281-313. 
 
6K\-µ7KH&XOWXUDO$SSURDFKWRWKH+LVWRU\RI:DU¶The Journal of Military History, 
57, 5 (Oct. 1993) pp.13-26. 
 
6PLWK0/5µ7KH,QWHllectual Internment of a Conflict: The Forgotten War in Northern 
,UHODQG¶International Affairs, 75, 1 (1999) pp.77-97. 
 
6RPPHU%DQG4XLQODQ0.µ$*XLGHWR2UDO+LVWRU\,QWHUYLHZV¶History News, 55, 3 




6SHHG*-µ'R1HZVSDSHUVQRZ*LYHWKH1HZV"¶The Forum (Aug., 1893) pp.705-711. 
<www.unz.org/Pub/Forum-1893aug-00705> [Accessed 23 Jul. 2012] 
 
Stone, P. J., Dunphy, D., Smith, M. and Ogilvie, D., The General Inquirer: A Computer 
Approach to Content Analysis (London: MIT Press, 1966) 
 
6ZDLQ(µ2UDO+LVWRU\LQWKH$UFKLYHV,WV'RFXPHQWDU\5ROHLQWKH7ZHQW\-First 
&HQWXU\¶American Archivist, 66, 1 (Summer 2003) pp.139-158. 
 
7DUOLQJ1µ%RUQHRDQG%ULWLVK,QWHUYHQWLRQLQ0DOD\D¶Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 5, 2 (1974) pp.159-165. 
 
7D\ORU3µ5HSRUWLQJ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG¶Index on Censorship, 7, 6 (1978) pp.3-11. 
 
7KRPSVRQ-µ6LU/DZUHQFH)UHHGPDQµThe Official History of the Falklands 
Campaign¶¶, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 29, 3 (Jun. 2006) pp.535-551. 
 
7KRPVRQ$µ)RXU3DUDGLJP7UDQVIRUPDWLRQVLQ2UDO+LVWRU\¶The Oral History Review, 
34, 1 (Winter 2007) pp.49-70. 
 
7LPRIHHYD(µ%RRN5HYLHZ7KH/DQJXDJHRIWKH1HZV¶Discourse and Society, 20, 1 
(2009) pp.173-175. 
 
Tosh, J., The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods and New Directions in the Study of 
Modern History (London: Longman, 2006) 
 
9DQ%HOOH'$µ3UHVV)UHHGRPDQGWKH'HPRFUDWLF3HDFH¶Journal of Peace Research, 
34, 4 (Nov. 1997) pp.405-414. 
 
:RUFHVWHU50µ7KH3olls: Britain at the Polls 1945-¶The Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 48, 4 (Winter, 1984) pp.824-833. 
 
Newspaper Articles  
 
%DUQHV-µ7KH:RUVW5HSRUWHG:DUVLQFHWKH&ULPHDQ¶The Guardian, 25 Feb. 2002 
<www.theguardian.com/media/2002/feb/25/broadcasting.falklands> [Accessed 14 October 
2011] 
 
%%&1HZVµ)DONODQGVURZ6XQSODFHVDGYHUWLQ$UJHQWLQDQHZVSDSHU¶BBC News, 4 Jan. 
2013 <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20907312> [Accessed 4 Jan. 2013] 
 
&REDLQ,µ0LQLVWU\RI'HIHQFHKROGVILOHVLQEUHDFKRI-\HDUUXOH¶The 
Guardian, 6 Oct. 2013 <www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/06/ministry-of-defence-
files-archive> [Accessed 7 Oct. 2013] 
 
&RSSLQJ-µ2IILFLDO%ULWLVKKLVWRU\RIWKH)DONlands War too pro-$UJHQWLQD¶The Daily 




British-history-of-the-Falklands-War-is-considered-too-pro-Argentina.html> [Accessed 03 
Mar. 2012] 
 
Evans, R. DQG/HLJK'µ)DONODQGVZDUVKLSVFDUULHVQXFOHDUZHDSRQV0R'DGPLWV¶The 
Guardian, 6 Dec. 2003 
<www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/dec/06/military.freedomofinformation> [Accessed 
23 Jan. 2014] 
 
*LOEHUW-DQG'REU\+µ)DONODQGV:DUVXUUHQGHU\HDU anniversary: Argentina's Mario 
0HQpQGH]RQGHIHDW¶The Daily Telegraph, 13 Jun. 2012 
<www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/falklandislands/9330565/Falklands-
War-surrender-30-year-anniversary-Argentinas-Mario-Menendez-on-defeat.html> 
[Accessed 6 Jan. 2014] 
 
+DVWLQJV0µ-RXUQDOLVW¶V/XVWIRU*ORU\DQGD5LVNWRRIDU¶Daily Mail, 11 Sep. 2009 
<www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-1212700/Lust-glory-risk-far.html> [Accessed 24 
Nov. 2012] 
 
-HZHOO-µRemembering the Falklands - The Worst Reported Conflict of the Century¶
Wales Online, 4 Apr. 2012 <www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/remembering-
falklands-worst-reported-conflict-2046922> [Accessed 27 Oct. 2012] 
 
.LUFKQHU&µ2SHQ/HWWHUWR3ULPH0LQLVWHU'DYLG&DPHURQ¶The Guardian, 2 Jan. 2013 
<www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jan/02/cristina-fernandez-kirchner-letter-cameron> 
[Accessed 4 Jan. 2013] 
 
Norton-7D\ORU5µ%ULDQ+DQUDKDQ¶VIDPRXVSKUDVHPDVNHGDPHGLDEDWWOHZLWKWKH
0R'¶The Guardian, 20 Dec. 2010 
<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/dec/20/brian-hanrahan-media-mod> 
[Accessed Jan. 2012] 
 
5XVEULGJHU$µ&RXUDJH8QGHU)LUH¶The Guardian, 10 Jul. 2006 
<www.theguardian.com/media/2006/jul/10/pressandpublishing.egypt> [Accessed 6 Dec. 
2011] 
 
The Sunµ2SHQ/HWWHUWR3UHVLGHQW&ULVWLQD)HUQDQGH]GH.LUFKQHU¶Buenos Aires Herald, 
3 Jan. 2013, p.5. 
 
Lectures, Papers or Conferences 
 
30th Anniversary of the Falklands War, University of Kent, 26-28 Apr. 2012 
 
µ7KH)DONODQGV:DU¶Centre for Contemporary British History, 5 Jun. 2002 
<www.icbh.ac.uk/witness/falklands/> [Accessed 21 Feb. 2014] 
 







Johnston, P., Culture, Combat and Killing: A Comparative Study of the British Armed 
Forces at War in the Falklands, PhD thesis (University of Kent, 2013) 
 
Lamonte, J., Attitudes in Britain towards its Armed Forces and War 1960-2000, PhD thesis 
(University of Birmingham, 2010) 
 
McQueen, D. A., %%&79¶Vµ3DQRUDPD¶FRQIOLFWFRYHUDJHDQGWKHµ:HVWPLQVWHU
FRQVHQVXV¶, PhD thesis (Bournemouth University, 2010) 
 
Noakes, L., Gender and British National Identity in Wartime: A Study of the Links between 
Gender and National Identity in Britain in the Second World War, The Falklands War, and 
the Gulf War, PhD thesis (University of Sussex, 1996) 
 
Quinn, A. A., 30 Years of Bad News: The Glasgow University Media Group and the 





+DOOLQ'µ9LHWQDPRQ7HOHYLVLRQ¶The Museum of Broadcast Communications 
<www.museum.tv/eotvsection.php?entrycode=vietnamonte> [Accessed 22 Feb. 2012] 
 
3DUNLQVRQ&µ&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\3ROLWLFDO%URDGFDVW¶%%&79Conservative Party 
Political Broadcast <www.youtube.com/watch?v=ziFlGc9_DXM> [Accessed 24 Oct. 
2014] 
 
:LOE\'µ7KH)DONODQGV&RQIOLFW¶History of the BBC 
<www.bbc.co.uk/historyofthebbc/resources/bbcandgov/pdf/falklands.pdf> [Accessed 20 
Oct. 2014] 
 
<www.oxforddictionaries.com/> 
 
 
 
